Incomplete contracts,renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and public debt issues

In a two-period model where an investment project is funded with standard debt, the probability distribution of final cash flow is determined, at the interim date, by an unverifiable state of nature together with a choice by the controlling party (entrepreneur or creditor). With a control allocation contingent on a noisy default signal, renegotiation may improve efficiency in two ways: (i) reduce excessive risk-taking – due to the entrepreneur's moral hazard – through debt forgiveness; (ii) avoid the costs of financial distress associated with excessive liquidation or underinvestment by debt-holders, by letting them receive an equity stake in the firm. Such efficiency gain is an advantage of bank loans over publicly traded debt, given that the former are more easily renegotiated than the latter. The difference between the two types of debt is increasing in the degree of contractual incompleteness (noise present in the default signal) and in the portion of project value accounted for by future discretionary investment options.     

The appropriateness of default investment options in defined contribution plans: Australian evidence

For participants in defined contribution (DC) plans who refrain from exercising investment choice, plan contributions are invested following the default investment option of their respective plans. Since default investment options of different plans vary widely in terms of their benchmark asset allocation, the most important determinant of investment performance, participants enrolled in these options face significantly different wealth outcomes at retirement. This paper simulates the terminal wealth outcomes under different static asset allocation strategies to evaluate their relative appeal as default investment choice in DC plans. We find that strategies with low or moderate allocation to stocks are consistently outperformed in terms of upside potential of exceeding the participant's wealth accumulation target at retirement as well as downside risk of falling below that target outcome by aggressive strategies whose allocation to stocks approach 100%. The risk of extremely adverse wealth outcomes for plan participants also does not appear to be very sensitive to asset allocation. Our evidence suggests the appropriateness of strategies heavily tilted towards stocks to be nominated as default investment options in DC plans unless plan providers emphasize predictability of wealth outcomes over adequacy of retirement wealth.     

Leverage change,debt overhang,and stock prices

We document a significant and negative effect of the change in a firm's leverage ratio on its stock prices. We find that the negative effect is stronger for firms that have higher leverage ratios, higher likelihood of default, and face more severe financial constraints. Moreover, firms with an increase in leverage ratio tend to have less future investment. These findings are consistent with Myers' (1977) debt overhang theory that an increase in leverage may lead to future underinvestment, thus reducing a firm's value.     

Credit risk assessment in real estate investment trusts: A perspective on blockholding and lending networks

This study assesses the credit risk of Japan's real estate investment trusts (J-REITs) in two related markets during the fiscal years 2008–2017. The first J-REIT market involves blockholders, while the second is a lending market of institutions, i.e., banks and insurers. J-REITs are corporation type of closed-end funds listed on the stock exchange and thus, has corporate credit risk. Consequently, a J-REIT's financial variables and its sponsor have a substantial effect on the J-REIT's credit risk. A sponsor's probability of default is a leading indicator of the J-REIT's default and double default probability acts as a coincident indicator of default. Network analysis indicates that some network centralities are proxies for funding liquidity via blockholding and lending networks. Rather than increases in other centralities, an increase in the degree of lending to a J-REIT explains a decrease in the issued J-REIT's credit risk.     

Risk aversion and the yield of corporate debt

This paper develops a model to estimate the implied default probability of corporate bonds. The model explicitly considers the risk averse behavior of investors to provide a more precise framework for estimating the implied default probability. A Kalman filter method is used to estimate time-varying risk premium associated with the investor's risk aversion. The results of nonlinear regressions indicate that previous risk-neutrality models consistently overestimate the implied default rates of corporate bonds. The results also suggest that investors may have been adequately compensated for investment in risky bonds.     

Equity Misvaluation and Default Options

We study whether default options are mispriced in equity values by employing a structural equity valuation model that explicitly takes into account the value of the option to default (or abandon the firm) and uses firm‐specific inputs. We implement our model on the entire cross section of stocks and identify both over‐ and underpriced equities. An investment strategy that buys undervalued stocks and shorts overvalued stocks generates an annual four‐factor alpha of about 11% for U.S. stocks. The model's performance is stronger for stocks with a higher value of the default option, such as distressed or highly volatile stocks.     

Interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions: The effects of agency conflicts

We examine interactions between flexible financing and investment decisions in a model with stockholder–bondholder conflicts over investment policy. We find that financial flexibility encourages the choice of short-term debt thereby dramatically reducing the agency costs of under- and overinvestment. However, the reduction in agency costs may not encourage the firm to increase leverage, since the firm's initial debt level choice depends on the type of growth options in its investment opportunity set. The model has a number of testable predictions for the joint choice of leverage and maturity, and how these choices interact with a firm's growth opportunities.     

Disclosure,investment and regulation

This paper provides a framework to analyze voluntary and mandatory disclosure. Since improved disclosure reduces the entrepreneur's ability to extract private benefits, it secures funding for new investments, but also provides existing claimholders with a windfall gain. As a result, the entrepreneur may choose to forgo investment in favor of extracting more private benefits. A mandatory disclosure standard reduces inefficient extraction and increases investment efficiency. Although the optimal standard is higher than the entrepreneur's optimal choice, it can be less than complete in order not to deter investment. The model also shows that better legal shareholder protection goes together with higher disclosure standards and that harmonization of disclosure standards may be detrimental.     

A Duration Model For Defaultable Bonds

I extend recent theoretical work on duration and derive an improved model for the risk‐adjusted duration of corporate bonds. My ex‐ante risk‐adjusted duration is the sum of the bond's Fisher‐Weil duration and the duration of the potential expected delay in recovery caused by the default option. My main conclusion is that failing to adjust duration for default is costly for high‐yield bonds, especially those with a shorter time to maturity. For investment‐grade bonds, this cost is trivial for all maturities.     

Investment opportunities and bankruptcy prediction

A firm's mix of growth options and assets in place is an important determinant of its optimal default strategy. Our simple model shows that shareholders of a firm with valuable investment opportunities would be able/willing to wait longer before defaulting on their contractual debt obligations than shareholders of an otherwise identical firm without such opportunities. More importantly, we show empirically using a dataset of recent corporate bankruptcies that measures of investment opportunities are significantly related to the likelihood of bankruptcy. Augmenting existing bankruptcy prediction models by these measures improves their out-of-sample forecasting ability.     

Explaining the default risk anomaly by the two-beta model

This study attempts to explain the anomaly that firms with high-default risk earn low average realized returns. We measure default risk according to Ohlson's (1980) O-score and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi's (2008) failure probability and further implement Duffie, Saita, and Wang's (2007) doubly-stochastic intensity model to estimate default probabilities that incorporate the dynamics of the changes in covariates. We then employ Campbell and Vuolteenaho's (2004) two-beta model to estimate firms' cash-flow and discount-rate betas according to the default risk. The default risk anomaly persists when using Duffie el al.'s (2007) method. We show that cash-flow and discount-rate betas, respectively, earn a high and low premium and find that high-default firms tend to have relatively high discount-rate and low cash-flow betas. Hence, high-default firms deliver low expected returns. Importantly, 25.5% of the default risk anomaly can be explained by the two-beta model and that, on average, also accounts for 49.2% of the cross-sectional variation across the portfolios formed on default risk. This result implies that investors believe that high-default firms are unlikely to generate significantly extra cash flows when market-wide profitable opportunities improve.     

Macroeconomic Conditions and the Puzzles of Credit Spreads and Capital Structure

I build a dynamic capital structure model that demonstrates how business cycle variation in expected growth rates, economic uncertainty, and risk premia influences firms' financing policies. Countercyclical fluctuations in risk prices, default probabilities, and default losses arise endogenously through firms' responses to macroeconomic conditions. These comovements generate large credit risk premia for investment grade firms, which helps address the credit spread puzzle and the under‐leverage puzzle in a unified framework. The model generates interesting dynamics for financing and defaults, including market timing in debt issuance and credit contagion. It also provides a novel procedure to estimate state‐dependent default losses.     

Tobin's Q, Debt Overhang, and Investment

Incorporating debt in a dynamic real options framework, we show that underinvestment stems from truncation of equity's horizon at default. Debt overhang distorts both the level and composition of investment, with underinvestment being more severe for long‐lived assets. An empirical proxy for the shadow price of capital to equity is derived. Use of this proxy yields a structural test for debt overhang and its mitigation through issuance of additional secured debt. Using measurement error‐consistent GMM estimators, we find a statistically significant debt overhang effect regardless of firms' ability to issue additional secured debt.     

LDC Debt: Forgiveness,Indexation, and Investment Incentives

We compare different indexation schemes in terms of their ability to facilitate forgiveness and reduce the investment disincentives associated with the large LDC debt overhang. Indexing to an endogenous variable (e.g., a country's output) has a negative moral hazard effect on investment. This problem does not arise when payments are linked to an exogenous variable such as commodity prices. Nonetheless, indexing payments to output may be useful when debtors know more about their willingness to invest than lenders. We also reach new conclusions about the desirability of default penalties under asymmetric information.     

Value chain capability,value strategies and firm default risk

Firm stakeholders are paying more attention to the firm risks rather than merely focusing on returns. Among those risks, a firm's ability to repay its debt increasingly becomes a yardstick to evaluate a firm and predict the security level of returning its borrowings. This situation is directly related to a firm's default risk. The current article links the firm's value strategies and capabilities to firm default risk reduction. Specifically, this article conceptualizes and operationalizes a new firm capability, value chain capability, and examines how this capability and two firm value strategies, R&D and advertising, reduce the firm's default risk. Meanwhile, the authors formulate the value chain capability's moderating effects on the relationships between the two value strategies and firm default risk. The findings suggest that value chain capability and advertising help the firm reduce default risk. R&D will have the same effect only when a firm has high value chain capability.     

The non-neutrality of debt in investment timing: a new NPV rule

Summary Limited liability debt financing of irreversible investments can affect investment timing through an entrepreneur’s option value, even after compensating a lender for expected default losses. This non-neutrality of debt arises from an entrepreneur’s unique investment opportunity, and it is shown in a standard model of irreversible investment that includes the equilibrium effect of a competitive lending sector. The analysis is partial, in that it takes as exogenously given an entrepreneur’s use of debt. Intuitively, limited liability lowers downside risk for the entrepreneur by truncating the lower tail of risks, and lowers the investment threshold. Compensating the lender for expected default losses reduces project profitability to the entrepreneur, and increases the investment threshold. The net effect is negative, because lower downside risk has an additional impact on the option value of delaying investment. The standard NPV rule in real options theory implicitly assumes debt to be neutral. With non-neutrality of debt, an investment threshold is higher than investment cost, but lower than the standard NPV rule. Comparisons with other standard investment thresholds show similar relationships.     

Investment Bank Reputation,Information Production,and Financial Intermediation

We model reputation acquisition by investment banks in the equity market. Entrepreneurs sell shares in an asymmetrically informed equity market, either directly, or using an investment bank. Investment banks, who interact repeatedly with the equity market, evaluate entrepreneurs' projects and report to investors, in return for a fee. Setting strict evaluation standards (unobservable to investors) is costly for investment banks, inducing moral hazard. Investment banks' credibility therefore depends on their equity-marketing history. Investment banks' evaluation standards, their reputations, underwriter compensation, the market value of equity sold, and entrepreneurs' choice between underwritten and nonunderwritten equity issues emerge endogenously.     

Financing decisions: The case of convertible bonds

Research studying firms' motivations to issue convertible bonds remains far from complete. This paper aims to provide further understanding of firms' motives behind issuing convertible bonds. We propose a theoretical model that explains issuers' choice between convertibles and equity when raising a required amount of capital by comparing the cash flow streams of both alternatives in order to maximize the firm's value for the current shareholders. We derive a closed form solution of our theoretical model both in absence and presence of default risk. Our model suggests that issuing convertible bonds is preferred to a direct stock issuance if the expected return of convertible bonds is lower than the expected return of common stocks. Empirical findings confirm our theoretical predictions.     

A structural model for credit risk with switching processes and synchronous jumps

This paper studies a switching regime version of Merton's structural model for the pricing of default risk. The default event depends on the total value of the firm's asset modeled by a switching Lévy process. The novelty of this approach is to consider that firm's asset jumps synchronously with a change in the regime. After a discussion of dynamics under the risk neutral measure, two models are presented. In the first one, the default happens at bond maturity, when the firm's value falls below a predetermined barrier. In the second version, the firm can enter bankruptcy at multiple predetermined discrete times. The use of a Markov chain to model switches in hidden external factors makes it possible to capture the effects of changes in trends and volatilities exhibited by default probabilities. With synchronous jumps, the firm's asset and state processes are no longer uncorrelated. Finally, some econometric evidence that switching Lévy processes, with synchronous jumps, fit well historical time series is provided.