Partial credibility and policy announcements: The problem of time inconsistency in macroeconomics revisited

This paper studies the credibility of policy announcements in macroeconomics. This issue is exemplified by the problem of monetary policy design in light of an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. In contrast to reputational models of the repeated games literature, the credibility problem between the central bank and the private sector, which results from the policymaker's temptation to create surprise inflation to raise employment, cannot be eliminated. The paper shows that credibility in any sequential equilibrium is generally only partial, in that market participants do not fully believe policy announcements of low inflation rates, even if forthright policies have been implemented in all periods. Indicating reputation-building, credibility improves over time. The example is then used to show the policy implications of partial credibility.     

Commodity prices and monetary policy in emerging East Asia during the global financial crisis

In the first phase of the global financial crisis, rising inflation was a major concern for emerging East Asian central banks. Coupled with a slowing US economy, regional central banks faced a monetary policy dilemma of either addressing higher inflation or supporting moderate growth. Higher food and fuel prices were the major drivers of headline inflation. Their causes, however, were a confluence of mutually reinforcing cyclical and structural factors. Understandably, different economies faced a different balance of risks between price stability and growth; but to attribute the inflation to supply shocks alone was misleading. This was unsettling given that inflation and inflation expectations were on the rise, and without much credibility, the reluctance of many central banks to raise interest rates risked repeating the mistake the advanced economies made in the 1970s. Without credibility, inflation expectations are unlikely to be well anchored. To gain credibility, a central bank must ‘walk‐the‐talk’, and understandably it must have the autonomy to do so.     

A Macroeconomic Policy Game for a Monetary Union with Adaptive Expectations

We consider a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union. Governments (fiscal policies) pursue national goals while the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objectives. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank. We consider conflicting (non-cooperative Nash equilibrium) and coordinated policy-making (cooperative Pareto solutions). We show that there is a trade-off between the deviations of instruments and targets from desired paths; the volatility of output and inflation increases when private agents react more strongly to changes in actual inflation.     

The Impact of EMU on Inflation Expectations

This paper analyses the impact of the monetary regime change from the Bundesbank to the ECB on inflation expectations. In the theoretical part, the Barro-Gordon model is used to derive the potential effect of a new central bank on inflation and inflation expectations. The econometric investigation is based on a flexible specification of expectation formation which allows both for rational and adaptive elements. The results indicate that the monetary regime change did not have a strong and lasting impact on the formation of inflation expectations and that the credibility of both central banks is not perceived to differ significantly anymore. JEL Classification Numbers: E 58, E 31     

Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement,Determinants, and Economic Effects

This paper studies monetary policy committee transparency (MPCT) based on a new index that measures central bankers’ educational and professional backgrounds as disclosed through central bank websites. Based on a novel cross-sectional data set covering 75 central banks, we investigate the determinants of MPCT as well as its economic consequences. We find that past inflation, institutional indicators, and monetary policy strategy are important determinants of MPCT. MPCT has a robust and significantly negative impact on inflation variability and inflation expectations, even after controlling for important macroeconomic variables and institutional transparency, as well as instrumenting MPCT in various ways. MPCT can be both a complement to and a substitute for institutional transparency.     

通胀预期管理下中央银行沟通的有效性研究——基于中国2003～2010年数据的实证分析

有效管理通货膨胀预期已成为中央银行货币政策调控的重要任务之一。近几年,世界上很多国家通过实施中央银行沟通引导市场预期,实现有效的货币政策调控。本文通过考察通货膨胀预期和中央银行沟通及其他经济变量之间的相关关系,分析中央银行沟通能否有效引导市场通胀预期。结果显示,由于缺乏系统性,中央银行沟通对市场预期的引导作用仍不如其他经济变量,但国内中央银行沟通对市场通胀预期的影响是显著的。其中,相对书面沟通,口头沟通对通胀预期的影响更为显著。在目前较强的通胀预期背景下,系统实施中央银行沟通将对未来通胀预期的管理起到积极作用。     

Central bank independence--conceptual clarifications and interim assessment

It is argued that credibility problems in macroeconomics hardlyexist, and certainly do not motivate central bank independence.The Rogoff banker, and much work which follows should be interpretedas blueprints for good policy, not institutional reforms. Thereare likely to be significant but at present unquantified costsassociated with central bank independence once the interactionof monetary and other policymakers is recognised. The evidencethat central bank independence reduces inflation or brings otherbenefits is questioned     

Debt targets and fiscal sustainability in an era of monetary independence

This paper investigates how to achieve flexibility in fiscal policy without sacrificing credibility or independence in monetary policy. The idea is to create a framework that generates fewer conflicts between policies but greater discipline within them. We assume an independent central bank and restraints on national fiscal policies. Using a theoretical model, we examine the consequences of assigning leadership to fiscal policies in order to exploit the implicit (but rule based) coordination available under standard transmission mechanisms and to allow priorities and targets to differ between policy makers. This works best when leadership takes the form of a debt rule (with hard or soft targets) to precommit fiscal policies over the longer term; but monetary independence to guarantee the credibility and discipline in the short term policies. Compared to the uncoordinated policies operating in Europe, inflation biases and debt/deficit ratios are both lower for no loss in output volatility. That matches the experience of the UK, an economy whose empirical reaction functions show fiscal leadership. On a wider sample of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, the gains from debt targeting are estimated at 2–4% of gross domestic product.     

THE SENSITIVITY OF SOUTH AFRICAN INFLATION EXPECTATIONS TO SURPRISES

Price stability is widely recognised as the primary goal of modern monetary policy, and the management of private sector inflation expectations has become an essential channel through which this goal is achieved. This evaluation aims to improve the understanding of how the sensitivity of private sector inflation expectations to macroeconomic surprises in South Africa compares internationally, as this provides an indication of the contribution of monetary policy in South Africa to anchoring inflation expectations. If a central bank is credible, the financial markets should react less sensitively to macroeconomics surprises, because they trust the central bank to manage these incidents and achieve the objectives they communicated over the medium to long term. In this paper, the methodology of Gurkaynack et al. is adopted in order to measure the sensitivity of South African inflation expectations to surprises. A comparison of South Africa's results with those of countries in the original studies supports the contention that the SARB (South African Reserve Bank) has encouraged inflation expectations to be relatively insensitive to macroeconomic surprises, and offers support for the inflation-targeting framework as a means to help anchor inflation expectations.     

Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Accountability

We analyse the issue of central bank accountability with the aid of a simple monetary policy game with uncertainty about the agent's inflation stabilisation preferences. We find that there may be an important economic role for accountability in addition to its political function of making the central bank answerable to voters through its accountability to the executive. The model suggests that for countries with relatively little central bank independence, or perhaps a poor inflationary track record, significant reductions in inflation can be achieved by lowering monetary policy uncertainty. These reductions are much smaller for inflation-averse central banks, when monetary policy uncertainty is reduced by the same absolute amount. Thus, the effectiveness of accountability – as a means of lowering both inflation and inflation uncertainty – is higher the lower the degree of central bank conservativeness.     

Structural Reform and Transparency in a Monetary Union

We assess how central bank transparency affects the incentives for labour market reform in a monetary union. We introduce transparency as affecting unemployment forecasts that provide information that the central bank has to the private sector and the governments. Under conditions of monetary policy opaqueness and inflation bias, we show that monetary union may induce more reform (as governments mitigate inflation surprises under idiosyncratic shocks), albeit to a lesser extent when inflation bias is only present at the national level. In the absence of inflation bias, central bank transparency, by eliminating inflation surprises in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, induces less reform in a currency union relative to monetary autonomy. Altogether, these results point to the need for a strong political commitment to reform so that member states benefit most from the combination of a credible and transparent single monetary policy with measures aimed at improving competitiveness and enhancing long-term growth.     

Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link?

Granting central banks independence is widely assumed to decreaseinflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to pricestability. This paper analyzes public- and private-sector behaviorin a sample of 17 OECD countries for evidence of variationsin disinflationary credibility with monetary institutions. Thepaper does not find evidence that the costs of disinflationare lower in countries with independent central banks. It alsofinds no evidence that independence inhibits collection of seignoragerevenues or electoral manipulation of policy. These resultsraise questions about some explanations of the negative correlationbetween central bank independence and inflation.     

On the conduct of monetary policy in Vietnam

Vietnam has the highest inflation rate in Southeast Asia (over 20 per cent year‐on‐year in 2011). This paper examines the extent to which inflation in Vietnam is due to its conduct of monetary policy. It is argued that, had the central bank implemented policy on a more timely basis, inflation would not have been as high as it was, but the more fundamental problem is that the central bank does not have the tools it needs to conduct monetary policy effectively. Monetary policy is further complicated by Vietnam's exchange rate policy. By choosing to peg the currency and maintain fairly free capital mobility, the country has all but given up the ability to pursue an independent monetary policy. As a consequence, the central bank is forced to attempt to sterilise its foreign exchange interventions, which it is ill‐equipped to do. The paper argues that financial sector liberalisation is needed not only to promote growth but also to maintain macroeconomic stability.     

货币政策透明度、通胀偏差与预期成本

由于预期的形成是需要成本的，本文通过建立一个引入预期成本的简单模型，分析可得信息的开发和处理信息成本之间的权衡关系对货币政策博弈的影响。模型得到两个结论：一是提高货币政策的透明度可以降低通货膨胀率；二是在特定的情况下，越“保守的”中央银行可能会导致更高的通货膨胀。因此，为了减少由动态不一致所导致的通胀偏差，中央银行越保守，就应该越透明。     

Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy

How many people should decide monetary policy? In this article, we take an empirical perspective on this issue and analyze the relationship between the number of monetary policy decision makers and monetary policy outcomes. Using a new data set that characterizes central bank monetary policy committees (MPCs) in more than 30 countries from 1960 through 2006, we find a U‐shaped relationship between MPC size and inflation; our results suggest that the lowest level of inflation is reached at MPCs with an intermediate size of about five to nine members. Similar results are obtained for inflation variability. Other MPC characteristics also matter for monetary policy outcomes, though to a smaller degree. For instance, the membership composition of the MPC as well as the frequency of MPC membership turnover appears to affect economic variables.     

Monetary Aggregates Targeting,Inflation Targeting and Inflation Stabilization in Ghana

The central bank of Ghana (BoG) has operated monetary aggregates targeting and inflation targeting since the 1980s, to ensure enhanced output growth, low unemployment and stable, low inflation. Under inflation targeting, the inflation rate averaged 13.26 per cent per annum between 2007 and 2015, compared with 29.22 per cent per annum under monetary aggregates targeting. The relatively lower inflation rates notwithstanding, an average inflation rate of 13.2 per cent per annum is far above the medium‐term target of 8 per cent. This paper has examined the effectiveness of monetary aggregates targeting and inflation targeting in keeping inflation at moderate levels. The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model was applied to the data covering the period 1970–2015. The results show that monetary targeting has steered inflation to moderate levels only in the short run while inflation targeting has maintained low inflation rates in both short run and long run. But neither regime has kept inflation at stable levels and within the target band, due to the sluggish transmission of broad money supply and prime rate changes to inflation. We implore the monetary authorities to strengthen the institutional setup for steering short‐term interest rates in Ghana. They should also enhance the BoG Act 2002 (Act 612), to develop secondary anchors and rules around output, money supply and fiscal deficit. Finally, the monetary policy committee should monetary policy credibility and transparency through strengthening its communication framework.     

Monetary Policy Implementation and Volatility Transmission Along the Yield Curve: The Case of Kenya

This paper analyses the degree to which volatility in interbank interest rates leads to volatility in financial instruments with longer maturities (e.g. T‐bills) in Kenya since 2012, year in which the monetary policy framework switched to a forward‐looking approach, relative to seven other inflation targeting (IT) countries (Ghana, Hungary, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand and Uganda). Kenya shows strong volatility transmission and high persistence similar to other countries in transition to a more forwardlooking monetary policy framework. These results emphasize the importance of a strong commitment to an interbank rate as an operational target and suggest that the central bank could reduce uncertainty in short‐term yields significantly by smoothing out the overnight interest rates around the policy rate.     

Can central bank communication effectively guide the monetary policy expectation of the public?

Central bank communication helps to optimize monetary policy. Therefore, it is essential to study whether central bank communication can effectively guide expectations via various communication methods. We study central bank communication in China using the events collected from its official websites and social media, and we divide them into formal and informal communications. We use the high-frequency quotation data of treasury bonds to identify monetary policy surprise caused by communication, which is measured by the target and path surprise. Then, we evaluate the forward-looking and backward-looking effectiveness of central bank communications. We show that central bank communications can help guide public expectations, but different topics and different forms of communication have heterogeneous effects. Forward guidance carries both potential benefits and drawbacks. It is worth noting that China's current central bank communications may have certain potential to be improved.     

Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies and Inflation Expectations

We analyse the empirical effects of credit easing and quantitative easing on inflation expectations and exchange rates. Both monetary policy strategies are summarised in measures for composition and size of the central bank balance sheet and are included in a VAR model. The results show that changes in balance sheet size had positive, albeit weak effects on inflation expectations in Japan, while the effects were negligible in the euro area. By contrast, an increasing balance sheet size is associated with reduced short-term inflation expectations in the US and UK, pointing at negative signalling effects. Shocks to balance sheet size or composition have no substantial effects on long-term inflation expectations in the euro area, US and UK. An expanding balance sheet size is associated with a depreciation of the euro, pound sterling and Japanese yen.     

Inflation Uncertainty and Monetary Policy in China

This paper uses a stochastic volatility model structural break tests with unknown point, and a counterfactual simulation method to discuss the significant decline in inflation uncertainty in China over 1978-2009. We attempt to quantify the contributions of better monetary policy and smaller structural shocks （including demand, supply and policy impacts） on the reduced inflation uncertainty. Empirical results in the present paper suggest that improved monetary policy accounts for only a small fraction of the reduction in inflation uncertainty from the pre-1997 period to the post-1997 period in China. The bulk of the significant moderation in inflation uncertainty arises from smaller shocks. This finding indicates that the quiescence of inflation in China over the past decade could well be followed by a return to a more turbulent inflation era. Therefore, the use of preemptive monetary policy to anchor inflationary expectations and keep moderate inflation uncertainty is warranted.