房产中介,暴利从何而来?

据一份报告显示,目前上海市民中,3年以内有购房打算的约有200万人,其中,打算购买二手房的占了将近一半。上海的二手房交易,基本上都是通过中介公司完成,上下家“手拉手”的交易少之又少。对于目前这样庞大的市场,中介的生存空间是很大的:因而买卖双方信息不对称,中介公司便可从中渔利。市场鱼龙混杂     

房产经纪行业：只有等待？

“现在都还没有正式上班,怎么成交?等上班以后再看吧。”2月23日,距离北京规定的多数企业的复工日期(2月10日)已过去近半个月,《中国经济周刊》记者询问春节后二手房交易情况时,一家中小规模中介公司门店负责人这样回答。他建议,如果有买卖二手房的需求可以先登记,“公司也没有说什么时候正常开门营业。”     

开辟房产交易新途径——对房地产三级市场现状的一点思考

房地产市场的二手房交易(房地产三级市场)至今依然靠中介公司完成,房产中介的作用地位不言自明。然而,由于门槛低及初期不够规范,进入市场的中介公司难免鱼龙混杂;加之相关方面监管不到位,     

高校二手自行车市场交易情况研究——以广州大学为例

通过以广州大学的二手自行车市场交易为例,发现二手自行车的买卖双方信息不对称,导致市场交易时间成本高、体验差,整体交易情况不理想。文章研究分析,提出构建一个二手自行车买卖平台的解决措施。     

知情交易的识别与测度的文献综述

知情交易是指由于市场中存在着非对称信息，一部分交易者利用自己所掌握的私有信息所进行的交易，对于知情交易的识别和测度已成为一个热门问题。本文从买卖价差，序贯交易模型，成交量，超常收益四个方面对已有的知情交易的识别和测度的文献进行了分类和总结。     

网络团购中的法律关系及责任承担

随着网络技术的不断发展和人们消费方式的日益多样化，网络团购作为一种新型的买卖形式应运而生。然而，由于网络团购的模式种类多样且参与主体复杂，其涉及的法律问题比传统的买卖交易复杂。本文通过分析网络团购的三种模式，进而探讨各种模式中主体之间的法律关系，以明晰实践中产生的团购问题中主体的权利义务和责任承担问题，最后对解决网络团购纠纷给出了自己的一些建议。     

从博弈论角度分析股市内幕交易

内幕交易是指证券交易内幕信息的知情人员或者非法获取证券交易内幕信息的人员，在内幕信息尚未公开之前，直接或间接买卖该证券或为别人提供该信息的行为，以达到获取经济利益或者避免经济损失为目的。由于内幕交易行为利用了一般投资者所不知道的信息而获取了利益或减少了本应有的损失，因而是一种不公正的交易行为。     

西方外汇买卖的新发展——按金交易

外汇买卖业务的发展可分为3个阶段,现货买卖(SPOT)和期货买卖(FORWARD)属第一阶段,1978年出现的期权交易(OPTION)以及调期交易(SWAP)属第二阶段,第三阶段除出现期权的变通方式和远期利率合约(FRA)外,按金交易的推出无疑最具吸引力,下面我们即介绍这种新出现的外汇买卖方式。     

宁波二手房交易流程新增房源核验环节

<正>新闻回顾房产买卖交易流程复杂,提前了解对房产买卖双方至关重要。随着宁波房产市场监管服务平台的上线运行,与之配套的宁波市房产交易信息服务网也改版上线,全市的房屋交易正逐步汇总到一个平台上,二手房交易流程也出现了新变化——自今年5月份起,二手房交易流程新增房源核验环节。新闻解读在以往的二手房交易中,房东只要将自己要出售的房源信息到网上     

我国期货市场应规范起步，加强宏观管理

期货市场是买卖标准合约为目的的特定交易场所．期货市场与现货市场(包括以远期合同交易为主的现货市场)在买卖对象、交易目的、交易方式、交易场所以及保障制度等方面有所不同。     

Costly Buyer Search in a Differentiated Products Model: An Experimental Study

This study examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affects seller market power. We construct laboratory markets with differentiated goods and costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. The experiment varies the information on price or product characteristics that buyers learn under different timing assumptions (pre‐ and postsearch), generating four information treatments. Theory predicts that price information lowers the equilibrium price, but information about product characteristics increases the equilibrium price. That is, contrary to intuition, the presence of informed buyers may impart a negative externality on other uninformed buyers. Data support the model's negative externality result when sellers face a large number of robot buyers that are programmed to search optimally. Observed prices conform to the model's comparative statics and are broadly consistent with predicted levels. With human buyers, however, excessive search instigates increased price competition, and sellers post prices that are significantly lower than predicted.     

Illustrating Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets with a Classroom Game

This paper describes a classroom game that illustrates the effects of asymmetric information and adverse selection in health insurance markets. The first part of this game simulates a market in which buyers can purchase insurance from sellers; in some periods, government regulation prevents sellers from using information about buyer type to determine premiums. The results demonstrate the classic prediction that asymmetric information will result in adverse selection. Here, low-risk buyers will forego the purchase of insurance at a measurable loss of potential earnings. In the second part of the game, sellers and buyers can trade two different types of health insurance policies, one moderate and another generous. Under government-mandated community rating and limits on premium increases, no buyers will purchase the generous plan. Questions are provided to stimulate discussion of the causes and consequences of adverse selection for consumers and insurers and possible solutions for employer- and government-sponsored programs.     

纯粹中介与套利中间人——一个普通商品市场微观结构内生化模型

本文给出了一个包括两种交易方式的普通商品市场微观结构内生化模型,其中,商品的买者、卖者不可以直接进行交易,但被允许在两种相互竞争的中介交易方式——“套利中间人交易”与被现有文献所忽略但又非常重要的“纯粹中介交易”——中进行选择。对于微观结构的内生性,模型给出了如下结论：交易意愿较高的个体倾向于通过套利中间人进行交易,而意愿相对较低的则会选择纯粹中介作为交易媒介;市场的微观结构决定于三个参数——跨期替代率、纯粹中介单位交易量的交易成本与最有效率的套利中间人单位交易量的成本。     

An experimental investigation of bilateral oligopoly in emissions trading markets

Market power in emissions trading has been extensively investigated because emerging markets for tradable emissions permits, such as the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), can be dominated by relatively few large sellers or buyers. Previous studies on market power in emissions trading have assumed the existence of a subset of competitive players. However, a key feature of emissions trading markets is that emissions permits are often traded by a small number of large sellers and buyers. Using a laboratory experiment, our objective in this paper is to test the performance of an emissions trading market utilizing a double auction in a bilateral oligopoly. Our results suggest that the theoretical bilateral oligopoly models can better describe market outcomes of emissions trading. The effects of the slope of the marginal abatement cost function on market power in laboratory experiments are found to be consistent with those predicted by the theoretical bilateral oligopoly model. How market power is exercised depends on the curvature of the abatement cost function. If the marginal abatement cost function of buyers (sellers) is less steep than that of sellers (buyers), the price of permits is lower (higher) than that under perfect competition. This is because the market power of buyers (sellers) exceeds that of sellers (buyers). The price of permits is close to the perfect competitive price when all traders have the sameslope of the marginal abatement cost function.     

COMPETITION BETWEEN INTERMEDIATED AND DIRECT TRADE AND THE TIMING OF DISINTERMEDIATION

This paper analyses how intermediation by a middleman who buysfrom sellers and sells to buyers is affected if direct tradebetween buyers and sellers becomes possible. Without coordinationamong sellers and buyers, disintermediation may not occur whenit would be welfare-improving. With such coordination, disintermediationmay occur too early. If direct trade is active, the supply anddemand for intermediation become interdependent: an increasein the bid price thus increases both supply and demand. Thisprocess of interdependence by which the two trade mechanismscompete for trade is a feature of competing markets generally.     

经济全球化与中国的对外开放

XML (eXtensibleMarkupLanguage,可扩展标记语言 是由万维网络联盟于 1998年 2月发布的一种标准 ,它以一种开放的自我描述方式定义了数据结构 ,人们可以利用XML的一组规则创建针对特定应用领域的标记语言。cnXML则是基于XML技术建立的一个符合中国大陆商业习惯、传统和商业流     

The market for corporate subsidiaries in Japan: An empirical study of trades among listed firms

We investigate trades of wholly- or partially-owned subsidiaries between firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) for the years 1996–2010, to explore the economic impact in terms of strategic refocusing, stock market valuation and performance effects. By pairing both sides to each deal, we show differences in firm characteristics, returns, and subsequent performance of buying and selling firms. Unlike mergers between whole firms, most subsidiary deals straddled different industries. Most sellers were larger, more diversified and less profitable than buyers. Our event study reveals that abnormal returns were positive for buyers yet insignificantly different from zero for sellers. However, subsidiary sales in the core business earned negative returns, the more so the larger the deal. An analysis of ex-post operating results shows that the performance of sellers often declined after the trade, in particular for firms that divested a core-related subsidiary. We conclude that subsidiary trades in Japan in this period contributed importantly to strategic repositioning and a more efficient use of corporate assets.     

Measuring Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly: The Wholesale Market for Beef

Econometric methods for assessing the degree of market power typically rely on a maintained hypothesis of price-taking behavior on one side of the market or the other. In the analysis of bilateral oligopoly, however, one would like to leave open the question of whether buyers or sellers (or both) behave competitively while allowing for the possible exercise of market power on either side. In this paper, we address the problem of measuring market power in bilateral oligopoly. This requires that we first distinguish among three candidate equilibrium concepts: bilateral price-taking, seller price-taking, and buyer price-taking. Choosing among them comes down to a test of nonnested, nonlinear, simultaneous equation models. Our application to the U.S. wholesale market for beef, characterized by high degrees of concentration among both sellers (beef packers) and buyers (primarily retail grocery chains), reveals seller price-taking among the three candidates to be the most consistent with the data. In particular, the hypothesis of price-taking conduct on both sides of the market can be rejected. This is a conclusion that would not have been reached had we considered monopoly conduct by sellers as the only alternative to perfect competition.     

Market-induced information disclosures: An experimental markets investigation

Abstract. This paper presents the results of 16 laboratory markets designed to test the theoretical assertion that, when disclosures are credible, managers/sellers will fully disclose private information to potential investors/buyers. Sellers are predicted to disclose all information so as not to be classified as having the worst possible information. This experiment manipulated two treatments: the number of disclosure options available to the seller and the buyers' knowledge of those disclosure options. The results show that, after repeated dealings between sellers and buyers, the sellers moved toward full disclosure. Buyers adjusted their bidding strategies in response to the seller's disclosure strategy in all markets except those that had both (1) a large number of disclosure options and (2) no knowledge by buyers of the disclosure options. These results may provide some perspective on the market-based results that show that investors do not react in a fully skeptical fashion with respect to managerial disclosures. Our results suggest that knowledge of the menu of disclosure options may increase the speed of markets adjusting to disclosures, particularly when the menu of disclosure options is large. Résumé. Les auteurs présentent les résultats de l'étude en laboratoire de seize marchés à partir desquels ils ont voulu vérifier l'affirmation théorique selon laquelle, lorsque l'information communiquée est vraisemblable, les gestionnaires-vendeurs présentent intégralement l'information privilégiée aux investissieurs-acheteurs potentiels. La décision des vendeurs de communiquer intégralement l'information serait motivée par leur désir de ne pas laisser supposer que l'information qu'ils possèdent est extrêmement négative. Dans le cadre de cette expérience, les auteurs ont abordé la question sous deux angles: le nombre d'options dont dispose le vendeur en matière de présentation de l'information et la connaissance de ces différentes options chez l'acheteur. Les résultats démontrent qu'après plusieurs séances de négociation entre vendeurs et acheteurs, les vendeurs consentaient à la présentation intégrale de l'information. Les acheteurs adaptaient leur stratégie d'offre en réponse à la stratégie de présentation de l'information du vendeur dans tous les marchés, à l'exception des marchés caractérisés à la fois par 1) un nombre important d'options de présentation de l'information et 2) aucune connaissance, chez les acheteurs, des options de présentation de l'information. Ces résultats pourraient ouvrir certaines perspectives en ce qui a trait aux résultats, fondés sur le marché, qui démontrent que les investisseurs ne mettent pas systématiquement en doute l'information présentée par les gestionnaires. Les résultats de l'étude laissent supposer que la connaissance des différentes options de présentation de l'information peut accélérer l'adaptation des marchés à la présentation de l'information, en particulier lorsque les options de présentation sont nombreuses.     

Seller Beware: Supply and Demand Reduction and Price Manipulation in Multiple‐Unit Uniform Price Auctions

We experimentally compare under‐revelation of supply and demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending two‐sided price clock auctions. We find that buyers reduce demand more when the price is ascending but sellers’ behavior is consistent across clock directions. As a result, the clock price rule has empirical effects on efficiency even though it is theoretically neutral.