CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DYNAMICS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that both a higher level of financial leverage and a faster speed of adjustment of leverage toward the shareholders' desired level are associated with better corporate governance quality as defined by a more independent board featuring CEO–chairman separation and greater presence of outside directors, coupled with larger institutional shareholding. In contrast, managerial incentive compensation on average discourages use of debt or adjustments toward the shareholders' desired level, consistent with its entrenchment effect. The effect of corporate governance on leverage adjustments is most pronounced when initial leverage is between the manager's desired level and the shareholders' desired level where the interests of managers and shareholders conflict.     

SECURITIES OFFERINGS AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORY

This paper analyzes a large sample of public security offerings to determine the motivation to issue debt or common equity. The results provide new evidence that the existence of asymmetric information plays a key role in firms' choice of security. Bankruptcy risk appears to affect the issue decision, but other traditional capital structure considerations do not. Variations in the determinants of security choice over time suggest a dynamic aspect to capital structure decisions not recognized in previous studies.