内部审计、内部控制与公司治理

随着经济全球化的不断发展,经济环境也发生了剧烈的变化,生产要素在全球范围内进行重组和配置的程度不断提高,企业面临越来越激烈的竞争压力和挑战,良好的公司治理和内部控制不仅是企业生存和发展的关键,而且也是公司治理重要的两个方面。本文首先介绍了内部控制、内部审计与公司治理的内涵,其次界定了三者之间的关系,最后阐述了企业利用内部控制与内部审计提高公司的治理水平的相关措施。     

公司治理、内部控制、组织结构互动关系研究

本文以委托代理理论、组织学理论解释公司治理、内部控制与组织结构之间的关系 ,提出以科学决策和效率经营为核心 ,以决策机制、激励机制、监督约束机制为纽带 ,建立治理型内部控制 ;指出对治理效率和经营效率的共同追求推动了内部控制演进。     

内部审计在公司治理中的作用

为了强化组织的公司治理,世界许多国家的法律要求建立内部审计制度,企业也开始重视内部审计对公司的作用.内部审计作为公司治理的“四大基石”之一,在公司治理中的作用已经得到公认.但是,内部审计在公司治理中的作用究竟体现在什么地方、内部审计与其他治理主体的互动关系是否改善了治理质量等问题,本文将对这些问题进行探讨.内部审计与公司治理之间的关系.     

内部审计和内部控制在公司治理中的作用

在公司治理过程中内部审计与内部控制越来越发挥着重要的促进作用.内部审计是加强与完善内部控制的主体实施工具,而内部控制在整体公司治理的发展管理中处在内部管理的监控地位.公司的发展,应将内部审计与内部控制结合起来,加强整体机制的建设,实现公司的顺利运行.本文主要通过对内部审计、内部控制、公司治理间的相互关系,进一步强调内部审计与内部控制对公司治理的重要作用.     

上市公司内部审计与公司治理问题探讨

审计是公司治理过程中的独立观察者,内部审计师、董事会、高层管理者与独立审计师是建立有效的公司治理的基石.本文通过公司治理视角,分析了内部审计发展的障碍及其对策.     

上市公司内部审计与公司治理问题探讨

审计是公司治理过程中的独立观察者,内部审计师、董事会、高层管理者与独立审计师是建立有效的公司治理的基石。本文通过公司治理视角,分析了内部审计发展的障碍及其对策。     

加强内部审计 完善公司治理

公司治理是对公司进行管理和控制,协调公司制度下公司内部不同利益相关之间的利益和行为等一系列法规制度的统称,是现代企业制度的基石。本文分析了内部审计和公司治理之间的关系,指出了存在的问题,探讨了完善的途径。     

浅议内部审计与公司治理

内部审计是现代制度的重要特征,它与公司治理相互影响、相互监督、相互制约,彼此共同促进发展。内部审计对公司治理既有积极作用,也有不足。基于公司治理角度的内部审计发展方向,联系国内外的内部审计,将有助于进一步完善公司治理结构和促进内部审计业务发展。     

加强内部审计 完善公司治理

公司治理是对公司进行管理和控制,协调公司制度下公司内部不同利益相关之间的利益和行为等一系列法规制度的统称,是现代企业制度的基石。本文分析了内部审计和公司治理之间的关系,指出了存在的问题,探讨了完善的途径。     

论内部审计在公司治理中的作用及实现方式

公司治理需要内部审计，而内部审计也需要在公司的发展中得到完善。内部审计和管理层都必须改变对内部审计在公司中的角色和影响力的认识，内部审计应当积极探索并进一步推动建立良好的内部审计职能，尤其是以有效识别、监控、计量和评价风险的技能为中心的内部审计职能，才能增加内部审计为公司发展带来的潜在效益，促进建立最佳的公司治理。     

倡导性规范与上市公司治理

上市公司治理领域长期以来依照强制性法律规范来运行,然而,上市公司治理的规范诉求的特性决定了单一的法律规范体系的局限性。以或遵守或解释规则为核心的倡导性公司治理规范迎合了上市公司治理的需求,并取得了显著的执行率。中国《上市公司治理准则》可进行适当的改革:从法律规范转变为倡导性规范;通过证监会信息披露法律规范的形式强化上市公司关于准则遵守或者解释的程序上的披露义务;利用现有的法律机制确保准则的有效执行,并鼓励股东发挥评判监督作用。     

上市公司内控诊断报告

在2008年6月28日财政部等五部委联合发布<企业内部控制基本规范>后,我国企业尤其是上市公司,纷纷开始了相关的准备工作.     

Extent of corporate governance disclosure by banks and finance companies listed on Nepal Stock Exchange

Corporate governance disclosure has seen renewed interest by researchers, policy makers, and regulating bodies internationally, but has remained only an emerging construct in Nepal. The primary purpose of this study was to assess the extent of mandatory corporate governance disclosure in Nepal. The secondary purpose was to examine the associations between the extent of disclosures and five firm-specific characteristics. The third purpose was to assess the significant determinants to explain variations of disclosures. The study's sampling frame consisted of 125 banking and finance companies listed on Nepal Stock Exchange. A sample size of 59 companies was randomly selected. On average, companies disclosed 91% of items in the mandatory category, 48% in the voluntary category, and 74% in total. A significant positive correlation existed between governance disclosures and firm characteristics of size, leverage, and foreign ownership. There was no significant relation between governance disclosure and listing age or profitability. With regards to determinants, bank size was a significant predictor of governance disclosure. Three regression models for total disclosures (DScore), mandatory disclosures [DScore (M)], and voluntary disclosures [DScore (V)] with three predictors of size, leverage, and foreign ownership were significant and explained 47%, 24%, and 54% variations respectively in total, mandatory, and voluntary corporate governance disclosures in Nepal. This research provides guidelines to policy makers and standard setters for developing future regulations and accounting policies.     

Corporate governance and audit fees: Evidence from companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange

This study uses data from companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and audit fees. Full sample results reveal a significant negative relationship between corporate governance and audit fees, and subsample results further show that corporate governance’s influence on audit fees is affected by corporate growth. The negative relationship between corporate governance and audit fees is economically and statistically significant in sample companies that grew moderately during the sample period, and mixed or insignificant in companies that experienced overly fast or negative growth.     

Corporate governance and the timeliness of corporate internet reporting by U.K. listed companies

This study is an examination of the timeliness of corporate internet reporting by U.K. companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The research examines the significance of several corporate governance and firm-specific characteristics as potential determinants of the timeliness of corporate internet reporting.Our primary analysis provides evidence of a significant association between timely corporate internet reporting and the corporate governance characteristics of board experience and board independence. Our findings provide evidence that boards with less cross directorships, more experience in terms of the average age of directors, and lower length in service for executive directors provide more timely corporate internet reporting. We find that board independence is negatively associated with timely corporate internet reporting.Follow-up analysis provides additional evidence of a significant association between the timeliness of corporate internet reporting and board experience. The evidence indicates that role duality and block ownership are associated with less timely corporate internet reporting.Our findings also reveal strengths and weaknesses in the Internet reporting of U.K. listed companies. Companies need to voluntarily focus on improving the timeliness dimension of their corporate internet reporting so that the EU and U.K. accounting regulators do not replace recommendations with regulations.     

Audit mode change,corporate governance and audit effort

This study investigates changes in audit strategy in China following the introduction of risk-based auditing standards rather than an internal control-based aud...     

Ownership, managerial control and the governance of companies listed on the Brussels stock exchange

This paper examines how corporate control is exerted in companies listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange. There are several alternative corporate governance mechanisms which may play a role in disciplining poorly performing management: blockholders (holding companies, industrial companies, families and institutions), the market for partial control, debt policy, and board composition. Even if there is redundancy of substitute forms of discipline, some mechanisms may dominate. We find that top managerial turnover is strongly related to poor performance measured by stock returns, accounting earnings in relation to industry peers and dividend cuts and omissions. Tobit models reveal that there is little relation between ownership and managerial replacement, although industrial companies resort to disciplinary actions when performance is poor. When industrial companies increase their share stake or acquire a new stake in a poorly performing company, there is evidence of an increase in executive board turnover, which suggests a partial market for control. There is little relation between changes in ownership concentration held by institutions and holding companies, and disciplining. Still, high leverage and decreasing solvency and liquidity variables are also followed by increased disciplining, as are a high proportion of non-executive directors and the separation of the functions of CEO and chairman.     

中小板民营上市公司治理调研分析报告

从问卷调查分析结果来看,中小板民营上市公司治理在最近几年有了很大提升,特别是在董事会的独立性和内部制衡机制方面。但中小板民营上市公司治理中存在的最主要问题是一股独大的股权结构,它一方面缓解了股东集体行动的难题,但同时又加剧了股东之间的利益冲突。因此,建构对实际控制人的制约制度是未来提升民营上市公司治理绩效的核心工作。     

浅谈审计委托模式的改进

目前,审计委托权由公司经营者行使是造成注册会计师无法保持应有的独立性,从而导致独立审计失败的重要原因之一。而我国国有控股公司内部治理结构上的缺陷又是造成审计委托权实际上由被审计人的经理层行使从而导致审计失败的根本原因。本文提出:要真正做到由完全独立于公司经营者的机构行使审计委托权,维护注册会计师的独立性,有必要从公司外部引进独立的第四方作为审计委托人,也可从制度上防范和减少审计失败,提高注册会计师的社会公信力。     

The rise of corporate governance in corporate control research

This article has two related tasks. First, we review the articles published in this Special Issue on Corporate Control, Mergers, and Acquisitions. These articles provide new evidence on several aspects of corporate control and governance including the value and performance effects of various ownership groups, the impact of internal governance structures, the effects of regulatory changes on specific industries and evidence on bidding strategies in takeovers. This analysis leads us to our second task – to examine the evolution of corporate control research, broadly defined. Our analysis shows a movement in research from mergers and acquisitions to a broader analysis of corporate governance, especially internal governance features. We suggest that there is a trend toward an increase in the relative importance of internal governance compared to discipline from the market from corporate control. This trend reflects an important change over the past several decades in the means through which the market disciplines corporate behavior.