Ownership Structure, Firm Performance and Top Executive Change: An Analysis of UK Firms

The results of this paper reveal a significantly negative relationship between the equity stake owned by a senior executive and the likelihood that this executive will be removed from office. We also establish the existence of a strong positive relationship between poor company performance and the likelihood that the top managers responsible will be forced out of their firms; this forced departure only tends to occur when the managers' stake in the firm is less than 1%; as the level of ownership rises, managers become increasingly entrenched in their posts. The stock market reaction to management change is greatest (a) when the departure is unexpected and (b) when the dismissed executive owns more than 5% of the equity of his company. This study also examines the influence of other aspects of ownership structure and board composition upon the likelihood of a top executive dismissal.     

Separation of Ownership from Control and Acquiring Firm Performance: The Case of Family Ownership in Canada

Abstract:   This study investigates the relationship between ownership structure and acquiring firm performance. A large proportion of Canadian public companies have controlling shareholders (families) that often exercise control over voting rights while holding a small fraction of the cash flow rights. This is achieved through the concurrent use of dual class voting shares and stock pyramids. Many suggest that these ownership structures involve larger agency costs than those imposed by dispersed ownership structures and that they distort corporate decisions with respect to investment choices such as acquisitions. We find that average acquiring firm announcement period abnormal returns for our sample of 327 Canadian transactions are positive over the 1998–2002 period. Cash deals, acquisitions of unlisted targets and cross‐border deals have a positive impact on value creation. Governance mechanisms (outside block‐holders, unrelated directors and small board size) also have a positive influence on the acquiring firm performance. Further, the positive abnormal returns are greater for family firms. We do not find that separation of ownership and control has a negative impact on performance. These results suggest that, contrary to other jurisdictions offering poor minority shareholder protection or poor corporate governance, separation of control and ownership is not viewed as leading to value destroying mergers and acquisitions, i.e., market participants do not perceive families as using M&A to obtain private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. We do find a non‐monotonic relationship between ownership level and acquiring firm abnormal returns. Ownership of a majority of the cash flow rights has a negative impact on announcement returns. This is consistent with the view that large shareholders may undertake less risky projects as their wealth invested in the firm increases.     

长安银行公司治理的实践与探索

公司治理是现代企业制度的核心,公司治理的效果决定公司的发展速度和质量,积极探索和改进公司治理方式是银行持续健康发展的永恒主题。本文从合理的股权结构、有效的工作机制、优良的高管团队、监管机构有力指导等方面,就如何构建具有中国特色的金融企业公司治理进行了阐释。     

股权结构对公司治理的影响

股权结构是公司治理结构的重要组成部分和基础,对企业来说,是否具有完善的公司治理,决定了它的生死存亡。因为股份制已成为现代企业制度的基本形式,投资者只有在确信自己的利益能够受到保护之后才会向企业投资,而良好的公司治理正是保护投资者利益的重要制度。     

Dynamics in Ownership and Firm Survival: Evidence from Corporate Germany

This study investigates the determinants of changes in corporate ownership and firm failure for German firms. We find that many of the determinants of failure also affect ownership changes in this bank‐based economy. They include poor performance, weak corporate governance, high leverage, and small firm size. The ownership structure also plays a role for both events. Separate analyses of one of these events are therefore likely to miss important effects. The implications for the German corporate governance system are that the differences to countries with more market‐based systems are not as pronounced as previously speculated.     

The Interrelationship Between Managerial Ownership and Board Structure

Abstract:  The paper tests the hypothesis that high managerial ownership entrenches managers by allowing the CEO to create a board that is unlikely to monitor. The results show a strong negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership and corporate governance factors, such as, the split of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman, the proportion of non-executive directors, and the appointment of a non-executive director as a Chairman. I also find that companies with low managerial ownership are more likely to change their board structure to comply with the Cadbury (1992) recommendations. The results suggest that managers, through their high ownership, choose a board that is unlikely to monitor. Overall, the findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of the board as an internal corporate governance mechanism when managerial ownership is high.     

终极所有权结构对审计定价的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以2005～2009年连续5年可获得相关信息的579家沪深上市非金融公司组成的平衡面板数据(共2895个观察值)为研究样本,在控制相关变量的基础上运用一系列混合最小二乘法实证检验终极所有权结构对审计定价的影响;实证结果表明,终极所有权结构是影响审计定价的重要因素,具体而言:(1)与现金流量权和控制权没有偏离的公司相比,现金流量权和控制权存在偏离的公司具有相对高的审计定价;(2)现金流量权和控制权的偏离度与审计定价显著正相关;(3)与终极控制股东是非国有的公司相比,终极控股股东是国有的公司的审计定价更高。     

The Role of Ownership Concentration and Debt in Downturns: Evidence from Brazilian Firms During the 2008–9 Financial Crisis

This article aims to reconcile conflicting literature about the role of ownership concentration in the responsiveness of stock prices to macroeconomic shocks. We modified a previous theoretical model, adding leverage as a disciplining device. An important implication of our model is that only in deep crises ownership concentration plays a role in attenuating the effect of macroeconomic shock on firm value. We test this hypothesis using a sample of Brazilian firms during distinct phases of the 2008–9 crisis. Our empirical analyzes shows that only in the most critical part of the crisis, ownership concentration reduced the negative effects of the financial crisis.     

The sources of shareholder wealth gains from going private transactions: The role of controlling shareholders

The present study investigates the sources of shareholder wealth gains – as measured by cumulative abnormal returns and premiums – from going private transactions (GPTs). Using data for 314 GPTs from 18 Western European countries, we find that the announcements of GPTs generate a cumulative average abnormal return of about 22% and that pre-transaction shareholders on average receive a raw premium of about 36%. We further find that these shareholder wealth gains increase with the degree of separation of cash-flow and control rights of the pre-transaction ultimate owner and decrease with its ownership interests and with the presence of a second large shareholder. Taken together, these findings support the view that GPTs are expected to mitigate the inefficiencies induced by pre-transaction agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders. Thus, shareholder wealth gains from GPTs reflect the potential additional value that will be created under private ownership.