Is there a relation between labor investment inefficiency and corporate tax avoidance?

This paper investigates the relation between labor investment inefficiency and corporate tax avoidance. Employing a large sample of 61,542 U.S. firm-year observations over the 1962–2014 period, our regression results show that labor investment inefficiency is significantly positively related to tax avoidance. More specifically, we find that a one standard deviation of labor investment inefficiency leads to a 0.71% reduction in the accounting effective tax rate. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns, alternative proxy measures of tax avoidance and labor investment efficiency, and additional control variables pertaining to accounting quality and managerial ability. Taken together, our regression results show that labor investment inefficiency is an important determinant of corporate tax avoidance.     

Financialization and Portuguese real investment: A supportive or disruptive relationship?

The article makes an empirical analysis of the relationship between financialization and real investment by Portuguese nonfinancial corporations from 1979 to 2013. In theory, while financialization leads to a rise in financial investments by nonfinancial corporations and thus deviates funds from real investment, it also intensifies the pressure for financial payments and therefore restricts the funds available for real investment. We estimate an aggregate investment function including control variables (profitability, debt, cost of capital and output growth) and two measures of financialization (financial receipts and financial payments). The study concludes that there is a long-term investment equation, and finds evidence that the process of financialization has hampered real investment largely as a result of financial payments. The article also finds that profitability and debt are both detrimental to real investment.     

Voting over selfishly optimal tax schedules: Can Pigouvian tax redistribute income?

This paper studies pairwise majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of individuals who differ in privately observable skills and make consumption comparisons, which creates a negative positional externality. It shows that the tax schedule preferred by the median skill type will win the voting contest. Given a reference consumption defined as the average consumption in the population, all skills face the same Pigouvian tax rate in the utilitarian optimum, whereas in selfish optima high skills face a Pigouvian tax rate larger than that facing low skills, generating a novel income redistributive effect. Under a constant elasticity of labor supply, two more results are obtained. First, for Pareto, Champernowne, Weibull, and lognormal skill distributions, the selfishly optimal tax schedule facing high (low) skills tends to be more progressive when the bottom‐skill's (top‐skill's) status concern intensifies. Second, it identifies the conditions under which, in the voting equilibrium, high skills face higher marginal tax rates while low skills face lower ones than what they face in the utilitarian optimum.     

Cross-border tax effects on affiliate investment—Evidence from European multinationals

Recent studies suggest that multinational firm activities at home and abroad are positively correlated which may be due to the use of common inputs (like marketing, patents, etc.). Then, a cost shock at one location may lead to reduced activity in all other locations within the firm. In this paper, we theoretically and empirically analyze national corporate tax policy in such a setting. Our main hypothesis is that corporate taxation at the parent location not only reduces the parent's capital stock but also lowers capital stocks at affiliates abroad. Using micro data on European multinational firms, we confirm the hypothesis showing that a 10 percentage point increase in corporate tax rates is associated with a 5.6% decrease in the affiliate's capital stock. From a welfare point of view, this cross-border tax effect on the capital stock gives rise to a negative fiscal externality of corporate taxation which is empirically shown to compensate a substantial fraction of the well-known positive externality due to profit shifting.     

Does a sudden death liven up the game? Rules,incentives, and strategy in football

Summary. In an effort to stimulate more attractive football, the international football association FIFA, has recently introduced the "sudden death" or "golden goal" rule for games going into extra time play. This paper analyses under which conditions, if any, the introduction of the sudden death rule improves the attractiveness of the football game. Our results indicate that the new rule will not change the behavior of equally powerful teams.Received: 20 November 2002, Revised: 12 May 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, L83.A preliminary version of this paper was presented at Queens University of Belfast and University of Southampton. The authors would like to thank the seminar participants. Indraijt Ray and an anonymous reviewer for their useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. We specially thank Giulio Seccia for his constructive comments. We also acknowledge K.U. Leuven for providing research support.     

Attracting private investment: Tax reduction,investment subsidy,or both?

This paper uses a real-option model to examine the net benefit to a government from using tax cut and/or investment subsidy as incentives to induce immediate investment. Although earlier papers generally concluded that investment subsidy dominates tax cut, it is observed that many governments use a combination of subsidy and tax cut. We show that, when the government uses a different discount rate from private firms, and when it has to borrow money to provide an investment subsidy, it is possible to get an internal optimum; that is, it might be optimal for the government to provide an investment subsidy as well as charge a positive tax rate on the profits from the project. Thus, we provide an explanation for the puzzling fact that many governments provide an investment subsidy to a firm while simultaneously taxing its profits.     

Adolescent premarital childbearing: do economic incentives matter?

This paper develops and tests a three-stage nested logistic model of teenage childbearing that is influenced by economic incentives and costs created by US public policy. The modeling of teenage childbearing involves becoming pregnant, the choice to have an abortion or to bear the child, and the choice to bear the child premaritally or maritally. Data were obtained from a sample of 1718 Black and White women aged 14-16 years in 1979 from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. In 1990, the birth rate among unmarried youth was 29.5/1000 unmarried White women vs. 110.1/1000 unmarried Black women. In the sample, the pregnancy rate was 24% among White teenagers and 48% among Black teenagers. Miscarriages or stillbirths occurred among 11% of Whites and 12% of Blacks. Abortions were performed for 37% of Whites and 12% of Blacks. An incentive variable is the welfare guarantee. Cost variables include the cost of obtaining an abortion and the cost of obtaining contraceptive services and supplies. Access to family planning services is also accounted for in the model. Findings indicate that welfare, abortion, and family planning policy variables have a racially specific impact. For White teenagers, these variables have significant effects on pregnancy outcomes. For Black teenagers, the insignificance may reflect differences in sample size or important unmeasured racial differences in factors that influence fertility and marital behavior. The authors suggest that the rational choice perspective does not adequately explain premarital childbearing. It is also suggested that the specification of the variables on abortion, family planning, and adolescent sexual behavior may be fundamentally different and reflect differences in state attitudes and social customs. Only if the policy variables really change the costs of different pregnancy outcomes will changes in social policy change individual adolescent behavior. The authors state that focusing on only economic incentives did not rule out other influences on premarital childbearing.     

Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?

Experimental dictator games have been used to explore unselfish behaviour. Evidence is presented here, however, that subjects’ generosity can be reversed by allowing them to take a partner’s money. Dictator game giving therefore does not reveal concern for consequences to others existing independently of the environment, as posited in rational choice theory. It may instead be an artefact of experimentation. Alternatively, evaluations of options depend on the composition of the choice set. Implications of these possibilities are explored for experimental methodology and charitable donations respectively. The data favour the artefact interpretation, suggesting that demand characteristics of experimental protocols merit investigation, and that economic analysis should not exclude context-specific social norms.

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Social investment: A guiding principle for welfare state adjustment after the crisis?

The European welfare states have undergone a significant amount of change over the last decades. In light of the unresolved tensions resulting from changed macroeconomic conditions, the emergence of new social risks as well as from the consequences of the Great Recession and its aftershocks, more adjustments are needed. The present paper investigates the current outlook on welfare state change, retracing its socio-economic drivers and the salient steps that were undertaken to reform welfare states in the last decades. Since the outbreak of the crisis, calls to adopt a social investment perspective on welfare state reform intensified, both in the academic field and at the EU policy-level. Ample space is therefore devoted to the discussion of this perspective, its conceptual basis, and implementation. For a number of reasons, social investment seems the most appropriate approach to frame the objectives that contemporary welfare states have to pursue and to devise a consistent set of policies. The objections which have been moved against the social investment perspective have however to be taken seriously. Moreover, current developments indicate diverging trends across EU Member States, with lack of progress in those countries which are most in need of a social investment strategy. To become an effective policy paradigm, the social investment perspective thus needs a stronger anchoring within the EU architecture and more co-ordinated commitment from Member States.     

Free daily newspapers: too strong incentives to print?

A free daily newspaper distributes news to readers and sells ad-space to advertisers, having private information about its audience. For a given number of distributed copies, depending on the type of audience (favorable or unfavorable), the newspaper may either have a large readership or a small readership. A large readership provides a greater return to advertisers, because ads are visualized by more people. A favorable audience has also the advantage of requiring a lower distribution cost (for a given number of distributed copies), because readers are willing to exert more effort to obtain a copy of the free newspaper and are less likely to reject a copy that is handed to them. We find that when the audience is unfavorable, the number of distributed copies and the price of ad-space coincide with those of the perfect information scenario. In contrast, if the audience is favorable, the newspaper prints extra copies to send a credible signal to the advertisers that the audience is favorable. Overprinting is not necessarily welfare-detrimental since readers benefit from the existence of additional copies.     

Is international tax competition only about taxes? A market-based perspective

This paper revisits tax competition among governments for foreign direct investment (FDI) by considering the role played by the economic dynamism of competitors on the setting of corporate tax rates (CTRs). Using a database with worldwide coverage over the period 1995–2014, we find that strong growth performance of neighbouring countries is associated with a lower CTR, especially in developed countries. This spatial effect is particularly manifest if competing countries are large and open to capital flows. These results appear to hold in most regions of the world and suggest that governments perceive foreign economic dynamism as a threat, leading them to reduce their CTRs to maintain their FDI attractiveness.     

Equalizing tax bases or tax revenues under tax competition? The role of formula apportionment

This paper contributes to the literature on fiscal equalization and corporate tax competition. The innovation is that we explicitly model multinational enterprises and a corporate tax system that is designed according to formula apportionment. Two main results are obtained. First, in contrast to previous studies we identify cases where tax revenue equalization is better in mitigating detrimental tax competition than tax base equalization. Second, tax base equalization nevertheless has the advantage that it may render tax rates efficient, depending on the shape of the apportionment formula. A pure payroll formula does not ensure efficiency, but a back‐of‐the‐envelope calibration of our model to Canadian provinces suggests that a pure sales formula may be optimal.     

Beneficial impact of tax reforms on tax revenue performances in Togo: Myth or reality?

Tax reforms are often motivated by their potential to improve tax revenue mobilization. However, their actual impacts are difficult to quantify. Using cross-country panel data over the period 2000–2021, this article evaluates the impact of the 2012 tax reforms on tax revenue performance in Togo. We follow the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) estimation procedures. After comparing the observed evolution of Togo's tax revenue output in the period 2013–2021 with that of synthetic Togo, our estimates show that an accumulated yearly average gain is about 3.09% of GDP. Hence, the article concludes that after 9 years of reform, the improvement in Togo's tax performance is remarkable. However, more tax-related and institutions-related reforms are crucial to make Togo's tax system more buoyant and sustainably improve tax revenue mobilization.     

Unskilled Migration: A Burden or a Boon for the Welfare State?

As relatively low earners, migrants are net beneficiaries of the welfare state. Therefore, in a static setup, migration may be resisted by the entire native-born population. However, it is shown that in a dynamic setup with a pension system, which is an important pillar of any welfare state, migration is beneficial to all income (high and low) and all age (old and young) groups, when the economy has good access to international capital markets. The pro-migration feature of the dynamic model is weakened and possibly overturned when the economy does not have good access to such markets. In this case, to the extent that factor prices are significantly affected by migration because of low substitution between labour and capital, low-skill native born and possibly also high-skill native born may lose.     

Global uncertainty and capital flows: any difference between foreign direct investment and portfolio investment?

This note investigates how global uncertainty relates to extreme waves of capital flows, including foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and other investment. We find the clear differences in the role of global uncertainty between advanced and developing economies. Global uncertainty increases the likelihood of sudden contraction of portfolio investment in both advanced and developing economies, while it increases that of foreign direct investment in only advanced economies.     

Which countries become tax havens?

This paper analyzes the factors influencing whether countries become tax havens. Roughly 15% of countries are tax havens; as has been widely observed, these countries tend to be small and affluent. This paper documents another robust empirical regularity: better-governed countries are much more likely than others to become tax havens. Controlling for other relevant factors, governance quality has a statistically significant and quantitatively large association with the probability of being a tax haven. For a typical country with a population under one million, the likelihood of a becoming a tax haven rises from 26% to 61% as governance quality improves from the level of Brazil to that of Portugal. Evidence from US firms suggests that low tax rates offer much more powerful inducements to foreign investment in well-governed countries than do low tax rates elsewhere. This may explain why poorly-governed countries do not generally attempt to become tax havens, and suggests that the range of sensible tax policy options is constrained by the quality of governance.     

Are financial incentives for wellness fair?

Employers have shown considerable enthusiasm for programs that use financial incentives to stimulate health-related changes in employee behavior and lifestyle. This article raises fairness issues in relation to these programs.     

Revisiting the democracy-private investment nexus: Does inequality matter?

Contrary to the predictions of a large theoretical literature, recent cross-country evidence suggests autocracies can generate statistically indistinguishable levels of private investment compared to democracies. We argue that the previous exclusion of inequality explains part of this puzzle. We model current investment as a function of investors’ beliefs about future tax rates, which are conditioned by the constraints on the Executive in setting tax rates and expropriating tax revenues. In democracies, where tax rates reflect the preferences of the median voter, investment declines with rising inequality. In autocracies, investor beliefs about future tax rates reflect the relative power of Elites compared to the Executive. As inequality rises, the increased resources available to Elites constrains the Executive’s ability to expropriate more tax revenues. The heterogeneous determinants of investor beliefs can explain the observed pattern of investment across regime types. We first test our predictions at the macro-level with cross-country data. We then test the behavioral underpinnings of our model with a novel laboratory experiment showing how inequality affects individual-level investment behavior dependent upon regime type. Results from both types of analyses show that when inequality is taken into account autocracies can generate similar levels of investment to democracies.