The dyadic structure of exchange partners' governing-agency social capital and opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships

Extant literature on opportunism examines its antecedents in dyadic relationships in business networks. With firms also developing relationships with government agencies, these connections can influence firms' propensity for opportunism in business exchanges. This study investigates how the governing-agency social capital on both sides of the buyer–supplier relationship affects firms' opportunism tendency toward their counterparts. In particular, we divide the governing-agency social capital of both parties into two dimensions: the asymmetry of governing-agency social capital and joint governing-agency social capital. We postulate that both the asymmetry of governing-agency social capital and joint governing-agency social capital promote the focal firm's propensity for opportunism through dyadic power and network power, respectively. Moreover, we propose that both dimensions interact to magnify each other's impact on the focal firm's propensity for opportunism. We test the hypotheses using 322 matched data of buyer–supplier dyads in China. Empirical results provide support for the research hypotheses.     

Using influence strategies to reduce marketing channel opportunism: The moderating effect of relational norms

In an empirical study of the North American lodging industry, we investigate the efficacy of influence strategies for managing opportunism in marketing channels. We posit that the effects of influence strategies upon opportunism are moderated by the extent to which relational norms characterize the channel exchange. The results support this moderating effect. In particular, we find that relational norms have an asymmetrical effect across coercive and noncoercive influence strategies. With high relational norms in the relationship, a channel member’s use of noncoercive influence strongly limits partner opportunism whereas the use of coercive influence exacerbates partner opportunism. In contrast, noncoercive influence intensifies and coercive influence mitigates partner opportunism under conditions of low relational norms. These findings offer first insights for curbing opportunism in marketing channel relationships with the simultaneous use of different socialization mechanisms. The authors acknowledge support for this study from the summer research program of the Cornell University School of Hotel Administration and the two hotel companies we studied and thank Reed Fisher for help with the data collection.     

The internal competitor: buyer motives and marketing strategies

Suppliers often face internal competitors. An internal competitor exists when a buyer simultaneously sources the same components from both an internal production unit and an external supplier. Based on a literature review we identify several different buyer motives for supporting such internal competitors. Though it may be difficult for an external supplier to immediately identify relevant buyer motives, the different motives suggest that these buyers should be targeted with different marketing strategies. For each buyer motive possible marketing strategies are suggested and briefly discussed. For example, it is discussed (1) how the external supplier may try to replace the internal competitor, (2) how the external supplier may try to operate in parallel with the internal competitor, and (3) when the external supplier should refuse to deliver to a customer with internal production of the same components.     

Dependence concentration and fairness perceptions in asymmetric supplier–buyer relationships

The purpose of this research is to investigate how a supplier manages its relationships with multiple buyers in a market structure of imbalanced power to achieve market success. Drawing on resource dependence theory and social exchange theory, we argue that dependence concentration (the degree of revenue concentration of a supplier’s multiple buyers) and fairness perceptions (distributive and procedural fairness) work together to impact a supplier’s market performance. The authors develop a structural model and empirically test how dependence concentration and fairness perceptions impact supplier performance with survey responses from 92 suppliers in the food supply industry. The findings show that a balanced set of dependence relationships governed by fair business policies and procedures leads to strong and effective relationships; and effective relationships with multiple buyers, rather than with any specific buyer, impact sales and profit growth in a market structure of imbalanced power.     

Coping With Dependence: A Logistics Strategy Based on Interorganizational Learning for Managing Buyer–Supplier Relations

The rise of outsourcing has heightened interest in the role of logistics managers in coping with dependence in buyer–supplier relations. Buying firm dependence on a supplier potentially reduces supplier performance to expectations because the buying firm cannot leverage power to capture value in the relationship. Drawing from interorganizational learning theory, we advance a logistics strategy that consists of supplier cost analysis and supplier integration as a means to create value and thereby mitigate the negative effects of dependence. By facilitating the acquisition and use of knowledge, supplier cost analysis and supplier integration enable buying firms to identify improvement opportunities while engaging in collaborative supplier relations. Using survey responses from 222 buying firms, we find that while buyer dependence decreases the buyer's perceived supplier performance, supplier integration suppresses these negative effects. Furthermore, we show that supplier cost analysis is a valuable knowledge acquisition tool that logistics managers can use to enable supplier integration as a relational form of governance. As such, we provide new insights into interorganizational learning theory and suggest to logistics managers the important role supplier cost analysis plays in managing buyer–supplier relationships.     

An investigation of relationship learning in cross-border buyer–supplier relationships: The role of trust

This paper investigates the factors influencing relationship learning in cross-border buyer–supplier relationships. A conceptual model is developed by integrating organizational learning theory, relational governance and the resource-based view. Based on a cross-sectional sample of 160 firms in the information technology industry and a structural equation model, the findings show that learning intent, absorptive capacity and cross-cultural differences influence relationship learning. This study further addresses the moderating effects of trust.     

The role of buyer and supplier relationships in integrating TQM through the supply chain

Many academics and practitioners have alluded to the importance of total quality management (TQM) principles and the important role the purchasing function plays in the quality process. However, the role of the buyer–supplier relationship in the TQM process has not been directly investigated to any large extent. Three hypotheses concerning the role of buyer–supplier relationships in the success of TQM implementation were tested. The results demonstrate that buyer–supplier relationships are different in firms with successful TQM programs. Hypothesis 1 suggests that those firms with successful TQM programs will have more formal mechanisms for interacting with suppliers. The second hypothesis suggests that business units with more successful TQM programs exhibit a greater degree of competitive focus and single sourcing. The third hypothesis relates to a higher level understanding of internal and external customer needs by successful TQM adopters. All hypotheses were supported. The buyer–supplier relationships in firms with successful TQM programs are different than firms with less successful TQM programs.     

Mutual adaptation in buyer-supplier relationships

In buyer-supplier relationships, effective partnerships require mutual adaptation to execute strategies effectively. Using LISREL, we test a model of relational exchange factors that includes dependence, joint action and trust and their influence on the mutual adaptation of supplier and buyer firms in the U.S. automotive industry. The results of the study indicate that both economic and social dimensions of the relationship impact mutual adaptation, but that these two are not necessarily complementary. Specifically, supplier adaptation is negatively impacted by trust between supplier and buyer, but positively impacted by dependence and joint action. Buyer adaptation, on the other hand, is positively impacted by trust between the two, joint action and the adaptation undertaken by the supplier. The negative relationship between trust and supplier adaptation may be symptomatic of deeper issues in the U.S. automotive industry that should merit concern.     

Knowledge transfer in the context of buyer–supplier relationship: An analysis of a supplier's customer portfolio

In the context of buyer–supplier relationship, the present study will not only analyse the role of formal and informal mechanisms to transfer knowledge but also the direct and moderating effect of trustworthiness, as relational dimensions, to understand how customers acquire knowledge from suppliers. The results related to a sample of 105 customers belonging to a medium-sized Italian manufacturer's customer portfolio show that both formal and informal transfer mechanisms positively impact knowledge acquisition. Trustworthiness positively moderates the effect of informal transfer mechanisms and negatively moderates the effect of formal transfer mechanisms on knowledge transfer. Some considerations regarding the customer portfolio are suggested to enhance our understanding of the effectiveness of knowledge transfer mechanisms in relation to different trustworthiness contexts.     

Relationship duration and buyer influence in just-in-time relationships

Heavy investments tailored to a specific JIT-relationship highlight the trade-off between improved value-added and inter-firm dependence in industrial purchasing relationships. The main reason for dedicating specific investments in a JIT-relationship is to enhance production efficiency and logistics performance. On the other hand, such investments induce substantial inter-firm dependence and high switching costs, which must be offset by stronger inter-firm co-ordination. Using transaction costs analysis (TCA) and relational contracting theory (RCT), the authors have examined whether the buyer's influence on a JIT-relationship is contingent upon the length of that relationship. Data from a survey of 165 industrial purchasing relationships demonstrate that as a JIT-relationship evolves over time, inter-firm co-ordination tends to increase reliance on relational governance. When the level of the JIT-investment is substantial, hierarchical buyer control relaxes significantly as the length of the relationship increases.     

Factors of determining long-term orientation in interfirm relationships

Marketers have witnessed a paradigm shift in which establishing, maintaining, and forging long-term buyer–seller relationships are considered the core of marketing activities. Accordingly, investigating a long-term orientation (LTO) has become a steady research stream in the marketing literature. Building on this on-going research stream, this study confirms that an essential precursor of a manufacturer's LTO is trust that, in turn, is formed by relational norms and satisfaction with supplier performance. Interestingly, however, the seemingly strong trust–LTO path is moderated by both power asymmetry and environmental uncertainty in buyer–seller relationships. The empirical findings suggest that regardless of emerging relationship marketing where buyer and seller are portrayed as parts of a team, power is still in use to control suppliers. In addition, a manufacturer facing uncertainty is less likely to form LTO toward its supplier for fear of losing flexibility in the time- and quality-based competition.     

Information Asymmetries as Antecedents of Opportunism in Buyer-Supplier Relationships: Testing Principal-Agent Theory

ABSTRACT

Purpose: A severe problem in supplier selection refers to moral hazard: suppliers not behaving in the expected way once contracted. Principal-agent theory could provide insights on how to reduce this problem. Because buyer–supplier relationships can be interpreted as principal-agent situations, the application of agency theory should facilitate improved supplier selection. Although theoretically compelling, empirical tests verifying this assumption are not prevalent. Regarding the advancement of theory, this paper tests whether both ex ante and ex post information asymmetries influence moral hazard. In particular, in the context of a globalizing economy with a subsequent increase in information asymmetries as a problem in supplier selection, this conceptual approach may be contributive.

Design/methodology/approach: The authors use a set of 87 buyer–supplier relationships to conduct a test, applying a partial least squares model with latent variables. A particularity of the data set is that it contains information on ongoing as well as on discontinued relationships.

Findings: The analysis indicated that both ex ante information asymmetries (operationalized by a reputation variable) and ex post asymmetries (operationalized by a monitoring variable) have shown to be significant and strong antecedents explaining the occurrence of moral hazard. Interestingly, and opposed to the common assumption, the length of a relationship and the amount of direct meetings have not revealed any explanatory significance. Buyer dependency hardly showed influence on supplier opportunism.

Research limitations/implications: Data were collected from a multitude of buyer–supplier relationships from a single firm in the chemical-pharmaceutical industry. Generalizations to other industries still need to be tested. Socially desirable answering behavior cannot fully be excluded because relationship discontinuation is not a desirable situation. In terms of theory implications, this research adds to the notion that both hidden action and hidden intention can lead to moral hazard.

Practical implications: An agency-based analysis can be operationalized with the help of an agency-based supplier classification portfolio. It might be of particular value to firms to discuss those suppliers that scored high in risk of opportunism but did not (yet) reveal any signs of moral hazard. Finally, the strong explanatory power

of reputation alerts buyers to pay more attention to behavioral information on the (potential) supplier available in the market.

Originality/value: Analyzing the occurrence of moral hazard and including terminated relationships adds to the emerging stream of literature on relationship discontinuation in B2B markets. Further, the strong empirical results may encourage researchers to elaborate on principal-agent theory-based assumptions, adding another layer of explanation to buyer–supplier relationships. Findings show that reputation is unduly neglected as supplier selection criterion in current theory and practice.     

An Empirical Study of Buyer–Supplier Relationships within Small Business Organizations

A paradox exists in small business organizations; although effective buyer–supplier relationships are essential to the success of small businesses, these organizations may not have the purchasing and selling power in terms of managerial resources to implement them. This provides us an opportunity for research to determine how well developed are buyer–supplier relationships within small business organizations. Grounded in transaction cost and resource dependence theory, this paper presents and empirically tests a model that examines the relationships between buyer and supplier specificity and long‐term buyer–supplier relationships and the latter's impact on organizational performance from the buyers' perspective. The results of this study provide insight into the development and impact of buyer–supplier relationships within small business organizations. Several managerial implications can be determined.     

The Impact of Relational Governance on Relational Exchange Performance: A Case of the Taiwanese Automobile Industry

Relational governance affects manufacturers’ ability to adapt flexibly to uncertainty in manufacturer–supplier relationships. Enhancing manufacturer–supplier relationships requires considering supplier willingness and opinions on the relational governance of their focal manufacturer and the effect of relational governance on relational exchange performance. After reviewing the related literature, I identified the antecedents of relational governance affecting suppliers’ relationships with their focal manufacturers and explored the effect of relational governance on relational exchange performance, taking relationship value and relationship norms as the intervening constructs. Data were collected from 241 usable questionnaires that had been completed by suppliers for all Taiwanese automobile manufacturers. The hypotheses were tested with respondent data by using a structural equation model. The results indicated that relational governance directly and positively relates to relationship value and relationship norms, relationship value and relationship norms directly and positively relate to relational exchange performance, and customer focus and competitive priorities directly and positively relate to relational governance.     

Matching governance mechanisms with transaction-specific investment types and supplier roles: An empirical study of cross-border outsourcing relationships

Drawing from transaction cost economics (TCE) and relational view (RV), we develop a contingency framework that matches governance mechanisms with different types of supplier transaction specific investments (TSIs) in cross-border outsourcing relationships. We further examine the three-way interaction effects between governance mechanisms, TSI types, and supplier roles in cross-border outsourcing relationships. Using data collected from 324 managers of local suppliers in China and 162 managers working for international buyers located in 15 different OECD countries, we find that while relational governance is more effective at safeguarding supplier human TSIs, it is not an effective solution for safeguarding supplier physical TSIs. In contrast, formal contracts help safeguard supplier physical TSIs against international buyer opportunism, but they are ineffective at safeguarding local supplier human TSIs. Moreover, we find that the interaction effect between formal contracts and supplier physical TSIs is stronger for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) than for original design manufacturers (ODMs), whereas the interaction effect between relational governance and supplier human TSIs is stronger for ODMs than for OEMs. Theoretical and managerial implications of the findings follow.     

The supply-side of environmental sustainability and export performance: The role of knowledge integration and international buyer involvement

Most of previous studies seek to understand buyer perspectives in green supply chain relationships and devote inadequate attention to the strategic role of upstream suppliers. Drawing on a market-oriented approach to sustainability, this paper examines the enabling factors and processes that underpin how export suppliers from emerging economies leverage their strategic intent to develop knowledge integration capacity for achieving improved export performance. The results from a sample of Chinese exporters show that the relational capacity of knowledge integration mediates the performance impact of market-oriented environmental sustainability, and such a mediating process of leaning is further enhanced by international buyer involvement. We reveal that relationship efforts should be directed at developing integrative capacity involving key partners for implementing proactive environmental strategy in international business-to-business (B2B) markets. This study contributes to the research of supply chain sustainability in a global context.     

Long-Term Relationships,Partnerships and Strategic Alliances:

The aim of this paper is to identify the conditions under which three different relationship marketing mechanisms-- long-term relationships, partnerships and strategic alliances--are most efficient. The contingency theory that is developed is based on, and extends, the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) framework. The TCE framework is modified in one respect, opportunism is assumed to vary across exchange relationships. In those relationships that are characterized by relational norms (absence of opportunism), the TCE governance mechanisms--markets, hierarchies and hybrids--are argued to be inefficient relative to the mechanisms of relationship marketing.     

An Integrative Framework of Buyer–Supplier Negative Relationship Quality and Dysfunctional Interfirm Conflict

ABSTRACT

Purpose: Problems of relationship quality and interfirm conflict in business-to-business settings are serious concerns that need to be addressed. Thus, the authors have engaged in an extensive review to promote an understanding of these complex issues. This article develops an integrated framework for analyzing wide-ranging relations between individual representatives and patterns of interfirm incompatibility for managerial control.

Methodology/approach: The review involves numerous sources that include articles and monographs. A theoretical framework is constructed to integrate fragmented empirical data. In particular, social identity and commitment-trust theories are mobilized for this framework.

Findings: The review of studies has a substantial consistency with the theoretical framework. The article outlines a causal chain from interpersonal agent dissimilarities to dysfunctional buyer–supplier relations, culminating in interfirm pathological conflict. Moderating factors in the causal chain are: agent identity differentiation (for interpersonal dissimilarity), supplier relations mismanagement (for buyer–supplier relationship quality), and interfirm opportunism (for interfirm pathological conflict). Buyer–supplier interfirm incompatibility mediates the causal link between interpersonal dissimilarity and buyer–supplier relationship quality. Identity differentiation, the validation of one’s self-image, is introduced as a process that determines buyer–supplier agent interpersonal dissimilarity judgments. This framework uses a contextual perspective. It describes interactions between observations of micro-level phenomena of interpersonal dissimilarities and macro-level models of interfirm fit. From a managerial perspective, interpersonal relations between individual buyer and supplier agents may be further strengthened by such strategies as expanding the scope of the interpersonal relationship, relaxation of role responsibilities, and volunteering business-related contact referrals.

Originality/value: A new theoretical framework has been devised to predict and explain relationship quality and interfirm pathological conflict in the business-to-business context. The framework contributes to the value of the knowledge base by serving as a means for building new diagnostic tools for assessment of interfirm behavioral issues affecting exchanges. New concepts are introduced to enhance current literature on business-to-business marketing. The framework provides concrete

indicators that operationally define ideas and enable or improve measurement for empirical modeling.     

Technological turbulence, supplier market orientation, and buyer satisfaction

The channel literature suggests that building a close relationship with key partners is one of the key strategies that channel members use to overcome the challenges of a changing environment. However, such a strategy may be ineffective when high technological turbulence exists in the buyer's market. This study focuses on the buyer's perspective in channel relationships and examines the buyer's satisfaction with outcomes resulting from engaging in relationships with a supplier. The results show that a buyer's performance is enhanced when a buyer develops a close relationship with a supplier whom it perceives to be market oriented but that a close relationship becomes detrimental to performance when technological turbulence increases. These findings suggest that managers need to be aware of the effect of technological turbulence and be alert in managing close relationships even with market-oriented suppliers.     

The Challenge of Multinational Corporation (MNC)-Led Growth and Internationalization: The Case of Nokia-Dependent Suppliers

Purpose: This research is aimed at gaining a better understanding of supplier–customer relationships in the context of asymmetrical dependence. Of particular interest is to develop an enhanced understanding of the conditions under which such relationships can be mutually beneficial despite the problems traditionally associated with relationship asymmetry.

Methodology: The empirical context is provided by a case study of Nokia and three of its Finland-based suppliers that have grown and internationalized in a customer-led manner. Following a review of the literature, we introduce a conceptual model and then test it against findings from the case study.

Findings: We find that relationships characterized by asymmetrical dependence can be mutually beneficial as long as the boundary conditions governing the relationship remain favorable. In particular, relational variables such as trust and commitment can balance an otherwise asymmetrical relationship. However, such relationships are vulnerable to changes in the external environment, which may expose the more dependent party to power influences. Thus high customer dependence is best viewed as a temporary condition and the supplier should actively seek for strategies to reduce dependence.

Originality: Much of existing research on interorganizational relationships fails to provide an understanding of relationship development over time and, in particular, in relation to changing environmental conditions. This study provides such a perspective and does so in the context of a supplier–customer relationship characterized by asymmetrical dependence.