Imperfect competition,indirect tax harmonization and public goods

This paper shows that the welfare implications of indirect tax harmonization in a two-country imperfectly competitive framework, are, in general, indeterminate in the presence of public goods: Both countries can be made either worse off or better off. This holds under both the destination and origin principles of taxation and is in sharp contrast to existing results where revenue effects are not present. A consequence of this indeterminacy is that a precise evaluation of tax-harmonizing policies under both tax regimes requires an explicit consideration of the underlying preferences for private and public goods as well as the oligopolistic sectors’ relative cost structures. JEL code F15⋅ H21⋅ H41⋅ H87     

Tax incentives and the location of FDI: Evidence from a panel of German multinationals

Using a firm-level panel data set this paper investigates the impact of taxation on the decision of German multinationals to hold or establish a subsidiary in other European countries or abroad. Taking account of unobserved local characteristics as well as firm-specific preferences for potential locations, the results confirm significant effects of tax incentives, market size, and of labor cost on cross-border location decisions. In accordance with Devereux and Griffith (1998) we find that the marginal effective tax rate has no predictive power for location decisions. However, the results indicate a considerably weaker predictive power of the effective average tax rate as compared to the statutory tax rate. JEL Code:H25 ⋅ F23 ⋅ F21 ⋅ R38     

Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer

The sharing between national tax authorities of taxpayer-specific information has emerged over the last few years as a—probably ‘the’—central issue on the international tax policy agenda. Yet this refocusing of the debate on international taxation—away from parametric tax coordination and towards strengthening information exchange—has gone largely unnoticed in the public finance literature. This paper gives an overview of this increasingly important area of international taxation, reviewing the key economic, legal, and practical concepts and issues bearing on the analysis and implementation of information exchange, and providing an account of recent policy initiatives and emerging theoretical insights. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

Making do: state constraints and local responses in California’s education finance system

California’s unique education finance system combines general state support for school districts, numerous state categorical aid programs, a restricted local property tax, and two unusual small local revenue sources: a parcel tax and contributions from educational foundations. This paper explores the incentives this system creates for local voters and school officials and estimates the impact of these incentives on education costs, school district efficiency, and the demand for student performance. The paper finds that voters in California respond to the price incentives in this system even though they work through the hard-to-pass parcel tax instead of the property tax; that educational outcomes are strongly influenced by student characteristics and other factors that influence educational costs; that school district efficiency is undermined by the state’s current emphasis on categorical instead of unrestricted aid; and that, overall, the education finance system is not well designed to meet the state’s educational objectives.     

The Property Tax as a Tax on Value: Deadweight Loss

Consider an atomistic developer who decides when and at what density to develop his land, under a property value tax system characterized by three time-invariant tax rates: τ_V, the tax rate on pre-development land value; τ_S, the tax rate on post-development residual site value; and τ_K, the tax rate on structure value. Arnott (2005) identified the subset of property value tax systems that are neutral. This paper investigates the relative efficiency of four idealized, non-neutral property value tax systems [(i) “Canadian' property tax system: τ_V = 0, τ _S = τ_K; (ii) simple property tax system: τ_V = τ _S = τ_K; (iii) residual site value tax system: τ_K = 0,τ _V = τ_S; (iv) two-rate property tax system: τ_V = τ _S > τ_K > 0] under the assumption of a constant rental growth rate. JEL Code: H2     

Disability insurance and optimal income taxation

This paper studies the design of disability insurance scheme when agents differ in their privately known productivity. We extend the Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) two period model to allow for agents differing ex-ante in their productivity and characterize the optimal nonlinear tax transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when per-period earnings and age are observable while individuals’ productivity and health status are not observable. We show that the induced tax/benefit scheme should exhibit a marginal income tax that decreases with age for some agents. A marginal subsidy on the young high productive income may be desirable. While the disability scheme always involves the old low productive agents to be indifferent between working and claiming disability benefits, this result is not always true for the old high productive agents. JEL Classification H55 · H23 · E62     

Taxpayers' responsiveness to tax rate changes and implications for the cost of taxation in Sweden

Historically, labor supply elasticities have been used to evaluate tax policy and predict tax revenue effects. They are likely to underestimate taxpayers' response to tax rate changes, and hence to underestimate changes in potential tax revenues, however, because they measure only how taxpayers alter hours worked. Taxpayers can also respond to tax rate changes by altering, for instance, their work effort and form of compensation. An alternative measure that accounts for these responses as well as hours worked is the elasticity of taxable income. This paper estimates the elasticity of earned taxable income for Swedish taxpayers using two different approaches and a number of control variables and the 1990/1991 tax reform as a “natural experiment”. The preferred elasticity estimates fall in the range of 0.4–0.5, comparable with recent estimates for the U.S. and larger than most of the labor supply elasticity estimates used to evaluate tax policy in Scandinavia previously, which suggests that deadweight losses are two to three times higher than previously thought. JEL Classification H21 · H24 · H31 · J22     

Neutral taxation of shareholder income? Corporate responses to an announced dividend tax

The introduction of the 2006 Norwegian shareholder income tax was announced in advance, and it increased top marginal tax rates on individual dividend income from zero to 28%. We document strong timing effects on dividend payout on a large panel of non-listed corporations, with a surge of dividends prior to 2006 and a sharp drop after. Mature firms are more likely to pay dividends, and high asset growth increases the probability of retaining all earnings. Intertemporal income shifting through the timing of dividends seems to be a drain on internal equity and cause increases in the corporations’ debt–equity ratios. The debt ratios drop sharply after the implementation of the reform.     

Two-Rate Property Tax Effects on Land Development

Economists have long understood that the conventional property tax causes the housing stock to be smaller than it would be in the presence of a nondistortionary tax such as a land or site value tax. This article brings together the results from models of housing development timing and structural density with the results of a modern model of a graded property tax in an urban setting. The combination of results is used to investigate the effects of a communitys movement from a property tax to a two-rate tax system where land is taxed at a higher rate than structures. The conditions under which increasing reliance on a land or site value tax will increase housing structural density and speed of development are identified and examined. Policy implications are drawn.     

Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation

The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities has recently emerged as a key and controversial topic in international tax policy discussions, most notably with the OECD's harmful tax practices project and the EU's savings tax initiative. This paper analyzes the effects of information exchange and withholding taxes, recognizing that countries which agree to exchange information do not forfeit the ability to levy withholding taxes, and also focusing in particular on the effects of innovative revenue-sharing arrangements. Amongst the findings are that: (i) the transfer of withholding tax receipts to the residence country, as planned in the European Union, has no effect on equilibrium tax rates, but acts purely as a lump-sum transfer; (ii) in contrast, allocating some of the revenue from information exchange to the source country—counter to usual practice (though no less so than the EU agreement)—would have adverse strategic effects on total revenue; (iii) nevertheless, any withholding tax regime is Pareto dominated by information exchange combined with appropriate revenue sharing; and, in particular, (iv) sharing of the additional revenues raised from information provided, while efficiency-reducing, could be in the interests of large countries as a means of persuading small countries to provide that information voluntarily. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

Food prices,tax reforms and consumer Welfare in Tanzania 1991–2007

This paper analyses the effect of observed food price changes on household consumption (welfare) in Tanzania and from this simulates the welfare effect attributable to tax (tariffs and VAT) reforms. The three rounds of the Tanzania Household Budget Survey (1991/92, 2000/01 and 2007) are used to apply Deaton’s method based on median unit values (prices) and household budget shares. The results indicate that real price increases over 1991–2007 have reduced welfare of the average household by 20 per cent of 1991 income, and the loss was fairly evenly distributed between the 1990s and 2000s. The welfare loss was much greater for the poor, especially the rural poor (a 27 per cent reduction), compared to the non-poor (in particular the urban non-poor, who suffered a five per cent loss). Although we cannot establish explicit links between tax reforms and domestic commodity price changes, to assess the extent to which welfare changes can be explained by tax reforms we simulate the effects of tax changes on domestic price changes. The simulation shows that tax reforms (tariff reductions) offset the welfare losses for all household groups, especially in the 1990s; although the differences were small, the urban poor benefit more in relative terms from tax reforms whereas the rural poor benefit least (the effect on the non-poor was similar irrespective of location).     

Corporate tax revenues in OECD countries

This paper studies variation among OECD countries in the size of corporate income tax revenues relative to GDP over the time period 1979–2002. A decomposition explains such variation as a function of the statutory tax rate, the breadth of the tax base, corporate profitability, and the share of the corporate sector in GDP. Empirical results indicate a parabolic relationship between tax rates and revenues, implying a revenue-maximizing corporate income tax rate of 33% for the whole sample. This revenue-maximizing rate is found to decrease as economies are smaller and more integrated with the world economy. JEL Classification H25, H87     

Dynamics of Asset Prices and Transaction Activity in Illiquid Markets: the Case of Private Commercial Real Estate

This paper investigates the relationship between capital flows, turnover and returns for the UK private real estate market. We examine a number of possible implications of capital flows and turnover on capital returns testing for evidence of a price pressure effect, ‘return chasing’ behaviour and information revelation. The main tool of analysis is a panel vector autoregressive (VAR) regression model in which institutional capital flows, turnover and returns are specified as endogenous variables in a two equation system in which we also control for macro-economic variables. Data on flows, turnover and returns are obtained for the ten market segments covering the main UK commercial real estate sectors. Our results do not support the widely-held belief among practitioners that capital flows have a ‘price pressure’ effect on property prices. However, we do find a significant positive relationship between lagged turnover and contemporaneous capital returns, suggesting that asset turnover provides increased price revelation which, in turn, reduces investment risk and increases property values.     

Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands

This paper provides a spatial-econometric analysis of the setting of property tax rates by Dutch municipalities. We find evidence of tax mimicking: a ten percent higher property tax rate in neighboring municipalities leads to a 3.5 percent higher tax rate. Mimicking is less pronounced in municipalities governed by coalitions backed by a large majority. This points to yardstick competition as the most likely source of tax mimicking. We also find that Dutch voters seem to be able to penalize incumbents for anticipated tax rate differentials, but not for unanticipated tax rate differentials. This limits the effectiveness of yardstick competition as a mechanism to reduce political rent-seeking.JEL Code: D72, H71     

The capital structure of multinational companies under tax competition

This article studies the relation between debt policies of multinational companies (MNCs) and governments’ tax strategies. In the first part, we show that the ability to shift income from high- to low-tax countries affects MNCs’ financial choices. In the second part we show how MNCs’ financial decisions can affect the tax strategies of two governments competing to attract income.      

Poverty-decreasing indirect tax reforms: Evidence from Tunisia

This paper proposes a methodology to identify revenue-neutral directions for poverty-alleviating tax reforms. The search for such poverty-reducing tax reforms is done “robustly” over broad classes of poverty measures and poverty lines. The methodology, which is illustrated using data from Tunisia, is of significant policy interest given the widespread use of commodity subsidization and taxation in developing and developed countries alike. The results suggest that Tunisian poverty could be decreased robustly by following reform directions that are often at odds with frequently-heard views. They also highlight the importance of stating clearly under which set of ethical criteria the desirability of potential indirect tax reforms is assessed. JEL Code D12 ⋅ D63 ⋅ H53 ⋅ I32 ⋅ I38     

Consumption tax competition among governments: Evidence from the United States

The paper contributes to a small but growing literature that estimates tax reaction functions of governments competing with other governments. We analyze consumption tax competition between US states, employing a panel of state-level data for 1977–2003. More specifically, we study the impact of a state’s spatial characteristics (i.e., its size, geographic position, and border length) on the strategic interaction with its neighbors. For this purpose, we calculate for each state an average effective consumption tax rate, which covers both sales and excise taxes. In addition, we pay attention to dynamics by including lagged dependent variables in the tax reaction function. We find overwhelming evidence for strategic interaction among state governments, but only partial support for the effect of spatial characteristics on tax setting. Tax competition seems to have lessened in the 1990s compared to the early 1980s.     

How Does FDI React to Corporate Taxation?

Based on a panel of bilateral FDI flows among 11 OECD countries over 1984–2000, we show that, although agglomeration-related factors are strong determinants of FDI, tax differentials also play a significant role in understanding foreign location decisions. We further investigate non-linearities in the impact of tax differentials, and explore the impact of tax schemes. Our results are consistent with the imperfect competition literature which underscores the possibility of tax differentials across countries in equilibrium.JEL Code: F21, H25, H87     

The “flat tax(es)”: principles and experience

This paper reviews experience with the ‘flat taxes’ that have been adopted in many countries in recent years. It stresses that they differ fundamentally, and that empirical evidence on their effects is very limited. This precludes simple generalization, but several lessons emerge: there is no sign of Laffer-type behavioral responses generating revenue increases from the tax cut elements of these reforms; their impact on compliance is theoretically ambiguous, but there is evidence for Russia that compliance did improve; the distributional effects of the flat taxes are not unambiguously regressive, and in some cases, they may have increased progressivity (including through the impact on compliance); adoption of the flat tax has not resolved common challenges in taxing capital income; and it may have strengthened, not weakened, the automatic stabilizers. A key reason for adoption of the flat tax seems to have been to signal a fundamental shift toward a market-oriented policy regime. Looking forward, as the value of the signal diminishes and familiar political economy forces reassert themselves, the question is not so much whether more countries will adopt a flat tax as whether those that have will move away from it.      

Labor tax reform, unemployment, and search

A key obstacle to reducing payroll taxes in many industrialized and transition countries is the direct revenue loss to the government that it implies. This paper studies a simple and practical labor tax reform of reducing a payroll tax and increasing a progressive wage tax that keeps the marginal tax wedge unchanged. Such a strategy increases employment, reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate, and increases public revenue as long as workers do not have all the bargaining power in wage negotiations. Moreover, welfare rises if workers’ bargaining power is sufficiently large to exceed a critical value determined by the second-best Hosios condition.