Managerial optimism and investment choice

This paper analyzes whether it might be desirable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain R&D strategy. I consider a Cournot model with an ex‐ante R&D stage where firms can invest in cost reduction before product market competition takes place. I show that firms want to hire overoptimistic managers and argue that a manager's type may serve as a substitute for strategic delegation via contracts. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

R&D in a strategic delegation game revisited: a note

In this note we reconsider the paper of Zhang and Zhang (1997), published in Managerial and Decision Economics, who analyze a strategic delegation model with R&D spillovers in an imperfectly competitive market. We were motivated to study their setup by a puzzling result given in their paper: delegating the production and R&D decisions to managers is never beneficial for the owners of the firm. When we tried to understand the driving forces of this result, we found however that the findings of Zhang and Zhang (1997) are incorrect. We explain why their derivations are wrong and demonstrate via counterexamples that the main propositions in their paper do not hold. In addition, we show how the correct solution of this R&D model with spillovers can be obtained. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic R&D Location by Multinational Firms: Spillovers, Technology Sourcing, and Competition

This paper develops a model of strategic interaction in R&D internationalization decisions between two multinational firms, competing both abroad and in their home markets. It examines different incentives for foreign R&D faced by a technology leader and a technology laggard. The model takes into account the impact of local inter firm R&D spillovers, (noncostless) international intra firm transfer of knowledge, and the notion that internal R&D increases the effectiveness of incoming spillovers. Analytical results suggest that greater efficiency of intra firm transfers and greater R&D spillovers increase the attractiveness of domestic R&D for the technology leader if the technology gap with the laggard is large. The lagging firm, in contrast, increases the share of foreign R&D as foreign technology sourcing becomes more effective. Competition encourages the leading firm to engage in foreign R&D to capture a larger share of profits on the foreign market, whereas the laggard concentrates more R&D at home to defend its home market position.     

Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers

This paper shows that it is profitable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain investment strategy in an R&D tournament situation. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, all firms delegate to overoptimistic managers, where the optimal degree of overoptimism depends on the riskiness of the tournament. In these situations a manager's type may serve as a substitute for delegation via contracts. By delegating to overoptimistic managers, firms can escape the rat race nature of R&D tournaments. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

External bargaining versus internal manipulation: A theory of managerial delegation

Does the competition mode influence the delegation decisions of the firm owners? By constructing a vertical negotiation game model, we find that under Cournot competition in the downstream market, the downstream firm's owner will not choose delegation, whereas under Bertrand competition, the downstream firm's owner will choose delegation. If the product substitution is relatively large, the adoption of delegation management by the owners of downstream firms under Bertrand competition will bring higher profits. It further shows that compared with the situation of no delegation, delegation management may reverse the social welfare ranking under Bertrand and Cournot competitions.     

Explaining Firms’ Export Behaviour: R&D,Spillovers and the Destination Market*

We examine the importance of a firm's own R&D activity and intra‐sectoral spillovers on the decision to export and the export intensity using firm level panel data for Spain for the period 1990–98. Own R&D activity is found to be an important determinant of export activity. There is little evidence to suggest that Spanish firms benefit from spillovers of the exporting activity of others. However, there is evidence that R&D spillovers exert positive effects on firms’ export ratios. We find a larger marginal impact of R&D spillovers on export intensity of firms exporting to other OECD countries than those exporting to non‐OECD nations.     

Endogenous Technological Spillovers: Causes and Consequences

We develop a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers. We analyze a game in which firms can first invest in cost-reducing R&D, then compete on the human-capital market for their knowledge-bearing employees, and finally enter the product market. If R&D employees change firms, spillovers arise. We show that technological spillovers are most likely when they increase total industry profits. We use this result to show that innovation incentives are usually stronger for endogenous than for exogenous spillovers and that endogenous spillovers may reverse the result that innovation incentives are stronger under quantity competition than under price competition. Finally, we explore the robustness of our results with respect to contractual incompleteness and the number of R&D workers.     

Effects of One-Way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R & D Cooperation

With one-way spillovers, the standard symmetric two-period R&D model leads to an asymmetric equilibrium only, with endogeneous innovator and imitator roles. We show how R&D decisions and measures of firm heterogeneity—market shares, R&D shares, and profits—depend on spillovers and on R&D costs. While a joint lab always improves on consumer welfare, it yields higher profits, cost reductions, and social welfare only under extra assumptions, beyond those required with multidirectional spillovers. Finally, the novel issue of optimal R&D cartels is addressed. We show an optimal R&D cartel may seek to minimize R&D spillovers between its members.     

The R&D Investment–Uncertainty Relationship: Do Strategic Rivalry and Firm Size Matter?

This paper uses a real options perspective to augment a standard research and development (R&D) investment model and implement a firm‐level empirical analysis to assess the practical significance of market uncertainty and its interactions with strategic rivalry and firm size. We use a measure of firm‐relevant market uncertainty along with panel data and find that firms invest less in current R&D as uncertainty about market returns increases. The effect of firm‐specific uncertainty on R&D investment is smaller in markets where strategic rivalry is likely to be more intense. Furthermore, holding access to financing constant, the effect of uncertainty on R&D investment is attenuated for large firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial delegation games and corporate social responsibility

In a duopoly in which firms universally engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, this paper shows that, in contrast to the main tenet of the received managerial delegation literature, if the CSR sensitivity is sufficiently high: (a) when both firms delegate output decisions to managers, at the equilibrium profit (resp. consumer welfare) is higher (resp. lower) than when firms are pure CSR; (b) in a managerial delegation game, asymmetric multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria emerge in which one firm delegates and the rival does not. These results hold under both the “sales delegation” and “relative profits” manager's bonus schemes.     

Do Spillovers Stimulate Incremental or Drastic Product Innovations? Evidence from German Establishment Data*

Despite the generally recognized importance of knowledge spillovers, the empirical literature is essentially silent on the type of innovation stimulated by spillovers. We estimate the determinants of product innovations differing in their degree of newness to the adopting firm. Knowledge spillovers from rivals have a positive impact on incremental innovations. This impact is largely independent of participation in R&D cooperation. Spillovers exert no such independent influence on drastic innovation activities. The results support the hypothesis that establishments face difficulties in using knowledge that comes from areas they are not familiar with. Establishments exploit spillovers for incremental innovations rather than for drastic innovations. To some degree R&D cooperation can help to overcome the difficulties in using spillovers for drastic innovations. Furthermore, our estimates provide evidence that the firm's own R&D effort and the use of outside information are substitutes.     

Technological spillovers and productivity in Italian manufacturing firms

We study whether a firm’s total factor productivity dynamics is positively influenced by its own R&D activity and by the technological spillovers generated at the intra- and inter-sectorial level. Our approach corrects simultaneously for the endogeneity and the selectivity biases introduced by the use of a firm’s own R&D as a regressor. The evidence suggests that a firm’s involvement in R&D activities accounts for significant productivity gains. Firms also benefit from spillovers originating from their own industries, as well as from innovative upstream sectors.     

Environmental regulations in private and mixed duopolies: Taxes on emissions versus green R&D subsidies

In this article, we compare two kinds of environmental regulations—emissions taxes and green R&D subsidies—in private and mixed-duopoly markets in the presence of R&D spillovers. We show that a green R&D subsidy is better (worse) than an emissions tax when the green R&D is efficient (inefficient), irrespective of R&D spillovers, whereas the existence of a publicly owned firm encourages the government to adopt a subsidy policy. We also show that the optimal policy choice depends on R&D efficiency and spillovers. In particular, when green R&D is inefficient and the spillover rate is low (high), the government should choose an emissions tax and (not) privatize the state-owned firm. When green R&D is efficient, however, an R&D subsidy is better, but a privatization policy is not desirable for society, irrespective of spillovers.     

Real options game models of R&D competition between asymmetric firms with spillovers

Using real options game models, we consider the characterization of strategic equilibria associated with an asymmetric Research and Development (R&D) race between an incumbent firm and an entrant firm in the development of a new innovative product under market and technological uncertainties. The random arrival time of the discovery of the patent protected innovative product is modeled as a Poisson process. Input spillovers on the R&D effort are modeled by the change in the leader’s hazard rate of success of innovation upon the follower’s entry into the R&D race. Asymmetry between the two competing firms include sunk costs of investment, stochastic revenue flow rates generated from the product, and hazard rates of arrival of success of R&D efforts of the two firms. Under asymmetric duopoly, we obtain the complete characterization of the three types of Markov perfect equilibria (sequential leader–follower, preemption and simultaneous entry) of the firms’ optimal R&D entry decisions with respect to various sets of model parameters. Our model shows that under positive input spillover, preemptive equilibrium does not occur in the R&D race due to the presence of dominant second mover advantage. The two firms choose optimally to enter simultaneously if the sunk cost asymmetry is relatively small; otherwise, sequential equilibrium would occur. When the initial hazard rate is low relative to the level of input spillover, simultaneous entry would occur as an optimal decision, signifying another scenario of dominant second mover advantage. On the other hand, when the initial hazard rate is sufficiently high so that the first mover advantage becomes more significant, simultaneous equilibrium does not occur even under high level of positive input spillover.     

A micro-econometric analysis of the role of R&D spillovers using a nonlinear translog specification

This paper assesses the impact of Research and Development (R&D) spillovers on production for a panel of 1,203 Italian manufacturing firms over the period 1998–2003.The estimations are based on a nonlinear translog production function augmented by a measure of R&D spillovers which combines the geographical distance between firms, the technological similarity within each pair of firms and the technical efficiency of each firm. The estimation method takes into account the endogeneity of regressors and the potential sample selection issue regarding the decision by firms to invest in R&D. Results show that the translog production function is more suitable than the Cobb-Douglas for modelling firm behaviour and that returns to scale are increasing. Moreover, the internal and external stocks of technology exert a significant impact on firms’ production. Finally, it emerges that, for Italian manufacturing firms, R&D capital and R&D spillovers are highly substitutes.     

Bilateral Delegation in Duopoly Wage and Employment Bargaining

We study bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining between firms and unions in a Cournot duopoly. Incentive delegation creates frictions for each party between its objectives of within‐firm rent extraction and market/job stealing from the rival firm. The net effect is restraint in production, resulting in a larger bargaining pie. But each player's payoff will be inversely related to his bargaining power. We also show that if players are given a choice to delegate, they will not resort to delegation when their bargaining power is sufficiently high. This is in contrast to the scenarios commonly assumed in many models. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cooperative and noncooperative R&D with spillovers: The case of labor-managed firms

This research focuses on the behavior of not-for-profit enterprises. In particular, using a familiar model of cost-reducing R&D with spillovers, we examine strategic interactions between labor-managed firms in a duopoly. Research spillovers have not been previously considered in the context of labor-managed firms. Among four market scenarios involving (i) competition in research and production; (ii) cooperation in research and production; (iii and iv) competition or cooperation in research and the reverse in production, our results show that research is greatest under full cooperation, while output is greatest under full competition. Output and R&D are the lowest in the case when firms compete in research, but form a production cartel. The degree of research spillovers has a crucial bearing upon these rankings. Some of these results differ from those for profit-maximizing firms. The effects of changes in research spillovers on employment (output) are shown to depend upon the nature of the underlying production technology. Policy implications are discussed.     

R&D,Interindustry and International Technology Spillovers and the Total Factor Productivity Growth of Manufacturing Industries in Canada, 1974-1989

The paper presents new econometric evidence on the relationship between total factor productivity growth and the R&D expenditures of Canadian manufacturing industries in the presence of interindustry and international spillovers of technology. In contrast to studies that presume that international spillovers are incorporated in imports of intermediate and/or capital equipment goods, the present paper assumes that the principal channel of transmission of new technology is foreign direct investment. Three original proxies for international spillovers use information on patenting, the size and the origin of foreign ownership in the host country and the R&D expenditures in the country of origin. The results suggest that the nexus between industry's own R&D expenditures and the TFP growth is significant and positive, especially for the process-related R&D. Domestic interindustry spillovers of new technology have a larger effect on TFP than industry's own R&D expenditures. All three proxies for international technology spillovers are associated positively and significantly with TFP growth. However, international spillovers contribute to TFP growth less than domestic interindustry spillovers and less than own process-related R&D.     

Knowledge spillovers in US patents: A dynamic patent intensity model with secret common innovation factors

During the past two decades, innovations protected by patents have played a key role in business strategies. This fact enhanced studies of the determinants of patents and the impact of patents on innovation and competitive advantage. Sustaining competitive advantages is as important as creating them. Patents help sustaining competitive advantages by increasing the production cost of competitors, by signaling a better quality of products and by serving as barriers to entry. If patents are rewards for innovation, more R&D should be reflected in more patent applications but this is not the end of the story. There is empirical evidence showing that patents through time are becoming easier to get and more valuable to the firm due to increasing damage awards from infringers. These facts question the constant and static nature of the relationship between R&D and patents. Furthermore, innovation creates important knowledge spillovers due to its imperfect appropriability. Our paper investigates these dynamic effects using US patent data from 1979 to 2000 with alternative model specifications for patent counts. We introduce a general dynamic count panel data model with dynamic observable and unobservable spillovers, which encompasses previous models, is able to control for the endogeneity of R&D and therefore can be consistently estimated by maximum likelihood. Apart from allowing for firm specific fixed and random effects, we introduce a common unobserved component, or secret stock of knowledge, that affects differently the propensity to patent of each firm across sectors due to their different absorptive capacity.     

Spillovers,absorptive capacity and agglomeration

I study knowledge spillovers in an industry where firms are heterogeneous in their ability to adopt knowledge (absorptive capacity). I set up a model in which firms choose locations anticipating potential gains and losses from other firms’ R&D activity. I apply the model to the US software industry and obtain the following results: the data supports localized knowledge spillovers; firms that have higher absorptive capacity are sorted into more agglomerated counties; ignoring firm heterogeneity leads to biased estimates of gains from spillovers; spillovers play an important role in explaining the geographic distribution of firms, but only within regions with high R&D activity.