Dominant design or multiple designs: the flash memory card case

Literature suggests that in battles between competing designs, ultimately one design will emerge as dominant to the detriment of the others. Various factors and forces have been identified to explain this phenomenon. Yet, sometimes no dominant design emerges at all and multiple competing designs coexist in the market. The flash memory card industry provides an example of this. In this study, we use this example as a case to investigate the circumstances under which an industry has a tendency toward multiple designs. The case shows that a combination of factors may result in multiple designs and we argue that such a combination of factors will increasingly also apply in other cases.     

Are OECD consumption–income ratios stationary after all?

This paper investigates the stochastic properties of the consumption–income ratio for a sample of 23 OECD countries over the period 1960–2005. For that purpose, we employ a battery of recently developed panel unit root and stationarity tests. Our findings from panel unit root tests which do not control for structural breaks appear in line with those from previous studies since they are clearly supportive of the unit root hypothesis. In stark contrast stand the results obtained from the application of a panel stationarity test with multiple breaks, which support the existence of regime-wise stationarity in OECD consumption–income ratios once we control for cross-sectional dependence through bootstrap methods. These findings are reinforced by the median-unbiased estimates of half-lives obtained from impulse-response functions which are found to be finite for the 23 OECD countries.     

Destructive behavior in a Fragile Public Good game

Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment–like damaging public goods–is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%.     

Bootstrap Methods in Econometrics*

There are many bootstrap methods that can be used for econometric analysis. In certain circumstances, such as regression models with independent and identically distributed error terms, appropriately chosen bootstrap methods generally work very well. However, there are many other cases, such as regression models with dependent errors, in which bootstrap methods do not always work well. This paper discusses a large number of bootstrap methods that can be useful in econometrics. Applications to hypothesis testing are emphasized, and simulation results are presented for a few illustrative cases.     

Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation

This paper introduces an algorithm to compute stationary equilibria in stochastic games that is guaranteed to converge for almost all such games. Since in general the number of stationary equilibria is overwhelming, we pay attention to the issue of equilibrium selection. We do this by extending the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games, called the stochastic tracing procedure. As a by-product of our results, we extend a recent result on the generic finiteness of stationary equilibria in stochastic games to oddness of equilibria.     

Using mean reversion as a measure of persistence

This paper suggests a new scalar measure of persistence together with a companion estimator, which has the advantage of not requiring the specification and estimation of a model for the series under investigation. The statistical properties of the companion estimator are established, which allow tests of hypotheses to be performed, under very general conditions. The use of the new measure is illustrated by re-evaluating persistence of inflation for the United States and the Euro Area. The conclusions for the United States do not differ significantly from what has been found in previous empirical studies. However, for the Euro Area we find evidence of a significant break occurring in 2001/2002, such that persistence becomes virtually nil for the period that follows the launch of the euro and the implementation of a common monetary policy by the European Central Bank.     

Bayesian Conjoint Choice Designs for Measuring Willingness to Pay

In this paper, we propose a new criterion for selecting efficient conjoint choice designs when the interest is in quantifying willingness to pay (WTP). The new criterion, which we call the WTP-optimality criterion, is based on the c-optimality criterion which is often used in the optimal experimental design literature. We use a simulation study to evaluate the designs generated using the WTP-optimality criterion and discuss the design of a real-life conjoint experiment from the literature. The results show that the new criterion leads to designs that yield more precise estimates of the WTP than Bayesian D-optimal conjoint choice designs, which are increasingly being seen as the state-of-the-art designs for conjoint choice studies, and to a substantial reduction in the occurrence of unrealistically high WTP estimates.     

Using structural restrictions to achieve theoretical consistency in benefit transfers

Analysts often extrapolate estimates of the value of environmental improvements reported in prior studies to evaluate new policy proposals, a practice sometimes referred to as “benefit transfer.” Benefit transfer functions are frequently specified based on statistical considerations alone. However, such a purely statistical approach can lead to willingness-to-pay functions that fail to satisfy some aspects of theoretical consistency that may be especially important for policy evaluations. In this paper, we examine several previous meta-analyses of nonmarket valuation studies in light of the adding-up condition, which is one important aspect of theoretical validity. We then use meta-regression to estimate a new willingness-to-pay function for surface water quality improvements intended to be used for benefit transfers. We estimate the meta-regression model using summary results from 51 previously published stated preference studies. An important feature of our approach is that we develop the meta-regression estimating equation to ensure that the resulting benefit transfer function will necessarily comply with the adding-up condition. This is achieved by first specifying a marginal willingness-to-pay function and then deriving an expression for total willingness-to-pay. This leads to a non-linear estimating equation, so we estimate the parameters of the model using non-linear least squares. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of our approach relative to other structural approaches, and we compare our empirical results to a more traditional nonstructural meta-regression model. Finally, we examine the quantitative importance of imposing the adding-up condition in our case study by performing some illustrative calculations of willingness-to-pay for hypothetical water quality improvements using both structural and non-structural models.     

A Note on Public Input Specifications

Public or fiscal policy is sometimes concerned with the provision of some infrastructure. This paper deals with the specification of such infrastructures as public inputs. Among other things, and in contrast to relevant literature, it is shown that there is no identity between various public inputs concepts. Thus, the results help to avoid misspecifications and may contribute to better public policy designs concerning the provision of infrastructures.     

Exploitable actions of believers in the “law of small numbers” in repeated constant-sum games

In repeated fixed-pair constant-sum games with unique equilibria in mixed strategies, such as matching pennies, the subgame perfect equilibrium is repeating the stage-game mixed-strategy equilibrium action. In such games rational players avoid strategies that are exploitable, in that current actions either deviate systematically from the equilibrium action probabilities or fail to be serially independent of past actions. I revisit classic experiments and find that subjects’ actions are sometimes exploitable because they are serially dependent. Subjects have difficulty in producing serially independent actions and in recognizing serially dependent sequences due to a bias called local representativeness.     

On negative time preferences

Survey data show that subjects positively discount both gains and losses but discount gains more heavily than losses. This holds for monetary and non-monetary outcomes. These results do not confirm the findings of two earlier studies about negative time preferences for non-monetary outcomes.     

Rational expectations equilibria of economies with local interactions

We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is, socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents’ choices, which might be in part determined, for instance, by family, peer group, or ethnic group effects. We study static as well as dynamic infinite horizon economies; we allow for economies with incomplete information, and we consider jointly global and local interactions, to integrate e.g., global externalities and markets with peer and group effects. We provide conditions under which such economies have rational expectations equilibria. We illustrate the effects of local interactions when agents are rational by studying in detail the equilibrium properties of a simple economy with quadratic preferences which captures, in turn, local preferences for conformity, habit persistence, and preferences for status or adherence to aggregate norms of behavior.     

Small noise asymptotics for a stochastic growth model

We develop analytic asymptotic methods to characterize time-series properties of nonlinear dynamic stochastic models. We focus on a stochastic growth model which is representative of the models underlying much of modern macroeconomics. Taking limits as the stochastic shocks become small, we derive a functional central limit theorem, a large deviation principle, and a moderate deviation principle. These allow us to calculate analytically the asymptotic distribution of the capital stock, and to obtain bounds on the probability that the log of the capital stock will differ from its deterministic steady-state level by a given amount. This latter result can be applied to characterize the probability and frequency of large business cycles. We then illustrate our theoretical results through some simulations. We find that our results do a good job of characterizing the model economy, both in terms of its average behavior and its occasional large cyclical fluctuations.     

An experimental examination of rational rent-seeking

The theoretical literature exploring various ramifications and applications of Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking model is extensive and rapidly growing. In contrast, there exist as yet only a few experimental evaluations of this model, with ambiguous results. Moreover, these studies focus on one particular case (proportional probabilities) and use a problematic experimental design. With an appropriate design we investigate the extreme cases of proportional probabilities and perfect discrimination, which offer the starkest contrast in theoretical predictions. We find substantial evidence for the predictive power of the rent-seeking model, particularly if one allows for the fact that people sometimes make mistakes or are confused about what to do.     

If at First You Don't Succeed…: Profits,Prices, and Market Structure in a Model of Quality with Unknowable Consumer Heterogeneity*

Why are higher quality niches seen as intrinsically more profitable in business circles? Why do high quality products sometimes have a low real price, whereas it is unusual to see low quality products with high real prices? Can markets have quality differentiation as well as quality bunching? How does the rate at which fixed costs change with quality affect market structure? In this article we develop a new model of quality that casts light on such issues.     

Are labor markets segmented in developing countries? A semiparametric approach

We test the hypothesis that observably similar workers earn higher wages in the formal sector than in the informal sector in developing nations. Using data from Argentina's household survey and various definitions of informal employment, we find that on average, formal wages are higher than informal wages. Parametric tests suggest that a formal premium remains after controlling for individual and establishment characteristics. However, this approach suffers from several econometric problems, which we address with semiparametric methods. The resulting formal premium estimates prove either small and insignificant, or negative. Neither do we find significant differences in measures of job satisfaction between the two sectors. We invoke these results to question the mainstream view that labor markets are segmented along formal/informal lines in developing nations such as Argentina.     

WHO VOTES EXPRESSIVELY,AND WHY? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

Experiments have shown that some people behave more altruistically in collective decisions than they do in individual ones, which could be interpreted as an ‘expressive voting’ effect. However, there is substantial variation in the behaviour of experimental participants. We conduct experiments to explore the reasons for this variation, and find that certain characteristics are sometimes associated with a propensity for expressive voting. However, the strength of these effects depends on the ordering of individual and collective choices. The ‘warm glow’ of expressive voting can influence subsequent individual decisions, and the ‘cold shower’ of individual selfishness can influence subsequent collective decisions.     

Endogeneity and sample selection in a model for remittances

We estimate a remittance model in which we address endogeneity and reverse causality relationships between immigrants' remittances, pre-transfer income and consumption. In order to take into account the fact that a large share of individuals do not remit, instrumental variable variants of the double-hurdle and Heckit selection models are proposed and estimated by Limited Information ML; semiparametric extensions are considered as robustness checks. Our results for a sample of recent immigrants to Australia show that endogeneity is substantial and that estimates obtained by the methods previously employed in the literature may be misleading if given a behavioral interpretation.     

What does “clean” really mean? The implicit framing of decontextualized experiments

It is standard in experimental economics to use decontextualized designs where payoff structures are presented using neutral language. Here we show that cooperation in such a neutrally framed Prisoner’s Dilemma is equivalent to a PD framed as contributing to a cooperative endeavour. Conversely, there is substantially less cooperation in a PD framed as a competition. We conclude that in a decontextualized context, our participants by default project a cooperative frame onto the payoff structure.     

What can we learn from revisions to the Greenbook forecasts?

Although there have been many evaluations of the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook forecasts, we analyze them in a different dimension. We examine the revisions of these forecasts in the context of fixed event predictions to determine how new information is incorporated in the forecasting process. This analysis permits us to determine if there was an inefficient use of information in the sense that the forecast revision has predictive power for the forecast error. Research on forecast smoothing suggests that we might find a positive relationship between the forecast error and the forecast revision. Although we do find for some variables and horizons the Fed’s forecast errors are predictable from its forecast revisions, there is no evidence of forecast smoothing. Instead the revisions sometimes have a negative relationship with the forecast error, suggesting in these cases that the Fed may be over-responsive to new information.