Transparency on the consumer side and tacit collusion

This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. Increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from undercutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment profit. The net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain. In the limiting homogeneous market, the effect vanishes. Here market transparency does not affect the possibilities for tacit collusion.     

Financial structure and exchange rate experience: Mexico 1954–1977

This paper discusses the Mexican experience regarding exchange rate policy and the development of the financial market since the 1950's. The unique structure of Mexican financial institutions is described, with emphasis on how they have conditioned possibilities for monetary and exchange rate policy intervention.     

MARKET TRANSACTIONS IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

This paper explains the treatment of market and non-market transactions in the national accounts. Different possibilities of defining these two types of transactions are discussed, and it becomes evident that a strong restriction of national accounts to market transactions only cannot be seriously taken into consideration. On the other hand, a system of supplementary tables is proposed which shows the market and the non-market transactions as such. Examples of tables of this kind are presented for the Federal Republic of Germany.     

Stepping Stones for Biological Invasion: A Bioeconomic Model of Transferable Risk

We investigate three sources of bias in valuation methods for ecosystem risk: failure to consider substitution possibilities between goods, failure to consider nonseparability of ecosystem services with market goods, and failure to consider substitution possibilities between ecosystems. The first two biases are known in the literature, and we offer insight on the size of the bias for a specific example. Our work on spatially transferable risk is novel. We develop the concept and show how it may undermine typical invasion prevention strategies. We find three key results. First, partial equilibrium estimates of welfare loss are significantly overestimated relative to general equilibrium estimates. If ecosystem services and market goods are substitutes the partial equilibrium bias is greater than if they are compliments. Second, well-intended policies do not necessarily reduce overall risk; risk reduction actions can transfer risk to another time or location, or both, which may increase total risk. Third, policies of quotas and inspections have to be extreme to improve welfare, with inspections having advantages over quotas.     

Growth versus Conservation: A Veblenian Perspective

This article is concerned with the role of institutions in organizing the economy and argues with some neoclassical and Marxist positions. The neoclassical approach usually ignores the role of institutions, while its “public choice-property rights” extensions overemphasize the market solution to market failure problems. The Marxist approach is useful in relating institutions to the conflicts of interest, but tends to be overoptimistic about possibilities of social control of economic activities.     

Interfuel substitution in US electricity generation

Ongoing changes in the US electricity market include restructuring and increased competition. With this unfettering of the market, the fuel choice in generation is expected to become more flexible and responsive. To investigate this hypothesis, studies of US electricity fuel choices over the last three decades are summarized and the most recent analysis is provided on a market very different from the one on which earlier studies were done. Modern data handling techniques allow the consideration of the most comprehensive database including 185 utilities on monthly data for 1993. This paper finds fuel choice to show a considerable amount of price responsiveness, the amount of responsiveness is sensitive to the fuel substitution possibilities within the utility, and the amount of responsiveness seems to have increased recently for oil and natural gas.     

A survey on physical delivery versus cash settlement in futures contracts

A futures contract may adopt physical delivery or cash settlement to liquidate open positions after the maturity day. While traditionally physical delivery specification is favored, exchanges have recently turned to examine cash settlement possibilities. This paper summarizes current literature on settlement specifications with emphases on market manipulation, cash index construction, and hedging effectiveness comparisons.     

Core and equilibrium in incomplete markets

Conclusions The classical foundation of general equilibrium analysis by the cooperative concept of the core has been extended to an economy with incomplete trading possibilities. This has been accomplished by restricting the exchange possibilities of coalitions of traders in accordance with the available market structure. However, compared with the classical result, the present foundation of rational expectations equilibria may appear much weaker. The reason is that in reality consumers may sign contracts which are more complex than the existing market structure. Therefore, it may happen that prices cannot decentralize all cooperative transactions by markets, in spite of perfect competition. With an incomplete set of markets, therefore, a cooperative exchange of commodities by individual contracts may coexist with trading in non-cooperative, competitive markets.I wish to thank Martin Hellwig for helpful comments and suggestions. Of course, I remain responsible for all shortcomings of the paper.     

Public investment and social risk-sharing

How the government uses market rates of return to discount risky public projects is intrinsic to the efficient allocation of capital and the choice of public investment policy. This paper shows that social discount rates for risk can be higher than, lower than, or equal to private rates. Previous analyses which argue for ‘one-sided’ rules where social discount rates are always lower or equal to private rates are shown to be inappropriate in general. The paper shows in a general model that the difference between the social value of a public project and its market value is determined by the social insurance value that the project has from improving risk-sharing relative to the market. Depending on the project and degree of market imperfection, this term can be positive, negative, or zero, explaining the different possibilities for the social evaluation of risk.     

Anti-competitive conduct, in-house R&D, and growth

Incumbent firms have two basic possibilities to improve their competitive position in the product market: Investment in R&D and the creation of entry barriers to the disadvantage of potential rivals, e.g. through lobbying activities, campaign contributions, bribes or the adoption of incompatible technologies. This paper proposes a simple oligopoly model which raises the possibility that such anti-competitive conduct and R&D investment are complementary activities for incumbents. Consequently, an institutional framework or technological possibilities which encourage anti-competitive conduct, although impeding entry of potential rivals and accentuating standard oligopoly distortions, may foster R&D-based growth and welfare. However, this outcome is less likely if entrants exert technological spillover effects, e.g. through foreign direct investment. Stronger protection of intellectual property rights, although triggering anti-competitive conduct and thereby impeding market entry as well, is more likely to foster economic growth.     

Labour demand under VES production and imperfect output market conditions: The U.K. manufacturing experience

A labour demand schedule is derived under VES production and imperfect production market conditions. Tests on UK manufacturing data suggest the importance of current output and to a lesser extent labour cost and the effects of adjustment costs on the employment decision. Substitution possibilities, dependent on the ratio of labour to capital's share generally lie between zero and unity.     

Beyond 'employability'

Concentrating on British welfare-to-work policy, the paper presentsa critique of 'employability-based' approaches to supply-sideintervention in the labour market. It is argued that the likelymacroeconomic impacts of the Blair Government's 'New Deal' programmeare being exaggerated, and that a more realistic appreciationof the limits and possibilities of such supply-side interventionsis required. Some suggestions for a reformed approach to welfare-to-workpolicy - based on a client-centred and developmental ethos,an enlarged concept of 'employment' (embracing the social economy)and active social redistribution - are proposed.     

Carbon Capture and a Commercial Market for CO2

With increasing evidence that the earth is warming at a faster rate than previously expected, there is pressure to reduce carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions on a large scale. Because carbon capture helps to internalize the CO₂ externality, economists have begun to evaluate its potential. Two possibilities exist: carbon capture and storage (CCS), where CO₂ is sequestered, usually underground; and the development of a commercial market, where CO₂ is used for transformation into calcium carbonate, biofuels, air conditioning, or other market options. This paper contrasts CCS with the development of a commercial market for CO₂ and finds that the commercial market holds many advantages: internalization of the pollution externality, addressing the innovation externality, and revenue generation. Depending on the development of the commercial market, revenue from the sale of CO₂ could partially or fully offset the cost of innovation in carbon capture technology.     

Collective Decisions and Competitive Markets

In a general equilibrium model, we allow for households with several, typically heterogeneous, members; households that make (efficient) collective consumption decisions where different households may use different collective decision mechanisms; yet households that operate within a competitive market environment. The interaction of two allocation mechanisms, collective decisions and competitive markets, is investigated, with a focus on the efficiency properties and decentralization possibilities of the dual allocation mechanism.     

Competition vs. collaboration in the generation and adoption of a sequence of new technologies: a game theory approach

The study provides a game theoretic exploration of firms’ decisions on whether to compete or collaborate in the generation and adoption of a sequence of new technologies. Different from models proposed by previous studies, which concentrates on process innovation and a two-strategy set (innovation or do nothing), the present game theory model emphasises product innovation and a three-strategy set (innovation, collaboration, or do nothing). The study makes three contributions. The proposed game theory model extends current understanding of the impacts of collaboration possibilities and collaboration cost in a dynamic game theory. Further, the model clarifies the impact of transaction costs on the outcome. Finally, the study finds that the relationship between collaboration costs is not univariate, but depends on the market type and various market characteristics, such as technology gap, technology level, the product substitution index, transaction costs, and the discount rate of price sensitiveness.     

SUSTAINABILITY IN A MULTIPRODUCT AND MULTIPLE AGENT CONTESTABLE MARKET

We prove that a natural monopoly can set subsidy free pricing and sustainable pricing schedules in a general economic environment. The setting is a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable market where demands are elastic and where rivals can enter the submarkets composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Our results suggest that the existence results of the extant literature admit analogues even in an environment where rivals have enlarged possibilities to enter the market and where demands react to prices. The approach makes use of cooperative games to deduce the main results under conditions of fair sharing cost, a threshold in consumption and regularity of the profit function.     

Stress that Doesn't Pay: The Commuting Paradox*

People spend a lot of time commuting and often find it a burden. According to standard economics, the burden of commuting is chosen when compensated either on the labor or on the housing market so that individuals' utility is equalized. However, in a direct test of this strong notion of equilibrium with panel data, we find that people with longer commuting time report systematically lower subjective well‐being. This result is robust with regard to a number of alternative explanations. We mention several possibilities of an extended model of human behavior able to explain this “commuting paradox”.     

Attribution of hedge fund returns using a Kalman filter

Hedge funds offer attractive investment possibilities because they engage in investment styles and opportunity sets which – because they are different from traditional asset class funds – generate different risk exposures. Conventional wisdom holds that hedge funds add value and provide unique investment opportunities because of their ability to invest in disparate risk exposures, and via the manager’s skill in selecting stocks and timing the market. In this article, a Kalman filter is used to decompose the time series of hedge fund returns into market timing and stock selection factors to establish whether fund managers really do generate statistically significant abnormal profits. Compelling evidence supports an alternative interpretation for the market timing return constituent. This work represents the first time the Kalman filter has been used to extract a time series of the capital asset pricing model’s dynamic variables for determining return component magnitudes.