Entrepreneurship education in the nineties

Bringing entrepreneurship education into the community support infrastructure poses one of the more important economic development issue for the 1990s. Aspart of the new strategy for job creation, entrepreneurship education holds promise as an integral component in a community's venture support system along with incubators, innovation centers, technology transfer offices, science parks, and venture capital operations. Since new venture success is foremost a function of entrepreneurial knowledge and know-how, entrepreneurship education may be the most promising of these economic development mechanisms. Unfortunately, it may be the most difficult to implement.Generally the extent and nature of education required by modern aspiring entrepreneurs is not well understood. Many would see entrepreneurship education as strictly an add-on to current education in management or engineering. Such is the option of minimal use. The real promise or entrepreneurship education will be realized when it is strategically organized for economic development and job creation. This article traces the recent history of entrepreneurship education before proceeding to deal with a number of questions facing those who would use entrepreneurship education as part of a modern economic development strategy:

1. 1.1. Why is entrepreneurship education important?
2. 2.2. How should it be distinguished from related programs?
3. 3.3. How will success be measured?
4. 4.4. Who will be the students?
5. 5.5. How will the subject be taught?
6. 6.6. What will be the curriculum?
7. 7.7. Who will be the teachers?

     

Assessing economic value added by university-based new-venture outreach programs

A new-venture development office was set up in a university to solicit, screen, and allocate community ventures into upper-level undergraduate and graduate project courses. Innovative ventures in the early stages of development were allocated according to: 1) the project requirements of different courses and 2) the assessed needs of the ventures themselves. During 1984, 89 different projects with a weighted average of 125 manhours per project were run through the new-venture office. Students who conducted the projects included law students, industrial-design students, and a few undergraduate commerce students, although the majority of the work was done by second-year MBA students. Most of the MBA students were parttime students holding middle-management positions and having five or more years of relevant business experience. Projects were run through twelve different courses and a seed-capital conference. The program was conceptualized and coordinated by a number of professors teaching within an entrepreneurship concentration in an MBA program. Early in 1985, a telephone survey of 50 of the 63 entrepreneurs who had projects in the program was completed. These people were asked to systematically and realistically assess the resulting net benefits to their ventures along a number of different prespecified dimensions. The total value added was computed to be $1.75 million (CDN). which stands in contrast to the direct, out-of-pocket cost of the program, which was only $75,000 (CDN).The individual dimensions of value added that were measured included:

• •• Time gained or saved in advancing their new venture;
• •• Knowledge (understanding) gained of new-venture development;
• •• Information added of use in pursuing their new venture;
• •• Contacts made in support of their new venture;
• •• Strategic changes made; and
• •• Overall value of the experience.

Additionally, respondents were asked to report whether or not they had secured new capital injections, increased or decreased employee levels, or made structural advances in their ventures. Rather than assume that the program was the primary instigator of all such changes, the respondents were asked to assess the relative impact of the program along appropriate dimensions.The program was perceived to have had a significant influence on most of the dimensions measured. A summary of the major results includes:

• •• Average value added of time saved or gained: $6,097.50;
• •• Average valeu added of new knowledge about venture development: $9, 389.47;
• •• Average value added of new information added: $6,293.48;
• •• Average value added of new contracts made: $7, 238.89;
• •• Average value added of strategy changes: $16,937.50;
• •• Average value added of overall involvement in the program: $37,269.00;
• •• Net employment generated: 20.4 FTE; and
• •• New capital raised: $5.1 million.

Certain shortcomings of the research are discussed, including the validity and reliability of the value added measures. Research is continuing to validate the findings and refine the program.     

The impact of regulatory legislation on contractual costs risk and the form of contracts used in the UK and Republic of Ireland

The problem of contractual cost and quality risk within the public sector has been infrequently addressed within the EU regulated procurement environment. The view of Member States has been that concentration of buying power, standard conditions of contract and competitive bidding are the protective mechanism and cornerstones of regulated sector buyers. Aspects of the size of the ‘bidding pool’ and the influence of EU purchasing requirements are addressed and seen as largely unsatisfactorily addressed. This article provides an empirical analysis on two significant points:

• •that the UK and Republic of Ireland (ROI) public sector bodies have not significantly changed the type of contract (or contractual form) as a result of regulatory requirements.
• •that the form of contract adopted does not effectively address the cost and quality risks management may face once such contracts have been let.

     

Towards a theory of entrepreneurship

Over 200 years of the study of entrepreneurship have provided many definitions of the word “entrepreneur”. However, no theory of entrepreneurship has been developed that would explain or predict when an entrepreneur, by any of the definitions, might appear or engage in entrepreneurship. Indeed, the search for a best definition may have impeded the development of theory.The Schumpeter economic outcome-based concept that an entrepreneur creates value by carrying out new combinations causing discontinuity is embodied in many of the definitions offered within the last 50 years. We strongly recommend the adoption of Schumpeter's definition for academic and policy-making purposes.We offer the following tentative entrepreneurship theory, extracted from anecdotal observations and extant literature, in the hope that it will better explain and begin to predict the phenomenon of entrepreneurship:“A person will carry out a new combination, causing discontinuity, under conditions of:

• 1.1. Task-related motivation,
• 2.2. Expertise,
• 3.3. Expectation of personal gain, and
• 4.4. A supportive environment.

”Several relevant research questions are posed in the hope that they will encourage discontinuity in further development of theory.     

After the cash arrives: A comparative study of venture capital and private investor involvement in entrepreneurial firms

Equity investments in entrepreneurial firms continue to grow in number and dollar amount from both venture capital and private investment sources. Increasingly, these two sources of capital play an important role in the development of new and existing entrepreneurial ventures. Due to the sometimes hurried attempt to turn their dream into reality, entrepreneurs may fail to consider similarities and differences in the value-added benefits supplied by venture capital firms (VCs) and private investors (PIs).Accordingly, the purpose of this study was to determine how initial relationships are established and maintained between entrepreneurs and their primary investors. Specifically, we asked entrepreneurs to assess characteristics of the relationship with their primary investor. We then contrasted the results between entrepreneurial firms that had received venture capital funding versus private investor funding. Differences were examined along the following lines:

• 1.• Levels of investor involvement in entrepreneurial firms
• 2.• Reporting and operational controls placed on the firm
• 3.• Types of expertise sought by the entrepreneur

     

Learning needs of growth-oriented entrepreneurs

As firms increase in size and complexities, the entrepreneurs managing them face a number of unique problems. Often the entrepreneurs lack the experience to address these challenges. Further, finding the best method to acquire the needed information has proven elusive for both entrepreneurs and educators.The existing entrepreneurship education literature related to teaching and/or learning skills to grow a business does not significantly address the problems brought on by growth. Most studies have examined students in an academic environment, away from realworld problems, in a relatively structured setting of a specific duration and with similar levels of competency and knowledge. Practicing entrepreneurs do not fit this educational mold.The results of this study show that entrepreneurs prefer learning experiences that are short, to the point, content oriented, and taught by practicing professionals. This study also identifies the priority learning needs and preferred delivery methods of fast growth entrepreneurs. These findings could be used to develop a series of courses or modules that could enhance the management efficiency and effectiveness of fast growth entrepreneurs.This study contributes to the general knowledge of entrepreneurship education in the following areas:

• 1.1. It identifies the learning needs and preferred instructional methods of practicing, fast growth entrepreneurs.
• 2.2. It provides market information on course offerings for executive education programs.
• 3.3. It provides a model of curriculum content for universities that wish to bring their courses more in line with the needs of practicing entrepreneurs.
• 4.4. It provides a teaching approach that can help bridge the gap between academe and the business world by focusing on learning needs common to both students and entrepreneurs.

     

Environment,corporate entrepreneurship,and financial performance: A taxonomic approach

This study examined the association between a firm's external environment, corporate entrepreneurship, and financial performance. The study emphasized three propositions: (1) perceived—rather than objective-characteristics of the environment significantly influenced entrepreneurship activities; (2) a multidimensional definition of a firm's environment was essential to unravel the interplay between the environment, orporate entrepreneurship activities, and financial performance; and (3) a taxonomic approach had the advantage of accounting for the interrelationships among the dimensions of the environment in classifying firms.Using data from 102 companies in six4-digit industrial classification codes (SIC),cluster analysis was used to distinguish four environmental settings: “dynamic growth,” “hostile and rivalrous but technologically rich,” “hospitable, product-driven growth,” and “static and impoverished” environments. These four environments varied in their characteristics.The four empirically derived environment clusters were then used to examine variations in corporate entrepreneurship—operationalized as corporate innovation and venturing, and corporate renewal activities. The first dimension—corporate innovation and venturing—had four components: new business creation, new product introduction, percent of revenue from new products, and technological entrepreneurship. The renewal dimension had three components: mission reformulation, reorganization, and system-wide change. The data were used to test six hypotheses:

• 1.H1: In dynamic or growth environments, companies will emphasize new business creation and innovation.
• 2.H2: Environmental hostility is positively associated with the redefinition of business through venturing activities.
• 3.H3: Hospitable business environments are positively associated with business venturing and renewal activities.
• 4.H4: Static environments are inversely associated with corporate venturing and renewal activities.
• 5.H5: Corporate entrepreneurship activities are positively associated with company financial performance.
• 6.H6: Corporate entrepreneurship activities emphasised in HI through H4 will be significantly and positively associated with company financial performance in their respective environmental clusters.

The results provided general support for the six hypotheses. They showed that: (1) each environmental cluster had a distinct combination of activities relating to corporate innovation and venturing, and renewal; (2) corporate entrepreneurship activities varied in their associations with measures of company growth and profitability; and (3) the associations between corporate entrepreneurship and company financial performance varied among the four environment clusters. The results from this study can help executives in selecting specific entrepreneurial activities that match the demands of success in their business environment to improve their company's performance.     

General managers control new and existing products differently

This article presents some initial findings from an ongoing research project on the way that divisional general managers of targe organizational units control new product innovations. (Control, in this instance, refers to the set of procedures, systems, and actions that general managers use to monitor, evaluate, influence, or define what subordinates are doing.) The research presented here focuses on three broad questions:

• 1.1. Do divisional general managers of large organizational units control their new product activities differently from their more established operations?
• 2.2. Is a new product's innovation strategy related to the nature and degree of divisional general manager control—and, if so, in what way?
• 3.3. Is a divisional general manager's choice of control methods related to his/her unit's new product output?

The results were based on in-depth interviews with the general managers of 26 large Canadian-based divisions in 12 firms. All the firms were significant competitors in the North American market and all were actively engaged in new product activities. Firm size ranged from $210 million to $5 billion in sales. The following is a summary of the study's principal findings and conclusions:

• 1.1. Control varies among dimensions. The study measured the degree of control exercised by divisional general managers over new and established products on 14 control variables. It was found that none of the new products (relative to established brands) was controlled in the same fashion by the managers. Instead, new products were always managed through a variety of “loose” and “tight” controls. In so doing, it appeared that the divisional general managers were trying to balance the control and freedom required by subordinates with new products.
• 2.2. Control varies with strategy. Both theory and empirical research generally support the notion of linkage between a unit's strategy and its organizational (eg, design, reward, placement, information, etc.) practices. The results of this study strengthen this line of thinking. The data show that both the nature and degree of divisional general manager control vary with three dimensions of product strategy (i.e., familiarity, uniqueness, and advancement).
• 3.3. Control varies with output. The analysis highlighted the pivotal relationship between divisional general manager control and new product output. Both the nature and degree of control were found to be associated with new product output in each strategic category. Although there does not appear to be one best way to control all types of new products, some divisional general management approaches to control were more preferred than others.
• 4.4. Loose formal/tight informal. The general managers' control patterns showed that formal control dimensions were usually managed more loosely than informal ones; that tighter informal controls were used to off-set (or “balance” ) the more relaxed formal dimensions; and that the observed reduction in formal control should not be interpreted to mean either the absence of bureaucracy or the absence of formal control. Indeed, some formal bureaucratic control was always found in the “high output” strategic categories. Thus, rather than being considered or labeled as typically “bad”, bureaucracy may in fact be “beautiful”—provided, of course, that it is appropriately used.

The article concludes by arguing that a divisional general manager's approach to controlling new products seems to make a difference in terms of performance. As such, the control approach chosen should not be made haphazardly or with abandon.     

Venture capital in transition: A Monte-Carlo simulation of changes in investment patterns

This article examines the nature of the investment process which has historically generated high returns for venture capital funds, and the impact on fund returns of perceived changes in management practice and the structure of the industry. The article outlines some policy implications for fund managers, investors, and the general management of corporations.The authors have investigated the investment process and the changes in the nature of the process through the use of a Monte-Carlo simulation model. Information gathered from interviews with fund managers and the available published data on venture fund performance (including proprietary surveys) was used to develop and calibrate the model. The model replicates the relatively high average fund returns and distribution of returns for funds through the early 1980s. The model simulates a multistaged investment process which draws on a pool of investment opportunities which have a log normal distribution of returns and a low (zero) average return. The model readily permits the exploration of the impact of management and industry practices on fund returns.The conditions identified by the authors, which led to high rates of return on the part of venture capital funds, include:

• 1.1) multistaged investment or commitment of funds on an incremental basis with evaluation of venture performance before commitment of additional fund;
• 2.2) objective evaluation of venture performance with the clear distinguishing of winners from losers;
• 3.3) parlaying funds or having the confidence to commit further funds to ventures identified as winners;
• 4.4) persistence of returns from one round to the next, which implies that valuable information is gained from previous rounds of investment in the same venture;
• 5.5) long-term holding of investment portfolios for a period sufficient for geometric averaging of compound returns to cause the winners to “take over” or raise portfolio returns.

Taken together, these conditions have permitted venture capital funds to historically realize strong average returns with a few of them realizing extraordinary returns.The article also explores the consequences of what some believe is happening in the industry: a trend toward holding investments for shorter periods, increased competition both for investments and later in the product-market arena, and a growing lack of loyalty between investors and investees. All of these conditions and their indirect consequences were shown by the model to negatively impact the limited partners in the venture capital funds while general partners, given the structure of fees and the distribution of investment returns, generally realized a reasonable to extraordinary return. The article outlines a number of management and investment policy implications for investors and fund managers.     

Three facets of satisfaction and their influence on the performance of innovation teams

This study investigates and demonstrates the mediating effect of job satisfaction between team deftness and team comprehension and the performance of 168 project teams involved in major innovation projects for their companies.The study demonstrates that there are at least three independent facets of job satisfaction: instrumental satisfaction with the way the task is progressing, social satisfaction with the way the team members interact with one another and the organization, and egocentric satisfaction with the individuals' perceived benefits to themselves.Previous studies have shown that innovation team performance is directly correlated with the two antecedents of performance: team deftness, which reflects how effectively the team works to achieve the innovation's purpose and team comprehension, which reflects how the team understands the linkages among key variables driving the innovation outcome. The study argues that these different facets of satisfaction differentially affect the ways in which team performance is affected by deftness and comprehension.There are three major results:

• 1.1. Social satisfaction mediates the relation between team deftness and performance—as social dissatisfaction of the team increases, it appears to impede the ability of the team to deploy its deftness in accomplishing the project's purpose.
• 2.2. Instrumental satisfaction mediates the relation between team comprehension and project performance—as instrumental dissatisfaction increases, it appears to impede the ability of the team to deploy its comprehension to accomplish the project's purpose.
• 3.3. Egocentric satisfaction does not appear to mediate the relation between team deftness and project performance.

Some managerial implications of these results are discussed.     

Contours of development

New ventures seem to suffer more difficulties and business failures than do established firms. Also, there is a pattern to the mortality, with most newly founded businesses lasting only a few years.Explanations of high failure rates in new ventures have often centered on “poor management,” or have postulated that firms chose inappropriate strategies for their markets and economic environments.The present article conceives of new venture mortality as similar in nature to patterns of development that we observe, for instance, in human embryos or in the formation of new species. That is, development is an inherently hazardous process.Some of the specific hazards of development are:

• 1.1. Generic Entry Barriers. It is generally not possible for a new firm or product to successfully enter an already crowded, stable market where competitors are strong. It is more feasible instead to enter a new or growing market; or to enter with a “substitute” product that is clearly superior to those existing; or to exploit an unnoticed market opening; or to develop competitive strengths “secretly,” without overtly challenging others in the industry.
• 2.2. Density of Developmental Hurdles. Any new entity must clear a sequence of important hurdles on its way to maturity, such as establishing a well-ordered office, a functional sales channel, etc. Failure at any one hurdle is potentially fatal, and a mathematical analysis shows that the likelihood of passing even 10 hurdles in a row is about one in three. The earliest hurdles tend to be the most difficult and to crowd more densely than later hurdles. Particularly troublesome are “phase changes” where a company first starts business or becomes one thing rather than another within a short period of time.
• 3.3. Amplification of Maturational Error. Any complex system that grows rapidly and is unable to predict the future perfectly is going to accumulate structural errors that become very difficult to remedy. This is a natural and inevitable developmental process, as the system grows in complexity and the flaw itself becomes a pillar of the system. If an imitator or competitor arrives soon afterward and spots the error, he or she will easily be able to retool and redesign a better system, whereas the first firm is stuck with old habits, tools, dies, and production methods.
• 4.4. Sequence and Control in Development. Every embryonic organism has a design template outlined in its DNA that is carefully followed. Both the developing fetus itself and the mother have monitoring and control mechanisms that trigger an abortion if the development process goes awry. New ventures lack such mechanisms. They are more susceptible to “developmental deviance,” likely to differ from the model successful corporation of their type.
• 5.5. Smallness and the Asymmetry of Luck. Small things are more subject to the whims of fate than big things. Amount of resources is the key. Because new ventures typically start off with scarce resources, a bad bounce can sink the company, and the probability of at least one such bad bounce is high.
• 6.6. Costs of Organizing. Like all of the larger-brained mammals, a new company, such as a medical supply firm, must learn through experience much of what it means to be mature. Costs associated with learning arrive just when the firm is most vulnerable and distracted by other challenges.

In one sense, the message of this article is good news, in that managers of failed enterprises need not assume all the blame. After all, if most new businesses do poorly, then failure is the average or typical case, and it makes little sense to say that the average manager is “poor.” The bad news is that, if our perspective is correct, managers of new ventures have less scope to influence the success of their enterprises than is commonly believed. The managerial recommendations that emerge are that new ventures are more likely to succeed to the extent that they: have sponsorship or capital, have managers with a range of experience in previous ventures, are given extra assistance of “shelter,” or can ensure a high probability of passing all of the hurdles faced by a new venture.     

Product life-cycle considerations and the nature of strategic activities in entrepreneurial firms

This article reports on the nature of strategic activities and concerns reported by the CEOs of 77 entrepreneurial manufacturing firms once initial success in their marketplace had been achieved. Once the entrepreneurial firm achieves initial market success, the rate and number of strategic decisions faced by the entrepreneurs rapidly expand. A product becomes a product line. Product lines are added. Facilities and equipment are expanded. Personnel are added. A more formal and interpersonally complex organization becomes necessary. Markets and distribution channels expand, adding uncertainty to key market-related decisions. New financial risks arise, often as the result of undercapitalized cash flows. All of these factors combine to dramatically increase the pressure on the entrepreneur's strategic decision making.A major factor underlying the complicity inherent in this scenario is the product/market life cycle: the entrepreneurs must now organize and make decisions regarding several product lines that span several life-cycle stages with different strategic concerns, rather than regarding the narrow product range and limited life-cycle position that provided their initial success. The research reported in this article examined the relative importance of ten strategic activities and concerns reported by the 77 CEOs across products at different life-cycle stages.Initial interviews with selected CEOs and a review of the strategic-management literature identified ten key factors shaping the firm's evolving decision-making practices. These ten factors were divided into three groups:

• 1.1. Operational concerns that necessitate strategic attention: 1) changes in product design; 2) changes in process design; 3) risk of producing a product; and 4) emphasis on creativity.
• 2.2. Dimensions influencing a firm's strategic-management activities: 5) demand on the strategic manager's time: 6) speed of decision making; 7) problems of internal politics; and 8) environmental uncertainty.
• 3.3. Fundamental assumptions underlying a firm's decision-making practices: 9) annual-profit potential; and 10) value of strategic planning.

There are two main sets of results: First, four process-related factors (value of strategic planning, demand on CEO's time, speed of decision making and annual-profit potential) were consistently the most important factors affecting performance within eact stage. Regardless of the life cycle of a particular product line, the manner or process by which decisions were made (strategic planning, CEO's time, and speed of decision making) and one key assumption or objective-annual-profit potential-were seen as factors more important in affecting performance than were operating concerns that necessitated strategic attention. Second, strategic issues associated with product lines at the development and growth stages of their life cycle are reported to be significantly more important to CEOs in entrepreneurial manufacturing firms than are strategic issues associated with mature or declining products lines.These results suggest that CEOs in entrepreneurial manufacturing firms should re-examine their strategies and practices to be sure that sufficient “strategic attention” is being given to decisions regarding mature product lines. In addition, these CEO's need to ensure, in the face of constant demands for their time and decisions, that operating concerns requiring strategic attention get appropriate consideration.     

The case method: A perspective

The task of preparing a case is similar to writing a legal brief or an essay insofar as all three should contain a thesis or main point and argumentation or logically arranged facts and inferences. However, different from a brief or an essay, case studies should not contain a conclusion. A case should lead the reader through the facts, but it should not offer a firm or fixed resolution or moral judgment. Ideally it should leave the reader with the opportunity to create and insert their own conclusion. A good case study should be amenable to the following kinds of questions or analysis procedures:

1. What is the problem? or What is at stake?
2. What are the non-normative or factual issues involved?
3. What are the normative or ethical issues involved?
4. What are the alternatives available?
5. What decision would you make?

     

Corporate social responsibility and public accountability

The development of legislation determining corporate behaviour is a fascinating topic, offering insight into the societal problems of corporate enterprise as they are related to their accounting, their administration, and their external reporting. In this paper the following specific implications for accounting are examined:

-Should accountants get involved in social auditing and are they the ‘core’ persons in corporate social accounting systems?

-Should corporate social performance measurement and reporting become obligatory and to what extent?

-A general framework for the implementation of corporate social accounting systems is suggested and quidelines for its auditing are proposed.

-A tentative set of social auditing standard is outlined together with its methodological accompaniments.

     

Offensive and defensive marketing: Closed-loop duopoly strategies

Offensive and Defensive Marketing: Closed-Loop Duopoly Strategies A modified Lanchester game is used to develop closed-loop strategies for offensive and defensive marketing expenditures of duopolistic competitors in a market share rivalry. Analysis of the model reveals that

1. well-defined closed-loop strategies can be developed that show directly the influence of market share on offensive and defensive marketing;
2. steady state is marked by balance between offensive and defensive marketing expenditures;
3. defensive marketing is more critical than offensive marketing due to greater risk of loss under deviation from closed-loop strategies.

The last result would appear to have particularly important implications for both practice and research.     

Commentary on “an empirical study of moral reasoning among managers”

Managerial reasoning is characteristic of a care-relationship ethics:

1. If a corporation provides certain community values to corporate members not reducible to their self-interested economic or professional objectives;
2. If such values are generated by a division of labor based on interdependence, reciprocity and concern for another's self-realization;
3. If it's based on promoting an ethical corporate self independent of its economic value.

Such an ethic is appropriate, given employees' tremendous personal contributions, the unique position of private industry to provide distinctive resources without committing extensive social resources, and due to its potential for reducing managerial moral fragmentation and hypocrisy.     

Corporate venturing: alternatives,obstacles encountered,and experience effects

In this study of a relatively small number of corporate executives with line experience in corporate venturing, some clues are uncovered that could help those corporations contemplating the initiation of acquisition, joint venturing, or corporate start-up activities to avoid or overcome the obstacles that our sample of managers encountered.The preliminary indications are;

• 1.1. Joint ventures appear to be a highly useful way of starting off in venturing activity while at the same time reducing the initial risk.
• 2.2. The excutives in this sample indicated that experience at venturing resulted in improvement in venturing performance, but only after several venture attempts. From this observation, two suggestions appear reasonable: 1) Start venturing with few relatively small ventures and keep ventures relatively small until experience is gained. Start perhaps with joint ventures to learn your way in and “graduate” to grass-roots start ups once significant learning has taken place; and 2) The experience gained will reside in people who may have been part of an unsuccessful venture, perhaps several unsuccessful ventures. If this experience is to be useful, the people who have gained it need to be retained and recycled to other new ventures.
• 3.3. Although some of the obstacles perceived by the executives diminish with experience, others do not. Regardless of experience, inability to plan for new ventures is a recurrently cited obstacle, as is the inability of the corporation to provide adequate support to the venture.

The last point may be the most significant observation in this study. Prevailing corporate values call for the ability to plan and to meet the plan as one of the primary measures of managerial competence. New ventures, however, rarely conform to plan, especially the quantitative projections. As a result, corporate support either dwindles when plans are not achieved or desperate spending efforts are made to achiev unachievable planned results, which often results in large losses. Very different planning methods are needed for ventures, methods that, in the highly uncertain surroundings of venturing activity, address what realistic corporate expectations should be, how progress should be measured and venture managers evaluated, and in what ways and at what times support will be provided by the parent corporation. These are discussed in the main body of the article.     

The Swedish product safety legislation

During the 1970's and 80's the interest in product safety has grown in Sweden. This in turn has led to an examination of the product safety legislation. On July 1, 1989, a new general Product Safety Act will come into force. Its aim is to prevent hazardous goods and services from causing personal injury or damage to property. Under the Act an entrepreneur can:

--be enjoined to provide safety information

--be prohibited from further provision of the hazardous goods and services

--be enjoined to provide cautionary information

--be ordered to recall hazardous goods and services.

A Governmental Committee has recently investigated whether or not rules concerning prohibition of export goods entailing a direct danger to life, health, or safety should be introduced and, in that event, how they should be devised. The Committee proposed certain rules in December 1988. This proposal will be circulated for comment whereupon it will be decided within the Government Offices how to proceed with the work on the proposal.