Climate Change Taxes and Energy Efficiency in Japan

In 2003 Japan proposed a Climate Change Tax to reduce its CO₂ emissions to the level required by the Kyoto Protocol. If implemented, the tax would be levied on fossil fuel use and the revenue distributed to encourage the purchase of energy efficient equipment. Analysis using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model shows that this policy is unlikely to bring Japan into compliance with its Kyoto target unless the subsidy encourages improvement in energy intensity well beyond Japan’s recent historical experience. Similar demand-management programs in the US, where there has been extensive experience, have not been nearly as effective as they would need to be to achieve energy efficiency goals of the proposal. The Tax proposal also calls for limits on international emission trading. We find that this limit substantially affects costs of compliance. The welfare loss with full emissions trading is 1/6 that when Japan meets its target though domestic actions only, the carbon price is lower, and there is a smaller loss of energy-intensive exports. Japan can achieve substantial savings from emissions trading even under cases where, for example, the full amount of the Russian allowance is not available in international markets.     

Emissions Trading and Profitability: The Swedish Pulp and Paper Industry

The purpose of this paper is to develop models with and without potential emissions trading and to compare industry profits under the two regimes. The model in which emissions trading is permitted is a nonparametric industry frontier model in the spirit of Färe et al. (1992). It is relative to this model that industry profit is computed. This profit is compared to the profit without emissions trading to give an estimate of the potential gains that can be realised by allowing for emissions trading. The model, which is applied to data for the Swedish pulp and paper industry, suggests that this industry would have had up to 6% (1%) higher profits in 1989 (1990) if emissions trading had been used instead of individual permits to achieve the same total emissions target. Currently there is no permit trading in this industry so our results only model the potential gains that can be made.     

Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion

In this paper, we show that loopholes in EU emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product markets. The abuses originate from the covert misuse of EU emissions trading institutions, such as pooling or project-based mechanisms. We analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish output restrictions, even if those firms are price takers on the~permit market (which might actually be the case for the majority of obligated firms in the EU). The identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms’ profits, decreases the consumers’ surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges. Consequently, public authorities should not allow emissions trading’s overall good reputation—based upon its efficient abatement of pollution—to blind them to options in European emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition.      

Multinational taxation and international emissions trading

Many studies have shown that the activities of multinational corporations are quite sensitive to differences in income tax rates across countries. In this paper I explore the interaction between multinational taxation and abatement activities under an international emissions permit trading scheme. Four types of plans are considered: (1) a single domestic permit system with international offsets; (2) separate national permit systems without trade; (3) separate national permit systems with limited offsets; and (4) an international permit trading system. For each plan, I model the incentives for the multinational firm to choose abatement activities at home and abroad and to transfer emissions credits between parent and subsidiary. Limits on trading across countries restrict efficiency gains from abatement, as is well known. But if available offset opportunities are limited to actual abatement activities, those activities are also more susceptible to distortions from incentives to shift taxable income. Transfer-pricing rules can limit but not always eliminate these distortions. In a system of unlimited international trading, abatement is efficiently allocated across countries, but tax shifting can still be achieved through intra-firm transfer pricing. From the basis of efficiency for both environmental and tax policies, the best design is an international permit trading system with transparent, enforceable transfer-pricing rules.     

Markets,Morality and Climate Change: What,if Anything,is Wrong with Emissions Trading?

This article explores whether emissions trading is morally defensible To do so it examines three different kinds of moral consideration Which might be used to judge emissions trading. The first kind makes what I term an ‘ethical’ objection, and holds that utilising market instruments to combat climate change is inherently objectionable. I examine three versions if this ‘ethical’ argument but find none persuasive. The remainder of the article considers two additional moral considerations, both of which appeal to principles of justice. Drawing on these it argues that emissions trading can be morally defensible but only it it meets these two demanding moral criteria. First, the costs of emissions trading should be shared equitably. The paper examines what this might mean and criticises the leading account of what constitutes a just distribution of emissions Second, emissions trading must make an appropriate contribution to climate mitigation. A number of ways in which current emissions trading schemes signally fail to meet this second criterion are then noted. The article concludes that emissions trading schemes could in principle be morally defensible but only if new schemes are introduced or existing schemes are radically redesigned in line with the principles outlined in the article.     

Hot air for sale: a quantitative assessment of Russia’s near-term climate policy options

Since January 2005 the European Union has launched an EU-internal emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) for emission-intensive installations as the central pillar to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS will be linked to a Kyoto emissions market where greenhouse gas emission allowances of signatory Kyoto countries can be traded. In this paper we investigate the implications of Russian market power for environmental effectiveness and regional compliance costs to the Kyoto Protocol taking into account potential linkages between the Kyoto emissions market and the EU ETS. We find that Russia may have incentives to join the EU ETS as long as the latter remains relatively separated from the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, Russia can exert monopolistic price discrimination between two separated markets thereby maximizing revenues from hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially reduce compliance costs if it does not restrain itself to EU-internal emission regulation schemes. However, part of the gains from extra-EU emissions trading will come at the expense of environmental effectiveness as (more) hot air will be drawn in.      

Contract-Based Trading Programs in Environmental Regulation

Emissions trading markets have been successful in addressing pollution problems where regulated entities can be treated in a similar manner and precise control of emissions quantities across time and space is not critical. In other situations, trading must account for individual circumstances, complexity, and the patchwork of existing regulations. In these circumstances trading systems have elements of contracts, in that transactions are unique and must be negotiated and approved individually. Such programs imply a high payoff to improved environmental information and to innovations in trading systems that allow making better use of such information. (JEL Q21 , Q25 , Q28 )     

Alternative standards and instruments for air pollution control in Poland

Like other Central European countries, Poland faces the twin challenges of improving environmental quality while also fostering sustainable economic development. In this study we examine the costs of different standards for air pollution control, and the cost savings from using incentive-based policy instruments in lieu of more rigid command-and-control policies. The comparisons are based on the results of a simulation model of energy use and air pollution control for the Polish economy over 1990–2015. The model simulates least-cost energy supply decisions under different environmental policy assumptions, the corresponding emissions, and the cost of achieving the specified policy objectives. The model results suggest that incentive-based policies will have efficiency gains over command policies that are at least worthy of consideration and may be quite substantial. The size of the gains in practice depends in part on how much flexibility is built into the command approach, e.g., capacity for intrafirm trading as well as alack of technology-specific requirements. To achieve these gains, an increase in the current levels of emissions fees is desirable both to strengthen abatement incentives and to improve the capacity of the Polish government to overcome past environmental damages. However, it seems highly unlikely in practice that fees could be raised to the levels necessary to meet current Polish emissions standards. To make further headway, an evolutionary approach to emissions trading patterned after (and profiting from the experience with) emissions trading in the U.S. seems useful. The program could start out relatively modestly and increase in ambitiousness as the Polish economic transition proceeds.     

Markets of concentration permits: The case of manure policy

Concentration permits are regarded as an interesting policy tool for regulating emissions where, besides absolute amounts, also local concentration is important. However, effects of governance structure, trading system and possible policy interventions in the permits' allocation are not yet well analysed and understood. This paper explores in how far tradable fertilisation standards can be seen as a concentration permit trading (CPT) system which can be fine-tuned for further policy intervention. Indeed fertilisation standards such as obliged by the EU Nitrate Directive can be regarded as local nitrate emissions limits, and thus concentration permits. A multi-agent spatial allocation model is used to simulate the impact of defining the manure problem in terms of concentration permits rather than conventional emission permits. Impacts are simulated in terms of environmental performance and increased reallocation costs. The model is applied on the Flemish manure problem.     

Price discovery and intermediation in linked emissions trading markets: A laboratory study

Many new and proposed emissions trading systems involve multiple countries and regions. The introduction of interregional trading raises questions about how flexible state- or national-level authorities should be in allowing individual firms to trade with firms or authorities in other states or countries. This paper uses laboratory methods to evaluate the efficiency and pricing performance of linking trading across regions at the firm-to-firm level. In one treatment, individual firms trade directly with firms or authorities in other regions. We compare performance in this treatment to an intergovernmental trading treatment, where emissions trading is restricted to occur only between intermediaries. A baseline treatment of autarky, where firms only trade with other firms in their country or region, provides a benchmark to assess the efficiency benefits of allowing linking. Although efficiency and price discovery are both improved by allowing intermediation in linked permit markets, we find that further gains can be realized through direct firm to firm trading. Buyers in high cost regions and sellers in low cost regions benefit the greatest from linking.     

Strategic partitioning of emission allowances under the EU Emission Trading Scheme

The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is breaking new ground in the experience with emission trading regimes across multiple jurisdictions. Since the EU ETS covers only some industries, it implies a hybrid emission control scheme where EU member states must apply complementary domestic emissions regulation for the non-trading sectors of their economies in order to comply with their national emission reduction targets. The EU ETS thus opens up for strategic partitioning of national emissions budgets by the member states between trading and non-trading sectors. In this paper we examine the potential effects of such strategic behavior on compliance cost and emissions prices. We show that concerns on efficiency losses from strategic partitioning are misplaced. In turn, our analysis implicitly indicates significant political economy forces behind EU climate policy, as both cost-effective and strategically motivated partitioning of national emission budgets are far off from the actual break-down between trading and non-trading sectors.     

德国国家碳排放权交易体系初探

为落实减排承诺,实现2050年碳中和目标,德国联邦政府立法明确从2021年起引入国家碳排放权交易体系,针对未纳入欧盟碳市场的交通和建筑领域实施二氧化碳排放定价。本文通过介绍政策背景、交易基础和各要素情况,对比欧盟碳排放交易制度,初步探析德国即将实施的国家碳交易体系。     

欧盟碳排放交易发展最新趋势及其启示

欧盟碳排放交易体系是目前全球最完备、影响面最大的温室气体排放权交易市场,对其发展历程、有关经验教训的深入剖析,有助于指导我国的碳市场建立实践。通过对欧盟碳市场的发展历程、主要特点、市场效果等进行系统梳理,特别是对其最新动向与发展趋势进行了深入分析,并探讨欧盟碳市场的成功经验与不足之处,在此基础上,给出了对中国建立和发展碳排放交易体系的几点启示。     

Permit Trading and Credit Trading: A Comparison of Cap-Based and Rate-Based Emissions Trading Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition

This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading) and on relative standards per unit of output (credit trading). Two types of market structure are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. We find that output, abatement costs and the number of firms are higher under credit trading. Allowing trade between permit-trading and credit-trading sectors may increase welfare. With perfect competition, permit trading always leads to higher welfare than credit trading. With imperfect competition, credit trading may outperform permit trading. Environmental policy can lead to exit, but also to entry of firms. Entry and exit have a profound impact on the performance of the schemes, especially under imperfect competition. We find that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions. Under credit trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level of emissions.     

Construction of legal system of carbon emissions trading in China

Countries in the world have taken a variety of means to control carbon emissions based on the serious situation of global warming,the concept of low-carbon economy and the provisions about emissions in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change（UNFCCC） and the Kyoto Protocol.With the measures of emissions reductions,the system of carbon emissions trading is taking shape.It is necessary for China as the big natural resources consumption country to establish its own carbon emissions trading system.By introducing the carbon emissions trading system of the European Union,America and Japan,and analyzing the market and policies been formed,the carbon emissions trading system in China can be established from the initial configuration of the emissions rights,the subject and object of carbon emissions trading,establishing the carbon emissions trading exchange and supervising and regulating the carbon emissions trading.     

Trade-offs in sulfur emission trading in Europe

How to implement emission trading is one question in the current negotiations on a new sulfur protocol in Europe. Whereas the current protocol stipulates a 30 percent uniform reduction, national emission ceilings included in the proposed new protocol imply differentiated reductions. In addition, emission and fuel standards are proposed. This paper examines the costs and environmental impacts of emission trading. Emission trading combined with regulations is a new element in the paper. Calculations using the RAINS (Regional Acidification INformation and Simulation) model suggest that overlaying emission trading on regulations not only reduces the cost savings but has beneficial impacts as well: ecosystem protection is not changed and significant decreases in environmental benefits for countries are largely avoided. Emission trading can also be used to decrease emissions and increase ecosystem protection. If combined with existing legislation, emission trading minimizes losses in expected environmental benefits for some countries, and most countries gain. However, the initial distribution of emission ceilings has to be used so that some countries are not confronted with higher costs. Trade-offs appear to exist between the use of emission trading to achieve cost savings on the one hand, and ecosystem protection and distributional equity on the other.     

污染物减排政策效果比较——基于经济学视角

我国政府已经把减少污染物排放作为约束性指标纳入到国家中长期发展战略之中,采取有效的污染物减排政策是中国缓解环境压力、实现经济社会可持续发展的重要手段.排污权交易制度是在总量管制的情况下,通过污染物排放权的分配,最终实现该区域总的排污量削减.本文从经济学的视角,研究了排污权交易的实施基础,并与行政强制性减排以及环境税减排进行了效率比较,结果表明排污权交易比单纯的行政强制性排污和环境税约束具有更高的市场效率以及灵活性,同时并不会降低整个社会的污染物排放效果.此外,从市场势力的影响、市场信息的影响、交易规则的影响等方面讨论了影响排污权交易市场效率的因素,对我国排污权交易市场的发展提出了相应的建议,为排污权交易市场的稳定运行提供了理论参考.     

国际碳交易的经济学理论分析

二氧化碳等温室气体的过度排放造成的全球气温上升已经威胁到人类的生存和发展。对国际碳交易的内涵及经济学理论进行了分析,对深入理解、研究国际碳交易理论基础和实践经验具有非常现实的作用和意义。     

The effectiveness of anti-leakage policies in the European Union: results for Austria

With the third trading period of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) starting in 2013, the system of allocating emission allowances will significantly change: In contrast to the previous two trading periods, auctioning of the allowances should now be the rule rather than the exception. Accompanying this policy change, concerns over competitiveness of energy intensive, trade exposed sectors as well as over limited environmental effectiveness via the channel of carbon leakage, have regained prominence. In this paper, we thus explore the impacts of potential EU policies to counter losses in international competitiveness and carbon leakage from the perspective of Austria. Based on numerical simulations with a computable general equilibrium model, we evaluate three policy options: an input subsidy for carbon allowances (thus reflecting the planned partially free allocation mechanism in the third EU ETS phase), a subsidy for domestic production, and an export rebate based on sectoral CO₂ costs. Our results show that each policy has the potential to support domestic production in exposed sectors relative to a full auctioning scenario and thus increase competitiveness. However, none is imperatively effective at reducing Austria’s net carbon emissions: while the carbon trade balance is improved and hence leakage declines, the tradability of emission permits within the EU ETS allows CO₂ emissions from Austria’s ETS output to increase. A cost benefit analysis indicates that the two policies promoting domestic output and exports are more cost effective than the CO₂ input subsidy.     

On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances

This paper derives optimal schemes for the free allocation of emission allowances in a dynamic context. We consider emissions- and output-based allocation rules which allow for updating of the basis of allocation over time and thereby do not rely on historical data only. We show that such dynamic schemes do not necessarily induce inefficient outcomes. In closed trading systems with an absolute cap on emissions, grandfathering schemes which allocate allowances proportionally to past emissions are first-best. However, in open trading systems where allowances can be traded with outsiders, first-best allocation schemes must not depend on firm-specific decisions while second-best schemes correspond to a Ramsey rule of optimal tax differentiation and are generally based on both past emission and output levels.