逃税的经济学分析

本文运用对伊兹哈基模型的推导,把分析建立在如何缩小申报收入同真实收入的差距上,指出了对逃税水平变化有重要意义的四个变量:所得水平、税率、发现的概率和罚款率。在社会经济中建立一种能促进所得水平显性化机制,比较容易查出逃税行为。逃税对整个经济具有三方面影响。     

对个人所得税逃税行为的一般分析

对个人所得税逃税行为的一般分析袁国良个人所得税是各国税收体系中很重要的一个税种，对个人所得的任何征税几乎都伴随着个人的免税和进税行为。分析个人在一定的所得税条件（利率、税基）下的逃税行为．对税收政策的制定和防止税收泄漏都有很重要的意义。在我国的财税理...     

纳税人与征税人的博弈——逃税行为的经济学分析

逃税是纳税人的一般行为倾向,逃税行为发生的概率取决于税务稽查成本,应纳税额和罚款金额,提高罚款税可有效降低逃税行为的发生。     

基于征税行为的A-S模型的探讨

自从税收产生之日,税收流失就与之形影相随,世界各国税收流失都很普遍,个人所得税流失也不例外,并且治理难度较大。个人所得税流失最直接的结果是国家财政收入的减少,进而影响国家职能的实现。对税收流失的影响因素进行一般理论分析的基本框架是1972年由阿林厄姆和桑德莫最先提出的预期效用最大化模型,即A-S模型。本文从传统A-S模型出发,在前人对模型扩展的基础上,利用数学中常用的函数y=e-x,建立一个基于征税角度的A-S模型,分析个人所得、税率、对偷逃税的罚款率以及征税人员的素质对偷逃税行为的影响,并根据分析结果,提出减少个人所得税流失的对策。     

企业腐败文化与逃税行为

本文基于2008—2018年沪深两市A股上市公司的样本数据,采用面板双向固定效应模型与工具变量法实证研究企业腐败文化对其逃税行为的影响。研究结果表明,腐败文化对企业逃税行为具有显著的影响：企业腐败文化越浓厚,企业逃税行为越严重。相较国有企业,腐败文化对民营企业逃税行为的影响更明显;市场化程度较高的地区,企业腐败文化对其逃税行为的影响也越显著。机制研究显示,在腐败文化的驱使下,公司会通过向税务征管人员行贿形成征纳合谋,以实施逃税活动。最后,金税三期工程自然实验的结果表明,强化税收征管总体上可以有效减少企业逃税行为,但对于腐败文化严重的企业则收效不大。     

我国逃税规模的测算及其经济影响分析

准确地把握逃税规模是对逃税的经济影响进行分析的前提和基础,本文运用现金比率法对我国自1985年到2002年地下经济规模和因地下经济导致的逃税规模进行了测算.同时,还估算了我国地上经济中存在的逃税规模,通过对二者的合并,计算出了我国逃税的总体规模.在此基础上,本文从三个方面着重分析了我国逃税对整个经济的影响:一是逃税对财政收入与GDP的效应,二是逃税的资源配置效应,三是逃税的收入分配效应.最后本文还对我国逃税的治理提出了若干对策建议.     

个人所得税逃税理论模型的演进及对我国的启示

个人所得税的逃税问题是我国当前税收征管的一大难题。纳税人的逃税决策受到税率、未申报所得或未纳税额、查处概率、罚款力度、以及纳税人的风险厌恶程度和税收隐瞒技术等因素的影响。早期的个人所得税逃税模型主要着重于纳税人与政府强制征税能力的博弈分析，最近的文献则主要对包括税收隐瞒技术在内的更一般的模型进行了分析。本文的目的在于综合述评西方个人所得税逃税理论模型的演进和最新发展，并籍此提出该理论在中国的应用。     

税收遵从成本对企业纳税遵从的影响分析——基于企业逃税模型的视角

在传统的A-S逃税模型中加入税收遵从成本因素分析以及对纳税遵从的影响,只适用于个人纳税。运用企业逃税模型分析税收遵从成本对企业纳税遵从的影响不仅符合企业实际,而且在我国更有现实意义。当前,应完善税收征管,简化税制,优化税收环境,从根本上降低企业税收遵从成本。     

国有企业价格行为的行为经济学分析

建立在完全理性、最大化基础上的传统经济学已经难以解释实际经济生活中企业的种种非理性价格行为。新兴的行为经济学通过将心理学引入经济学,增加了对经济现象的解释能力。本文以国有企业为例,运用行为经济学的有关理论对国有企业的非理性价格行为进行解释。     

中国税收与经济增长问题实证研究

文章应用新古典经济增长研究思路,从税收规模和结构两个角度出发分析其对增长的要素贡献,就中国税收对经济增长影响问题进行实证分析,结果表明:在现阶段的中国经济中,有必要加强税收体制改革,适当调整所得税类份额,促进生产模式转变,保证经济长期稳定增长。     

Trading Off Tax Distortion and Tax Evasion

Income tax evasion is modeled as a risky activity and integrated into a standard optimal tax problem in which there is a good whose sales are observable. If the penalty for evasion is proportional to the tax evaded (the Yitzhaki scheme), the optimal tax structure is unaffected by evasion. If the penalty is proportional to unreported income (the Allingham–Sandmo scheme), it is efficient to tax both the observable good and income. The cost of the risk of tax evasion is traded off against the distortion from taxing the observable good. For equal penalties, Allingham/Sandmo is more efficient than Yitzhaki.     

Tax Evasion,Corruption and Tax Loopholes

This paper addresses tax loopholes that allow firms to exploit borderline cases between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. In general, tax loopholes are detrimental to a revenue‐maximizing government. This may change in the presence of corruption in the tax administration. Tax loopholes may serve as a separating mechanism that helps governments maximize revenues and curb corruption, which may explain why developing countries only gradually close loopholes in their tax codes.     

Tax Evasion and Limited Liability

Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) suggest that imposing very high penalties for tax evasion is not possible under bankruptcy or limited liability constraints. In this paper, we complement their suggestion by showing that, in the presence of these constraints, imposing very high penalties can make an economy Pareto worse‐off. This result helps provide a further insight into why governments typically do not set very high penalties for tax evasion in practice. Implications for optimal deterrence policies in the context of tax evasion are also explored.     

Tax Amnesties In A Dynamic Model of Tax Evasion

We present a dynamic model of tax evasion, where tax liabilities last for two periods and the probability of an inspection decreases with the sum of taxes evaded this period plus taxes evaded last period. We show that a tax amnesty that pardons more than the evasion penalties (an extensive amnesty) can temporarily improve compliance. Whenever the inspection technology improves, steady state compliance also improves, but the economy takes time to transit from one steady state to the other. We show that an amnesty may accelerate this transit, or even make it instantaneous if the amnesty is extensive enough.     

Tax Overpayments, Tax Evasion, and Book-Tax Differences

A strictly risk-averse manager makes joint decisions on a firm's tax payments and book profit declarations according to accounting standards. It is analyzed how the incentives to overpay or evade taxes and to inflate book profits are influenced by (1) the composition of the manager's remuneration, (2) the ability to control the manager's actions, (3) the costs of making untruthful profit declarations, and (4) the tax rate. If the firm's owner or the government take into account these effects when pursuing their own objectives, the changes in tax payments and book profit declarations become theoretically more ambiguous.     

税收流失中的双委托-多代理问题

本文首次给出了税收流失问题中的多委托—多代理模型分析框架,并将政府、国税局和地税局、纳税人置于统一的博弈框架下,作为博弈的三方进行讨论。只要政府给国税局和地税局以适当的激励,政府仍然能设计出让纳税人"诚实"申报的显示机制;国税局和地税局作为税收征管者和纳税人之间的博弈可以看成是一个双委托—代理问题,此时税收征收上的"正外部性"和税收监菅上的"搭便车"效应将是双委托—代理问题中的新现象。     

影响中国税收增长率变动的经济因素分析——基于1978-2006年中国税收收入时间序列数据

近年来,中国税收呈现高增长态势。税收增长率远超经济增长率,税收高速增长以及税收结构不合理在一定程度上抑制了消费增长。然而,影响税收增长率变动的经济因素是多元的,主要受到经济增长水平、价格水平等影响。实证分析表明,经济波动决定税收增长率的变动,经济波动与税收增长率变动存在长期均衡变动关系,价格对税收增长率也有较大影响。     

Tax Liability and Tax Evasion in a Competitive Labor Market

In a competitive labor market, a change in the legal incidence of a tax on labor will not alter employment if tax obligations are fulfilled. However, this irrelevance result may no longer apply if taxes can be evaded. In particular, a shift from payroll to income taxes will lower employment. This will be the case if workers exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, have a utility function, which is strongly separable in income and the disutility from working, and the penalty for evasion is not proportional to the amount of taxes evaded. Accordingly, tax evasion opportunities can make the legal incidence of a tax on labor an important determinant of its economic incidence.