On Hegel,imperialism, and structural stagnation

The essentials of the economic theory of imperialism à la Hobson-Luxemburg are anticipated in two paragraphs of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Marx did not pay attention to this aspect of Hegel's thought, perhaps because it implied a longer survival probability for capitalism than Marx cared to acknowledge. The second part of the paper shows the formal similarity between the economic theory of imperialism and the theory of structural stagnation that was proposed in Latin America in the 1960s. The blindspots and early demise of that theory have the same psychological root as Marx's neglect of Hegel's insights.     

On the existence of equilibria in economies with infinitely many commodities and without ordered preferences

The present paper deals with the existence of equilibria in economies whose commodity space is L_∞(M, M, μ) and where the agents' preferences need not be complete or transitive. Applying a fixed point theorem of Browder, an equilibrium existence theorem for abstract economies (generalized qualitative games) is proven where each agent's choice set is contained in an arbitrary topological vector space. With the help of this theorem the existence of Walrasian general equilibrium for a suitably specified economic model is obtained. The final result is a generalization of T. F. Bewley's (J. Econ. Theory4 (1972), 514–540) equilibrium existence theorem to the case of non-ordered preferences.     

Schumpeter’s ‘conduct model of the dynamic entrepreneur’: scope and distinctiveness

Schumpeter formulated a ‘conduct model’ of entrepreneurial behaviour. Received wisdom has emphasised the economic functions of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur, neglecting behavioural aspects. Schumpeter’s model is examined; it posits a continuum of behaviours which are ‘entrepreneurial’, that rely on socially situated, tacit knowledge and are expressions of conscious, subjective rationality. Schumpeter’s model excluded unconscious optimisation and decision rules derived from bounded rationality. Comparisons are drawn with modern neoclassical, Austrian, and the older behavioural characterisations of entrepreneurial behaviour. The newer ‘effectuation’ model of entrepreneurial behaviour is also contrasted with Schumpeter’s approach. We find, among other things, that modern Schumpeterian economics associated with Nelson and Winter is not a natural continuation of Schumpeter’s model. However, some developments in neo-Schumpeterian economics, including the effectuation model deriving from the older behavioural tradition, are congruent with both the original ‘conduct model’ and Schumpeter’s directions for further research.     

The origins of meso economics

The paper starts from Schumpeter’s proposition that entrepreneurs carry out innovations (the micro level), that swarms of followers imitate them (meso) and that, as a consequence, ‘creative destruction’ leads to economic development ‘from within’ (macro). It is argued that Schumpeter’s approach can be developed into a new—more general—micro-meso-macro framework in economics. Center stage is meso. Its essential characteristic is bimodality, meaning that one idea (the generic rule) can be physically actualized by many agents (a population). Ideas can relate to others, and, in this way, meso constitutes a structure component of a ‘deep’ invisible macro structure. Equally, the rule actualization process unfolds over time—modelled in the paper as a meso trajectory with three phases of rule origination, selective adoption and retention—and here meso represents a process component of a visible ‘surface’ structure. The macro measure with a view to the appropriateness of meso components is generic correspondence. At the level of ideas, its measure is order; at that of actual relative adoption frequencies, it is generic equilibrium. Economic development occurs at the deep level as transition from one generic rule to another, inducing a change of order, and, at the surface level, as the new rule is adopted, destroying an old equilibrium and establishing a new one.     

Monopolistic competition,aggregation of competitive information,and the amount of product differentiation

Consider an industry with a large number of homogeneous firms. Each firm's profits are a function of its own strategy and the strategies the other firms select. Suppose other firms' strategies enter into each firm's profit function only through one or more statistics. For example, average price in the market may parameterize every firm's profit function. We prove that, as a general rule, the industry's firms will in equilibrium follow at most M + 1 distinct strategies, where M is the number of statistics by which competitors' strategies affect each firm's profits.     

Political system and economic efficiency: The east European context

Sections 1 and 2 reexamine the proposition about democratization of socialism as a factor of economic efficiency—in the light of the challenge contained in the article by Stanislaw Gomutka, “Economic Factors in the Democratization of Socialism and the Socialization of Capitalism” (J. Comp. Econ., Dec. 1977, 1, 4:389–406). The author takes issue with Gomulka's conclusions, which view democracy as of little relevance for economic efficiency under socialism. Dissident views on the link between democracy and efficiency are discussed. Section 3 goes beyond this controversy in an attempt to analyze the prospects and efficiency aspects of a limited change within the existing Soviet-type political system (“Kadarism”).     

On the existence of lindahl equilibria in economies with a measure space of non-transitive consumers

We present a generalization of Roberts' theorem on the existence of Lindahl equilibria in economies with a measure space of agents. The principal contribution of this paper is methodological. We show that by formulating the problem in what we consider to be its natural infinite dimensional setting, the basic structure of Debreu's proof in the theory of value can be applied. Our proof makes use of functional analysis and relies, in particular, on Artstein's characterization of weak sequential convergence in L₁(μ).     

Risks of Latin America sovereign debts before and after the financial crisis

We investigate the financial determinants of the return and volatility of sovereign CDS spread from six major Latin American countries before and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Other than CBOE VIX index, we also find that global factors including US Baa–Aaa default yield, TED spread and US Treasury rate all contribute to the changes in these sovereign CDS spread. Although global risk aversion (VIX) is a significant determinant of sovereign debt spread, in the years after the crisis, the emphasis has shifted towards short-term refinancing risk (TED). Furthermore, the risk of Greek sovereign debt crisis also transmitted Latin American CDS spreads immediately, but only in the post-Lehman sub-period. These findings provide implications for international bonds and credit derivatives trading strategies.     

Overlapping expectations and Hart's conditions for equilibrium in a securities model

Hart (J. Econ. Theory9 (1974), 293–311) gave conditions for equilibrium to exist in a securities model where each agent undertakes asset transactions to maximize expected utility of wealth. These conditions rule out agents wanting to undertake unbounded balanced transactions to reach a Pareto superior allocation given their expectations. With mild extra assumptions to make agents unwilling to risk incurring unbounded losses on their portfolios, Hart's conditions become equivalent to an assumption of “overlapping expectations,” which is comparable to a much weaker form of Green's “common expectations” (Econometrica41 (1973), 1103–1124).     

Risk sensitivity in bargaining with more than two participants

In two-person bargaining over riskless outcomes where the outcome is chosen according to the Nash solution or the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, an increase in a player's risk aversion is to the advantage of the opponent. It is shown in this note that for the n-person Nash solution, an increase in risk aversion is to the player's own disadvantage but needs not be advantageous to all the opponents. For the n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the increase is to the player's own disadvantage and to the advantage of all the opponents.     

Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge

The paper begins by presenting an axiomatic model of simple and iterated knowledge. A formal definition of the intuitive notion of common knowledge is given and shown equivalent to previous characterizations. It is shown that agents have information partitions. The second part generalizes Aumann's (Ann. Statist.4 (1976), 1236–1239) well-known propositions about common knowledge between two rational agents of each other's probability assignments. It is shown that: common knowledge of decisions—if these are rational—implies a common decision for like-minded agents; and that a “dialogue” in decisions leads to a common decision. A “no-trade” theorem is given which includes trade under complete uncertainty.     

Thoreau's economic philosophy

Abstract

This paper provides an encompassing portrayal of Thoreau's economic thought. It is analyzed against the background of the history of economic thought and the economic thinking of his time. Thoreau's economic thought is an extensive examination of the ideas of classical political economy, and particularly of Jean-Baptiste Say, and it is a fundamental critique thereof. Thoreau recognizes that some aspects and foundations of the modern conception of the economy lead to an alienation of the human being from itself as well as to an alienation from nature. I demonstrate that this critique is a result of Thoreau's specific approach to the economy, which, based on his particular understanding of the human being and his philosophy of nature, seeks the meaning of the economy for human life and for nature. In this philosophical approach, which I characterize as an economic philosophy, Thoreau's deeper defiance of classical political economy and his original place within the history of economic thought are grounded. It leads Thoreau to an alternative conception of an economy of moderation, which is identified and described in detail. I conclude with considerations on the potential meaning of Thoreau's thought for current economic research.     

A re-examination of Verdoorn's law and its application to the manufacturing industries of the UK,West Germany and the USA

This paper examines recent theoretical justification of Verdoorn's law and suggests a derivation of Verdoorn's law in the form P?=aQ?+b which requires only the assumption K?=γ a constant. This derivation is generalised to include the effect of the efficient use of labour on productivity change. The manufacturing industries of the United Kingdom, West Germany and the United States are analysed on the basis of the theory.     

Extension of Oi's price instability theorem

Oi's theorem that product price variability raises the average profit of a single-product perfectly competitive firm is generalized in this paper to cover the case of an n-commodity firm. Under similar conditions to those mentioned by Oi for the single-product case, commodity (factor or product) price instability raises the average profit of an n-commodity perfectly competitive firm.     

Transfer principles in income redistribution

Dalton's principle of transfer for income redistribution says that society will be better off when a unit of income in transferred from a richer to a poorer individual. This paper investigates the conjunction of a natural extension of Dalton's principle — which says that any combination of a socially desirable transfer with its inverse at uniformly higher levels of income will have positive social benefit — and a traditional utilitarian-egalitarian formulation of social welfare. The transfer principles involved in the extension of Dalton's rule correspond to stochastic dominance relations between income distributions with a common mean, and lead to the conclusion that, when ? and g are income distributions, the social welfare of ? is larger than that of g if $\text{Σe}{}^{\mathrm{-ax}}\text{?(x)<Σe}{}^{\mathrm{-ax}}\text{g(x)}$ for all positive a. This conclusion is intimately connected with a measure of income inequality studied by Kolm.     

Ethically flexible gini indices for income distributions in the continuum

A single-parameter generalization of the Gini coefficient (S-Gini) is presented for income distributions defined in the continuum. Special cases are Dorfman's formula for the Gini, and the authors' S-Ginis for finite populations. We exploit the duality between indices of relative inequality and homothetic social-evaluation functions to construct these new indices.     

Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility

This paper analyzes how an early entrant in a market can exploit its head start by strategic investment. The analysis is based on Spence's paper, Investment strategy and growth in a new market, (Bell J. Econ., 10 (1979), 1–19). We frist study the investment game in the no-discounting case, which embodies the key features of mobility deterrence. We establish the existence of a set of perfect equilibria and suggest that one particular equilibrium is most reasonable. This equilibrium, also valid with discounting, involves the follower firm being forever deterred from investing to its steady-state reaction curve, in contrast to Spence's proposed solution.     

The economics of joint ventures in centrally planned and labor-managed economies

The paper analyzes the allocational and distributional issues connected with the operation of joint ventures by firms in Yugoslavia, several Eastern European countries and the People's Republic of China with Western firms. A variable-bargaining-power model is used to examine the behavior of joint ventures under the various institutional circumstances of these countries. Contrary to Brada's conclusions (J. Comp. Econ.1(2):167–181, June 1977), the present study indicates that the behavior of joint ventures in most of these countries is likely to be quite similar.     

Envy,wealth, and class hierarchies

A persion i is said to not envy another person j if he likes his own bundle of goods as well as he would like j's bundle. This paper explores the social structure defined by the non-envy relation, and relates it to the social structure defined by market values of bundles, or wealth.