Nonlinear Pricing, Redistribution, and Optimal Tax Policy

This paper examines the role of nonlinear pricing by public (or regulated) utilities as a redistributive mechanism in presence of an optimal nonlinear income tax. It models an economy with many types of persons who differ in two unobservable characteristics (earning abilities and tastes). We show that nonlinear pricing does have a redistributive role; it is not a substitute for an ill-designed tax policy. We prove, assuming separable preferences, that a person whose valuation of the public sector output is smaller than the average valuation of the population (all measured at the same consumption bundle) must face a marginal price for the good above its marginal cost. Further assuming that tastes and earning abilities are perfectly correlated, we prove that everyone must face a marginal price for the public sector's output which strictly exceeds its marginal cost if correlation is positive. These properties provide an economic rationale for the provision of "support for low-income consumers" as mandated by the universal service and similar regulatory policies. Finally, we show that with correlated characteristics, implementation can be achieved through two separate functions: a pricing function that depends only on the public sector output and a tax function that depends only on income.     

Reliability of individual valuations of public and private goods: Choice consistency, response time, and preference refinement

We examined the reliability of a large set of paired comparison value judgments involving public goods, private goods, and sums of money. As respondents progressed through a random sequence of paired choices they were each given, their response time decreased and they became more consistent, apparently fine-tuning their responses, suggesting that respondents tend to begin a hypothetical value exercise with relatively imprecise preferences and that experience in expressing preference helps reduce that imprecision. Reliability was greater for private than for public good choices, and greater for choices between a good and a monetary amount than for choices between two goods. However, the reliability for public good choices was only slightly lower than for the private goods.     

Clubs,local public goods and transportation models: A synthesis

Clubs, local public goods, and transportation models are analyzed within a unified model. The emphasis is on the derivation of optimal allocation, pricing and the size of the sharing group. We derive the conditions under which optimal prices will yield surplus or deficit, as well as those under which competitive provision will be efficient. Given heterogeneous tastes we prove that segregation according to tastes is generally efficient although several cases where this result does not hold are also discussed. We show that the existing literature is unnecessarily restrictive and that the unified approach suggested here considerably extends the existing analysis of clubs' local public goods and the transportation problems.     

STRATEGY‐PROOF ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLE GOODS AMONG COUPLES

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods among couples. Agents in a couple share the indivisible good assigned to them. The main result is that an allocation rule is strategy‐proof, neutral and non‐bossy if and only if it is serially dictatorial. An allocation rule is serially dictatorial if there is a priority order of couples and a function that identifies who chooses in each couple, such that for all preference profiles, a good assigned to couple i is the best element according to the preference of the identified agent in couple i among the remaining goods when the couples with higher priorities have made their choice.     

Kids Cause Specialization: Evidence for Becker’s Household Division of Labor Hypothesis

We examine the division of labor within households and marital matching patterns in the USA using both the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). We use Becker’s theory of marriage markets by estimating household production functions and using the estimates to test for positive or negative assortive matching. We also construct match matrices, which are used to judge how well our model fits Becker’s theory. We find positive assortative matching on all traits in young marriages and couples without children, and negative assortment along some traits in marriages with children. This suggests that children induce specialization whereas couples without children exploit household public goods.

Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices

This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a non-cooperative locational model of public goods provision choices, where the levels of taxation and the local public good varieties provided within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting, and where equilibrium jurisdictions consist of consumers with similar tastes. We show that interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries, and, even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers, can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdiction.     

Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach

This paper takes a fresh look at the trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods. It argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions. When spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives, this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature. Depending on precisely how the legislature behaves, the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts. The extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending. Thus, the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending, but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature.     

Public infrastructure,non‐cooperative investments,and endogenous growth

Two countries strategically invest in productive infrastructure within a general equilibrium model with endogenous growth. These public investments generate externalities. Dynamic analysis reveals that: (1) under constant returns, the two countries’ growth rates differ during the transition but are identical on the balanced growth path, (2) a country with decreasing returns can experience sustained growth provided that the other country grows at a positive constant rate, (3) cooperation does not necessarily lead to higher growth for each country, and it can increase or decrease the gap between countries’ growth rates depending on the countries’ consumption preferences regarding domestic and foreign goods.     

Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects,nonessential private goods and convex costs

Summary In the theory of economies with public goods one usually considers the case in which private goods are essential, i.e., each agent receives a fixed minimum level of utility if he consumes no private goods, irrespective of the public goods consumed. This paper develops the second welfare theorem for economies with public projects and possibly inessential private goods. As a corollary we also derive conditions under which valuation equilibria exist.hank Dolf Talman and an anonymous referee for many useful remarks and annotations of a previous draft of this paper.     

Is the public sector too large in an economy with club goods? A case when consumers differ in both tastes and incomes

In an archetypal economy with a single private good and a single shared good, the latter represents the public sector. With the shared good a club good, we ask if second-best (SB) provision of it is too small, as usually claimed for pure public goods. When consumers differ only in exogenous incomes, if the club good is a superior good in a single-club economy, overprovision in the SB occurs if club good demand is convex in income. We show this can extend to an economy where consumers differ in both tastes and incomes, depending on the covariances between consumers' incomes and their relative strength of preference for the club and private goods, and the covariances between incomes and taste parameters.     

Heterogeneity in Consumer Demands and the Income Effect: Evidence from Panel Data

This paper uses unique Spanish panel data on household expenditures to test whether unobservable heterogeneity in household demands (taste, etc.) is correlated with total expenditures (income). The main finding is that tastes are indeed correlated with income for about half of the goods considered, implying that cross‐sectional estimates of income elasticities for these goods are biased. The goods are the following: food eaten outside home, alcohol and tobacco, transportation, and energy. The elasticity of alcohol and tobacco is more than halved when taking unobserved heterogeneity into account. For transportation, the bias is sufficiently large to misclassify the good as a luxury.     

Noncooperative household demand

We study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against noncooperative alternatives and the noncooperative model against a general alternative.     

Voluntary contributions when the public good is not necessarily normal

We argue that there are interesting examples of privately provided public goods that do not satisfy the assumption of strict normality, and reconsider voluntary-contribution games in a more general framework. We show that, in general, (1) equalizing transfers between individuals with identical tastes can increase total supply of the public good, and (2) more of the public good can be supplied if agents move sequentially rather than simultaneously. These results are in sharp contrast to earlier conclusions derived in the literature under the assumption of strict normality.     

Public goods in networks

This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network.     

Public investment and budgetary consolidation in Portugal

In this paper we find that public investment in durable goods has a positive effect on long-term economic performance in Portugal. We also find that these positive effects are not strong enough for public investment to pay for itself in the form of future tax revenues. Therefore, cuts in public investment in durable goods, although costly in terms of long-term economic performance seem to be an effective way of alleviating pressure on the public budget. It is important to note, however, that this general result contrasts sharply with the evidence found in this paper for public investment in equipment, a small component of public investment in durable goods, as well as with evidence elsewhere for public investment in transportation infrastructures. For these, the effects on output are strong enough for public investment to pay for itself. Therefore, cuts in these two types of public investment, would have negative long-term economic effects as well as negative long-term budgetary effects. Clearly, not all public investment is created equal. We would like to thank the editor as well as two anonymous referees for unusually useful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.     

Public goods,voting, and growth

We study a parametric politico‐economic model of economic growth with productive public goods and public consumption goods. The provision of public goods is funded by a proportional tax. Agents are heterogeneous in their initial capital endowments, discount factors, and the relative weights of public consumption in overall private utility. They vote on the shares of public goods in gross domestic products (GDP). We propose a definition of voting equilibrium, prove the existence and provide a characterization of voting equilibria, and obtain a closed‐form solution for the voting outcomes. Also we introduce a “fictitious” representative agent and interpret the outcome of voting as a choice made by a central planner for his benefit. Finally, we undertake comparative static analysis of the shares of public goods in GDP and of the rate of balanced growth with respect to the discount factors and the preferences for public consumption. The results of this analysis suggest that the representative‐agent version of our model is capable of capturing the interaction between many voting heterogeneous agents only if the heterogeneity is one‐dimensional.     

The ratchet,price sensitivity,and assortment plan

The performance of the USSR economy is seriously damaged by the proclivity of enterprises to restrict output and to violate their assortment plan. This note shows that when managers of multiproduct enterprises successfully restrict output, they thereby also increase the influence of output prices on their selection of the relative levels of production of the various goods. If Soviet prices are irrational in that they do not reflect relative scarcities, the increased influence of output prices on this set of managerial decisions induces socially dysfunctional decisions. Moreover, the restriction of output may cause enterprises to violate their assortment plan. The analysis focuses on the two features of the incentive system that induce managers to restrict output and abstracts away from other considerations.     

Education and income attraction: an online dating field experiment

Prior studies have found a robust correlation in the education of dating and married couples. However, there is little evidence to suggest that such correlations are causal, that is, for the sake of relationship public goods such as the pleasures of the enlightened conversations that only a common high level of education might support. Being empirical studies, they cannot rule out couples matching on other characteristics like income, height or health, which are correlated with education, from driving results. We contribute to this literature by randomly assigning high and low education and income levels to 388 artificial male and female profiles on a large online dating website in China. We then counted thousands of ‘visits’ – clicks on abbreviated profiles, which included education and income information, from search engine results. We found that men’s visits to female profiles were unaffected by the profile’s assigned education level, while women’s visits to male profiles increase with the profile’s education. However, that increase was not increasing on the women’s own level of education, though their visits to the higher income male profiles was increasing on their own education. Our findings suggest that the relationship public goods that stem from a common level of high education are not at the forefront of either men’s or women’s minds before their first dates, when one might expect such goods to play a critical role in the decision to develop the relationship further.     

A theory of rational marriage and divorce

Despite high rates of cohabitation before marriage, and considerable efforts invested in the search for a life partner, a high number of marriages end in divorce. This paper develops a model of household formation and dissolution in which it may be rational for individuals to marry, fully anticipating that they will subsequently divorce. Economies of scale associated with living as a couple rather than in two separate households provide an incentive to marry; problems with free riding in the provision of household collective goods may lead to divorce. Marriages which involve partners who are similar, in tastes or in their productive capacities, and in which private goods are equally shared, are the most likely to be stable. In contrast, marriages which involve very disparate partners, or which share the fruits of market labor very unequally between the partners, are more likely to be shortlived and end in divorce.     

Uncertainty, Commitment, and Optimal Taxation

This paper examines the optimal tax design problem in the presence of wage uncertainty. The wage has a continuous distribution, individuals are ex ante identical, preferences are separable in labor supply and goods, public policy aims at providing the population with social insurance, and the only restriction on the tax instruments is that emanating from lack of public observability of realized wages and labor supplies. We show that optimal tax structures depend crucially on whether it is labor supply or goods that consumers have to commit to before the resolution of uncertainty. Specifically, we prove that, in the absence of commitment, the social insurance problem collapses to the traditional optimal tax problem. Second, if labor supply is precommitted, it would be possible to effect a first-best outcome. Third, commitment to goods would make indirect taxation a useful instrument of tax policy even in the presence of a general income tax; it requires differential tax treatment of committed and noncommitted goods. Finally, if preferences are separable between the two types of goods, precommitted goods must be taxed at a uniform rate lower than that on the noncommitted goods.