Image differentiation and locational proximity among retail firms

Hotelling's (1929) classic paper gave rise to a voluminous literature and founded a controversy concerning the validity of the Principle of Minimum Differentiation (PMD). This research has produced conflicting theoretical results and inconsistencies between theory and empirical observations of retail competition. This paper develops a theory of market behavior that encompasses the extent and direction of customer loyalties, the multiplicity of chains and stores, and three forms of competitive expectations. Under conditions of shared competitive expectations, competitive pessimism, and competitive optimism, it provides a theoretical test of PMD and an explanation for the prevalence of spatial proximity and the differentiation of images in retail competition.     

Price-induced technical progress in 80 years of US agriculture

This paper presents a theory of technical progress that interprets the price-induced conjecture of Hicks. It provides also an exhaustive set of comparative statics conditions that constitute the scaffolding for an empirical test of the theory. A crucial assumption is that entrepreneurs make decisions about techniques on the basis of expected information about prices and quantities. Another assumption is that these decisions are made in order to fulfill a profitability objective. The novelty of our approach is that expected relative prices enter the production function as shifter of the technology frontier. The consequence of this assumption is an expansion of the traditional Shephard lemma that is useful for identifying the portion of input quantities that has been determined by the conjecture of price-induced technical progress (PITP). The theory is applied to a sample of 80 years of US agriculture. Three versions of the general model are presented. The first version deals only with expected relative prices. The empirical results do not reject the PITP hypothesis. The second and third versions introduce lagged expected relative prices, lagged R&D expenditures and lagged extension expenditures as explanatory variables of the portion of the input quantities that may be attributable to technical progress. I acknowledge invaluable discussions on this subject held over several years with Michael R. Caputo. I also acknowledge the use of the theory and its justifications that were presented in previous papers by Paris and Caputo (2001) and by Caputo and Paris (2005). All the errors are mine. I dedicate this paper to my wife, Carlene, who died of a rare cancer on May 5, 2001.     

Globalfocusing: From Domestic Conglomerates to Global Specialists*

abstract Globalization is changing the competitive terrain on which companies develop their corporate strategy. On the global stage, key competitive advantages are gained through internationally fungible resources. Consequently, diversified conglomerates are converting to global specialists in narrower niche markets and competing with a small number of multinational enterprises operating worldwide. Their internationalization and their reduction of product diversification are opposite sides of the same coin: globalfocusing. I extend Penrosian resource‐based theory to analyse this change process, notably by distinguishing country and industry specificity of firms' core competences, and by integrating divestment as part of firm growth processes. Globalfocusing is driven by shifts in the relative importance of country‐specific and industry‐specific resources and capabilities due to changes in the internal and external environment, notably the globalization of markets and supply chains. The argument is developed using case studies of restructuring of two Danish manufacturing enterprises. On this basis, I analyse the forces driving globalfocusing processes and suggest propositions for empirical testing.     

Occupational Differences in the Determination of U.S. Workers'Earnings: Both the Human Capital and the Structured Labor Market Hypotheses Are Useful in Analysis

Abstract . Using the older men's panel of the National Longitudinal Surveys (n = 5,000), path analysis and occupationally stratified samples, an empirical examination is made of the relative role of the human capital hypothesis and the structured labor market hypothesis in the determination of earnings. Results suggest that both hypotheses are useful in achieving an understanding of the process. There is a primary labor market (jobs with high wages, job security and mobility on promotional ladders) with individual productivity differences largely consequent from human capital differentials (investments in education, training and experience). There is also a secondary labor market (jobs with low wages, high turnover poor working conditions) in which human capital investments are not rewarded, dominated by structural influences (e.g. unionization) that, rather than individual productivity differences, explain the process by which earnings are determined.     

On the Economics of Moral Preferences

Abstract . The long‐standing critique of the “economic model of man” has gained new impetus, not least due to the broadening research in behavioral and experimental economics. Many of the critics have focused on the apparent difficulty of traditional rational choice theory to account for the role of moral or ethical concerns in human conduct, and a number of authors have suggested modifications in the standard model in response to such critique. This article takes issue with a quite commonly adopted “revisionist” strategy, namely, seeking to account for moral concerns by including them as additional preferences in an agent's utility function. It is argued that this strategy ignores the critical difference between preferences over outcomes and preferences over actions, and that it fails to recognize that “moral preferences” belong in the second category. Preferences over actions, however, cannot be consistently accounted for within a theoretical framework that focuses on the rationality of single actions. They require a shift of perspective, from a theory of rational choice to a theory of rule‐following behavior.     

Heuristic learning and the discovery of specialization and exchange

I develop and calibrate an agent-based model of boundedly rational, adaptive agents in a two-good production and exchange economy to replicate human-subject outcomes in the same eight-person experimental economy. To test agents’ ability to capture human behavior, I extend the model and use its output to make predictions about a second experimental environment in which the group of eight agents is slowly constructed by merging smaller groups. This environment improves human-subject performance in the specialization and exchange task, and commensurate improvement emerges for some parameterizations of the agent-based model. This iterative process yields incremental improvement of decision-level theories about economic discovery.     

Response of double-auction markets to instantaneous Selling�CBuying signals with stochastic Bid�CAsk spread

Statistical properties of order-driven double-auction markets with Bid–Ask spread are investigated through the dynamical quantities such as response function. We first attempt to utilize the so-called Madhavan–Richardson–Roomans model (MRR for short) to simulate the stochastic process of the price-change in empirical data sets (say, EUR/JPY or USD/JPY exchange rates) in which the Bid–Ask spread fluctuates in time. We find that the MRR theory apparently fails to simulate so much as the qualitative behaviour (‘non-monotonic’ behaviour) of the response function R(l) (l denotes the difference of times at which the response function is evaluated) calculated from the data. Especially, we confirm that the stochastic nature of the Bid–Ask spread causes apparent deviations from a linear relationship between the R(l) and the auto-correlation function C(l), namely, R(l) μ -C(l){R(l) \propto -C(l)}. To make the microscopic model of double-auction markets having stochastic Bid–Ask spread, we use the minority game with a finite market history length and find numerically that appropriate extension of the game shows quite similar behaviour of the response function to the empirical evidence. We also reveal that the minority game modeling with the adaptive (‘annealed’) look-up table reproduces the non-linear relationship R(l) μ -f(C(l)){R(l) \propto -f(C(l))} (f(x) stands for a non-linear function leading to ‘λ-shapes’) more effectively than the fixed (‘quenched’) look-up table does.     

The Rise of Individual Performance Pay

Existing empirical evidence suggests that individual performance pay is more prevalent in human‐capital‐intensive industries. We introduce a model that can contribute to explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we analyze the conditions for implementing peer‐dependent incentive regimes when agents possess indispensable human capital. We show that the larger the share of values that the agents can hold up, the lower is the implementable degree of peer‐dependent incentives. In a setting with complementary tasks, we show that although team‐based incentives are optimal if agents are dispensable, it may be costly, and, in fact, suboptimal, to provide team incentives when the agents become indispensable.     

Gender‐Biased Breastfeeding in Egypt: Examining the Fertility Preference Hypotheses of Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011)

Jayachandran and Kuziemko (Why do mothers breastfeed girls less than boys? Evidence and implications for child health in India. Quarterly Journal of Economics 2011; 126 (3): 1485–1538) develop and empirically validate a theory showing son preference in India generates ‘passive’ parental bias against girls in breastfeeding due to gender‐differentiated birth spacing and fertility stopping. I scientifically replicate their empirical exercises to test the validity of the theory in Egypt, where there is also high prevailing son preference, but little research on its implications for child health investments. I additionally examine whether using the exclusive breastfeeding rate as an alternative outcome yields supportive evidence for the theory. I find the theory is strongly supported by empirical results from Egyptian data, bolstering its policy relevance for developing countries besides India. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Charitable Donations and the Estate Tax: A Tale of Two Hypotheses

Regression studies have suggested that reducing estate‐tax rates would lead to a net reduction in total charitable donations distributed at death. Not only is this notion counterintuitive, our empirical analysis yields the contrary conclusion: overall donations would increase. In rationalizing this donation‐decline outcome, investigators have pointed to the tax deductibility of donations in assessing estate‐tax liability. These efforts, we show, are dubious. The view that donations will decline is also shown to be inconsistent with axioms of generally accepted economic theory. Two distinct sets of indifference curves that imply these two antithetical views are suggested, their observable predictions derived and compared to the relevant evidence, showing that the increasing‐donation hypothesis is confirmed, offering overall a clear challenge to the decline‐in‐donation position. Our empirical results suggest that most estate‐tax payers possess indifference curves consistent with those that embody the increasing‐donation hypothesis.     

A social procedurial approach to the Pareto optimization problematique

This article applies a variant of game theory to the Pareto multi-value problematique, that is situations where members of a group, community or society are faced with alternative allocations, institutional arrangements, or states of the world and may collectively choose an allocation, institutional arrangement or state of the world if they can agree on it. This type of multiple value decision situation is increasingly prevalent not only on the level of societal and political issues but on the level of many enterprises, particularly those advocating corporate social responsibility. Because actors hold and apply values from different perspectives, there are potential contradictory value judgments and incompatible equilibria. In a world of contradiction, incommensurability, and disequilibrium, to what extent can conflicts be resolved and social equilibrium accomplished? Force works but it is inherently unstable. Drawing on an extension of classical game theory, generalized game theory (GGT), this article addresses the multi-value problematique in terms of collective “resolution procedures.” These regulative procedures—or social algorithms—are applied to problems of conflict and suboptimality in a multiple value world such as Pareto envisioned. This paper (the first of two) outlines key elements of GGT, defines the Pareto multi-value problematique, pointing out several of the critical weaknesses, theoretical as well as empirical, of the Pareto approach. GGT is then applied in defining and analyzing several major procedures to realize improvements in a multi-value world characterized by conflict and sub-optimality. A second article conceptualizes a complex of societal games making up a social system with 2-phase multi-level game processes; it applies the conceptualization to the different societal procedures for multi-value choice under conditions of conflict. Procedures such as democratic voting, adjudication and administrative decision-making, and multi-lateral negotiation are capable of producing outcomes that in many cases are widely accepted as legitimate and become social equilibria (at least within some range of conditions). These procedures and the conditions for their activation and implementation are modelled and explicated through a generalized game approach.     

Promotion dynamics the Peter Principle: Incumbents vs. external hires

The “Peter Principle” (Peter and Hull, 1969; Fairburn and Malcomson, 2001; Lazear, 2004) suggests that individuals are “promoted to their level of incompetence”. A corollary of the “Peter Principle” prediction is that external hires should have an advantage when competing with incumbents for a higher position. Using five years of personnel records from a single large U.S. corporation, this paper contributes to the literature on internal labor markets and intra-firm job mobility by testing this prediction for career advancement. Results support the idea of differences in promotion dynamics among incumbents and external hires, since past career advancement within the firm result in a lower probability of subsequent promotion, even after controlling for workers' heterogeneity and tenure on the current job. The advantage for external hires does not hold once other job changes (lateral transfers, task reorganizations) are considered, highlighting that promotions are a very different job placement mechanism than transfers. Overall, the evidence points out towards declining performance following promotion, as opposed to alternative competing hypothesis of probation placement or “handicapping” external candidates.     

Testing conditional independence via empirical likelihood

We construct two classes of smoothed empirical likelihood ratio tests for the conditional independence hypothesis by writing the null hypothesis as an infinite collection of conditional moment restrictions indexed by a nuisance parameter. One class is based on the CDF; another is based on smoother functions. We show that the test statistics are asymptotically normal under the null hypothesis and a sequence of Pitman local alternatives. We also show that the tests possess an asymptotic optimality property in terms of average power. Simulations suggest that the tests are well behaved in finite samples. Applications to some economic and financial time series indicate that our tests reveal some interesting nonlinear causal relations which the traditional linear Granger causality test fails to detect.     

煤矿企业生产的经济学分析——基于我国矿难频发的经验与理论研究

本文利用近几年发生在我国的较为重大的煤矿安全事故的相关数据和信息,采用数据挖掘分析方法,分析导致我国煤矿安全事故频发的缘由。通过建立博弈模型,对矿难事故中的四方博弈主体,即煤矿工人、煤矿经营者、地方政府官员和中央政府监管部门之间的利益关系开展了博弈分析。在经验分析和理论分析的基础上,文章最后提出了应对我国煤矿安全事故频发的对策建议。     

Fertility, Labor Force Participation and the Relative Income Hypothesis:

Abstract . AN empirical test with Canadian data was made of the relative income hypothesis which states that fertility and labor force participation depend upon relative income, where relative income refers to the current family income level relative to the family's desired income level. The interpretation of the desired income level is modified slightly to mean that it is determined not by the past parental income, as originally formulated, but by contemporaneous income levels of other age groups. An empirical model of labor force participation is estimated for the post-war period. The results on the whole tend to provide empirical support for the relative income hypothesis. The post-war baby boom, which led to a decline in the income of young adults relative to that of older age groups, had the effect of increasing participation rates of young adults, especially of young (married) women.     

城市居民环保行为的内在机理

为探索城市居民环保行为的规律性,根据行为科学相关理论,结合我国城市居民环保行为特征构建了城市居民环保行为内在机理模型。通过问卷调查,运用验证性因子分析、结构方程模型对假设模型进行了实证检验,以人口统计变量为调节变量进行了多群组分析。假设检验结果表明,环保知识、环境问题感知、环保责任意识对环保行为意向正向影响较为显著,个人消费观念对环保行为意向正向影响不显著;环境问题感知、环保行为意向对环保行为产生直接正向影响,但环保知识、环保责任意识、个人消费观念对环保行为正向影响不显著。多群组分析结果显示,性别、婚姻状况、年龄、文化程度、家庭人均月收入等调节变量在不同假设路径中的影响存在显著差异。     

Signaling and Efficiency in Gift Exchange: An Application to Tipping

In the gift exchange principal–agent game, other‐regarding preferences can be sufficient to support an efficient equilibrium with a strictly positive transfer. When the agent is uncertain about the altruism of the principal or the extent to which the principal adheres to social norms, however, he chooses a suboptimal level of effort to insure himself against unfair outcomes. I demonstrate that under certain conditions, a relatively simple change to the structure of the game allows the principal to costlessly signal his type and restores efficiency. I argue that this result has implications for the design of gratuity‐based service industries. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Citizen Willingness to Assist as Volunteers in the Provision of Local Public Goods: A Case Study of Volunteer Firemen in 70 West German Cities

A bstract . Volunteer activity , from one perspective, that of the theory of public choice , provides an outlet for the articulation of demand for public goods. To analyze its role in that function, a theoretical model is constructed which incorporates the social, benevolence and demand articulation elements of volunteerism into a single utility function. The utility function is based on the economics of clubs and the economics of charity views of utility. The theoretical model shows how the rational individual weighs the benefits and costs of volunteerism and relates this behavior to the rational voter model of demand articulation. The model is then empirically tested, using data for volunteer fire companies in 70 West German cities. The empirical results show that to the extent volunteer activities are considered to be a form of demand articulation, they are consistent with the rational voter hypothesis.     

动态环境与生命周期视角下人力资源管理策略对组织绩效的影响:基于模糊集定性比较分析

基于资源依赖理论,采用模糊集定性比较分析(fs/QCA)方法 ,探讨在动态环境下,处于不同生命周期的组织该采用何种人力资源管理策略(HRMP)才能有效提高组织绩效。对491个企业样本进行统计分析,本研究发现:(1)在环境动态性程度不高的情境下,处于成长期的企业实施控制型HRMP能帮助组织取得高绩效;(2)在环境动态性比较高的情境下,处于成长期的企业实施承诺型HRMP能帮助组织取得高绩效;(3)在环境动态性比较高的情境下,处于衰退期的企业需采用承诺与控制相混合的HRMP才能实现组织高绩效目标;(4)不论环境动态性程度如何,实施承诺型HRMP的成熟期企业将取得高绩效;(5)不论环境动态性程度如何,初创期企业采用承诺与控制相混合的HRMP能帮助组织取得实现高绩效目标。本研究的结论细化了不同类型HRMP实现高绩效的情境条件,这为企业人力资源管理策略在动态环境中的发展和应用提供具体的现实指导。     

The testable implications of zero-sum games

We study collective choices from the revealed preference theory viewpoint. For every product set of individual actions, joint choices are called Nash-rationalizable if there exists a preference relation for each player such that the selected joint actions are Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. We characterize Nash-rationalizable joint choice behavior by zero-sum games, or games of conflicting interests. If the joint choice behavior forms a product subset, the behavior is called interchangeable. We prove that interchangeability is the only additional empirical condition which distinguishes zero-sum games from general non-cooperative games.