Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition

This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents’ effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal.     

The determinants of hospital size: a survivor analysis

A common criticism of foreign aid is that it reduces domestic tax effort. Empirical research on the issue has been hampered by the failure to tackle endogeneity issues effectively. We use measures of geographical and cultural distance to donor countries as instrumental variables to uncover the causal effect of aid on tax revenue in a panel of 93 countries. The tax to GDP ratio is found to decrease following aid inflows. This reduction in tax effort is statistically and economically significant; a one SD increase in aid causes a 0.52 percentage point drop in the tax-to-GDP ratio. The results indicate that the effect is driven by unconditional grants, whereas aid given as loans induces recipient governments to improve their tax effort. Our results are robust to changes in the sample and the use of a nearest neighbour matching technique to account for nonrandom assignment of aid. Our identification strategy is sharpened by the use of a difference-in-difference estimation strategy that leverages a natural experiment in which aid flows exogenously increased for some countries following the Iranian Revolution in 1979.     

The determinants of inward investment: a Welsh analysis

Inward foreign direct investment is becoming increasingly important to the UK economy and the regions. This paper examines the motivation behind inward investment into the UK generally, before considering the success of Wales in attracting relatively high levels of new inward investment during the eighties. The paper then examines key factors which influence foreign direct investment into Wales, and the associated policy implications.     

The determinants of FDI location choice in China: a discrete-choice analysis

This study addresses two questions: What are the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) location choice in China? What are the factors that determine investors’ choice between ‘Economic zones’ in China on one hand, and ‘other cities’ of China on the other hand? This study shows that FDI location choice is sensitive both on the endowment conditions in different regions/cities/economic zones in China as well as on the country of origin of the FDI. Based on a data set of 1218 observations, the results of the binary logit regressions indicate that the protection of intellectual rights, agglomeration economies, investments in education and gross regional product affect the location choice of FDI in China. This choices, however, varies depending on the origin of the FDI. Policy makers can use these findings to channel FDI to targeted regions/ cities.     

Understanding wage determination in a multi-level bargaining system: a panel data analysis

This article presents an estimation of the elasticity of actual wages to industry-level collective bargaining thereby quantifying empirically the role of industry-level bargaining on wage determination. For this purpose, we use a unique employer–employee panel dataset covering the entire Belgian employment population over 9 years (1998–2006). Like several other European countries, e.g. Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands, Belgium has a relatively centralised wage bargaining system, with the industry level playing the most important role. Regression results confirm that wage increases collectively decided at the industry level are, on average, fully passed on to individual wages. In addition to industry-level bargaining, we are interested in the supplementary wage increases granted at the firm level, referred to as wage drift or wage cushion in the literature. Our estimates show that wage drift is affected by company size, by the economic performance of the industry and to a much lesser extent by labour market tensions as measured by the local unemployment rate. Interestingly, our results show that industry-level bargaining also takes most of these features into account.     

The bargaining set of a large game

We study the equivalence between the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core in the general context of TU games with a measurable space of players. In the first part of the paper, we study the problem without imposing any restriction on the class of games we consider. In the second part, we first introduce a new class of exact games, which we call thin games. For these games, we show not only that the Mas-Colell bargaining set is equal to the core, but also that it is the unique stable set in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern. We then study the relation between thin games, exact non-atomic market games and non-atomic convex games. Finally, by further developing “thinness” related ideas, we prove new equivalence results for a class of non-exact market games as well as a class of non-exact, non-market games.     

Persistence of economic uncertainty: a comprehensive analysis

One of the most heavily researched and cited issue in applied economics is the relationship of uncertainty indices with the financial and macroeconomic variables. While the statistical features of financial and macroeconomic variables have been thoroughly examined, virtually nothing has been done to examine uncertainty indices under the statistical perspective. In this paper, we focus on two primary characteristics of uncertainty indices: persistence and chaotic behaviour. In order to evaluate the persistence and the chaotic behaviour we analyse 72 popular uncertainty indices constructed by forecasting models, text mining from news articles and data mining from monetary variables to measure the Hurst and Lyapunov exponents in rolling windows. The examination in rolling windows provides a dynamic evaluation of the specific characteristics revealing significant variations of persistence and chaotic dynamics with time. More specifically, we find that almost all uncertainty indices are persistent, while the chaotic dynamics are detected only sporadically and for certain indices during recessions of economic turbulence. Thus, we suggest that the examination of persistence and chaos should be a prerequisite step before using uncertainty indices in economic policy models.     

A comprehensive analysis of farmland value determination: a county-level analysis

This study develops a comprehensive model of farmland value determination to analyze the effects of various economic variables such as net farm income, government payments, macroeconomic factors, and demographic conditions on farmland values for the counties along the Snake River valley in Idaho. Land values, net farm income, and population show considerable variation among the counties. Therefore, use of county level cross-sectional and time-series data helps to assess the impacts of various factors on land values more accurately. The empirical results show that net farm income, wheat yield, population, and credit availability have positive effects, and property tax rates, interest rates, and debt to asset ratio have negative effects on farmland values.     

Investment in Eastern Europe: The role of multilateral organisations

Director and Chief Economist, Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America, European Investment Bank.     

FDI performance: a stochastic frontier analysis of location and variance determinants

The opening up process of the eastern European countries was marked by greater integration of FDI with their western neighbouring countries. Using the single-step ML approach to stochastic frontier analysis, the location and variance determinants of FDI are estimated using the knowledge capital (KK) model framework. The findings, based on a panel of bilateral FDI stocks from 10 western to 10 eastern European countries over the 1996–2007 period, suggest FDI is determined by both horizontal and vertical motives while the process of liberalization and infrastructural developments significantly reduces the variance of FDI. In using a stochastic frontier specification of the KK model, the efficiency of FDI performance is identified relative to maximum levels. The bilateral efficiency scores suggest a mixed performance, indicating scope to improve the efficiency of FDI.     

Lottery expenditures in Canada: a regional analysis of determinants and incidence

This article examines two issues; first, it evaluates the statistical significance of a number of socio-economic and demographic variables on the level of household lottery expenditures in the six regions of Canada. While some household characteristics vary in the extent to which they significantly affect the level of lottery expenditures across regions (wealth, age, occupation, mother tongue and urban location, for example), others are significant in every region. Regional consistency exists in the statistical significance of after tax household income, sex and education of the head of household – lottery expenditures increase as incomes increase; lottery expenditures are significantly lower for female heads of households than for their male counterparts; lottery expenditures decline as the education level of the head of household increases. Second, lottery expenditures are found to be regressive, although the degree of regressivity is less than for lotteries in the United States.     

Collective bargaining and regional wage differences in Spain: an empirical analysis

This article analyses the importance of labour market institutions and, in particular, collective wage bargaining in shaping regional wage differences in the Spanish labour market. Using microdata from the Spanish Structure of Earnings Survey, our results reveal that there are significant inter-regional wage differences for similarly skilled workers. These differences are present throughout the whole wage structure and can be explained by both competitive and non-competitive factors, such as insufficient competition in product markets. In this context, industry-level collective bargaining plays a major role in accounting for regional wage differences, a role that in the Spanish case is enhanced due to its unusual regional dimension.     

Wage bargaining and employment revisited: separability and efficiency in collective bargaining*

We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow. We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of “independence of irrelevant alternatives” is shown to be crucial for this type of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining problem into one-dimensional problems – and thus helps to facilitate real-world negotiations.     

Stability analysis and efficiency determinants: empirical evidence

Efficiency determinants analysis is a main contemporary component in the productive efficiency literature. Two-stage data envelopment analysis (DEA) procedure supposed a turning point in the methodology as the significance of a certain exogenous factor can provide policymakers with accurate information for future strategic decisions, but a deeper scrutiny into the importance of each factor remains unsettled. This article provides a novelty theoretical extension and empirical application for the two-stage DEA bootstrap procedure. We define the stability coefficient (SC) whose magnitude reveals the effect of each exogenous factor in the efficiency estimates. We present empirical evidence to examine the hypothesis that the efficiency of the 17 Spanish tourism regions for the average period data 2005–2013 is determined by a group of contextual variables, illustrating how the SCs strengthen knowledge concerning the significance of each potential attractor. The results help us to classify the significant attractors into strong and weak, accordingly enhancing the public or private decision process, and henceforth avoiding the wastefulness of decision-making units spending.     

On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results

Strictly Majoritarian Social Choice Functions (SMSCFs) are such that the choice on an agenda can be defined with the knowledge of the simple majority relation on the agenda as the sole information. The possibility for SMSCFs to satisfy both the General Pareto condition and choice consistency conditions strong enough to be meaningful has been doubted. Here we exhibit three reasonable SMSCFs that do both. One of them can be interpreted as eliminating from the agenda all alternatives one can suspect of being Pareto dominated by some other. We compare some of their properties with those of the SMSCFs already known in the literature.     

Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing

This paper introduces wage bargaining in the framework of Milgrom and Roberts (Econometrica 50(2):443–459, 1982) where the workers’ reservation wage is the private information parameter critical for entry. We show that entry threat significantly distorts the wage, which in some cases adversely affects the firm’s ability to signal through price. Consequently, the separating equilibrium (in price) does not always exist. If, however, wage agreements are made public, signalling occurs with or without distortions in wage depending on whether the union’s bargaining power is high or low. Pooling equilibrium also exists and it features similar distortions. We also examine which signal, wage or price, generates greater social welfare. We would like to thank two referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. This paper is partially based on a chapter of Pal’s PhD thesis done at Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR), India. For remaining errors we are solely responsible.     

The evaluation of majority rules in a legislative bargaining model

A budget needs to be distributed among jurisdictions through bargaining in the legislature. Using a simple three-player, three-period Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., Ferejohn, J.A., 1989. Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181–1206] style legislative bargaining model with incomplete information, we evaluate two kinds of majority rules: the simple majority rule and the unanimity rule. Under the simple majority rule, it is less expensive to form a minimum-winning coalition, so that every type of proposer prefers his proposal to be passed immediately. The proposer has fewer incentives to reveal his information by delaying the bargaining, since there is a possibility of being excluded from the majority in future periods. Thus, in contrast to the unanimity rule, there does not exist any fully separating equilibrium. We also show that if the first-period proposer has greater agenda-setting power, it can help to reduce the probability of delay.     

The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information

Summary. We study the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which each trader has the “joint information” of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the associated economy. Received: February 15, 1999; revised version: August 9, 1999     

The endogenous objective function of a partially privatized firm: A Nash bargaining approach

We establish a model wherein a private firm competes with a partially privatized firm whose objective function is endogenously determined through bargaining between owners—the welfare-maximizing government and dividend-maximizing private shareholders. Many existing works on partial privatization have assumed that privatization increases the weight of profits in the partially privatized firm's objective, whereas it decreases the weight of welfare. However, our bargaining approach shows that this result can be reversed.