Financial development,financial structure,and domestic investment: International evidence

Does it matter for domestic investment whether a country's financial system is bank-based or stock-market based? This paper posits that financial intermediation affects domestic investment notably by alleviating financing constraints, allowing firms to increase investment in response to increased demand for output. The key result is that the structure of the financial system has no independent effect on investment, in the sense that it does not enhance the response of investment to changes in output, while financial development makes investment more responsive to output growth. Consequently, rather than promoting a particular type of financial structure, countries should implement policies that reduce transactions costs in financial intermediation and enforce creditor and investor rights. This will facilitate the development of banks and stock markets, which will stimulate domestic investment.     

Financial globalization, financial crises and contagion

Two observations suggest that financial globalization played an important role in the recent financial crisis. First, more than half of the rise in net borrowing of the U.S. non-financial sectors since the mid-1980s has been financed by foreign lending. Second, the collapse of the U.S. housing and mortgage-backed-securities markets had worldwide effects on financial institutions and asset markets. Using an open-economy model where financial intermediaries play a central role, we show that financial integration leads to a sharp rise in net credit in the most financially developed country and to large asset price spillovers of country-specific shocks to bank capital. The impacts of these shocks on asset prices are amplified by bank capital requirements based on mark-to-market.     

Financial flexibility and corporate liquidity

I provide an overview of the topics covered in this Special Issue of the Journal of Corporate Finance on “Financial Flexibility and Corporate Liquidity.” This burgeoning literature encompasses studies of the determinants and consequences of corporate cash holdings, as well as the impact of flexibility considerations on corporate capital structure and payout policies. The papers published in this special issue make important contributions to this literature and point towards several promising areas for future research.     

The value of financial flexibility and corporate financial policy

We propose a novel approach to measure the value that shareholders assign to financial flexibility. In contrast to existing proxies for financial constraints, our measure is market-based, forward-looking and not directly influenced by past financial decisions. We find that firms for which shareholders consider financial flexibility more valuable have lower dividend payouts, prefer share repurchases to dividends, and exhibit lower leverage ratios. Moreover, these firms tend to accumulate more cash. Our analysis contributes to the growing literature on financial flexibility and indicates that—in line with prior survey evidence—financial flexibility considerations shape corporate financial policy.     

Political connections,financial constraints,and corporate investment

This study investigates whether firms politically connected to the ruling party can mitigate financial constraints and increase their investments. Data on Taiwan-listed companies from 1991 to 2010 are used to answer the preceding issue. Results indicate that firms connected to the ruling party that transitioned into power can mitigate financial constraints, but results do not hold for firms connected to the opposition party that transitioned out of power. Firms connected to both parties have similar results with those connected to the ruling party, but the diminishing effect is weaker than those connected to the ruling party. Results further indicate that financially constrained firms can increase their investment when they have political connections to the ruling party. Finally, firms with strong connections can reduce financial constraints more effectively.     

Financial flows,financial crises,and global imbalances

In this lecture I document the proliferation of gross international asset and liability positions and discuss some consequences for individual countries’ external adjustment processes and for global financial stability. In light of the rapid growth of gross global financial flows and the serious risks associated with them, one might wonder about the continuing relevance of the net financial flow measured by the current account balance. I argue that global current account imbalances remain an essential target for policy scrutiny, for financial as well as macroeconomic reasons. Nonetheless, it is critically important for policymakers to monitor as well the rapidly evolving structure of global gross assets and liabilities.     

Financial hedging and corporate investment

Building on the well-documented relationship between corporate financial hedging and firms' borrowing costs, this study examines the impact of utilizing financial derivative instruments on corporate investment. We document that engaging in financial hedging enables firms to pursue more inorganic growth opportunities in the form of M&As. Acquiring firms with financial hedging programs have a lower borrowing cost and are more likely to pay for their deals with cash and use external borrowing. While financial hedging serves as a vehicle for firms to bring their inorganic investment plans to fruition by facilitating their financing, it also leads to inferior investment choices when conflicts of interest among managers and shareholders are more likely to arise. Our study shows for the first time that the financial flexibility emanating from corporate financial hedging can give rise to agency costs by instigating entrenched managers to overinvest.     

Financial leverage and corporate taxation: evidence from German corporate tax return data

To estimate the impact of profit taxation on the financial leverage of corporations, this study uses a pseudopanel constructed from comprehensive corporate tax return microdata for the period 1998–2001, which saw the introduction of major corporate tax reform in Germany. Financial leverage refers to the ratio of long-term debt to total capital. The endogeneity of the firm-specific marginal after-financing corporate income tax rate is controlled for by an instrumental variable approach. The instrument for the observed marginal tax rate is the counterfactual tax rate that a corporation would have faced in a particular period had there been no endogenous change, triggered by the tax reform, of its financial leverage and tax base. This counterfactual tax rate is derived from a detailed microsimulation model of the corporate sector, based on tax return microdata. The marginal tax rate has a statistically significant and relatively large positive effect on corporate leverage; for firms reporting positive profits, an increase of the marginal tax rate of 1 % would increase the financial leverage by approximately 0.7 %, on average. The debt ratio is less responsive to tax incentives for small corporations and firms facing high economic risks.     

Financial crises,bank risk exposure and government financial policy

A macroeconomic model with financial intermediation is developed in which the intermediaries (banks) can issue outside equity as well as short term debt. This makes bank risk exposure an endogenous choice. The goal is to have a model that can not only capture a crisis when banks are highly vulnerable to risk, but can also account for why banks adopt such a risky balance sheet in the first place. We use the model to assess quantitatively how perceptions of fundamental risk and of government credit policy in a crisis affect the vulnerability of the financial system ex ante. We also study the effects of macro-prudential policies designed to offset the incentives for risk-taking.     

Share repurchases on trial: Large-sample evidence on share price performance,executive compensation,and corporate investment

Using a large sample of US stocks covering more than three decades, we empirically examine common criticisms of and rationales for stock repurchases. Repurchases account for a tiny fraction of the trading volume in a typical stock, making their price impact too small to generate short-term price manipulation. Price appreciation following repurchases is modest and does not reverse on average, suggesting the small price increases following repurchases signal firms’ good prospects. Also, we find no evidence that CEOs of repurchasing firms are paid excessively or that repurchases crowd out valuable investment opportunities. Because repurchases do not appear to be systematically abusive, enforcement action should be sufficient to deal with any bad actors, and significant regulation seems unwarranted.     

Product markets and corporate investment: Theory and evidence

Investment patterns often associated with agency and information problems can emerge as rational responses to product-market rivalry. We illustrate this result when industry players make simultaneous or sequential investment decisions in the face of two negative externalities. One externality arises when all competing firms invest, thus eroding the gains to investment accruing to any one firm. Another externality arises when some firms do not invest and lose out to rivals who do invest. The value of investment therefore depends on the investment’s intrinsic merits and the actions of all competitors. Our analysis can rationalize investment patterns that might appear suboptimal when such externalities are ignored. For instance, our simultaneous model can justify investment levels that might otherwise be interpreted as under- or over-investment. Our sequential model shows that value-maximizing firms might optimally herd in their investment decisions. We present evidence supporting key aspects of both the simultaneous and sequential models.     

Financial distress, reorganization and corporate performance

Prospects for financially distressed companies in Australia have improved since the introduction of voluntary administration (VA) as an alternative to liquidation. This paper investigates whether companies that reorganise can be distinguished from those that liquidate under VA. In addition, performance of reorganised companies is examined to determine variables that distinguish 'successful' from 'unsuccessful' reorganisations. Significant variables in the logistic regression models developed differ between the analyses. The results of the analyses have implications for policy makers regarding efficiency of the VA procedure, as it appears the reorganisation decision is biased toward permitting inefficient firms to reorganise.     

Financial liberalization,insurance market,and the likelihood of financial crises

This paper provides empirical evidence to investigate the direct impact of financial liberalization on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and examines the roles of insurance market, country risk, and economic conditional variables on the relationship between financial liberalization and financial crises in 39 countries. Our empirical results support that financial liberalization does have a significantly negative impact on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and that the indirect effects of insurance development and lower country risk decrease the probability of crises, but the indirect effect of economic conditional proxies is enhanced with the likelihood of a financial crisis. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of the insurance sector in order to combat financial crises.     

Institutional investment horizons,corporate governance,and credit ratings: International evidence

Using a comprehensive set of firms from 57 countries over the 2000–2016 period, we examine the relation between institutional investor horizons and firm-level credit ratings. Controlling for firm- and country-specific factors, as well as for firm fixed effects, we find that larger long-term (short-term) institutional ownership is associated with higher (lower) credit ratings. This finding is robust to sample composition, alternative estimation methods, and endogeneity concerns. Long-term institutional ownership affects ratings more during times of higher expropriation risk, for firms with weaker internal corporate governance, and for those in countries with lower-quality institutional environments. Additional analysis shows that long-term investors facilitate access to debt markets for firms facing severe agency problems. These findings suggest that, unlike their short-term counterparts, long-term investors improve a firm's credit risk profile through effective monitoring.     

Board size and corporate performance: evidence from European countries

This paper examines the effects of board size on corporate performance across a number of European economies. Agency models suggest that large boards may destroy corporate value. Our fixed effects econometric evidence demonstrates that the effect of board size on corporate performance is generally negative. A negative effect is isolated for all five European countries in question when performance is measured as return on equity; this inverse relationship is more difficult to isolate using market-based measures of performance.     

The investment opportunity set,director ownership,and corporate policies: evidence from an emerging market

This paper provides evidence of the association between a firm's investment opportunity set (IOS), director ownership, and corporate policy choices. Using a sample of growth and non-growth firms in an emerging Asian market, we find that the IOS theory has significant explanatory power in the financing, dividend, executive compensation, and leasing aspects of corporate policies. Growth firms have lower debt-to-equity ratios and dividend yields, pay higher cash compensation and bonus amounts to their top executives, and finance a higher proportion of their asset acquisitions through operating leases. We also find that director ownership moderates and counteracts the association between IOS and corporate policies. Our results are consistent with contracting theory predictions that high director ownership mitigates the need for incentive or bonus compensation plans in growth firms.     

Return on investment and corporate capital expenditures: Empirical evidence

It is well known (e.g., Gordon 1996, Chapter 8) that maximizing a firm's ROI is not equivalent to maximizing the value of the firm. This fact notwithstanding, it is often claimed that many managers use ROI in making capital expenditure decisions. The purpose of our paper is to empirically examine this claim. The primary findings presented in this paper offer substantial evidence demonstrating the positive association between ROI and capital expenditures. The positive association between ROI and capital expenditures occurs even where the interests of owners and managers are apparently in conflict.     

Carbon disclosure,carbon performance and financial performance: International evidence

This study examines how carbon performance affects carbon disclosure and how carbon disclosure affects financial performance. With a sample of global firms, the study analyses how relationships between carbon disclosure, carbon performance and financial performance vary in institutional contexts. Our results show that carbon disclosure positively affects carbon performance, consistent with the signalling theory. We find that carbon disclosure negatively (positively) affects financial performance in the short-term (long-term). Our findings have significant implications for investors as some firms use carbon disclosure as part of impression management. Our results help regulators to monitor carbon disclosure and assist investors with investment decisions.     

Liquidity management,operating performance,and corporate value: evidence from Japan and Taiwan

This study examines the relationship between liquidity management and operating performance, and that between liquidity management and corporate value for firms in Japan and Taiwan. We observe that the cash conversion cycle (CCC)–returns on assets (ROA) and CCC–returns on equity (ROE) relationships are commonly negative and sensitive to industry factors. Both Japanese and Taiwanese firms with q>1 have significantly lower CCC than firms with q⩽1. In addition, Japanese firms with q>1 have significantly higher ROA and ROE than firms with q⩽1. Overall, the findings indicate that aggressive liquidity management enhances operating performance and is usually associated with higher corporate values for both countries in spite of differences in structural characteristics or in financial system of a firm.     

International corporate investment and the relationships between financial constraint measures

This paper uses international panel data to examine the interrelationships among some commonly used measures of financial constraint. The analysis reveals the following insights: (1) firms with stronger financial positions are more investment-cash flow sensitive than firms with weaker financial positions even after controlling for size and dividend payout and (2) higher payout firms are more investment-cash flow sensitive than lower payout firms even after controlling for size and financial strength. Evidence regarding the impact of firm size that is documented originally becomes much weaker once financial health and dividend payout behavior are controlled for. Finally, additional analysis reveals that many of these results may be driven by the fact that firms possessing high cash flow volatility display lower investment-cash flow sensitivities.