产品市场竞争、会计稳健性与企业投资效率

本文以2007-2016年280家民营上市公司为研究样本,考察了产品市场竞争、会计稳健性与企业投资效率三者之间的相互作用。实证结果发现,产品市场竞争和会计稳健性均能有效提高企业投资效率,降低企业的过度投资和投资不足程度,且两者干预过度投资的作用要大于对投资不足的作用。进一步研究发现,在竞争程度较高的市场条件下,会计稳健性对企业非效率投资行为有着更加敏感的制约作用,这表明产品市场竞争与会计稳健性在提高企业投资效率方面具有显著的互补作用。最后,论文从产品市场竞争与会计稳健性的交互项和企业财务风险两方面进行了稳健性检验。     

高管更换与经理人市场有效性

从控制权转移、经营业绩、股东财富与高管更换关系的角度回顾了国内外关于高管更换的研究文献,并从理论性障碍与技术性障碍两个方面指出了这一领域研究中的困难。     

产品市场竞争、代理成本及代理效率：一个经验分析

文章以我国2004-2005年深沪两市上市公司为样本,检验我国产品市场竞争与代理成本及代理效率之间的经验关系。研究发现:产品市场竞争能够有效降低企业代理成本,提高企业代理效率,并且对于我国国有企业作用效果尤其显著。     

Career Concerns and Product Market Competition

This paper studies the effect of increased competition in the product market on managerial incentives. I propose a simple model of career concerns where firms are willing to pay for managerial talent to reduce production costs, but also to subtract talented executives from competitors. This second effect is privately valuable to firms, but is socially wasteful. As a result, equilibrium pay for talent can be inefficiently high and career concerns too strong. Explicit incentive contracts do not solve the problem, but equilibrium pay is reduced if managerial skills have firm‐specific components, or if firms are heterogeneous. In this second case, managers are efficiently assigned to firms, but equilibrium pay reflects the profitability of talent outside the efficient allocation. The effect of increased competition is ambiguous in general, and depends on the profit sensitivity to cost reductions. This ambiguity is illustrated in two examples of commonly used models of imperfect competition.     

Organizational Structure and Product Market Competition

This paper explores the link between delegation of authority and product market competition. It considers a firm that is contemplating entering a market served by an incumbent. The firm can adopt either a decentralized or a centralized authority structure. In the former, authority is delegated to an agent, while in the latter, it is retained by the principal. We address the questions of how the toughness of future product market competition affects the delegation decision, and how this decision in turn affects product market competition. The delegation decision is determined by a trade‐off between inducing the agent to take greater initiative and accepting lower operating profits from a less efficient decision taken by the agent.     

Job Securityand Product Market Competition

In the present paper, we relate the extent of job security offered to incumbent managers to the extent of competition among firms in the product market, where the extent of job security is measured by the probability that an incumbent manager continues to be employed by his current firm and the extent of competition is measured by the degree of differentiation between competing brands. We demonstrate that when competition between firms intensifies and "on-the-job training" is relatively more conducive to reducing the variable costs of production, firms tend to offer reduced (increased) job security to incumbent managers, provided that the degree of differentiation between competing products is sufficiently large (small), respectively. If "on-the-job training" is relatively more conducive to reducing the fixed costs of production, however, the previous result is reversed.     

Product Market Competition and Returns to Talent

This paper investigates how product market competition influences the wages paid to workers and the distribution of talent across industries. We develop a model where firms facing different competitive conditions bid for workers. The model predicts that wages are increasing in talent, decreasing in competition, and the interaction between talent and competition is positive. In addition, the most talented workers will be concentrated in competitive industries and talent dispersion rises with competition. We use linked employee–employer data to test these predictions.     

CEO Overconfidence and Overinvestment Under Product Market Competition

How does product market competition influence whether CEOs with greater or lower levels of overconfidence are hired and whether CEOs overinvest in innovation? In a Cournot model in which firms hire a CEO to take charge of research and development (R&D) investment and production decisions, this paper shows that CEO overconfidence and overinvestment can be explained as an equilibrium outcome. More importantly, the intensity of product market competition and the equilibrium CEO overconfidence level (and R&D investment) exhibit an inverted U‐shaped relationship. As the product market tends toward perfect competition, all firms hire a realistic CEO and do not overinvest. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

产品市场竞争与现金持有动态调整

本文采用中国上市公司2005～2008年812家公司3248个样本的平衡面板数据,对产品市场竞争及其变化与企业现金持有动态调整之间的关系进行研究。实证研究的结果表明,从静态角度看,产品市场竞争对现金持有调整速度的影响不显著;但是从动态角度看,企业的现金持有水平将随着产品市场竞争的动态变化做出调整,产品市场竞争越趋向激烈,企业现金持有调整的速度越快。进一步研究发现,产品市场竞争的动态变化与现金持有调整速度之间的上述关系在非国有企业和高成长企业更为明显。     

产品市场竞争、公司违规与商业信用

通过研究公司违规被监管机构处罚这一事件对商业信用获取及其使用成本的影响,考察了企业在资本市场的声誉受损是否会传染并影响到"供应商-客户"关系。实证结果发现,公司在发生违法违规行为被监管机构处罚后,获得的商业信用额度变少,"商业信用-现金持有"敏感性提高,也即商业信用的使用成本上升。进一步地,违规被罚事件在竞争激烈的行业中对"供应商-客户"关系破坏更严重,即在产品市场竞争更加激烈的行业,公司违规被罚后商业信用减少与使用成本的提高更显著。结论表明,除了股东和债权人,供应商也会看重公司的违法违规事件,监管机构对公司违规行为的处罚并非"纸老虎",处罚的传染效应使得企业会承担因与其他合约方关系的破坏而造成的间接成本。     

产品市场竞争、代理成本与企业绩效

本文基于2010—2016年944家A股上市公司财务数据,运用面板固定效应模型实证研究了产品市场竞争、代理成本与企业经营绩效之间的关系。研究表明:(1)代理成本能够显著的降低企业的经营绩效,且代理成本对国有企业经营绩效的负向作用要显著大于非国有企业;产品市场竞争、股权集中度和股权制衡度能够显著降低企业代理成本,相对于国有企业,产品市场竞争对代理成本的负向作用在非国有企业中更为显著;(2)对于国有企业,产品市场竞争能够直接促进企业经营绩效的提高,而对代理成本与经营绩效的影响并不存在显著的调节作用;对于非国有企业,产品市场竞争并不能直接显著的提高企业绩效,而是通过调节作用显著的抑制代理成本对企业绩效的负面作用。     

财务困境、产品市场竞争与企业创新

基于2007-2016年我国沪深两市的非金融类上市公司样本,实证检验了财务困境与企业创新的关系,并进一步考察了产品市场竞争的调节作用以及产权性质差异所带来的影响。研究结果表明,财务困境与企业创新呈倒U型关系;产品市场竞争会负向调节财务困境与企业创新之间的倒U型关系;进一步基于产权性质差异分组后的分析发现,财务困境与企业创新呈倒U型关系在非国有企业中更为明显。     

产业政策、产品市场竞争与企业债务融资

关注产业发展和资源配置效率,现实考察特定行业的企业融资效率,不仅需要分析产业政策的冲击,还需重点检验产品市场竞争的影响。选取A股非金融类上市公司2006-2015年数据为研究样本,统计分析我国产业政策对企业债务融资的影响,并结合产品市场竞争分析产业政策影响下银行的信贷资金配置效率。结果表明,相比未受产业政策支持的行业企业,受产业政策支持的行业企业债务水平较高,且产品市场竞争越激烈,这种正向效应越强。研究结论对于产业政策的有效实施和信贷资源的优化配置具有重要启示。     

内部控制、产品市场竞争与代理成本

本文以2012-2016年我国A股上市公司数据为研究样本,探讨内部控制、产品市场竞争与代理成本之间的关系,研究结果表明内部控制可以有效缓解经理人与股东之间的代理冲突,提升信息披露质量。进一步研究发现,在高强度产品市场竞争下,内部控制对代理成本的抑制作用显著降低。在低强度产品市场竞争下,内部控制缓解代理冲突、降低代理成本的效果更加显著。这说明,产品市场竞争在内部控制抑制代理成本的过程中起到了一定的替代作用。     

产品市场竞争、代理成本与企业绩效

本文基于2010—2016年944家A股上市公司财务数据,运用面板固定效应模型实证研究了产品市场竞争、代理成本与企业经营绩效之间的关系。研究表明:(1)代理成本能够显著的降低企业的经营绩效,且代理成本对国有企业经营绩效的负向作用要显著大于非国有企业;产品市场竞争、股权集中度和股权制衡度能够显著降低企业代理成本,相对于国有企业,产品市场竞争对代理成本的负向作用在非国有企业中更为显著;(2)对于国有企业,产品市场竞争能够直接促进企业经营绩效的提高,而对代理成本与经营绩效的影响并不存在显著的调节作用;对于非国有企业,产品市场竞争并不能直接显著的提高企业绩效,而是通过调节作用显著的抑制代理成本对企业绩效的负面作用。     

Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition

This paper surveys recent work in contract theory that relates to the allocation of tasks among agents within an organization as well as to the effect of product market competition upon optimal contracting and agency costs.     

北京产品市场竞争力分析

通过对北京市若干大中型商业单位的走访调查发现 ,北京产品在市场上的竞争力呈下降趋势。本文针对这一现实 ,运用现代营销理论综合分析其原因 ,并且从产品定位、重塑品牌、参与“二次竞争”等方面提出增强北京产品竞争力的对策     

产品市场竞争、薪酬-业绩敏感性与企业零杠杆策略

通过对现行资本结构相关研究进行分析可以发现,学术界普遍认为企业合理开展债务融资能够有效提升企业价值,但是在实际经营过程中,诸多企业开始采用零杠杆策略,不断减少债务规模,以有效提升企业盈利能力,获取更多的留存收益。值得注意的是,部分企业在采用零杠杆策略过程中因资金短缺而产生经营危机,因此对零杠杆策略影响因素进行分析具有一定的必要性。本文对企业零杠杆策略受产品市场竞争及薪酬-业绩敏感性的影响程度进行分析,研究发现:薪酬-业绩敏感性与企业零杠杆策略之间存在显著正相关;产品市场竞争与企业零杠杆策略之间存在显著正相关;产品市场竞争能够增强薪酬-业绩敏感性与企业零杠杆策略的相关性。     

产品市场竞争、财务报告质量与投资现金流敏感性

文章以2005年至2010年间的非金融上市公司为样本,对中国产品市场竞争、财务报告质量与投资现金流敏感性之间的关系进行实证研究.研究结果发现:财务报告质量与投资现金流敏感性负相关,高质量的财务报告提高了投资效率;行业竞争与财务信息披露之间既具有互补效应又具有替代效应;行业管制降低了财务报告质量对非效率投资的正面作用;处于行业竞争劣势的企业中财务报告对投资现金流敏感性的作用更强.     

产品市场竞争动态与企业财务保守行为选择研究述评

自20世纪80年代中期以来,产业组织理论与传统融资理论的交叉渗透为现代资本结构研究开辟了广阔视野,企业融资结构管理更加强调财务灵活性,即须基于产品市场竞争动态、公司战略、特殊的公司治理结构以及资本市场环境等因素进行综合权衡.财务保守由此作为一种能够适应企业当前情况以及未来投资机会的投融资战略选择行为而在最近的资本结构研究中颇受关注.本文基于产品市场竞争与公司资本结构互动关系,从两大方面的五种视角,对财务保守行为的相关研究予以述评.