Interactions of the firm's real and financial decisions

This paper provides an integrated approach to the theory of the firm. Under technological uncertainty, corporate taxes, risky debt and risk neutrality it is shown that the firm's investment production and financing decisions are made simultaneously. It is demonstrated that the relationship between optimal capital (or labour) and debt is not strictly negative as in Dotan and Ravid (1982) nor strictly positive as in Hite (1977). The direction of this relationship depends on the characteristics of debt and the characteristics of the firm's production function. Given the simultaneity of the real and financial decisions, it is shown that an interior optimum exists for the firm's value as a function of debt.     

Effect of piracy on innovation in the presence of network externalities

This paper analyzes the impact of simultaneous increases in piracy (piracy effect) and network externalities (network effect) on R&D investment. A single firm's R&D investment increases (or decreases) if the network effect (or piracy effect) is dominant. With R&D competition, if the firms “significantly” differ with respect to their R&D efficiencies and if the piracy effect dominates the network effect then the less efficient firm's R&D investment increases and that of the more efficient firm's decreases. In this case, the overall probability of successful innovation increases. The reverse holds if the network effect dominates the piracy effect. If the firms are “less” asymmetric then their R&D investment either increases or decreases depending on the relative strengths of the piracy and network effects.     

Do judges react to the probability of appellate review? Empirical evidence from trial court procedures

The appellate review system is intended to serve as an efficient remedy for imperfect judicial decision making. However, it can fulfil this task only when appeals are ex ante unpredictable to the judge, and thus can be expected to occur primarily in case of a bad verdict. Using data from case records of a German trial court, we show that the probability of appeal can be predicted based on easily observable exogenous factors. Controlling for the complexity of a legal case, we find that judges also tend to decrease their effort when the ex ante probability of appeal is low. Thus, our empirical evidence indicates an inefficiency in the appellate review system because trial judges allocate their effort to cases not exclusively according to case complexity, but particularly according to the ex ante probability of being reviewed.     

The effect of outward investment to China on domestic R&D: a two-hurdle model with endogenous ODI

Outward direct investment (ODI) and domestic R&D are interrelated, but empirical evidence is affected by the nature of a firm's data, which are heavily censored. Firm data contain a firm's yes/no decision to invest in China, yes/no decision of R&D, and the decision of R&D intensity. We thus adopt a two-hurdle model and allow the China investment decision to be endogenous in an R&D model in order to examine the effect of ODI in China on domestic R&D investment in Taiwan's electronics industry. In the model, a two-equation simultaneous subsystem is formed, in which three regression equations are specified: a decision of R&D intensity, and a yes/no decision of location to conduct R&D together with a yes/no decision to invest in China Our results indicate that China investment and R&D intensity are positively related such that ODI in China helps to raise significantly a firm's R&D intensity as compared to the estimate if the endogeneity of China investment and the nature of data were not properly accounted.     

Domestic R&D,Foreign Direct Investment and Welfare

This paper provides a new rationale to examine the two‐way relationship between domestic research and development (R&D) and foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as their impacts on domestic welfare. Our analysis is based on the strategic interaction in cost‐reducing investment decisions between domestic firms and a foreign firm, which is different from the common factors that are discussed in the literature such as spillovers and technology sourcing. Our results are as follows. We show that domestic R&D investment may either increase or decrease the foreign firm's FDI incentives. Further, depending on the marginal cost of domestic firms, domestic R&D incentives can always increase regardless of the effects of domestic R&D investment on the foreign firm's FDI decision. Finally, we find that domestic welfare improves under domestic cost reduction if the slope of the marginal cost of domestic R&D investment is sufficiently small.     

INFORMATIONAL CASCADES ELICIT PRIVATE INFORMATION*

We introduce cheap talk in a dynamic investment model with information externalities. We first show how social learning adversely affects the credibility of cheap talk messages. Next, we show how an informational cascade makes truth‐telling incentive compatible. A separating equilibrium only exists for high‐surplus projects. Both an investment subsidy and an investment tax can increase welfare. The more precise the sender's information, the higher her incentives to truthfully reveal her private information.     

Progressive taxation and the intensity and timing of investment

This paper examines the effect of progressive taxation on a firm's investment intensity and timing decisions using a real options approach. The firm possesses a perpetual option to invest in a project at any instant by incurring an irreversible investment cost at that time. The amount of the irreversible investment cost determines the intensity of investment that augments the value of the project. Tax progression is specified in a particular case of a constant marginal tax rate with an exogenously given tax exemption threshold that makes the average tax rate increase with the tax base. We show that the firm's investment decisions are neutral to tax progression only when the exogenously given tax exemption threshold is sufficiently large. When tax neutrality does not hold, we show that progressive taxation has a perverse effect on investment intensity. Finally, we show that progressive taxation induces the firm to invest earlier as compared to the case under proportional taxation (i.e., in the absence of any tax exemption).     

Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

This study incorporates the corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of a domestic firm and analyses strategic trade policy towards a foreign firm in a different market structure. We show that the tariff rate under a foreign (domestic) firm's leadership is lowest when the degree of CSR is large (small). We also show that the foreign firm's leadership yields the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is intermediate, while the domestic firm's leadership yields the highest welfare otherwise. In an endogenous‐timing game, we show that a simultaneous‐move outcome is the unique equilibrium when the degree of CSR is small; thus, it is never socially desirable. We also show that the domestic firm's leadership can be an equilibrium, which results in the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is large. Finally, when the degree of CSR is large, collusive behaviours between the domestic and foreign firms can increase welfare.     

Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information

We model non-cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers, assuming each consumer has private information about the intensity of her preferences for the firms' respective products and each firm has private information about its own product's quality. We characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm's price reveals its respective product quality. We show that the equilibrium prices, the difference between those prices, the associated outputs, and profits are all increasing functions of the ex ante probability of high safety. If horizontal product differentiation is sufficiently great then equilibrium prices and profits are higher under incomplete information about quality than if quality were commonly known. Thus, while signaling imposes a distortionary loss on a monopolist using price to signal quality, duopolists may benefit from the distortion as it can reduce competition. Finally, average quality is lower since signaling quality redistributes demand towards low-quality firms.     

HEDGING AND THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER AMBIGUOUS PRICE AND BACKGROUND RISK

This paper examines the optimal production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm that possesses smooth ambiguity preferences and faces ambiguous price and background risk. The separation theorem holds in that the firm's optimal output level depends neither on the firm's attitude towards ambiguity nor on the incident to the underlying ambiguity. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the full‐hedging theorem holds and thus options are not used. When these conditions are violated, we show that the firm optimally uses options for hedging purposes if ambiguity is introduced to the price and background risk by means of mean‐preserving spreads. We as such show that options play a role as a hedging instrument over and above that of futures.     

Foreign ownership and investment: evidence from Korea

This study examines whether an increase in foreign ownership affects investment in Korea. Many studies have shown that in an imperfect financial market, a firm's investment depends on the availability of internal funds. If high foreigners’ shareholding is a sign of a firm's good financial position, and if foreign investors demand better corporate governance to protect their investments, then cash-flow sensitivity of investment decreases with the level of foreign ownership. Using data from Korean firms, it is found that cash-flow sensitivity of investment is lower in firms with high foreign ownership than in those with low foreign ownership. This finding is regarded as evidence for a potential benefit of open financial markets.     

The Perverse Effect of Debt Tax Benefits on Firm Investment Decisions

In this paper we question the idea that the deduction of debt interest is always an effective policy instrument to spur firm investment. We analyse the investment decision in presence of a borrowing constraint on the amount of debt that the firm can raise. We show that if the debt interest rate is decreasing in the firm's capital accumulation and another financial resource more expensive than debt is available (at least for levels of debt lower than the upper bound), then the deduction of the debt interest from taxes on capital income may reduce firm investment. This theoretical result is relevant for economic policy decisions when financial intermediaries are not willing to finance beyond a certain threshold but firms have access to other sources of finance.     

The effects of abandonment options on operating leverage and investment timing

This paper examines how the presence of an abandonment option affects a firm's investment decision in general, and its operating leverage in particular. We show that the value of the abandonment option is a decreasing function of the firm's operating leverage. Upon the introduction of the abandonment option, the firm as such optimally lowers its operating leverage. We further show that there are direct and indirect effects of the abandonment option on the firm's optimal investment trigger, which act against each other. First, the ability to shut down production offers downside protection to the firm, thereby making the firm more eager to exercise the investment option. This is the negative direct effect that pushes down the investment trigger. Second, introducing the abandonment option to the firm induces the firm to lower its operating leverage, thereby making the firm more reluctant to exercise the investment option. This is the positive indirect effect that lifts up the investment trigger. We numerically verify that the overall effect of the abandonment option on the firm's optimal investment trigger is negative.     

The relations among accounting conservatism,institutional investors and earnings manipulation

Most scholars have indicated corporations using accounting conservatism to reduce earnings manipulation, although certain scholars believe that firms have more incentive to increase earnings manipulation. Institutional investors play an important external monitoring role, and affect firm's earnings manipulation. Previous studies adopted accruals as an earnings manipulation proxy to detect the relationship among accounting conservatism, institutional investor shareholdings, and earnings manipulation. We further investigate the relationship among accounting conservatism, institutional investor shareholdings, and earnings manipulation by using Benford's law. Our results indicate that firms with more conservative financial reporting have less probability of engaging in earnings-manipulative activities. We also find the negative association between earnings management and institutional investor shareholdings. However, if corporate financial statements tend toward conservatism, institutional investor shareholdings could increase managers' incentive to manage earnings. Our findings have important implications for investors to make investment decisions.     

COMPETITIVE LONG RUN INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM AND FACTOR-PRICE UNCERTAINTY*

In this paper we have considered competitive long run industry equilibrium with factor-price uncertainty. We discussed the long run equilibrium output of firms with risk neutrality, output price and their responses to changes in uncertainty, factor price and industry demand. In the first part of this paper we have derived a result that, given risk neutrality, the firms operate at proper capacity, i.e. where expected long run marginal cost is equal to expected long run average cost, as shown in the case of output-price uncertainty. This result is, however, different from that obtained from Sheshinski and Dréze (1976). From the comparative static analysis we first discovered that even under risk neutrality factor-price uncertainty affects the long run industry equilibrium: that is, a mean preserving increase in uncertainty leads firm's to enter the industry, because they can decrease expected long run costs as the variability of factor price increases. Consequently, output price goes down. In contrast, firm size is kept invariable in response to its increase as long as the cost function is separable, i.e. the separability of the cost function holds when production functions are the Cobb-Douglas and CES types used commonly in empirical work, although firm size might, generally, be affected by the increase. It is an interesting fact that firm size and industry size will express different responses to a change in risk. The result that the long run industry equilibrium with cost uncertainty is explicitly affected is a sharp contrast to the result under output-price uncertainty and provides a new aspect for understanding about the behaviour of the industry with uncertainty. Secondly, increased factor-price causes the number of firms in the industry to decline and output price to rise. In addition, firm's size will expand with its increase if that factor is inferior, while the effect on firm size is ambiguous if it is normal. The firm's output, i.e. firm size, is, however, kept constant if the cost function is separable. Thirdly, the long run equilibrium output of the firm remains intact but the number of firms increases as industry demand rises. This result holds, regardless of the firm's attitude towards risk. Finally, we find throughout the paper that the functional form of the cost function plays a significant role in determining the behaviour of the industry with factor-price uncertainty.     

SHAREHOLDERS' UNANIMITY WITH INCOMPLETE MARKETS*

When markets are incomplete, shareholders typically disagree on the firm's optimal investment plan. This article studies the shareholders' preferences with respect to the firm's investment in a model with aggregate risk, incomplete markets and heterogeneous households who trade in firms' shares instead of directly accumulating physical capital. If the production function exhibits constant returns to scale and borrowing limits are not binding, a firm's shareholders unanimously agree on its optimal level of investment. In contrast, with binding borrowing constraints, constrained shareholders prefer a higher level of investment than unconstrained ones.     

TARIFF JUMPING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DECISION IN A QUALITY‐DIFFERENTIATED MARKET

Using a product differentiation model, this paper discusses the issue of transnational firms evading tariffs and investing directly in a host country (through foreign direct investment (FDI)). Where product quality is differentiated between foreign and host country firms and assuming a firm's quality requirement is a long‐term strategy and is not affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, we obtain the following findings. First, whether or not a host country firm produces high or low quality products, raising the quality requirement for foreign products will increase the possibility of a foreign firm choosing FDI instead of exporting a product to the host country. Second, raising the quality requirement for domestic products will lower the possibility of foreign firms choosing FDI without regard to the product's quality. Finally, given a competitor in the host country, in FDI, a foreign high‐quality product‐producing firm has an advantage over a low‐quality product‐producing firm. We also find that even when firms' quality decisions are affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, most of the above results will still hold.     

Network externality and incentive to invest in network security

Breaches of network security can result in substantial losses for businesses. A game theory-based model is developed to investigate in the short run how network externality influences the optimal strategy of competing online firms producing homogenous services to invest in NS. A firm's self-protect rate and survival probability against NS security incidents differ depending on its related investment decisions. The incentive of a firm to invest in NS is derived, and the impact of the survival probability and the effect of the number of firms investing in NS on a firm's incentive to invest in NS are also analyzed. Policy implications drawn from the study are provided at the end the work.     

Search and the market for lemons

This paper provides an explanation, not found in the literature, for the origin of quality dispersion in product markets. The consumer's pure experience case of sequential search is modeled and the model is closed by explaining the firm's optimal decision making problem. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions for a non-degenerate distribution of quality are established. It is also shown that if a non-degenerate equilibrium distribution of quality does exist then it is an unstable equilibrium. The only stable equilibrium distribution is the degenerate lemon distribution. Therefore the model provides added support for Akerlof's argument that lemons tend to drive out good quality.     

Real option analysis for effects of emission permit banking on investment under abatement cost uncertainty

The present paper analyzes the investment effects of emission trading scheme (ETS) when emission permits are bankable and there is technological uncertainty with regard to the abatement cost. A real option model is employed to accommodate irreversibility of investment and cost uncertainty. In the absence of abatement cost uncertainty, a bankable ETS reduces a firm's incentive for environmental investment, because the firm can utilize the banked permits for future compliance which act as substitutes for abatement investment. However, when cost uncertainty is prevalent, investment may reduce the opportunity cost of irreversible investment under the banking system, thereby increasing a firm's investment incentive. The condition is derived under which a bankable ETS provides higher investment incentives than a non-bankable ETS does.