An economic-demographic approach to forecasting national and subnational birth rates

This paper conceptualizes and tests an economic-demographic fertility projection model, founded in the prevailing microeconomic theories of fertility behavior and embracing both economic and demographic determinants. Through a simulataneous system approach, the focus is on the linked decision areas for women concerning marriage, childbearing, employment, carreer and education. National age-race fertility rate projections are generated for the period of 1978–1985. An approach is explored whereby these can be adjusted to subnational levels and this is illustrated for the state of Illinois. The multivariate model appears to capture the key factors affecting fertility. It supports the Easterlin forecast that a turnaround from the steep decline of fertility rates during the past two decades will occur by the early 1980s. However the upturn will be relatively modest though sustained due to strong offsetting forces. The results justify further research on the potential and form of the economic-demographic approach to projecting the direction of fertility at the various geographic levels.     

Population forecasting theory,methods and assessments of accuracy. The magnitude of error due to different vital processes in population forecasts

The accuracy of population forecasts depends in part upon the method chosen for forecasting the vital rates of fertility, mortality, and migration. Methods for handling the stochastic propagation of error calculations in demographic forecasting are hard to do precisely. This paper discusses this obstacle in stochastic cohort-component population forecasts. The uncertainty of forecasts is due to uncertain estimates of the jump-off population and to errors in the forecasts of the vital rates. Empirically based of each source are presented and propagated through a simplified analytical model of population growth that allows assessment of the role of each component in the total error. Numerical estimates based on the errors of an actual vector ARIMA forecast of the US female population. These results broadly agree with those of the analytical model. This work especially uncertainty in the fertility forecasts to be so much higher than that in the other sources that the latter can be ignored in the propagation of error calculations for those cohorts that are born after the jump-off year of the forecast. A methodology is therefore presented which far simplifies the propagation of error calculations. It is noted, however, that the uncertainty of the jump-off population, migration, and mortality in the propagation of error for those alive at the jump-off time of the forecast must still be considered.     

Modeling and forecasting the time series of US fertility: age distribution,range, and ultimate level

This discussion of modeling focuses on the difficulties in longterm, time-series forecasting of US fertility. Four possibilities are suggested. One difficulty with the traditional approach of using high or low bounds on fertility and mortality is that forecast errors are perfectly correlated over time, which means there are no cancellation of errors over time. The shape of future fertility intervals first increases, then stabilizes, and then decreases instead of remaining stable. This occurs because the number of terms being averaged increases with horizontal length. Alho and Spencer attempted to reduce these errors in time-series. Other difficulties are the idiosyncratic behavior of age specific fertility over time, biological bounds for total fertility rates (TFR) of 16 and zero, the integration of knowledge about fertility behavior that narrows the bounds, the unlikelihood of some probability outcomes of stochastic models with a normally distributed error term, the small relative change in TFR between years, a US fertility cycle of about 40 years, unimportant extrapolation of past trends in child and infant mortality, and the unlikelihood of reversals in mortality and contraceptive use trends. Another problem is the unsuitability of longterm forecasts. New methods include a model which estimates a one parameter family of fertility schedules and then forecasts that single parameter. Another method is a logistic transformation to account for prior information on the bounds on fertility estimates; this method is similar to Bayesian methods for ARMA models developed by Monahan. Models include information on the ultimate level of fertility and assume that the equilibrium level is a stochastic process trending over time. The horizon forecast method is preferred unless the effects of the outliers are known. Estimates of fertility are presented for the equilibrium constrained and logistic transformed model. Forecasts of age specific fertility rates can be calculated from forecasts of the fertility index (a single time varying parameter). The model of fertility fits poorly at older ages but captures some of the wide swings in the historical pattern. Age variations are not accounted for very well. Longterm forecasts tell a great deal about the uncertainty of forecast errors. Estimates are too sensitive to model specification for accuracy and ignore the biological and socioeconomic context.     

Sex differentials in the earnings of Ph.D.s.

Using a survey of two cohorts of men and women who received Ph.D.s in the years 1958-63 and 1967-72, the authors test two hypotheses: (1) that the relatively lower earnings of highly educated women can be explained largely by their career interruptions and by their lesser willingness to accumulate human capital in anticipation of such interruptions, and (2) that the differential in earnings between men and women increases with age because of career interruptions and that the gap narrows once women reenter the labor force on a permanent basis The findings do not lend support to either of these hypotheses, leading the authors to reject the proposition that the lower rewards of women Ph.D.s are primarily caused by their own voluntary decisions.     

Killing off cohorts: Forecasting mortality of non-extinct cohorts with the penalized composite link model

Mortality forecasting has crucial implications for insurance and pension policies. A large amount of literature has proposed models to forecast mortality using cross-sectional (period) data instead of longitudinal (cohort) data. As a consequence, decisions are generally based on period life tables and summary measures such as period life expectancy, which reflect hypothetical mortality rather than the mortality actually experienced by a cohort. This study introduces a novel method to forecast cohort mortality and the cohort life expectancy of non-extinct cohorts. The intent is to complete the mortality profile of cohorts born up to 1960. The proposed method is based on the penalized composite link model for ungrouping data. The performance of the method is investigated using cohort mortality data retrieved from the Human Mortality Database for England & Wales, Sweden, and Switzerland for male and female populations.     

How low can U go?

• ? Although there is growing evidence that wage growth is building in response to low and falling unemployment in the advanced economies, there is scope for unemployment rates to fall further without triggering a pay surge.
• ? For a start, current unemployment rates in comparison to past cyclical troughs overstate the tightness of labour markets. Demographic trends associated with the ageing ‘baby boomer’ bulge have pushed down the headline unemployment rate – unemployment rates among older workers are lower than those of younger cohorts. And in a historical context, Europe still has a large pool of involuntary part‐timers.
• ? In addition, rising participation rates mean that demographics are less of a constraint on employment growth than widely assumed. In both 2017 and 2018, had it not been for increased activity rates (mainly for older cohorts), unemployment would have had to fall more sharply to accommodate the same employment increase. We expect rising participation rates to continue to act as a pressure valve for the labour market.
• ? Finally, unemployment rates were generally far lower during the 1950s and 1960s than now. If wages stay low relative to productivity, as was the case during that prior era, employment growth may remain strong, with unemployment falling further. In the post‐war era, low wages were partly a function of a grand bargain in which policy‐makers provided full employment in return for low wage growth.
• ? There is evidence to suggest that many post‐crisis workers have opted for the security of their existing full‐time job and its associated benefits despite lower wage growth, rather than change job and potentially earn more; the rise of the ‘gig economy’ has led some workers to value what they already have more. Put another way, the non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) has fallen. So, the role of labour market tightness in pushing wage growth higher may continue to surprise to the downside.

     

Time costs,aspirations and the effect of economic growth on German fertility

Recent research has shown strong support for the model of reproductive behavior derived from the new home economics, and it is shown in this discussion that the evidence from the Federal Republic of Germany is consistent with the new home economics model. There is little support for Easterlin's relative economic hypothesis, but there is limited endorsement for model which adds the influence of experience based material aspirations to the new home economics model. Easterlin's relative income model is reviewed before directing attention to the new home economics model and an explanation of fertility movements in West Germany. The new home economics model focuses on the family division of labor between home activities and work outside the home. The marked decline in German fertility during the 1970s is mostly attributable to factors such as expanding women's earning capacities which increased the importance of 2 earner families, who have a different family division of labor and possibly preferences biased towards "quality" of children rather than numbers. Also, real wage growth lagged behind the growth in experience based aspirations, and this drop in relative income is more dramatic if it is presumed that material aspirations are based upon the family's income experienced by a young adult during his/her adolescence, rather than just the father's earnings. The mother's contribution to family income will contribute to her family's actual standard of living and the desired standard of living of her children. The labor force participation rates of married, middle-aged German women increased markedly during the 1st half of the 1950s, thus tending to enhance the increase in the standard of living desired by the young adults reaching marrying and childbearing ages in the mid-1960s. The analysis indicates that if there is not a substantial reduction in the proportion of young married women in the labor force, fertility will move countercyclically. In that there must be some floor to fertility, one should be cautious of using these parameter estimates considerably outside the 1950-1977 period. Nonetheless, the estimates indicate that economic growth will not bring a substantial rise in German fertility, and, outside the unlikely situation of sustained economic decline, fertility will remain low.     

AFDC Payments and Illegitimacy Ratios: A Reappraisal of Endogeneity Using Panel Data

This paper develops a rational choice model of the fertility of single women in the presence of government transfers. Evidence is presented which suggests that real AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) bene~ts leads to higher rates of illegitimacy. In fact, the unbiased parameter estimate which we present is six times larger than those estimates using OLS (Caudill and Mixon 1993). Also, the point elasticity estimate of real public benefit levels with respect to changes in the illegitimacy rate produced in this study is very robust, approximately +1.4. Our result, which encompasses all fertility of single women in the U.S., is quite encouraging because it falls within an elasticity range of +1.3 to +2.1 produced by a recent study (Clarke and Strauss 1998) for black and white teen fertility (for single women), respectively.     

PENSIONS, FERTILITY AND FAMILIES

Public pay-as-you-go pension systems induce low fertility rates, which in turn contribute to the insolvency of those very systems. They have replaced the old-age security motive for having children, which is a major factor behind fertility in their absence. They also penalise fertility by externalising the contributions of children while leaving the costs of child-bearing unaffected. Fertility rates could be raised by moving towards personal savings schemes or re-linking pension benefits to fertility.     

Real-time macroeconomic forecasting with leading indicators: An empirical comparison

This paper demonstrates that the Conference Board’s Composite Leading Index (CLI) has significant real-time predictive ability for Industrial Production (IP) growth rates at horizons from one to six months ahead over the period 1989-2009. A popular but unrealistic analysis, which combines real-time data for CLI and final vintage data for IP as predictor variables, obscures the actual predictive content of the CLI, in the sense that in that case, the improvements in forecast accuracy relative to a univariate AR model are not significant. The CLI appears to be less useful for forecasting growth rates of the Conference Board’s Composite Coincident Index (CCI) in real time, as a univariate AR model performs better. This result is mostly due to its disappointing performance during the first five years of the forecast period. The CLI may not be the best way of exploiting the information contained in the underlying individual leading indicator variables. The use of principal components instead of CLI leads to more accurate real-time forecasts for both IP and CCI growth rates.     

Toward a New Model for Probabilistic Household Forecasts

Household projections are key components of analyses of several issues of social concern, including the welfare of the elderly, housing, and environmentally significant consumption patterns. Researchers or policy makers that use such projections need appropriate representations of uncertainty in order to inform their analyses. However, the weaknesses of the traditional approach of providing alternative variants to single "best guess" projection are magnified in household projections, which have many output variables of interest, and many input variables beyond fertility, mortality, and migration. We review current methods of household projections and the potential for using them to produce probabilistic projections, which would address many of these weaknesses. We then propose a new framework for a household projection method of intermediate complexity that we believe is a good candidate for providing a basis for further development of probabilistic household projections. An extension of the traditional headship rate approach, this method is based on modelling changes in headship rates decomposed by household size as a function of variables describing demographic events such as parity specific fertility, union formation and dissolution, and leaving home. It has moderate data requirements, manageable complexity, allows for direct specification of demographic events, and produces output that includes the most important household characteristics for many applications. An illustration of how such a model might be constructed, using data on the U.S. and China over the past several decades, demonstrates the viability of the approach.     

Are central banks really breaking the (policy) rules?

• ? Looking at the strength of the global economy, it's no surprise that simple policy rules suggest that interest rates in some advanced economies are much too low and/or that several rate hikes would be needed in 2018 to avoid falling further behind the curve. Nonetheless, we expect central banks to respond cautiously and we see a slower pace of tightening than the consensus view .
• ? Policy rules, such as the Taylor Rule, have long been considered a useful guide to the potential path for policy rates. But while it suggests that current US, Eurozone and Australian central bank rates are broadly appropriate, it signals that UK, Canadian, and Swedish rates should be substantially higher. Based on our economic forecasts, Taylor Rules suggest that the central banks in the US, Eurozone, Canada and Australia will all need to raise intertest rates by around 100bps by end‐2018.
• ? However, there are several reasons not to draw strong conclusions from such point estimates. First, the Taylor Rule requires estimates of two unobservable variables – the output gap and the natural rate of interest – which cannot be estimated precisely.
• ? Second, using models that were designed to predict US policy responses in the 1990s to forecast central banks' behaviour today is likely to be misleading. Meanwhile, inferring central banks' reaction functions from recent policy rate moves to assess the future policy path is fraught with difficulties. Not only have interest rates been broadly unchanged for the bulk of the post‐financial crisis period, but policymakers have provided other forms of policy support.
• ? Third, outside the US at least, Taylor Rules have historically pointed to persistently different policy rates from those observed, yet inflation has been well anchored.
• ? The upshot of all this is that we expect central banks in the advanced economies to err on the side of caution and anticipate interest rates rising less quickly than the consensus amongst economists.

     

Random Scenario Forecasts Versus Stochastic Forecasts

Probabilistic population forecasts are useful because they describe uncertainty in a quantitatively useful way. One approach (that we call LT) uses historical data to estimate stochastic models (e.g., a time series model) of vital rates, and then makes forecasts. Another (we call it RS) began as a kind of randomized scenario: we consider its simplest variant, in which expert opinion is used to make probability distributions for terminal vital rates, and smooth trajectories are followed over time. We use analysis and examples to show several key differences between these methods: serial correlations in the forecast are much smaller in LT; the variance in LT models of vital rates (especially fertility) is much higher than in RS models that are based on official expert scenarios; trajectories in LT are much more irregular than in RS; probability intervals in LT tend to widen faster over forecast time. Newer versions of RS have been developed that reduce or eliminate some of these differences.     

The impact of fertility policy on the actuarial balance of China’s urban employee basic medical insurance fund–The selective two-child policy vs. the universal two-child policy

This study aims to investigate the impact of the change in China’s fertility policy from its selective two-child policy to a universal two-child policy on the balance of its Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) fund. This study uses data obtained from the 2013 and 2015 China General Society Survey to estimate the Poisson model, and then adopts a bisexual Leslie matrix, estimated adjusted coefficients, and an actuarial model to forecast the current balance and accumulated balance of the UEBMI fund under each of the selective two-child and universal two-child policies up to the year 2060. The primary finding of this study is that this change in fertility policy results in the current balance of the UEBMI fund registering a lower deficit and eventually a surplus. Although this policy change cannot prevent the UEBMI from facing bankruptcy, the deficit in terms of the accumulated balance of the UEBMI fund will decline.     

Higher interest rates should not unduly faze consumers

• ? Though the MPC has signalled a more aggressive pace of interest hikes than previously anticipated, we still expect the impact on the consumer sector in aggregate to be modest. We estimate that household debt servicing costs will rise from the current level of 4.1% of household income to 5.0% by the end of 2019. This would still be only a little over half the pre‐crisis peak.
• ? We expect the MPC to hike interest rates twice in both 2018 and 2019, taking Bank Rate to 1.5% by the end of next year. Higher interest rates will impact on consumer spending by increasing debt servicing costs and reducing the attractiveness of credit (including mortgages), but savers will benefit from higher returns on their deposits.
• ? Mortgages account for 77% of loans to UK households and full pass through of a 100bp rise in Bank Rate to variable rate loans, implying an increase from 2.78% to 3.78%, would add £100 a month to the cost of servicing an average mortgage. But only two‐fifths of borrowers have a variable rate deal, so for many homeowners the adjustment to higher interest rates will not be immediate. And the proportion of houses which are owned via a mortgage has fallen over the past decade, suggesting that the household sector as a whole will be less sensitive to higher mortgage interest rates.
• ? Historically the relationship between Bank Rate and interest rates on unsecured lending has been weak and rates on credit cards and personal loans have not yet risen following November's rate hike. The link to deposit rates has been stronger and higher returns on savings will mitigate some of the damage to household income from higher debt servicing costs, although uneven distribution of debt and savings means that there will be winners and losers at a more disaggregated level.
• ? We have used the Oxford Economics Global Economic Model to run a counterfactual scenario where Bank Rate is kept at 0.5% throughout 2018 and 2019. The results suggest that the pace of rate hikes assumed in our baseline forecast would reduce the level of consumer spending by 0.2 percentage points by the end of 2019.

     

Functional sunspot equilibria

Consider a one step forward looking model where agents believe that the equilibrium values of the state variable are determined by a function whose domain is the current value of the state variable and whose range is the value for the subsequent period. An agent’s forecast for the subsequent period uses the belief, where the function that is chosen is allowed to depend on the current realization of an extrinsic random process, and is made with knowledge of the past values of the state variable but not the current value. The paper provides (and characterizes) the conditions for the existence of sunspot equilibria for the model described.     

Strategies for successful organizational downsizing

This article reports the results of a study of 30 organizations that engaged in downsizing over a four-year period. Three questions were investigated: (1) What general strategies are used by organizations to downsize? (2) What are the effects of downsizing on organizational performance? (3) What are downsizing's “best practices?” or, What are the differences between organizations that effectively downsize and those that do not? Three main strategies for downsizing are explained, the managerial actions to overcome the negative effects of downsizing are enumerated, and the best practices of successful downsizing firms are presented.     

Earnings expectations and the relative information content of dividend and earnings announcements

Recent studies of financial analysis' earnings forecast revisions following dividend announcements suggest that dividends convey information regarding a firm's future prospects. In this study, we extend the analysis by explicitly controlling for earnings information released during the forecast revision measurement period. Our results suggest that earnings forecast revisions previously attributed to dividend announcements are driven primarily by earnings surprise. At best, dividends appear to serve a corroborative role. The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of I/B/E/S Inc. for providing earnings per share forecast data, available through the Institutional Brokers Estimate System.     

Low Wage Returns to Schooling in a Developing Country: Evidence from a Major Policy Reform in Turkey

In this paper, we estimate returns to schooling for young men and women in Turkey using the exogenous and substantial variation in schooling across birth cohorts brought about by the 1997 reform of compulsory schooling within a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. We estimate that the return from an extra year of schooling is about 7–8% for women and an imprecisely estimated 2–2.5% for men. The low level of the estimates for men contrasts starkly with those estimated for other developing countries. We identify several reasons why returns to schooling are low for men and why they are higher for women in our context. In particular, the policy alters the schooling distributions of men and women differently, thus the average causal effect puts a higher weight on the causal effect of schooling at higher grade levels for women than for men.     

Assumptions on Fertility in Stochastic Population Forecasts*

In recent years Statistics Netherlands has published several stochastic population forecasts. The degree of uncertainty of the future population is assessed on the basis of assumptions about the probability distribution of future fertility, mortality and migration. The assumptions on fertility are based on an analysis of historic forecasts of the total fertility rate (TFR), on time‐series models of observations of the TFR, and on expert knowledge. This latter argument‐based approach refers to the TFR distinguished by birth order. In the most recent Dutch forecast the 95% forecast interval of the total fertility rate in 2050 is assumed to range from 1.2 to 2.3 children per woman.