Why Do Firms Switch Banks? Evidence from China

This article uses a sample of matched firms-banks data in China over the period 1999–2012 to determine the drivers of firms switching behavior from one bank relationship to another. The results show that the principal driver of a switching action is the credit needs of the firm. The binding force of the Communist Party in state-owned banks and enterprises would suggest that switching should be a rare phenomenon in Chinese commercial relations. But switching occurs. The findings support the extant literature that transparent firms are able to switch more readily than opaque firms. The results also suggest that banks that develop their fee income services are more effective in locking-in their borrowers and that firms tend to switch from state-owned banks to smaller non-state owned banks. However, in other areas switching does not conform with the mainstream explanations.     

(Why) Do Central Banks Care about Their Profits?

We document that central banks are discontinuously more likely to report slightly positive profits than slightly negative profits, especially when political pressure is greater, the public is more receptive to extreme political views, and central bank governors are eligible for reappointment. The propensity to report small profits over small losses is correlated with higher inflation and lower interest rates. We conclude that there are agency problems at central banks, which give rise to discontinuous profit incentives that correlate with central banks’ policy choices and outcomes. These findings inform the debate about the political economy of central banking and central bank design.     

Why Do Banks Go Abroad?—Evidence from German Data

This paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants of foreign activities of German banks. We use regionally disaggregated panel data for the years 1981–98 and distinguish foreign direct investment from total foreign assets of domestic banks, of their foreign branches and of their subsidiaries. Foreign activities are found to be positively related to demand conditions on the local market, foreign activities of German firms, and the presence of financial centers. This supports the hypothesis that German banks follow their customers abroad. Exchange rate volatility has some negative impact. EU membership and the abolition of capital controls seem to have exerted a greater influence on foreign assets than on FDI of German banks, thus weakly supporting the hypothesis that the two are substitutes.     

Do Banks Follow Their Customers Abroad?

The market share of US business loans made by foreign‐owned banks has increased dramatically since 1980. At the same time, foreign direct investment in the US rose, so that much of the growth in foreign‐owned US‐based bank lending to businesses in the US could conceivably be accounted for by an increase in loans to the nonbank US affiliates of firms headquartered abroad, an expectation consistent with the conventional wisdom that banks "follow their customers" abroad. Our study investigates the lending patterns of US‐based banks from Japan, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, countries that account for the vast majority of foreign bank activity in the US. Simultaneously, we look at the borrowing patterns of nonbank US affiliates of firms from those countries. We find that banks from four of the six countries (Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK) allocated a majority of their loans to non‐home‐country borrowers for some or all of the 1981–1992 period. These findings suggest that the "follow the customer" hypothesis may have a more limited applicability than previously supposed.     

Do Central Banks React to House Prices?

We estimate the Federal Reserve's, the Bank of England's, and the Bank of Japan's responses to house prices. We show that generalized method of moments estimates of a Taylor rule augmented with house prices are biased and dispersed. We then use full‐information methods and estimate the policy rule together with a VAR for the nonpolicy variables. These estimates are also biased. We propose an alternative approach and estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model embedded with a monetary rule with a direct response to house prices. We find that house prices played a separate role in the reaction functions of these central banks.     

Do Banks Value Innovation? Evidence from US Firms

This study evaluates how innovation within companies alleviates the information asymmetry problems in relationship lending. We hypothesize that patenting activities could reveal favorable private information and, hence, reduce the information asymmetry between innovative borrowers and banks. Using a sample of US patenting firms from 1987 to 2004, we show that borrowers with higher innovation capability (revealed by having more patent applications, higher research & development (R&D) productivity, or higher‐quality patents) enjoy lower bank‐loan spreads and better nonprice‐related loan terms. Our evidence further suggests that the information benefits of patenting activities on loan spreads is more pronounced for small or less R&D‐intensive firms.     

Why Do the Swiss Rent?

At less than 34%, Switzerland has the lowest home ownership rate in Western Europe. This may seem odd given the economic strength of the country. We use household survey data for five Swiss cantons to explore some possible reasons for this. We estimate a tenure choice equation that allows us to analyze the impacts of a number of key variables on the ownership rate. We pay particular attention to the relative cost of owning and renting, which is a function of house prices, rents, and the user cost of owning. The latter is a function of income tax policy and expected house price inflation, among other things. We also measure mortgage underwriting criteria and consider rent control and other policies affecting rental housing. By simulating a number of hypothetical changes to taxation and other policies, underwriting criteria, and price levels, we assess the importance of these variables in explaining the ownership rate. We conclude that high house prices—relative to household incomes and wealth—and the tax on imputed rent are the most important causes of Switzerland’s low ownership rate.     

Why Do Traders Split Orders?

We examine factors that influence decisions by U.S. equity traders to execute a string of orders, in the same stock, in the same direction, around the same time. Order splitting is more likely to occur when traders submit larger‐size orders and when market depth and trading activity are lower. Order splitters demand liquidity more and pay higher trading costs, but their overall performance is better. When controlling for execution time, split orders are more informative than single orders. Our results suggest that order splitting arises from a variety of factors, including informational differences, order and trader characteristics, and market conditions.     

Do Strict Regulators Increase the Transparency of Banks?

We investigate the role that regulatory strictness plays on the enforcement of financial reporting transparency in the U.S. banking industry. Using a novel measure of regulatory strictness in the enforcement of capital adequacy, we show that strict regulators are more likely to enforce restatements of banks' call reports. Further, we find that the effect of regulatory strictness on accounting enforcement is strongest in periods leading up to economic downturns and for banks with riskier asset portfolios. Overall, the results from our study indicate that regulatory oversight plays an important role in enforcing financial reporting transparency, particularly in periods leading up to economic crises. We interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the idea that strict bank regulators put significant weight on concerns about the potential destabilizing effects of accounting transparency.     

Do Public Banks Compete with Private Banks? Evidence from Concentrated Local Markets in Brazil

We measure the competitive effect of public banks in concentrated local markets in Brazil using branch location patterns. We employ variation in market size, number, and identity of competitors to determine how the conduct of private banks is affected by the entry of a public bank. We find that the market size needed to sustain a private bank branch is 35% larger if a private competitor is present and is not significantly affected by the presence of a public bank. These results suggest that the presence of a public bank does not affect conduct of private banks.     

Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure?

We examine the voluntary disclosure practices of family firms. We find that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms provide fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls, but more earnings warnings. Whereas the former is consistent with family owners having a longer investment horizon, better monitoring of management, and lower information asymmetry between owners and managers, the higher likelihood of earnings warnings is consistent with family owners having greater litigation and reputation cost concerns. We also document that family ownership dominates nonfamily insider ownership and concentrated institutional ownership in explaining the likelihood of voluntary disclosure. Using alternative proxies for the founding family's presence in the firm leads to similar results.     

What Do Investment Banks Truly Bring to the Table?

This paper investigates the role of intermediaries in the initial public offering (IPO) process. In the U.S. market, investment banks have traditionally been involved in a firm‐commitment or best‐efforts underwriting capacity. However, in the Australian IPO market, investment banks are increasingly being named in association with new issues in diverse roles such as issue managers, sponsoring brokers and corporate advisers. Using a sample of 468 IPOs over the 1996 to mid‐2006 period, we examine the influence of investment banks across these different engagements. In support of the signalling and information production roles of intermediaries, we find that issuers choosing high intermediary involvement are typically older, retain more capital, seek to raise larger amounts of capital and are without independent expert certification. We find mixed support for the certification hypothesis when testing for the effect of intermediary reputation on IPO issuer wealth loss. Further, the impact of intermediary involvement on underpricing is not significantly different for the different levels of intermediary involvement once issue characteristics have been accounted for. This is puzzling since these different roles by definition do not provide the same level of issue quality assurance.     

Why Do European Firms Go Public?

We survey chief financial officers (CFOs) from 12 European countries regarding the determinants of going public and exchange listing decisions. Most CFOs identify enhanced visibility and financing for growth as the most important benefits of an IPO, but other motivations for IPOs differ significantly across firms, countries, and legal systems. We find strong support for the IPO theories that emphasise financial and strategic considerations, such as enhanced reputation and credibility, and financial flexibility as a major advantage of an IPO. At the same time, we find moderate support for theories that focus on exit strategy, balance of power with creditors, external monitoring, and merger and acquisition motivations. European CFOs' views on the major benefits of an IPO are generally similar to those of US managers as reported in Brau and Fawcett (2006) , but differ significantly on outside monitoring; outside monitoring is considered a major benefit by European CFOs but a major cost by US CFOs. Our evidence suggests that the decision to go public is a complex one, and cannot be explained by one single theory because firms seek multiple benefits in going public. These motivations are influenced by the firm's ownership structure, size and age as well as by the home country's institutional and regulatory environment.     

Do ATMs Increase Technical Efficiency of Banks in a Developing Country? Evidence from Indian Banks

Prior studies have confirmed that the greater the investment in information technology (IT), the better the performance of the firm. In the present study, we use bootstrap data envelopment analysis (DEA), which has previously been used in the accounting literature, and which has an edge over traditional accounting‐based measures, to compute the performance efficiency of Indian banks. Specifically, we measure the impact of automated teller machine (ATM) investment intensity on the production efficiency of Indian banks. We also study the impact of bank ownership, soundness, size and risk on efficiency. The study contributes to the literature on the productivity paradox and also draws on structure–conduct–performance theory. We find that ATM intensity has a significant negative association with bootstrap DEA technical efficiency. These results differ from prior research in developed countries. The results could be ascribed to heavy investment in IT such as ATMs by banks, and their inability to reduce labour costs given that many processes still continue to be manual. Accordingly, the study suggests that investment decisions with regard to IT need to be taken with great caution. If the related processes are not simultaneously automated, such investments are unlikely to yield the results that management may have envisaged.     

Do Internet Activities Add Value? Evidence from the Traditional Banks

Very little is known about how adopting Internet activities impact traditional banks. By tracing the experience of Italian commercial banks, we provide evidence and implications for banks’ use of new Internet technology and innovative banking products as they relate to performance. Using different definitions for what is considered as Internet activity and by examining alternative proxies for bank return and risk, we find a significant link between offerings of Internet banking products and bank performance. Although this link is significantly positive for bank returns, we find a negative, marginally significant, association between the adoption of Internet activities and bank risk.

How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Hedge Loans?

Before the credit crisis that started in mid-2007, it was generally believed by top regulators that credit derivatives make banks sounder. In this paper, we investigate the validity of this view. We examine the use of credit derivatives by US bank holding companies with assets in excess of one billion dollars from 1999 to 2005. Using the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Holding Company Database, we find that in 2005 the gross notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks exceeds the amount of loans on their books. Only 23 large banks out of 395 use credit derivatives and most of their derivatives positions are held for dealer activities rather than for hedging of loans. The net notional amount of credit derivatives used for hedging of loans in 2005 represents less than 2% of the total notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks and less than 2% of their loans. We conclude that the use of credit derivatives by banks to hedge loans is limited because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems and because of the inability of banks to use hedge accounting when hedging with credit derivatives. Our evidence raises important questions about the extent to which the use of credit derivatives makes banks sounder.

Why Do We Need Countercyclical Capital Requirements?

We show that risk-based capital requirements can eliminate the market failure, caused by asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and banks, which distorts the efficient allocation of low-risk and high-risk investment projects among entrepreneurs. If project success probabilities decline in recessions, optimal capital requirements will have to be lower because the size of the market failure changes. This provides a new rationale for keeping risk-based capital requirements higher in good times and lowering them in bad times.     

Do Goodwill Impairments by European Firms Provide Useful Information to Investors?

In 2004 International Accounting Standards Board. (2004). International Accounting Standard (IAS) N°36: Impairment of assets. London: Author. [Google Scholar], the IASB adopted the mandatory annual impairment-test-only of goodwill (IAS 36) instead of amortization of goodwill. We present and discuss the academic literature regarding the association between the goodwill impairment, under this new standard, and the revision of investors’ expectations about a company’s future cash flows. The academic literature highlights that, in some specific cases, IAS 36 may help investors to revise their expectations. More precisely, goodwill impairment seems relevant when: (a) there is strong asymmetry of information between managers and investors, (b) managers disclose detailed information in the notes regarding their own assumptions about future cash flows, and (c) managers do not manage earnings and provide reliable information to investors. In many cases, goodwill impairment is probably useless for investors because they are able to revise their expectations based on public information, or because they cannot trust the accounting numbers and additional information in the notes about the impairment test, which are provided by (undisciplined) managers. More research is, however, needed to understand in which circumstances impairment-test-only is more useful, as well in which cases it is less adequate. Our analysis relates to the current post-implementation review and should be useful to standard-setters. Before any modification, we argue that standard-setters should carefully consider the economic and the institutional contexts when issuing a new accounting standard.     

Why Do Bidders Do Badly Out of Mergers? Some UK Evidence

This paper builds on Roll's hubris hypothesis as to why bidders overpay. It rejects the winner's curse hypothesis (which implies that the generosity of the merger terms increases the probability of a successful bid) on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The empirical study examines a bargaining theory approach: that the terms offered are determined by the parties' individual eagerness to merge. It also examines a modification of this: that the terms are dominated by the existence of a premium required by the market irrespective of synergy, thereby also dominating the decision as to whether a bid should be made.