新产品开发项目评价方法研究

为提高新产品开发的成功率 ,企业需要根据自身的资源条件 ,经济合理地选择开发能够满足市场需要、并适应企业外部环境和内部条件的新产品。运用层次分析法对新产品开发项目进行综合评价 ,根据评价值的高低来确定项目的优劣次序 ,可作为企业投资决策分析之用。     

基于AHP和PCA的企业能耗水平评价

为了对企业能源消耗水平进行评价,构建了能耗水平评价模型,并对各项能耗水平指标的内涵作了解释;利用主成分分析法(PCA)对底层指标做了综合,作为相应准则层的指数;利用层次分析法(AHP)确定了各个层次能耗水平指标的权重,最后用一个实例来说明该能耗评价模型是可行的。     

中小企业ERP项目实施风险分析方法

目前,国内企业ERP实施的成功率偏低,失败的最主要原因往往与ERP实施项目管理不善有关,因此对ERP项目实施风险管理势在必行。目前的研究中,针对大型企业的居多,而管理能力和经验不如大型企业的中小企业,对实施ERP项目所要面临的压力更为巨大。风险识别是风险管理中最重要的步骤,只有帮助中小企业认识自身的风险因素,才能更好地进行风险管理。文章结合案例分析,尝试使用风险分析法(RAM)对企业的关键风险进行识别和评估;然后通过特征分析法(CAM),将企业ERP项目管理进行划分,获得对企业风险管理的建议。     

基于AHP和BP神经网络模型的集团管控模式选择

在集团管控的模式选择中,本文将具有学习能力、记忆能力以及智能处理功能的BP神经网络与层次分析法相结合,构建了集团管控模式选择的AHP-BP神经网络模型,模型以AHP评价结果为神经网络输入,利用BP神经网络对评价结果进行训练与检验。通过MATLAB软件仿真的结果表明,该模型既能充分吸收专家评估的隐性知识和经验,又降低了人为主观随意性的缺陷,计算结果准确、方法可行,为企业的集团管控模式选择提供了科学的思路和方法。     

上市公司财务风险评价决策模型研究

针对我国上市公司财务风险较大、投资者面临损失较重的现状,文章将影响上市公司财务风险的因素进行分解,采用层次分析方法(AH M)进行分析评价,以期为谨慎性投资者在预期收益率相同的企业中选择风险较小的上市公司进行投资提供借鉴。     

供应链条件下的合作伙伴评价方法研究

供应链条件下合作伙伴的选择成为决定企业成功与否的关键,首先,建立了合作伙伴的评价指标体系;并结合DEA和AHP的优点,提出基于DEA/AHP的合作伙伴评价方法;最后,通过算例验证该方法的科学性和可行性。     

群体决策和AHP法结合确定指标权重

在层次分析法计算指标权重的基础上,研究了如何运用群体决策的方法来确定评价指标的综合权重。首先,在单一专家情况下,运用层次分析法求出指标权童;然后求出群体决策中各专家所获得的相对权重;最后,对每一指标的权重进行线性加权,从而得到在群体决策情况下基于专家的相对权重来对评价对象进行综合评价的方法     

PHA-LEC法在建筑施工方案安全评价中的应用研究

介绍了预先危险性分析法（PHA）与作业条件危险性评价法（LEC）结合的应用步骤、实现方法;用LEC法确定PHA的危险等级。并以建筑施工为例,具体说明了PHA-LEC法在建筑安全评价中的应用。     

基于价值工程的高速公路改扩建互通式立交设计方案评价

针对高速公路改扩建互通式立交设计方案的评价问题,文章采用了价值工程法选择最优设计方案。通过对设计方案进行功能性分析,在功能评价中引入AHP计算功能权重,降低权重确定的主观因素,从而提高方案评价的准确性。并对广州至清远高速公路新华互通设计方案进行了实证分析,研究结果表明该方法切实有效。     

KM公司基于CSR的供应商的本土化选择

本文存分析了研究基于企业社会责任(Corporate Social Responsibility,以下简称CSR)的供应商选择的背景与意义,并介绍了KM公司的背景和目前的现状,介绍了基于CSR基础上进行供应商选择和管理的重要性,并介绍目前供应商选择和管理的一些方法,结合KM公司的实际情况采用层次分析法(AHP)对相关的选择指标进行分析,确立各项选择指标的权重,最终建立供应商选择和管理系统.     

A reconsideration of the link between vertical externality and managerial incentives

Previous research revealed that the strategic role of delegation contracts disappears if two quantity‐setting firms outsource input production to a monopolistic supplier. I show that this role is restored if the assumption of a downstream duopoly is relaxed. Thus, delegation contracts allow downstream profit‐maximizing owners to commit their firms to a behavior that differs from their preferences. This behavior varies nonmonotonically with the number of firms in the downstream market. Corresponding deviations from profit maximization are larger if the upstream monopolist makes a price precommitment. But little to no deviation occurs if the number of firms is large.     

Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization

Whether vertical integration between a downstream oligopolist and an upstream oligopolist is profitable for an integrated pair of firms is shown to depend on whether one means by this that profits increase no matter what other firms do, that all integrated firms are better off when all firms are integrated than when none are, or simply that no downstream-upstream pair of firms has an incentive to deviate from a situation where all firms are integrated. It is also shown to depend on the number of firms in each oligopoly and on the type of interaction that is assumed between firms that are integrated and firms that are not. In particular, it is shown that if no restriction is put on trade between integrated and nonintegrated firms, integrated firms may continue to purchase inputs from the nonintegrated upstream firms, with the goal of raising their downstream rivals' costs. Furthermore, even though firms are identical, asymmetric equilibria, where integrated and nonintegrated firms coexist, may actually arise as an outcome of the integration game.     

A comparison of the roles and responsibilities of manufacturing engineers in Japan and the United States

The manufacturing engineering work in nine Japanese firms is structured by a horizontal division of labor between manufacturing design engineers and production process engineers, in contrast to a vertical division of labor between manufacturing engineers and technicians in three American firms. The production process engineers in the Japanese firms link manufacturing engineering processes closely with production processes, whereas less coordination between the two processes occurs in the American firms. Regarding product design, manufacturing engineering, and production processes in the Japanese firms, employees engaged in downstream processes are more heavily involved with work concerned with upstream processes than in the American firms.     

Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation

This paper examines how discriminatory input pricing by an upstream monopolist affects the incentives that owners of downstream duopolists offer their managers. Regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price), owners of downstream firms induce their managers to be more profit‐oriented and to behave less aggressively when the monopolist is allowed to price‐discriminate than when he charges a uniform price. If the monopolist price‐discriminates, managerial downstream firms always earn more than owner‐managed profit‐maximizing firms. However, if the monopolist charges a uniform price, managerial downstream firms earn more than profit‐maximizing counterparts under price competition and earn less under quantity competition. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare

I analyze the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall welfare. Standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and society as a whole.     

LOCATION OF VERTICALLY LINKED OLIGOPOLISTS

This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its relation to the creation of an industrial cluster. In a two-region spatial economy, a monopolist firm supplies an input to N consumer goods firms that compete in quantities. When the transport cost of the input increases, downstream firms prefer to agglomerate where the upstream firm is located, to save in production cost. However, simultaneous increases in the transport cost of the input and of the consumer good or increases in the number of downstream firms lead to a relative dispersion of these firms, to reduce competition and locate closer to the local final consumer. In contrast to Mayer (2000) , when both transport costs increase, the location decision of downstream firms is based more on the geographical point that maximizes accessibility to the local final consumer than on the geographical point that minimizes the production cost.     

The road to cooperative supply‐chain environmental management: trust and uncertainty among pro‐active firms

The pressures on firms to improve their environmental performance have caused them to look outside their boundaries towards their supply chains. In such approaches, firms work with vendors to develop the environmental profile of supplied materials (for example) by reducing materials' toxicity or the amount of packaging used. While large firms can mandate that their suppliers comply with such initiatives, more cooperative approaches are generally likely to be more fruitful. This article presents the results from an exploratory, two phase study of the conditions under which firms engage in cooperative supply‐chain environmental management. First, the authors conducted interviews with 14 leading‐edge firms. In the second phase, the authors conducted a theoretical‐sample survey to examine a model of the antecedents of cooperative supply‐chain environmental management. The results suggest that inter‐firm trust, uncertainty and pro‐active environmental management most directly affect the extent to which firms engage in cooperative supply‐chain environmental management. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration

This paper analyzes the effect of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentive to integrate vertically when firms in both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that as downstream competition becomes more intense, the upstream firm obtains a larger share of a smaller downstream industry profit. The upstream firm may encourage downstream competition (even excessively) in response to high downstream bargaining power. The option of vertical integration may be a barrier to entry downstream and may trigger strategic horizontal spinoffs or mergers. We extend the analysis to upstream competition.     

The Role of Upstream‐Downstream Competition on Bundling Decisions: Should Regulators Force Firms to Unbundle?

We develop an upstream–downstream model to analyze downstream firms' incentives to bundle. In our framework, the upstream firms are content providers (such as television stations) and the downstream firms are system operators (such as cable/satellite operators). We show that an a la carte regulation (i.e., a regulation that forces downstream firms to unbundle) leads to higher consumer surplus, if the unregulated equilibrium exhibits pure bundling (PB). Hence, our model predicts that in the television industry, which is mainly characterized by PB, an a la carte regulation will be beneficial for the consumers. If, on the other hand, the unregulated equilibrium is characterized by mixed bundling, then an a la carte regulation will increase consumer welfare provided that demand for multiple purchases is strong.