企业竞争战略选择的博弈分析

博弈论和企业竞争战略之间有着天然的相通之处。基于博弈论,人们对企业竞争优势的来源、战略目标的确定以及战略模式等都有了新的认识,给企业战略管理带来了深刻的影响。本文首先建立了对称信息条件下的双寡头企业竞争战略选择的微分博弈模型,通过对模型的求解和纳什均衡的讨论,分析了电信企业在博弈均衡状态下的战略选择,并把研究结果用在企业竞争战略选择的实例中。     

竞争环境下平台企业定价与补贴竞争策略研究

考虑商户企业在平台企业所配置资本的跨平台流动效应，建立竞争环境下平台企业定价和补贴决策的微分博弈模型。以静态博弈模型为参考，分析两个同质平台企业在动态环境中采取开环策略和马尔科夫策略的定价和补贴竞争决策，并对比分析平台系统收益。研究表明，平台企业间的定价与补贴竞争具有显著的博弈时间相关特征，在平台企业采取对定价和补贴预先承诺的开环策略时，市场竞争强度低于静态博弈；相对于马尔科夫策略模型和静态博弈模型，开环策略模型中的平台系统最优收益最高，取得帕累托最优。研究结论可为平台企业的定价及补贴决策提供参考。     

贸易联盟的动机和稳定性——一种合作博弈的观点和视角

在WTO的背景下,贸易联盟改变了传统的竞争关系和组织结构,塑造了一种新型的"竞争中合作"的市场机制。在不局限于非合作博弈的研究框架之中,侧重运用合作博弈的理念解析了贸易联盟的产生动机和存在机理,并将合作博弈中的核心、核仁和Shapley值等思想与贸易联盟中的各种合作指标进行了关联分析。     

价格和服务竞争下多供应链间Bertrand博弈决策分析

假设顾客需求受价格和服务水平影响,以两条包含一个制造商和一个零售商的单链式供应链为研究对象,在Bertrand博弈框架下,讨论了两条供应链采用三种不同决策结构(分散——分散、分散——集中、集中——集中)时链间竞争情况。研究表明,链间价格和服务水平的竞争强度等关键变量对链间博弈均衡解有着重要的影响,特别地,当供应链间价格和服务竞争强度较低时,都采用集中决策是供应链间博弈的帕累托均衡解,但当竞争强度较高时,都采用集中决策会使两条供应链陷入"囚徒困境"。     

不同市场力量下的再制造闭环供应链决策研究

本文建立了由一个制造商和两个竞争零售商组成的再制造闭环供应链博弈模型,研究了制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈、零售商领导的Stackelberg博弈、制造商和零售商Nash均衡博弈等三种市场力量结构,研究和对比了三种市场力量结构下的均衡回收率、批发价、零售价、渠道成员利润、渠道总利润。研究结果表明：零售商的回收率在市场无领导者时最高,在制造商领导的市场中最低。批发价格在制造商领导时最高,最小的是零售商领导情形。零售价在制造商领导时最高,最小是市场无领导者情形。消费者和整个行业均受益于无领导者的市场结构。然而,制造商和零售商均有动机成为领导者。在具市场领导的市场结构下,消费者和整个行业偏好零售商领导的市场结构。     

气候政策的微分博弈及其环境效应分析

文章基于微分博弈原理,构建了全球福利最大化下的两国微分博弈模型,分析了碳税、碳关税、碳减排合作三种气候政策对全球福利和全球碳排放的影响。运用Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman方程分别求得了静态线性Markov完美纳什均衡的最优碳税和碳关税水平。研究发现,在给定的碳排放水平下,全球福利在单边碳税政策下最小,碳关税次之,碳减排合作政策下最大;但碳排放存量则以单边碳税政策的最大,碳关税政策的次之,碳减排合作政策的最小;就全球碳减排效应而言,碳减排合作政策是最优的,碳关税政策次之,单边碳税政策最差。这主要是由于单边碳税存在"碳泄漏"现象和"免费搭车效应",使执行相对宽松环境标准的国家从中受益,同时严格的气候政策将有利于气候宽松政策国家的企业国际竞争力的提高,即存在"租金转移效应"。碳关税和碳减排合作政策则可以部分或完全消除这些效应的影响。     

市场进入次序竞争优势研究

为了探求企业能否通过市场进入次序选择而获得更多的竞争优势,文章采用时间博弈方法,建立数量竞争时间博弈模型和价格时间博弈模型,对市场进入次序进行综合研究。结果表明:在市场竞争中存在一定市场进入次序的优劣势,在数量竞争时间博弈分析中的产量竞争模型条件下,企业在其余情况不变的情况时,先动企业由于先进入市场,获得了产量和利润的优势,存在先动优势;在价格竞争的时间博弈模型的分析中,后动企业的利润大于等于先动企业的利润,不管企业的产品是否同质,后定价的企业都存在后动优势。     

基于博弈分析的网络版权利益整合机制研究

首先对出版权人、网络内容服务商和公众用户三方的利益关系进行梳理；然后建立了版权人-网络内容服务商两方博弈模型并在三方博弈框架下分析了公众用户的博弈策略和效用影响因子，通过博弈分析得出不能盲目提高侵权赔偿金额和降低网络作品价格来降低侵权概率的结论。最后对网络版权利益整合机制的建立提出建议。     

肯德基麦当劳的完全信息价格博弈

本文从麦当劳和肯德基在中国的竞争背景入手,研究了完全信息静态博弈以及由此引出的完全信息动态博弈的价格博弈模型,通过库诺特寡头竞争模型以及斯坦克尔伯格寡头竞争模型的学习以及借鉴,着重用战略式的表格方式和博弈数的分析方法分析了麦当劳去年的价格微浮和2008年麦当劳肯德基纷纷提价所寓含的原因,以及麦当劳与肯德基之间的各种博弈。以提高我们对完全信息静态博弈和完全信息动态博弈的认知能力,并为国内的寡头企业提供一点启示。     

不同消费者分布下双寡头产品差异化策略博弈分析

对产品实施差异化是企业的一种重要的竞争策略。传统的Hotelling模型通过假定消费者均匀分布在市场之中,研究企业产品差异化问题。在传统模型的基础上建立了一种消费者非均匀分布的双寡头定位定价竞争模型,用动态博弈论的方法求出了模型的子博弈纳什均衡,并根据均衡结果分析了几种消费者分布下双寡头企业的产品差异化策略、定位策略以及定价策略。     

基于Lanchester模型的双寡头市场广告竞争研究

通过讨论微分博弈模型——Lanchester模型及其开环解和闭环解,并进行对比,发现闭环策略能比开环策略更好地反映市场动态变化,这意味着闭环策略可能更受营销决策者的欢迎。     

The Gamification of Advertising: Analysis and Research Directions of In-Game Advertising,Advergames, and Advertising in Social Network Games

The study presents a framework for the analysis of advertising in digital games. It reviews literature on in-game advertising, advergames and advertising in social network games. The framework distinguishes between stimulus characteristics of the game as well as of the advertising that lead to psychological responses toward the game and the brand and to actual behavior toward the game and the brand. It takes into consideration individual factors of the player and social factors surrounding the player. In addition, theoretical models of advertising perception in digital games and issues regarding regulation are addressed. Directions for future research in the area of advertising in digital games are provided.     

An Empirical Model of Advertising Dynamics

This paper develops a model of dynamic advertising competition, and applies it to the problem of optimal advertising scheduling through time. In many industries we observe advertising “pulsing”, whereby firms systematically switch advertising on and off at a high-frequency. Hence, we observe periods of zero and non-zero advertising, as opposed to a steady level of positive advertising. Previous research has rationalized pulsing through two features of the sale response function: an S-shaped response to advertising, and long-run effects of current advertising on demand. Despite considerable evidence for advertising carry-over, existing evidence for non-convexities in the shape of the sales-response to advertising has been limited and, often, mixed. We show how both features can be included in a discrete choice based demand system and estimated using a simple partial maximum likelihood estimator. The demand estimates are then taken to the supply side, where we simulate the outcome of a dynamic game using the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) concept. Our objective is not to test for the specific game generating observed advertising levels. Rather, we wish to verify whether the use of pulsing (on and off) can be justified as an equilibrium advertising practice. We solve for the equilibrium using numerical dynamic programming methods. The flexibility provided by the numerical solution method allows us to improve on the existing literature, which typically considers only two competitors, and places strong restrictions on the demand models for which the supply side policies can be obtained. We estimate the demand model using data from the Frozen Entree product category. We find evidence for a threshold effect, which is qualitatively similar to the aforementioned S-shaped advertising response. We also show that the threshold is robust to functional form assumptions for the marginal impact of advertising on demand. Our estimates, which are obtained without imposing any supply side restrictions, imply that firms should indeed pulse in equilibrium. Predicted advertising in the MPE is higher, on average, than observed advertising. On average, the optimal advertising policies yield a moderate profit improvement over the profits under observed advertising.JEL Classification: L11, L66, M30 M37 R12     

Optimal Timing of Advertising with Demand Spillovers

We construct a model of a horizontally differentiated duopoly with demand spillovers in which advertising influences the willingness-to-pay of consumers for products and thereby affects not only market share, but also the level of market demand. Furthermore, firms decide the timing as well as the level of advertising. We first derive a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibria in the advertising competition. Then, using the framework of an endogenous timing decision game with an observable delay (i.e., Hamilton and Slutsky, Games Econ Behavior 2: 29–46, 1990), we consider the optimal timing of advertising. We demonstrate that the optimal timing depends on the degree of demand spillovers and the product substitutability. In particular, if there are sufficient asymmetric demand spillovers between firms, there is a unique Stackelberg equilibrium in the advertising competition, in which the firm providing the product with small (large) demand spillovers chooses to invest in advertising early (late), regardless of the mode of competition.     

Vertical Product Differentiation and Advertising

A duopoly model is developed in which firms' strategic variables include brand quality, the number of distinct market segments to enter and price. Informative advertising is used to overcome consumer ignorance about brands. In contrast to many existing models in which firms engage in price competition, the subgame perfect equilibria of the game are not characterised by the production of vertically differentiated products. Further, whilst the firms typically produce identical high quality products, in some circumstances the production of homogeneous low quality brands can be an equilibrium strategy.     

Disbanding an Effective System for Self Regulation of Advertising: Beyond the Media Council of Australia

This paper analyses the role of government, advertisers, advertising agents, and the industry complaints body in unravelling what was once an effective self regulatory system for advertisements. It outlines the connection between the system for the accreditation of advertising agents and the system of fuzzy Codes of Practice rules for the content of advertisements that regulated Australian advertising until the end of 1996. It shows how a revamped competition policy, government review, aggrieved advertisers and an entrenched Advertising Standards Council contributed to the demise of the Media Council system of self regulated advertising. The paper describes the new self regulatory system that has been put in place and analyses both the old Media Council Code of Practice rules and the rules of the new Advertiser Code of Ethics.     

中国大陆广告伦理道德研究综述

广告具有经济和文化双重属性，它作为一种重要的商业手段的同时，也对大众的社会生活和价值观念等产生重大的影响甚至起导向作用。然而随着广告业在我国的逐渐发展繁荣，广告也出现了许多问题，逐渐引起社会各界的重视。本文回顾和反思我国广告伦理道德研究十几年来的研究现状，综述了广告伦理道德的相关成果，发现广告伦理道德研究的不足与缺陷，为我国未来广告伦理道德的研究提供依据，为中国广告业更好的发展提供一些建议。     

基于品牌战略的广告策略研究——广告策略在医药保健品、化妆品行业的应用

随着我国经济建设的逐步发展,改革开放的不断深入,我国企业面临的竞争日渐加剧,企业之间的竞争已经不再只局限于产品之间的竞争,越来越多的企业意识到品牌的重要性,品牌已成为一种新的国际语言,越发受到重视。广告策略作为品牌战略的重要环节之一,在设计以及实施的过程中,与品牌战略之间具有密切的联系。因此,建立广告策略与品牌战略结合模型,深入讨论基于品牌战略的广告策略在医药保健品、化妆品行业的应用很有必要。     

动态最优控制模型在广告业的应用综述(中)

本文介绍了动态最优控制模型在广告领域的研究进展,主要包括Sethi在1977年总结之后的模型发展。这些模型要回答的基本问题是,如何确定一个或一组相互竞争的企业的最优广告支出和其他可能随时间变化的利益相关因素。模型的最优化描述了这些变量如何转化为销售额,进而转化为利润。本文有两个主要目的。一方面,整理了早期综述文献中已经提到过的领域中产生的新贡献。另一方面,探讨了1977年以来广告学领域出现的新的研究方向。考虑到文章长度,本文将分成上中下三篇刊载。本篇主要介绍了销售—广告响应模型;耐用品的累积销售额模型;广告过程中具有多个状态变量的广告模型。     

The Advertising–price Relationship: Theory and Evidence

The relationship between advertising and price is important because the welfare effect of advertising depends upon the price effect of advertising. We attempt to provide a better understanding of the theoretical relationship between advertising and price. We establish theoretical conditions sufficient for advertising to raise prices. This will occur, for example, when firms play a supermodular game – a structure that considers the type of advertising (i.e., persuasive, image creating, or informative) and the effect that advertising has on a firm’s demand and costs. We also compare results from two simple duopoly models, one with horizontal and the other with vertical differentiation, and find that only the model with horizontal differentiation is supermodular for the forms of advertising that are thought to raise price (e.g., persuasive advertising). In consideration of these theoretical issues, we then develop an empirical model to determine whether advertising raises prices in the US brewing and cigarette industries.