Scientific research,firm heterogeneity,and foreign R&D locations of multinational firms

We examine the influence of host countries’ scientific research strengths on global R&D location choices by multinational firms. In an analysis of 277 new R&D activities identified for 175 firms in 40 host countries and 30 technology fields, we find that the strength of relevant university research positively affects the likelihood that host countries attract foreign R&D. When allowing for firm heterogeneity, university scientific research appears only a significant factor for firms with a strong science orientation in their R&D activities. Host countries’ corporate scientific research has no systematic influence on R&D location choices. Empirical results are replicated in an analysis at the regional level covering regions in Europe, the United States, and Japan.     

R&D, Investment, and Industry Dynamics

We present a model of industry evolution where the dynamics are driven by a process of endogenous innovations followed by subsequent embodiments in physical capital. Traditionally, the only distinction between R&D and physical investment was one of labeling: the first process accumulates an intangible stock, knowledge, while the second accumulates physical capital. Both stocks affect output in a symmetric fashion. We argue that the story is not that simple, and that there is more to it than differences in the object of accumulation. Our model stresses the causal relationship between past R&D expenditures and current investments in machinery and equipment. This causality pattern, which is supported by the data, also explains the observed higher volatility of physical investment relative to that of R&D expenditures.     

Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction

This paper analyzes the relationship between incumbency and R&D incentives in the context of a model of technological competition in which technologically successful entrants are able to license their innovation to (or be acquired by) an incumbent. That such a sale should take place is natural, since postinnovation monopoly profits are greater than the sum of duopoly profits. We identify three key findings about how innovative activity is shaped by licensing. First, since an incumbent's threat to engage in imitative R&D during negotiations increases its bargaining power, there is a purely strategic incentive for incumbents to develop an R&D capability. Second, incumbents research more intensively than entrants as long as (and only if) their willingness to pay for the innovation exceeds that of the entrant, a condition that depends critically on the expected licensing fee. Third, when the expected licensing fee is sufficiently low, the incumbent considers entrant R&D a strategic substitute for in-house research. This prediction about the market for ideas stands in contrast to predictions of strategic complementarity in patent races where licensing is not allowed.     

Financial Constraints: Routine Versus Cutting Edge R&D Investment

We analyze financial constraints on R&D, where we account for heterogeneity among investments that has been neglected in previous literature. According to economic theory, investments should be distinguished by their degree of uncertainty, e.g. routine R&D versus cutting‐edge R&D. Financial constraints should be more binding for cutting‐edge R&D than for routine R&D. Using panel data we find that R&D spending of firms devoting a significant fraction of R&D to cutting‐edge projects is curtailed by credit constraints while routine R&D investments are not. This has important policy implications with respect to the distribution of R&D subsidies in the economy.     

On robust asymmetric equilibria in asymmetric R&;D-driven growth economies

In R&D-driven growth models with asymmetric fundamentals, the steady-state equilibrium R&D investments are industry-specific, and they are such that R&D returns are equalized across industries. Return equalization, however, makes investors indifferent as to where to target research and, hence, the problem of allocation of R&D investments across industries is indeterminate. Agents’ indifference creates an ambiguous investment scenario. We assume that agents hold “ambiguous” beliefs on the per-industry profitability of their R&D investments. Investors’ aversion towards ambiguity eliminates the indeterminacy of the investment problem. In particular, the asymmetric return-equalizing equilibrium is robust against a however small degree of investors’ ambiguity aversion.     

The Productivity Effects of Internal and External R&D: Evidence from a Dynamic Panel Data Model*

We examine the impact of internal and external R&D on labour productivity in a 6‐year panel of Dutch manufacturing firms. We apply a dynamic panel data model that allows for decreasing or increasing returns to scale in internal and external R&D and for economies of scope. We find complementarity between internal and external R&D, with a positive impact of external R&D only evident in case of sufficient internal R&D. These findings confirm the role of internal R&D in enhancing absorptive capacity. The scope economies are accompanied by decreasing returns to scale at high levels of internal and external R&D. The analysis indicates that productivity grows by increasing the share of external R&D in total R&D.     

The R&D Investment–Uncertainty Relationship: Do Strategic Rivalry and Firm Size Matter?

This paper uses a real options perspective to augment a standard research and development (R&D) investment model and implement a firm‐level empirical analysis to assess the practical significance of market uncertainty and its interactions with strategic rivalry and firm size. We use a measure of firm‐relevant market uncertainty along with panel data and find that firms invest less in current R&D as uncertainty about market returns increases. The effect of firm‐specific uncertainty on R&D investment is smaller in markets where strategic rivalry is likely to be more intense. Furthermore, holding access to financing constant, the effect of uncertainty on R&D investment is attenuated for large firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of One-Way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R & D Cooperation

With one-way spillovers, the standard symmetric two-period R&D model leads to an asymmetric equilibrium only, with endogeneous innovator and imitator roles. We show how R&D decisions and measures of firm heterogeneity—market shares, R&D shares, and profits—depend on spillovers and on R&D costs. While a joint lab always improves on consumer welfare, it yields higher profits, cost reductions, and social welfare only under extra assumptions, beyond those required with multidirectional spillovers. Finally, the novel issue of optimal R&D cartels is addressed. We show an optimal R&D cartel may seek to minimize R&D spillovers between its members.     

Optimal regulation of technical progress in natural monopolies with asymmetric information

The focus of this paper is to characterize regulatory mechanisms for natural monopolies to provide for optimal technical progress when information is asymmetric. We model a Bayesian-Nash game where the monopolist has private knowledge of the cost-reducing effects of R&D investment to generate process innovations. In the first case, a price-regulated, profit-maximizing firm whose R&D level is unobservable sets its R&D level efficiently to maximize profits at the output level chosen by the firm. However, the level of technical progress achieved by the firm in this case is too high from the regulator's point of view since, in the second-best regulated solution of interest, the regulator has to provide for the R&D expenditures, assumed sunk, as well as for information rents transferred to the firm. In a second case, it can be shown that if the regulator can observe and set limits on the firm's investment in R&D, social welfare is improved, even though the regulated investment level is no longer efficient at the output level chosen by the firm. The reason for the welfare improvement is that losses in consumer surplus due to a decrease in output and an increase in the price are offset by a decrease in information rents and R&D costs transferred, causing the social costs of public funds to fall. Received: 31 July 1994 / Accepted: 15 January 1999     

The role of executives in hostile takeover attempts

This paper proposes a two-stage game theoretic model where the discretionary power of executives acts as an implicit defense against hostile takeovers. Following managerial enterprise models, this paper analyzes the effects of discretionary power of target’s executives over R&D and advertising expenditures in defeating hostile takeover attempts. It is shown that in vertically differentiated industries, in equilibrium, target’s executives keep low level of R&D and advertising expenditures to make their firm an unattractive target for hostile takeovers. The model reveals that executives are influenced by their self-interest of monetary and non-monetary benefits and this self-interest makes the industry more differentiated.     

Mining the R&D innovation performance processes for high-tech firms based on rough set theory

The research and development (R&D) innovation of firms continues to be viewed as an important source of competitive advantage to academics and practitioners. To explore and extract the R&D innovation decision rules, it is important to understand how the R&D innovation rule-base works. However, many studies have not yet adequately induced and extracted the decision rule of R&D innovation and performance based on the characteristics and components of the original data rather than on post-determination models. The analysis of this study is grounded in the taxonomy of induction-related activities using a rough set theory approach or rule-based decision-making technique to infer R&D innovation decision rules and models linking R&D innovation to sales growth. The rules developed using rough set theory can be directly translated into a path-dependent flow network to infer decision paths and parameters. The flow network graph and cause-and-effect relationship of decision rules are heavily exploited in R&D innovation characteristics. In addition, an empirical case of R&D innovation performance will be illustrated to show that the rough sets model and the flow network graph are useful and efficient tools for building R&D innovation decision rules and providing predictions. We will then illustrate that integrating the flow network graph with rough set theory can fully reflect the characteristics of R&D innovation, and, through the established model, we can obtain a more reasonable result than with artificial influence.     

Spillovers,absorptive capacity and agglomeration

I study knowledge spillovers in an industry where firms are heterogeneous in their ability to adopt knowledge (absorptive capacity). I set up a model in which firms choose locations anticipating potential gains and losses from other firms’ R&D activity. I apply the model to the US software industry and obtain the following results: the data supports localized knowledge spillovers; firms that have higher absorptive capacity are sorted into more agglomerated counties; ignoring firm heterogeneity leads to biased estimates of gains from spillovers; spillovers play an important role in explaining the geographic distribution of firms, but only within regions with high R&D activity.     

The Incentives for Innovative Activity in the Managerial Firm

This paper discusses the incentives for innovation by a manager‐led firm. In particular, it is investigated how remuneration practices influence the choice of a risky project. In the first place, a dynamic model with uncertainty is used to determine the optimal employment level with exogenous growth and risk. In the second part of the paper, growth and risk are explained by R&D expenditures. Optimal investment expenditures for R&D are derived for (i) the profit‐maximizing firm and (ii) the managerial firm, where the manager receives a fixed salary as well as a variable share of profits. If risk neutrality is assumed, then no difference exists. However, if risk aversion is considered, the managerial firm will invest more into R&D than the owner‐led company. Size‐related salaries are an additional reason for higher expenditures of R&D by managers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

R&D in a strategic delegation game revisited: a note

In this note we reconsider the paper of Zhang and Zhang (1997), published in Managerial and Decision Economics, who analyze a strategic delegation model with R&D spillovers in an imperfectly competitive market. We were motivated to study their setup by a puzzling result given in their paper: delegating the production and R&D decisions to managers is never beneficial for the owners of the firm. When we tried to understand the driving forces of this result, we found however that the findings of Zhang and Zhang (1997) are incorrect. We explain why their derivations are wrong and demonstrate via counterexamples that the main propositions in their paper do not hold. In addition, we show how the correct solution of this R&D model with spillovers can be obtained. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is R&D spending influenced by disinvestment and local political corruption? The case of Indian central public sector enterprises

The current study examines the effect of disinvestment (dilution of state ownership) and local political corruption on R&D spending in enterprises owned by the central government of India. Based on certain characteristic features of innovation as a strategy available to state-owned enterprises, I build two sets of hypotheses formalising the channels of how these variables may affect the possibility and amount of R&D. Data is drawn from multiple sources to compile a dataset that covers all manufacturing central government-owned enterprises in India over a period of ten years from 2007 to 2016. The study employs an instrumental variable technique to reduce the endogeneity between disinvestment and R&D decisions. We find that, while disinvestment and local political corruption have strong negative effects on whether a firm invests in R&D or not, it has no effect on the amount of R&D. In fact, the amount is driven by a host of firm-specific factors such as size, profit and proficiency of the share of skilled labor, managerial strength and non-unionisation of labor. We also find that the effects are strongly driven by the size of firms, special status awarded to firms and the ideology of the state where the enterprise operates.     

The negative impact of R&D capitalization: A value relevance approach

Abstract

Accounting for R&D costs is an open issue. SFAS N°2 mandates that all R&D costs must be immediately expensed. IAS 38 requires capitalization of R&D costs if they meet certain criteria. Recent research papers show the value relevance of capitalized R&D. We test the value relevance of R&D reporting in a sample of 197 French firms between 1993 and 2002. The French context provides an interesting field for R&D value relevance studies because both accounting treatments of R&D costs (expensing and capitalization) are allowed. Unlike previous studies, we find that capitalized R&D is negatively associated with stock prices and returns. This negative coefficient on capitalized R&D implies that investors are concerned with and react negatively to capitalization of R&D. We also find that the firms choosing to capitalize (successful) R&D are smaller, more highly leveraged, less profitable and have less growth opportunities. Taking into account these characteristics, our robustness checks confirm that capitalized R&D is not associated with higher prices and is related to lower returns.     

The R&D location decision of the firm and “creative” regions—a survey

In the flurry of recent concern about and research on high technology firms and economic development, there is relatively little attention paid to the perspective of firms and their location decisions. This paper surveys the literature on the location of R&D facilities and on attempts to establish regions based on innovation and creativity. The locations of R&D facilities are constrained by the labor market for scientists and engineers. The locational needs of the firm revolve around ensuring both that professional labor will be able to be attracted to its R&D locations, and that communication (especially face-to-face communication) will be facilitated. Given these twin concerns, R&D is likely to locate primarily in large urban regions. The corresponding success of regions which hope to become major areas of spin-off and creativity is likewise constrained by the joint preferences of R&D workers, venture capital investors, and high-tech employers.     

Managerial optimism and investment choice

This paper analyzes whether it might be desirable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain R&D strategy. I consider a Cournot model with an ex‐ante R&D stage where firms can invest in cost reduction before product market competition takes place. I show that firms want to hire overoptimistic managers and argue that a manager's type may serve as a substitute for strategic delegation via contracts. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Learning from R&D outsourcing vs. learning by R&D outsourcing

We analyze how research and development (R&D) outsourcing influences product innovation. We propose a separation between learning from R&D outsourcing, whereby the firm improves its ability to innovate by using outsourced R&D directly in new products, from learning by R&D outsourcing, whereby the firm indirectly uses outsourced R&D by integrating it with internal R&D to create new products. Building on the knowledge-based view, we argue that learning from R&D outsourcing is likely to have an inverse U-shaped relationship with product innovation, because the initial benefits of using outsourced component R&D knowledge to innovate products is eventually outweighed by the hollowing out of the firm's ability to innovate. In contrast, we propose that learning by R&D outsourcing is likely to have a U-shaped relationship with product innovation, because the initial challenges of integrating internal and external R&D are eventually overcome, resulting in more innovations. Finally, we distinguish between domestic and foreign R&D outsourcing and propose a liability of foreignness in R&D outsourcing as it has a lower impact on new products than domestic R&D outsourcing. The empirical analysis shows that outsourced R&D has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the number of new products, while the interaction between outsourced R&D and internal R&D has a U-shaped relationship with the number of new products. It also shows that domestic outsourced R&D has a higher positive impact on the number of new products than foreign outsourced R&D.     

MNEs,technological efforts and channels of export spillover: An analysis of Indian manufacturing industries

The present study provides some empirical evidence for the export spillover effect examining the case of an emerging market economy, namely India, using firm level data for the period 1994–2006. We disentangle different spillover channels, namely the demonstration effect, the imitation effect (R&D spillover) and a proxy to measure spillover effects coming from higher MNEs’ skills. We also account for the heterogeneous technological behaviour of local firms considering how in-house R&D efforts and disembodied technological imports may affect the exporting performance. Our findings show how export spillover effects are mainly mediated by an imitation effect, contrary to the case of other emerging market economies like China, where a demonstration effect is evident. We also recognise that both the decision to export and export intensity are influenced most of all by the technological activities of local firms. Moreover, the findings of the analysis suggest that in-house R&D is more relevant than other external sources of technological knowledge such as disembodied technology imports to internalise the positive spillover effect emanating from MNEs.