Asymptotic Revenue Equivalence in Auctions

We study the revenue in auctions of a single object when the number of bidders becomes large. We show that all sequences of auctions belonging to a class of mechanisms have limiting expected revenue equal to the expected best-use value of the object. An important special case that is covered is common value auctions, but more generally not even affiliation of values is assumed. This provides an asymptotic revenue equivalence result for settings beyond that of private values. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, C72.     

Designing Multi-unit Multiple Bid Auctions: An Agent-based Computational Model of Uniform, Discriminatory and Generalised Vickrey Auctions

Multi-unit auctions are being used by public agencies to allocate resources and to purchase services. These auctions resolve the lumpy bid problem inherent in single-bid auctions by allowing bidders to submit a supply or demand schedule. However, the choice of pricing formats for multi-unit auctions is controversial. Neither economic theory nor laboratory experiments depict a complete picture of how alternative pricing formats perform in terms of budgetary or allocative efficiency. This paper constructs an agent-based computational model to compare uniform, discriminatory and generalised Vickrey pricing formats under different degrees of competition and heterogeneity in the bidder population.     

Labour Market Efficiency with Discriminatory Unions

The paper considers 'efficient bargains', with a union that weighs the utilities of its members unequally and negotiates over group employment levels. Such discrimination may lead to socially inefficient overemployment of the dominant group, and underemployment of the group suffering discrimination.     

An Asymptotic Solution for Sealed Bid Common-Value Auctions with Bidders Having Asymmetric Information

We investigate a first-price common-value auction where bidders have asymmetric information about an item of unknown value. We compute the unique Nash equilibrium when the bidders are constrained to translation-invariant bid functions. Further, this profile of bid functions is also an asymptotic Nash equilibrium (without the constraint on the bidders' strategies) as the a priori distribution of the true value becomes increasingly diffuse. All bidders have positive expected profits at equilibrium. In the second-price analogue with two bidders there is a continuum of Nash equilibria in which both bidders have positive expected profits. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.     

Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels

A pay-as-offered or discriminatory price auction (DPA) has been proposed to solve the problem of inflated and volatile wholesale electricity prices. Using the experimental method we compare the DPA with a uniform price auction (UPA), strictly controlling for unilateral market power. We find that a DPA indeed substantially reduces price volatility. However, in a no market power design, prices in a DPA converge to the high prices of a uniform price auction with structural market power. That is, the DPA in a no market power environment is as anti-competitive as a UPA with structurally introduced market power.     

Endogenous Entry and Exit in Common Value Auctions

We develop and experimentally test a model of endogenous entry, exit, and bidding in common value auctions. The model and experimental design include an alternative profitable activity (a safe haven) that provides agentspecific opportunity costs of bidding in the auction. Each agent chooses whether to accept the safe haven income or forgo it in order to bid in the auction. Agents that enter the auction receive independently-drawn private signals that provide unbiased estimates of the common value. The auctioned item is allocated to the high bidder at a price that is equal to the high bid. Thus the market is a first-price sealed-bid common value auction with endogenous determination of market size.     

Asymmetric Demand Information in Uniform and Discriminatory Call Auctions: An Experimental Analysis Motivated by Electricity Markets

We study experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty, motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. We study the effect of asymmetric demand-information in the two auction institutions. In our treatment condition some sellers have less information than in our baseline conditions. In both conditions transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, under asymmetric information discriminatory auctions are significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower prices and less volatility.     

私有制的效率——马克思制度理论与新制度经济学观点的比较

文章从私有制度的效率出发,对马克思的私有制与新制度经济学的私有产权在不同语境下的问题进行了研究,通过提出马克思的私有制理论与新制度经济学的私有产权理论的重大差异、制度效率观的差异阐述了马克思同新制度经济学对私有制认识的不同及原因。提出马克思私有制的观点同新制度经济学不能简单的谈互补,而是要在特定的历史环境下来分析两者的关系与作用,关键的问题是形成什么样的互补关系,以此科学界定公有制与私有制的范围,制度选择和制度效率问题要考虑最终的结果即社会分配问题。既要坚持公有制的主导作用,也要不断完善私有产权的运行过程和方式。     

信誉的价值:以网上拍卖交易为例

本文使用网上拍卖交易数据,就卖者信誉对市场交易的影响进行了实证研究。我们发现,卖者的信誉评价一方面影响物品成交的价格,另一方面还对物品拍卖成功的概率有着显著的正面影响;但相对来说,卖者的信誉评价对后者的效果比对前者要更显著。这是本文的主要发现。该结果验证了在一个没有政府干预、近乎自由放任的“虚拟”市场上信誉机制的积极作用。     

Common Value Auctions with Default: An Experimental Approach

This paper examines a common value auction in which bidder default is explicitly allowed. The lack of contractual enforcement has implications for the formation of bids as well as the revenue properties of the auction. Using a common value procurement auction, we explore these implications in an experimental setting. Our results show that bidders are more aggressive when default is allowed. A theoretical result shows that allowing default can actually be in the best interest of the auctioneer. Experimental evidence, however, indicates that this result does not hold true in practice. One possible reason for this discrepancy is that the data in our experiments is consistent with winner's curse behavior.     

Using Random nth Price Auctions to Value Non-Market Goods and Services

Public policy decision making often requires balancing the benefits of a policy with the costs. While regulators in the United States and abroad rely heavily on benefit-cost analysis, critics contend that hypothetical bias precludes one of the most popular benefit estimation techniques—contingent surveys—from providing reliable economic values for nonmarket goods and services. This paper explores a new methodology to obtain the total value of nonmarket goods and services—random nth price auctions. The empirical work revolves around examining behavior of 360 participants in a competitive marketplace, where subjects naturally buy, sell, and trade commodities. The field experiment provides some preliminary evidence that hypothetical random nth price auctions can, in certain situations, reveal demand truthfully.     

Auctions for Universal Service Subsidies

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that telephone service be available in high-cost areas at rates that are affordable and reasonably comparable to those charged in low-cost areas. It also requires that carriers serving high-cost areas at below-cost rates be compensated with explicit and sufficient subsidies. This paper analyzes an auction mechanism for the allocation of such subsidies. It shows that in a wide range of circumstances auctions are more efficient than traditional subsidy schemes. It also shows, however, that auction designs aimed at stimulating competition among several subsidized carriers may be particularly vulnerable to collusion.     

基于Bayes逐步判别分析的油气储量价值分级

油气储量是国家的战略资源,鉴于其经济性差异,要实现资产化管理,必须首先评价其价值的优劣等级。本文选取影响油气储量价值等级的7个因素,将Bayes逐步判别分析方法应用于油气储量价值等级评价与分类中,建立了油气储量价值综合评判的Bayes判别分析模型。首先,经逐步分析,剔除储层渗透率,模型筛选出采收率、储量丰度、原油粘度、储层埋深、储量规模、原油凝固点等6个指标作为有判别意义的判别因子;然后,以已知价值等级的油气储量数据作为训练样本。将油气储量价值划分为优、良、中、差4个等级,建立4个Bayes线性判别函数,并回判检验判别函数的优良性。最后,并对待判样品进行Bayes判别。研究表明,Bayes逐步判别分析模型误判率较低,回判正确率达到85％,是评价油气储量价值等级的有效方法。     

Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions

This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1954 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but equally informative, signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present. We develop tests of rational and equilibrium bidding in a common values model that are implemented using data on bids and ex post values. We also use data on tract location and ex post values to test the comparative static prediction that bidders may bid less aggressively in common value auctions when they expect more competition. We find that bidders are aware of the "winner's curse" and their bidding is largely consistent with equilibrium.     

On Endogenous Efficiency in Public and Private Firms

This paper reconsiders a model proposed by De Fraja (1993) to compare public and private production under complete and incomplete information. It is argued, in contrast to previous results, that such a model provides no convincing grounds to sustain the productive superiority of public ownership. It is also suggested that meaningful comparisons of efficiency require settings where differences in ownership imply different implementation constraints.     

Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement

We compare sequential and bundle procurement auctions in a framework of successive procurement situations, where current success positively or negatively affects future market opportunities. We find that in bundle auctions procurement cost is lower and less risky than in sequential standard auctions, but still higher than in the optimal sequential auction. Only a sequential second price auction leads to the efficient outcome.     

中国私营企业的生产率表现和投资效率

本文利用第一次全国经济普查数据系统地研究中国私营企业的生产率表现和投资效率问题。样本分析表明,东部地区材料和机械设备制造业的私营企业在劳动生产率和资本生产率上都明显领先于其他地区,然而这种优势主要集中表现在规模较大的企业上。生产函数的估计结果显示各地区大部分行业的资本弹性稳定地处于0.2—0.3之间。对生产率方差的分解表明,地区和行业内部近90%的生产率差异来自TFP的差异,劳均资本的差异只占贡献来源的13%左右。虽然行业间生产率差异的主要来源还是TFP,但地区间的生产率差异则主要来源于劳均资本的差异。资本边际产出在地区间和行业间的不均衡分布意味着部门间存在资本配置的非效率。我们通过模拟实验发现,省际间资本重置给私营制造业带来的潜在产出增长效果比行业间的资本重置更加明显,这意味着私营制造业资本的地区间流动障碍比行业间障碍更为严重。     

Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Second Price Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: The Two-Bidder Case

We study affiliated value second price auctions with two financially constrained bidders. We prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium under quite general conditions. Comparative static results are provided. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.     

论私募股权投资的委托代理与价值流转

私募股权投资作为金融领域新兴起的一个产业,其运作管理过程中的委托代理问题已由许多学者作过探讨。文章探讨了投资者货币资本、基金管理者人力资本、企业经营者人力资本、企业实物资本在私募股权投资的委托代理关系中的价值流转过程,并论述了私募股权投资过程中组织机制和契约安排对价值流转的作用机理。