A Note on Managerial Delegation with Asymmetric and Convex Costs

In this note, we investigate if the standard result by the managerial delegation literature, i.e., the sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium is not Pareto‐optimal from the firms' viewpoint, still applies when asymmetric and convex costs are introduced into the analysis. In such a framework, the managerial delegation choice still represents a sub‐game Nash perfect equilibrium, but the more efficient firm may obtain higher profits provided that the degree of cost asymmetry between firms is sufficiently large. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE ECONOMICS OF COUNTERTERRORISM: A SURVEY

We provide a review of theoretical and empirical contributions on the economic analysis of terrorism and counterterrorism. We argue that simple rational‐choice models of terrorist behavior – in the form of cost‐benefit models – already provide a well‐founded theoretical framework for the study of terrorism and counterterrorism. We also hint at their limitations which relate to the failure of accounting for the dynamics between terrorism and counterterrorism that may produce unintended second‐order effects as well as for the costs associated with counterterrorism and its international dimension. We reevaluate previously proposed counterterrorism strategies accordingly. Finally, in the light of our findings, we discuss interesting areas of future research.     

Supply chain decisions under asymmetric information with cost and fairness concern

ABSTRACT

The two-echelon supply chain including single supplier and single retailer is set, and we study the compact of asymmetric information on the decisions in the supply chain when the both supplier’s private cost information and retailer’s private fairness-concern information are asymmetry between the supply chain members, so as to study the effect of misreporting behavior and fairness concern on the supply chain. By mathematical model derivation and numerical analysis, we prove that the misreporting behavior of supplier will intensify the unfair distribution of supply chain and thus make the supply chain operation further deviate from the optimal condition.     

Bankers closing idiosyncratic deals: Implications for organisational cynicism

To better meet flexibility demands and increase person–job fit, organisations might offer their employees the opportunity to negotiate task‐related arrangements, namely, idiosyncratic deals, referred to as “i‐deals.” However, not every employee who requests an i‐deal is successful in their negotiations. Thus, this study aims to further the knowledge of potential shortcomings of task‐related i‐deals and the role of supervisors in determining them. Drawing on social exchange theory, we hypothesise that low‐quality supervisor–employee relationships (i.e., leader–member exchange) are more likely to result in unsuccessful task‐related i‐deal negotiations, which consequently might provoke increased organisational cynicism. We analysed three waves of data from 202 Swiss bankers who had requested task‐related i‐deals within the investigated business cycle. The results supported our hypothesis. Our findings highlight the role of supervisors in reducing the potential costs of using task‐related i‐deals as employee‐initiated job design practices.     

Managing Discretionary Accruals and Book‐Tax Differences in Anticipation of Tax Rate Increases: Evidence from China

This paper investigates how firms manage their earnings to trade off various incentives when tax rates increase. We hypothesize and find that firms generally choose to manage their taxable income upward in a book‐tax non‐conforming manner rather than in a book‐tax conforming manner before a tax rate increment, which in turn reduces the detection risk of aggressive financial reporting. These results suggest that firms give more weight to tax incentives and tax audit or regulatory inspection risks than to boosting financial reporting income in tax management. However, when firms have higher book management incentives or lower tunneling incentives (i.e., non‐state‐owned enterprises), we find that they manage their taxable income and book income upward together (i.e., in a book‐tax conforming manner), whereas their counterparts (i.e., state‐owned enterprises) do not. Overall, our paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating the interplay of tax, tunneling and financial reporting incentives in influencing tax management strategies. The findings from our paper should also help government and regulators understand more about firms’ reactions to tax rate increases.     

When destructive deviance in the workplace becomes a liability: a decisional behavioral model

In recent years destructive deviant behavior in organizations has drawn increasing attention. However, surprisingly little work has been devoted to assessing when the economic value of deviant behavior is tolerable (i.e., the benefits from employing the deviant worker exceed the financial costs of his/her deviance) and when it becomes unbearable (i.e., the financial cost of the deviance exceeds the benefits accrued from his/her employment). The purpose of the present paper is to introduce a mathematical model which may resolve this lacuna. In addition, a simulation was conducted and its results were reported in order to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed mathematical model. In conclusion it is suggested that the present model be further examined empirically in the real workplace.     

Balancing the additional costs of purchasing and the vendor set dimension to reduce public procurement costs

The paper addresses the reduction of the total cost of purchasing in public procurement, focusing on tenders called for in the European Union and awarded by the Lowest Price (LP) criterion. Taking into account the main characteristic features of governmental purchasing (competition, prescribed procedures, and transparency) and building upon the related contributions in the literature, we present a probabilistic approach for evaluating and limiting the total cost of purchasing in public tenders awarded according to the LP criterion. The presented framework includes the evaluation of the so-called additional costs of purchasing (ACP), a part of the transaction cost that is typically considered in the related literature from a private organization perspective only. The approach can be applied to a generic transaction in any public tender issued according to the European legislation with the LP criterion. Considering the real case study of the public tender for maintenance works on a municipal sport facility in Bari (Italy), we take into account the costs of both transaction counterparts, i.e., the ACP regarding the contracting authority and those related to the firms involved in the tender. Applying the model to the case study, we underline the relevance of ACP for public tenders and show that, by inviting a suitable number of bidders to participate in the call, it is possible to save money both for the contracting authority and the involved competitors.     

Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection

We extend the strategic contract model where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs within each owner–manager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation involves a trade‐off between strategic commitment and the cost of an extra informational rent linked to decentralization. Which policies will arise in equilibrium? We introduce in the game an initial stage where owners can simultaneously choose between control and delegation. We show that if decision variables are strategic substitutes, choosing output control through a quantity‐lump sum transfer contract is a dominating strategy. If decision variables are strategic complements, this policy is a dominated strategy. Further, two types of dominant‐strategies equilibrium may arise: in the first type, both principals use delegation; in the second one, both principals implement delegation for a low‐cost manager and output control for a high‐cost one. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Co‐Worker Exclusion and Employee Outcomes: An Investigation of the Moderating Roles of Perceived Organizational and Social Support

When does social support alleviate or exacerbate the effects of being excluded by colleagues in the workplace? This study integrates belongingness and social support theories to predict and demonstrate the differential effects of work‐related support (i.e., perceived organizational support; POS) and non‐work‐related support (i.e., family and social support; FSS) on employee reactions to co‐worker exclusion. Consistent with our predictions, we found that employees reporting high levels of co‐worker exclusion and high levels of perceived organizational support demonstrate higher levels of performance and increased levels of self‐worth than those reporting low levels of POS. Alternatively, support from family or friends intensified the negative relationship between co‐worker exclusion and self‐esteem and the positive relationship between co‐worker exclusion and job‐induced tension. Unexpectedly, FSS did not influence the supervisor‐rated task performance of excluded workers, nor did POS mitigate the relationship between co‐worker exclusion and job‐induced tension. Implications for theory, research, and practice are discussed.     

The impact on the cost of equity capital in the effects of integrated reporting quality

Integrated reporting is a new reporting tool that includes financial and nonfinancial information, which represents a natural evolution of the corporate reporting movement. Although this practice has gained increasing attention in recent years, both from an academic and professional perspective, the quality of the reports still represents a critical aspect due to inadequate investigation. Only a few studies have focused on integrated reporting quality, and contributions on the effects of quality have been even rarer. This study aims to investigate on the impact of integrated reporting quality on the firm's cost of equity capital, owing to the paramount importance of this parameter for firms and investors. Our results highlight that integrated reporting quality has a significantly negative association with the cost of equity capital, suggesting that integrated reporting quality represents an innovative way to reduce the cost of equity. To our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the relationship between integrated reporting quality and a firm's cost of equity.     

The cost and technological structure of aluminium smelters worldwide

A cost model is developed for the estimation of several technological parameters describing the production process of aluminium smelters worldwide. The model is similar to Baltagi and Griffin's ( 1988 ), but, instead of estimating technological change using a panel data set of firms, we estimate, among other things, the vintage effect, using a cross‐section of aluminium smelters in operation throughout 1994. The vintage effect is defined as the variable cost differential that may be attributed to the utilization of a specific technical vintage in the production of aluminium in relation to another. Other technological measurements are also discussed: the scale effect or returns to scale and technological characteristic effects, i.e. the variable cost elasticities with respect to pot size and current intensity. The results show that considerable cost reductions may be expected from the change of old technical vintages to more recent ones. Also, results show that for a majority of smelters in the sample, returns to scale seem to be exhausted. Finally, variable costs are very sensitive to pot size in the sense that large cost reductions can be expected from the increase in pot size, an important characteristic of the technology used by smelters. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Learning strategic cooperative behavior in industrial symbiosis: A game‐theoretic approach integrated with agent‐based simulation

This paper investigates the negotiation phase of industrial symbiosis relationships, where companies exchanging wastes for inputs need to develop strategies on how to share the additional costs to operate the industrial symbiosis business. The business behavior is approached as a “coopetition” problem where companies need to cooperate to reduce waste discharge costs and traditional input purchase costs and dive into competition to pay a minimum share of additional costs (i.e., waste treatment, waste transportation, and transaction costs) of operating industrial symbiosis. A noncooperative game‐theoretical model for sharing the additional costs is proposed that highlights the two strategies that companies can adopt aimed at sharing costs: a fair strategy and an opportunistic strategy. Then, an agent‐based model is used to simulate the game iterated over time and investigate how the players can adapt their strategies according to their past experience. Simulation results show that players learn that playing the fair strategy is beneficial in the long period, despite in the short period they can gain more benefit by playing the opportunistic strategy. Findings of the paper are critically important to reduce the business and managerial barriers against the formation of industrial symbiosis networks and to stimulate innovative thinking of company managers to foster the development of the circular economy. The paper proposes theoretical, managerial, and policy implications, which are discussed in detail in a comparative manner between linear and circular economy.     

Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests

We analyze the first model of a group contest with players that are heterogeneous in their risk preferences. In our model, individuals’ preferences are represented by a utility function exhibiting a generalized form of constant absolute risk aversion, allowing us to consider any combination of risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-loving players. We begin by proving equilibrium existence and uniqueness under both linear and convex investment costs. Then, we explore how the sorting of a compatible set of players by their risk attitudes into competing groups affects aggregate investment. With linear costs, a balanced sorting (i.e., minimizing the variance in risk attitudes across groups) always produces an aggregate investment level that is at least as high as an unbalanced sorting (i.e., maximizing the variance in risk attitudes across groups). Under convex costs, however, identifying which sorting is optimal is more nuanced and depends on preference and cost parameters.     

Water disclosure and firm risk: Empirical evidence from highly water‐sensitive industries in China

In this paper, we examine the relationship between water disclosure and firm risk. Specifically, based upon a panel dataset of 334 Chinese listed firms operating in highly water‐sensitive industries during 2010–2015, we use regression models to analyze the relationships between water disclosure and three types of firm risk (i.e., total risk, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk) and the moderating effects of media coverage on these relationships. Our empirical results show that (a) although there are no significant relationships between water disclosure and total risk and idiosyncratic risk, there is a significant negative relationship between water disclosure and systematic risk; (b) negative media coverage weakens the negative relationship between water disclosure and systematic risk, whereas nonnegative media coverage reinforces this negative relationship. Our cornerstone study examines the effect of a specific type of environmental disclosure (i.e., water disclosure) on firm risk, and our empirical findings are different from previous studies, which examined the effects of overall corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure on firm risk. We analyze the causes of the differences in detail. With this study, we make theoretical, empirical, and managerial contributions to CSR disclosure–firm risk research in business ethics literature.     

Information Technology and the Organization of Firms

This paper seeks to understand why improved information technology (IT) might strengthen the case for decentralization, as recent empirical work suggests. We study a firm with a headquarters and two managers, each of whom gathers information about her changing local environment. The firm earns a gross profit that depends on actions taken as well as the current local environments. More information permits better actions, and information‐gathering costs drop as IT improves. When the firm is centralized, information‐gathering expenditures are first best, but after the firm decentralizes, each manager becomes a self‐interested player of a “sharing game” in which she collects a share of gross profit and bears the cost of her chosen information‐gathering activities. The firm's actions are determined by the information gathered at the equilibria of the game. As a result, the firm experiences a decentralization penalty, namely the change in net profit (gross profit minus informational costs) after decentralizing. If the penalty is small, then it is outweighed by the advantages of decentralizing—the vanishing of monitoring costs and perhaps the improved motivation of a decentralized manager's staff. To gather information a manager chooses (once and for all) a partitioning of her possible local environments and then searches to find the set in which her current environment lies. Our main measure of a manager's information cost is a technology parameter, θ, times the number of sets in her chosen partitioning. A second measure is θ times the partitioning's “Shannon content,” which may be interpreted as average search time when search is efficient. We ask whether improved IT, i.e., a drop in θ, indeed lowers the decentralization penalty. We obtain a strongly affirmative answer to this question for both cost measures in a class of examples and a mixed answer when we generalize so as to preserve some of the key properties of those examples. In a parallel manner we explore another conjecture suggested in the empirical literature, namely that better IT raises the coordination benefit, which we define as the increase in net profit when the firm bases its actions on pooled information, rather than letting each action variable depend on the information gathered by just one manager.     

About and beyond leading uniqueness and belongingness: A systematic review of inclusive leadership research

The purpose of this systematic review of 107 papers is to address the conceptual confusion about what inclusive leadership (IL) behavior entails and understand the theoretical development of IL. Synthesizing the divergent conceptualizations of inclusive leader behaviors, we propose a multi-level (i.e., employee, team, organizational) model of IL behavior consisting of four dimensions namely, fostering employee's uniqueness (e.g., promoting diversity); strengthening belongingness within a team (e.g., building relationships); showing appreciation (e.g., recognizing efforts and contributions); and supporting organizational efforts (e.g., promoting organizational mission on inclusion). Further, we provide a summary of studied variables as a nomological network in relation to inclusive leadership and an overview of the different theories (e.g., social exchange, intrinsic motivation) supporting the respective relationships and explaining the underlying mechanisms (e.g., reciprocity, motivation). We propose future research to empirically test the multi-level model of IL and examine the predictive value in terms of employee and organizational outcomes.     

Horizontal alliances and the merger paradox

Mergers and alliances are two organizational forms which allow firms to combine complementary capabilities to realize strategic goals; they are, in many cases, strategic substitutes. Managerial decision‐makers, therefore, require a framework for choosing between the two strategies. This paper contributes to this decision‐making process by highlighting one advantage of alliances over mergers. Specifically, while the profitability of a cost‐reducing horizontal merger is diminished by the resulting expansion of non‐merging competitor(s), an alliance, where partners collaborate to reduce costs but sell their product independently, enables its partners to realize the benefits of merging but avoid the problem of strengthening competitors. A model is developed which demonstrates the profitability of establishing such an alliance compared to a merger. The implications of this strategy for antitrust review are briefly discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The surprising benefits of a parallel universe

Suppose that the successful completion of a project requires performing n tasks, each of which has a probability of success p. The paper establishes under what conditions it may be profitable to engage in parallel multi‐tasking, i.e. tackling each task by following two independent routes. It is found that for ?n>1 parallel multi‐tasking is profitable for a wide range of parameters when costs are linear and is always profitable for convex costs. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Matrix balancing with unknown total costs: preserving economic relationships in the electric power sector

Many preferred matrix balancing methods suffer limitations when total costs (i.e. column sums) are unknown or uncertain. If the total cost (column) constraint is relaxed, economic relationships both between inputs to and/or amongst the sub-sectors may not be preserved (i.e. cost structure and row share, respectively). These relationships are significant in modeling, where production behavior depends on relative costs. This paper presents a share preserving cross-entropy (SPCE) approach which targets economic relationships directly and allows the column constraint to be relaxed. Further, the SPCE solution is identical to the RAS solution when the column constraint is imposed. This cross-entropy formulation complements an existing sum squared error-type approach. The two matrix balancing methods are demonstrated with a disaggregation of the electric power industry where only unit input costs are known with greater certainty. There is a clear trade-off between preserving economic relationships versus the column totals when compared to their column-constrained counterparts.