我国地方税主体税种选择趋势研究

当前,我国地方税体系仍然存在一些不容忽视的问题,比如,现行地方税主体税种的定位不明晰、权限受限制、辅助税源贫乏、收入不确定、税制不规范等等问题,这些问题导致了我国地方税收入增长乏力,地方税体系缺乏与经济增长密切相关的内生增长机制,同时也极大地妨碍了我国地方税体系收入功能和调节功能的发挥。因此,分析当前我国地方税主体税的现状和问题,比较各自利弊,并探讨我国地方税主体税种的选择具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。     

构建以财产税为主体的地方税体系研究

随着我国政治经济体制改革的深入,我国也开始了财政分权的改革历程,并期望以此来促进公共产品供给效率,解决基层政府的财政困难。财政分权的核心支撑因素就是地方应拥有可自主支配的地方税,且财产税和地方税主体税种的选择标准有很高的吻合度。另外,研究还发现:销售税和个人所得税作为地方税主体税种的合理性值得怀疑。在地方主体税种的构建中,综合国外成功经验并本着地方税收原则,建议把我国现行的房地产税收体系改革、整合为新的财产税,并以此作为我国地方税收入的主要来源。     

公共品供给中的政府责任

在公共品供给中,政府责任是提供它需要并且能够提供的公共品。需要提供的公共品是指在现有的资源技术条件下,达到社会效用最大化所需提供的公共品。能够提供的公共品是指征到拉弗曲线隐含的最大税收量所能提供的公共品。需要并且能够提供的公共品是指需要提供的公共品与能够提供的公共品中量较小的一方。通过比较政府实际提供的公共品与需要并且能够提供的公共品,可以评价政府在这一领域称职与否。     

关于完善地方税体系的探讨

地方税体系是分税制财政管理体制的重要组成部分，是我国目前在理论和实践中尚未解决好的问题，提出了完善地方税体系应坚持的原则，在原则指导下，借鉴国外的经验，合理划分中央和地方税收管理权限，科学界定税种归属；优化地方税制结构，完善地方税体系。     

Reforming the local public sector: economics and politics in privatization of water and solid waste

Several empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local privatization. We examine the influence of transaction costs and political factors on local governments’ choices through new variables. We consider two relevant services accounting for different amounts of transaction costs: water and solid waste delivery. Our results show that privatization is less common for water, which has higher transaction costs. Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling party privatize more often regardless of the ideological orientation of the constituency. Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation may be a suitable organizational form for some municipalities.     

The effect of remittances prior to an election

The objective of the article is to assess whether remittances have an influence on political manipulation, which may occur prior to an election, through an increase in the government consumption-to-GDP ratio. We combine data from the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy data set compiled and discussed in Hyde and Marinov (2012) and the World Development Indicators data set. We focus on 70 developing countries over the period 1990–2010. It appears that the political budget cycle is reduced up to the point where it is fully cancelled out at a remittance threshold of 10.7% of GDP. Those findings are robust to different robustness checks.     

我国财产税改革的阶段化路径研究

财产税是适合我国地方政府的主体税种。财产税制度的改革和完善必须分阶段逐步推进,主要可以分为两个阶段,第一阶段将征税范围主要限制在财富积累程度高、人均负税能力强且房地产市场发达的城市地区,第二阶段再将征税范围扩展至乡镇和农村。     

Incentives for budget discipline in the presence of elections

This paper presents a mechanism to mitigate the adverse consequences of the political budget cycle on social welfare. We use a simplified two-period version of Rogoff's [Rogoff, K., 1990. Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review 80, 21–36.] rational budget cycle model to address the normative issue of reducing the budget deficit in pre-electoral periods. A regulation consisting of a sanction scheme contingent on fiscal policy joint with a fixed transfer is shown to provide the appropriate incentives for budget discipline in the presence of elections.     

A Theoretical Basis for the Consideration of Spending Thresholds in the Analysis of Fiscal Referendums

This paper concerns the political economy of budget balances and focuses on fiscal referendums. It specifically suggests – on the basis of theoretical arguments –that any analysis of fiscal referendums must take their spending thresholds into account. Thus, it claims that mandatory fiscal referendums can impose greater constraints than optional fiscal referendums. In conclusion, various recommendations based on this observation are proposed.JEL classification: D70, H72.     

地方政府、土地产权管制与经济增长：理论与证据

地方政府的土地产权管制解决了其在促进地方经济发展过程中的财政压力,为改革开放以来的中国经济增长做出了重要贡献。但理论分析表明,土地产权的政府管制虽然会促进短期经济增长,却不利于长期经济增长。基于中国31个省份1998～2012年面板数据的实证检验,和同时期面板数据的分组实证检验以及时间序列模型的回归残差分析,证实了地方政府土地产权管制与经济增长之间的这种逻辑关系。为促进我国长期经济增长,政府应该逐步放松对土地产权的管制。     

物业税可行吗？

物业税作为一种财产税，具有其自身的特征。未来我国在物业税的设计过程中需要考虑多种因素，规避相关风险，否则很可能使得现在的高房价变成未来的高额物业税。     

略论单一税视野中的新一轮税制改革

"单一税" 的税制设计模式,体现了拓展税基、降低税率、简化征管的中性税收思想.在我国税制改革中引入单一税的理念,符合社会分工演进中的税制调整趋势,有助于免除经济性重复征税.我国连续多年的预算超收,也具备了启动单一税改革的财力基础.在改革路径上,需要结合现实国情,逐步调整主体税种结构,实行长期性的低税政策.     

财政关系调整与地方政府行为的变迁——纪念改革开放30周年

30年来,我国财税体制改革先后经历了财政包干制、分税制和公共财政体系建设三个阶段,每个阶段的地方政府与同一阶段不同层级或地域的地方政府,其行为表现出较大的差异。导因于中央与地方财政关系调整对地方政府的不同激励与约束机制,地方政府对中央政府的财政依附性在不断增强;地方政府之间的财政竞争逐渐让位于合作;地方政府推动市场化改革进入了良性轨道;地方政府职能逐步从经济性向公共性过渡。     

From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style

In 1995, China began a profound reform of its state-owned enterprises. We first describe and characterize this progress in two areas: privatization of small state-owned enterprises at the county level and mass lay-offs of excess state workers at the city level. Local governments have initiated these reforms, which are proceeding in economically and politically sensible ways. We then argue that privatization, Chinese style, rests on an adequate economic and political foundation - federalism, Chinese style. We suggest a range of incentives that propel local governments toward state-owned enterprise reform, including their harder budget constraints and increased competition from the non-state sector. In this sense, federalism, Chinese style, has induced privatization, Chinese style.
JEL classification: H7, L30, P3.     

Better to be direct? Evidence from the abolition of direct elections in Italian local governments

This paper provides evidence for the importance of direct electoral processes by investigating the consequences for public spending of an unexpected reform that repealed direct elections for local (provincial) politicians in Italy. Direct elections were substituted with indirect ones, whereby directly elected municipal politicians choose a municipal mayor to serve as provincial president. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, I document two main consequences of the reform. First, municipalities connected to the provincial presidents tend to receive disproportionately more public funds after the reform, suggesting geographic favoritism increased. Second, the share of provincial resources spent on public goods drops in favor of bureaucratic costs. I discuss suggestive evidence that these results are driven by weaker electoral incentives rather than by the selection of worse politicians.