浅析内部审计风险及防范

随着我过社会主义市场经济的不断发展,国家对水利行业的投资力度也在不断加大,如何做好水利行业的内部审计工作,最大限度的消除其内部审计的风险,显得尤为重要.本文从分析加强水利行业内部审计的必要性出发,从而提出目前水利行业内部审计存在的系列的问题,进而提出具体对策,以消除水利行业内部审计的风险,确保水利行业合理、有序的发展.     

企业内部审计风险及其防范

企业内部审计是在现代企业下自我监督、自我约束机制的重要组成部分．是现代企业建立和完善法人治理结构的内在需要。文章介绍了内部审计和内部审计风险，分析了内部审计风险产生的机理及特征．并从我国企业所面临的审计风险现状及问题提出了相应的防范措施。     

企业内部审计风险与防范的研究

随着经济的发展和改革的深化,内部审计工作在企业的经营管理中也起着日益重要的作用。如何降低和防范企业内部审计风险也成了当下的研究热点。文章分析了内部审计风险的特征和形成原因,然后提出了针对性的建议以防范企业的内部审计风险。     

防范企业内部审计风险之所见

通过对企业内部审计风险的成因进行客观的分析,目的是为了探讨防范企业内部审计风险的具体措施。     

企业内部审计风险与防范的研究

企业内部审计结果是企业进行资源分配的重要依据,然而,企业内部审计风险会直接影响到企业内部审计工作的质量。一般来说,企业内部审计风险是客观、普遍存在的,但是也是可控的。造成企业内部审计风险一般以分为内部制度因素、内部人为因素、外部法规等多方面因素。因此,降低内部审计风险,不仅需要良好的内部审计外部环境,还需要从企业自身着手,加强企业内部制度建设以及提高对企业内部审计人员的要求。有效地防范企业内部审计风险,涉及到了企业审计工作的方方面面,企业应该对内部审计机制进行完善,审计人员在进行内部审计工作的过程中应该配合外部审计积极地发现问题,解决问题,确保内部审计能够适应我国企业的需要,有效地规避与防范审计风险。     

谈内部审计风险成因及防范措施

内部审计同样存在审计风险。本文分析了当前内部审计风险产生的原因，并从各种审计风险产生的原因出发提出了相应的防范和控制措施。     

探究内部审计风险意义及其防范与控制措施

文章结合笔者所掌握的会计知识和法律知识,并参考相关书籍,提出了对内部审计风险的认识和理解.     

浅议内部控制审计风险及其防范

内部控制的发展经历了内部牵制阶段、内部控制阶段、会计控制与管理控制阶段、结构阶段、整体框架阶段到现在的风险管理阶段。作为标准制定者的COSO委员会,从起初的八要素分析,发展到现在控制环境、风险评估、控制活动、信息与沟通以及监察的五要素框架,它在内控发展的进程中发挥了关键作用。我国财政部颁发的《内部控制基本规范》整合了八要素分析的内容,提出了内部环境、风险评估、控制活动、信息与沟通以及内部监督的五要素框架,它兼具了COSO报告八要素内容的实质和五要素框架的形式。与内部控制不断完善发展的同时,内部控制审计也经历了一次大的洗礼,文章就是建立在这个大的框架背景之上,着力解决内部控制审计过程中内控审计风险的识别与防范。     

浅谈中小企业内部审计风险及其风险防范

文章结合审计风险的概念及审计风险的特点,对中小企业内部审计的含义、现状、现存的审计风险及其方法措施进行各方面因素进行简要分析,进而得到一些相应的防范方法与应对措施。     

谈内部审计风险成因及防范措施

内部审计同样存在审计风险.本文分析了当前内部审计风险产生的原因,并从各种审计风险产生的原因出发提出了相应的防范和控制措施.     

基于风险导向的银行内部审计探讨

风险导向内部审计是内部审计发展的最新趋势。新的审计模式倡导新的审计理念，新的审计理念必将引导内部审计发生诸多变化。银行是高风险行业，在银行实施风险导向内部审计有利于提高银行审计的效率与效果，强化银行的风险管理。本文首先对风险导向内部审计进行了初步探讨，并从银行内审的角度分析了推行风险导向内部审计所带来的变化，最后提出了银行内部审计的工作重点。     

Outsourcing and Audit Risk for Internal Audit Services*

Some companies now outsource their internal audit function to public accountants. Internal auditors and accounting firms disagree about the merits of outsourcing. Each type of auditor claims to provide more cost‐effective services and appears to claim superior expertise. This paper uses agency theory to examine outsourcing and reconciles the outsourcing debate without resorting to differential auditor expertise. Under the assumptions that public accountants' “deep pockets” provide incentives to outsource and their higher opportunity cost provides a disincentive, we characterize the optimal employment contract with each auditor. We find that public accountants provide higher levels of testing, but possibly for a higher expected fee. This result supports both the internal auditor's claim as the lower cost provider, and the public accountant's claim of higher quality. We also find that incentives to outsource generally increase in various measures of risk, including the risk that a control weakness exists and the size of the loss that can result from an undetected control weakness.     

风险导向审计在商业银行内部审计中的应用

商业银行所面临的内外部经营环境日趋复杂,风险也日益增加,传统的内部审计模式已无法满足商业银行经营和发展的需求。如何使有限的审计资源得以合理配置,提高审计效率与效果,已成为商业银行内部审计面临的崭新课题。本文从风险导向审计的一般概念入手,对商业银行开展风险导向内部审计的必要性与可行性,及风险导向审计在商业银行内部审计中的应用进行了分析,并提出了一些不断完善的建议。     

The Impact of Internal Auditor Compensation and Role on External Auditors' Planning Judgments and Decisions*

This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates how external audit planning is affected when internal auditors have incentives and the opportunity to bias their evaluations. Specifically, we draw on attribution theory to examine how internal auditor eligibility for incentive compensation and participation in consulting (i.e., two factors that provide incentives to bias audit evaluations) affect external audit planning. In addition, we examine the effects of incentive compensation and a consulting role across two routine internal audit tasks — an objective tests of controls task and a subjective inventory valuation task — to evaluate whether their effects are contingent upon task subjectivity (i.e., opportunity to bias audit evaluations). Seventy‐six external auditors from four Big 5 public accounting firms participated in an experiment that manipulated internal auditor compensation (fixed salary versus incentive compensation), the type of work that the internal auditors routinely perform (primarily auditing versus primarily consulting), and audit task subjectivity (objective tests of controls versus subjective inventory valuation). Our results suggest that the nature of internal auditors' compensation and work affect audit planning recommendations differently. The opportunity to receive incentive compensation results in less reliance on internal auditors' work and greater budgeted audit hours, but only for the subjective task. Although a consulting role decreases perceived internal auditor objectivity, it has a limited effect on planning recommendations. Specifically, consulting has no effect on reliance, and leads to greater budgeted audit hours only when incentive compensation is available. We discuss potential explanations for the results as well as implications for audit research, practice, and regulation.     

新巴塞尔协议与银行审计风险

新巴塞尔协议强化了银行风险管理理念，对银行业建立完善的内部风险制度提出了更高的要求。为适应新巴塞尔协议全面实行后带来的冲击与挑战，银行审计的理论和方法也需要改进。本文主要探讨了新巴塞尔协议对我国银行业的影响，以及银行审计的改进措施。     

预算软约束、企业财务风险与审计定价

本文具体考察在上市公司存在预算软约束的情况下,我国的会计师事务所在审计定价时如何考虑上市公司的财务风险.研究结果表明:①事务所的审计收费与上市公司的负债比率之间呈显著的正相关关系;②在国有上市公司中,预算软约束程度的增加降低了公司的财务风险,因此审计收费与公司负债比率之间的正相关关系有所减弱;③在金融发展水平比较高的地区,预算软约束程度的减轻提高了公司的财务风险,因此审计收费与公司负债比率之间的正相关关系有所增强.这一研究结果说明,我国的会计师事务所在审计定价时不仅考虑了上市公司的财务风险,而且还会根据公司的预算软约束程度对其财务风险进行相应的调整.     

The Influence of Nonaudit Service Revenues and Client Pressure on External Auditors' Decisions to Rely on Internal Audit*

This paper investigates how external auditor provision of significant nonaudit services and client pressure to use the work of internal audit influence external auditors' use of internal auditors' work. More specifically, we study how external audit evidence gathering choices are influenced by nonaudit fees and client pressure. Our research is motivated by an observation that the magnitude of nonaudit services provided to audit clients introduces the risk that client management may leverage its position with the external auditor and potentially affect the audit process. We address this issue by extending prior research and focusing on the importance of various explanatory variables, including nonaudit service revenues, client pressure, internal audit quality, and coordination, to the external auditor's decision to rely on the work of internal audit. We use data primarily obtained through surveys completed by internal and external auditors. The survey responses represent 74 separate audit engagements. Our findings reveal that when significant nonaudit services are not provided to a client, internal audit quality and the level of internal‐external auditor coordination positively affect auditors' internal audit reliance decisions. However, when the auditor provides significant nonaudit services to the client, internal audit quality and the extent of internal ‐ external auditor coordination do not significantly affect auditors' reliance decisions. Furthermore, when significant nonaudit services are provided, client pressure significantly increases the extent of internal audit reliance. Thus, external auditors appear to be more affected by client pressure and less concerned about internal audit quality and coordination when making internal audit reliance decisions at clients for whom significant nonaudit services are also provided.     

非洲贸易与风险管理

本文讨论了两个层次的问题:一、非洲贸易及其存在的风险。二、如何管理和防范狭义的外汇风险(交易风险、折算风险以及经营风险或者经济风险)以及广义外汇风险中的国家风险、信用风险以及流动性风险等。特别是信用风险的管理与防范已经成为一个战略性和决定性的重大课题。     

论企业并购财务风险的成因及对策

随着企业并购活动的进行,其中的财务风险越来越引起了理论界的重视。本文首先提出了并购财务风险的概念及特征,其次分析了企业并购财务风险的类型及成因,最后提出了具体的防范对策。     

审计失败的博弈分析与防范措施

近年来,我国审计失败事件层出不穷。为深入了解其原因,有必要对委托代理审计关系中各方经济行为进行博弈分析。本文以博弈理论为基础,对委托代理审计中的相关关系人的行为进行了博弈分析,并提出了防范审计失败的对策。