公共物品有效供给的经济学分析与对策研究

公共物品具有受益的非排他性和消费的非竞争性,是市场失灵的空白区域,由政府部门担任供给主体.文章基于微观经济学理论构建社会福利最大化目标约束下公共物品有效供给模型,发现当所有消费者消费公共物品所获得的边际收益与生产者生产最后一单位的公共物品所消耗的边际成本相等时,公共物品实现有效供给.要提高公共物品供给的有效性,应不断完善对部门的监督机制、加强公共物品供给的资金监管,充分运用信息技术手段以提高政府决策的科学性,不断完善市场竞争机制、构建多元化公共物品供给格局.     

公共物品供给的动态化视角研究

现有的公共物品理论较多从公共物品特性的静态视角考察公共物品的供给问题,因而在解决公共物品供给的现实问题上都过分强调单一解决方案的有效性。本文认为,公共物品一方面由于其非竞争性和非排他性强弱程度的不同组合,使公共物品呈现出层次性;另一方面由于其非排他性和非竞争性是动态变化的,使其边界呈现出不确定性和模糊性。公共物品的层次性、特性的动态性及边界的模糊性,要求公共物品的供给主体、供给模式不能静止不变,应当确立公共物品供给的动态发展模式。     

农村社区公共物品文献述评

公共物品的概念 公共物品的概念最早来自于经济学和政治学,社会学用这个概念考察一个社区的社会结构和人们之间的互动。经济学家萨谬尔森认为公共物品是纯公共物品,是指每个人消费这种产品不会导致他人对该产品消费的减少。阿特金森和斯蒂格里茨认为纯公共物品的特征是它的非排他性。上述观点是最近二十年经济学中对公共物品的代表性看法。从中我们可以看出公共物品的特征：首先是它的非竞争性,即使消费者人数增加也不影响它的生产成本的增加。其次是它的非排他性,即无法排除他人使用或是从公共物品中获益。     

国有企业的公共物品性质分析

企业的公共性可能导致企业资产的公共物品性，即国有企业的资产在责任体系非人格化，企业关系与企业过程非市场化，且在合法收益人与利益相关者之间存在严重的信息不对称的情况下，国有企业的资产退化为不同层级，不同区域范围的“公共物品”。国有企业作为被泛化的公共物品，其非排他性受到两个方面的影响：一个是随着泛化过程从排他性向非排他性的转变，另一个是由共享成本引起的共享边界的存在。     

公共产品供给中的“政府失灵”现象分析

公共产品是指消费过程中具有非排他性和非竞争性的产品。从本质上讲,生产公共产品与市场机制的作用是矛盾的,生产者是不会主动生产公共产品的。而公共产品是全社会成员所必须消费的产品,它的满足状况也反映了一个国家的福利水平。这就需要由政府来承担提供公共产品的责任。但是,政府部门在提供公共物品时趋向于浪费和滥用资源,致使公共支出规模过大或者效率降低,政府的活动并不总像应该的那样或像理论所说的那样“有效”。克服这种现象,有三种政策选择：（1）市场化改革;（2）宪法改革;（3）政府机构改革。     

农村公共产品供给的问题及供给制度创新

根据公共经济学理论,社会产品分为公共产品和私人产品。按照萨缪尔森的定义,纯公共产品是指那些每个人消费这种物品不会导致别人对该物品消费的减少。公共产品具有区别于私人产品的三个基本特征：效用的不可分割性、取得方式的非竞争性和消费的非排他性。私人产品是可以由个别消费者占有和享用,具有可分性、竞争性和排他性的产品。在现实经济生活中还存在一些兼有公共产品和私人产品特征的物品和劳务,称为准公共产品或混合产品。根据西方经济理论,市场不能提供公共产品,也无法解决准公共产品的供需问题,需要由政府提供公共产品和解决准公共产品的供需问题。     

国外公共物品多元化供给研究综述

Samuelson（1954）认为，由于公共物品具有区别于私人物品的非排他性和非竞争性两大特性，消费者都会选择“免费搭车”。因此市场机制在资源配置上几乎完全失灵，而由政府充当资源配置者则会达到“帕累托最优”。然而，由于政府的特殊政治地位，其“自利性动机”无法得到有效抑制，其高度垄断的公共物品供给行为会破坏稀缺资源趋于最优配置的过程，造成交易成本的增多和社会资源的浪费，产生严重的“政府失灵”现象。在此背景下，一批主张经济自由的经济学家论证了“公共物品私人供给”的可行性，随即将公共物品供给寄希望于私人力量及民间组织。但实践中很快出现的“契约失灵”、     

农村公共产品供给机制创新研究

一、农村公共产品与农民私人产品　　农村公共产品是与农民私人产品相区别而存在的。根据公共经济学对公共产品的专门解释,笔者认为,农村公共产品是指区别于农民私人产品,用于满足农村社会的公共需要,具有非排他性和非竞争性的社会产品。农村公共产品因性质的不同,分为纯公共产品和准公共产品。纯公共产品是指具有充分的非排他性和非竞争性,并且不能确定价格的产品,即指完全意义上的公共社会产品。准公共产品是指一个人消费的产品总量对别人的福利有重要的外部影响,且具备其中一个特性而不具备另一个特性的公共社会产品。据此来分析…     

我国农村公共产品供给模式的选择

一、农村公共产品的特性分析农村公共产品首先作为公共产品具有公共产品的一般特征,如保罗·萨缪尔森(1954)认为,公共产品是所有人共同享有的集体消费品,每个人对该产品的消费不减少任何其他人的消费。这就说明公共产品具有非排他性和非竞争性。而农村公共产品还具有一些特殊的特性。首先,具有区域性。这就是说在农村有些公共产品只是针对一部分地区而言的,这种公共产品的提供只是部分地区受益,而其他地方的人却由于各种原因而无法做到“搭便车”,例如一个地区的水库、村级灌溉系统等等。其次,具有时段性。农民实际收入的提高和增长会提高对…     

公共物品供给方式及其对我国公共物品供给的思考

公共物品由于其消费的特殊性 ,其供给方式一直是经济学界研究的重点。我国公共物品的供给方式还比较单一 ,效率低下。文章结合中国实际状况提出了一些适合国情的公共物品供给有效方式。     

Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods

It is well known that public goods are underprovided in a static setting with voluntary contributions. Public provision—in a median voter framework with proportional taxation—generally exceeds private provision. This paper compares private and public provision of public goods in a dynamic setting. In a dynamic setting, voluntary donations can result in efficient provision. Also, majority‐rule solutions exist even when taxes are not proportional to income. At low discount factors, public provision tends to exceed private provision. As patience increases, however, private provision may exceed public provision. This occurs because many outcomes with a low level of public good provision—and potentially large targeted transfer payments to particular individuals—become sustainable under public provision. Under private provision, however, large targeted transfers are unsustainable. To finance the public good, private provision tends to result in benefit taxation, and public provision tends to result in progressive taxation.     

Heterogeneity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

We investigate the effects of heterogeneity and incomplete information on aggregate contributions to a public good using the voluntary contribution mechanism. The non-linear laboratory environment has three-person groups as partners under varying conditions of information and communication. Bergstrom, Blum and Varian predict that increasing heterogeneity will have no effect on aggregate contributions in a no-communication environment. Ledyard conjectures a positive effect of incomplete information, a negative effect of heterogeneity, and a positive interaction of heterogeneity and incomplete information. We find that incomplete information has a small but significant negative effect. Heterogeneity has a positive effect on aggregate contributions, but its effects interact unexpectedly with communication. In a no-communication environment, heterogeneity in two dimensions (endowment and preferences) increases contributions substantially while heterogeneity in a single dimension (endowment or preferences) has little effect. In the communication environment we find the reverse. We also find a positive interaction between heterogeneity and incomplete information. Thus we reject the Bergstrom, Blume and Varian invariance result and provide mixed evidence on Ledyard's conjectures.     

The Organization of Public Service Provision

This paper addresses the question of how the responsibility for the delivery of social services, including health, education, and welfare programs, should be divided between state and central governments. We combine a random voting model and the incomplete contracts paradigm to formalize the trade‐off between central and state responsibility for service delivery, and find that authority should rest with the party for whom the marginal impact of the service on re‐election chances is greater. This in turn means that, other things equal, states with lower than average health, education, or welfare status should be given responsibility for service delivery, while authority in states with above average indicators should reside with the central government. Also, we show that there is no presumption that states that are given authority for service delivery should necessarily be granted expanded tax authority.     

采矿业繁荣与公共品提供

资源型地区的财政收入高度依赖于采矿业,地方政府对财政资金的有效利用是提升居民福利水平和促进经济社会发展的必要条件.本文从财政收入获取形式影响地方政府行为激励的角度,分析了采矿业繁荣恶化地方公共品提供的机制.然后,文章基于1998-2018年中国地级市层面数据,利用国际矿产资源价格变动作为外生冲击,对采矿业繁荣影响地方公共品提供进行实证检验.结果 表明,采矿业繁荣尽管大幅度增加了地方财政收入,但是教育、医疗等民生性公共品供给水平并未因此而提升,基础设施等生产性公共品供给也未因此而改善.进一步研究发现,采矿业繁荣期,财政供养人员数量显著膨胀、财政资金使用效率降低,因而高速增长的财政收入并未有效转化为公共品供给.本文的结论表明,应该强化资源型地区财政资金使用的监督约束机制,提高财政资金使用效率.     

Public Good Provision Under Monopolistic Competition

This paper presents a model of voluntary private provision of public good under monopolistic competition following Pecorino. Consumers prefer product varieties and a public good. Marginal utility of income depends inversely upon the aggregate consumption of private goods in this model. As population size increases, aggregate consumption of private goods goes up and marginal utility of income falls. This explains the positive relationship between population size and public good provision. Any technological changes in the production of private goods are shown to be neutral to the aggregate provision of public good. These results are in contrast to Pecorino.     

The Asymptotic Voluntary Provision of the Pure Public Goods

This paper analyzes the voluntary provision of the pure public good in a sequence of finite economies. The boundedness of this provision is established under very weak conditions. The Cournot–Nash provision of the public good is bounded. In contrast, the Lindahl provision is unbounded but the proportion of private good devoted to its production may be infinitesimal. Several examples are provided to relate this paper to the literature.     

区位性因素与公共品的最优供给

本文分析了两种区位性因素对地方公共品最优供给(质量与数量)的影响。一类区位性因素为某公共品在城市中所在的区域。分析表明,位于城市边缘地区的公共品的最优质量要小于位于城市中心地区公共品的最优质量。另一类区位性因素为某公共品与居民的相对位置(距离),这一因素在具体分析中被转化为使用居民出行半径表示的指标。结论表明,出行半径的增加一方面加大了中间投票人与公共品之间的距离,另一方面也使得原先距离公共品较远的居民得以有机会享用该公共品。前一种影响对公共品的最优质量起抑制作用,后一种影响的效果则相反。而公共品的最优质量随出行半径如何变化,将取决于这两种效应之间的比较。本文还根据公共品之间是否存在替代性区分了替代性公共品与非替代性公共品,并分析了这两种不同性质的公共品受区位性因素影响而在最优质量与最优供给数量上所呈现出的差异。     

Factor Endowments and the Private Provision of Public Goods

The paper examines the consequences of increasing the size of the community in the standard model of the private provision of public goods when costs are variable. In contrast to an economy with fixed costs, the provision of the public good can fall with a larger community, and an increased provision of the public good is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for individual utility to rise. The paper also contributes to the literature on immiserizing growth in that it shows that capital accumulation can possibly result in lower utility for all individuals.     

Repeated Interaction and the Public Provision of Private Goods

The literature suggests that governments can use in-kind transfers to design efficient and targeted redistribution schemes if individual incomes are not directly observable. We investigate the extent to which the self-selection property of in-kind transfers carries through if redistributive transfers are made repeatedly. In a two-period setting, the government may gain information about the individuals' incomes in the first period and exploit this information for making targeted transfers in the second-period. This, however, also triggers changes in the individuals' behavior. If the government can commit to its future policy, the least cost policy may involve randomization between cash and in-kind transfers. Without commitment, the dynamic setting works against the government's interest. It may no longer be able to use in-kind transfers to generate information about the individuals' types.
JEL classification : H 42; H 2     

论城市公共服务的有效供给--政府与民间投资的互补性贡献与制度安排

本文探讨了公共机构和民营机构投资的配合(组合)问题,指出了二者在一个共同系统中投资的互补性贡献。同时,向人们展示了城市公共服务供给模式的多样性。作者认为,在发达的公共经济中,政府必须善于找到一种混合的策略,部分地依靠自己的力量提供公共服务,同时还要与民营机构以及其它机构维持广泛的契约安排,以生产其居民所偏好的服务集。只有这样,城市公共服务供给方可能是有效率的。