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以盈余管理行为作为研究视角,采用2002年~2011年我国A股上市公司的数据,研究了董事高管责任保险、制度环境与公司治理水平之间的关系。研究发现,相对于没有购买保险的公司,购买了董事高管责任保险的公司具有更高的盈余管理程度。进一步将样本分为国内和香港交叉上市(同时发行AH股)和仅国内上市(仅发行A股)两个子样本,发现对于AH股公司,购买保险的公司具有更低的盈余管理程度,而对于仅发行A股的公司,购买保险的公司却具有更高的盈余管理程度。研究结果表明,董事高管责任保险目前尚未发挥对国内上市公司应有的治理作用。此外,董事高管责任保险的治理作用受到外部制度环境的影响。具体地,在法律和监管制度相对完善的环境下,董事高管责任保险才能发挥正向激励作用。 相似文献
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董事高管责任保险在公司治理中的作用及购买动因日益受到重视.本文以沪深两市A股制造业上市公司为样本,对企业集团框架内母子公司董事高管协同与上市公司董事高管责任保险购买行为的关系进行了研究,并考察了委托人与代理人利益目标的一致性和企业集团产权性质在上述关系中的调节作用.研究发现:第一,母子公司董事高管协同对上市公司董事高管责任保险购买行为,具有显著的负向影响;第二,委托人与代理人利益目标的一致性会弱化上述关系,即上市公司管理层持股比例越高、委托人与代理人利益目标的一致性越强,母子公司董事高管协同对上市公司董事高管责任保险购买行为的负向影响越小;第三,从产权性质看,国有企业集团中母子公司董事高管协同对上市公司董事高管责任保险购买行为的负向影响更强.本文在用固定效应模型和PSM方法进行稳健性检验后,以上结论依旧成立.上述研究结论有助于明晰集团框架内上市公司董事高管责任保险的购买动因,可为实践中母子公司治理结构的优化提供参考借鉴. 相似文献
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本文探讨了企业引入董事高管责任保险将会对企业高管的私有收益产生何种治理效应,以及不同的公司治理环境又将如何影响董事高管责任保险对高管私有收益的治理效应。研究发现,企业高管有动机通过董事高管责任保险的引入来提升其个人货币性私有收益;与之相反,企业高管非货币性私有收益将会因董事高管责任保险的引入而得到降低。另外,本文进一步研究发现,公司治理水平的改善有助于加强董事高管责任保险对高管货币性私有收益的正向激励效应和非货币性私有收益的负向抑制效应。此外,关于董事高管责任保险对高管货币性和非货币性两部分私有收益所产生的相异治理效应的结果,本文给出了部分解释,研究表明,董事高管责任保险的引入将会使高管非货币性私有收益在一定程度上被货币性私有收益所替代,并且这种替代效应受公司治理水平显著正向影响。 相似文献
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本文运用沪深A股上市公司财务数据,实证检验董事高管责任保险的购买与上市公司负债能力之间的关系。研究结果显示,公司的负债水平与上市公司的董事高管责任保险的购买之间呈现显著正相关关系,同时上市公司负债的期限,不管是期限结构还是期限水平也都与董事高管责任保险购买正相关。随后本文对比国有上市公司和非国有上市公司购买董事高管责任保险的效用,结果显示董事高管责任保险的购买对国有上市公司负债能力的作用显著大于非国有上市公司。最后总结并提出包括完善我国董事高管责任保险制度、加强公司的内部监督、完善购买董事高管责任保险的信息披露等建议。 相似文献
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董事高管责任保险的引入能否提升公司治理效果,目前存在机会主义假说和外部监督假说两种截然相反的观点。文章以银行信贷决策为切入点,首先考察不同的审计意见如何影响银行信贷决策,在此基础上重点考察董事高管责任保险对审计意见与银行信贷规模关系的调节作用,以检验董事高管责任保险的治理效应。研究显示,与获得标准审计意见的公司相比,那些获得非标审计意见的公司,其次年新增的银行信贷规模显著下降;更为重要的是,董事高管责任保险的购买强化了非标审计意见降低次年新增银行信贷规模的关系。上述结果表明,董事高管责任保险的引入向银行传递了机会主义的信号,导致银行做出了减少信贷规模的决策。 相似文献
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公司治理机制被认为是影响公司违规的重要因素,然而董事高管责任保险作为一种重要的外部治理机制,是否会影响公司违规尚未得到充分研究。本文研究发现董事高管责任保险显著降低公司违规概率,符合监督效应假说。经工具变量法、Heckman两阶段模型和倾向得分匹配法稳健性检验,上述结论依然成立。影响机制分析表明,董事高管责任保险显著降低了公司违规倾向,显著增加了违规后被稽查的概率,并降低了上市公司的第一类代理成本。对董事高管责任保险的监督职能做进一步分析发现:(1)董事高管责任保险对上市公司经营违规和领导人违规的监督效应更为显著,但对信息披露违规的治理作用并不显著;(2)董事高管责任保险发挥的监督职能与股权属性和保险机构股东治理存在替代效应,与外部审计师治理和董事长CEO二职分离存在互补效应;(3)分组检验结果表明,董事高管责任保险对公司违规的监督效应在外部监管环境较差或者公司内部信息透明度较高的情况下更加显著。本文既提供了保险合约通过公司治理渠道影响公司违规的证据,同时也表明保险机构通过董事高管责任保险为中国资本市场提供了一种较为有效的公司外部治理机制。 相似文献
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Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Aggressive Tax‐Reporting Activities: Evidence from Canada
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Tao Zeng 《Accounting Perspectives》2017,16(4):345-369
This paper examines the relationship between directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) and firms’ aggressive tax reporting. Using large Canadian public companies listed on the TSX300 and relying on several measures to capture aggressive tax‐reporting activities, including GAAP effective tax rates, cash effective tax rates, and the total and residual book‐tax differences, I find that D&O insurance exhibits a strong negative relationship with the GAAP effective tax rates and a strong positive relationship with both the total and residual book‐tax differences. However, there is generally no evidence showing that D&O insurance is associated with the cash effective tax rates. I interpret these results as indicating that D&O insurance reduces the tax expenses reported in the financial statements but not the actual tax paid. In other words, D&O insurance contributes to financial tax management but not to cash tax savings. Further tests in this study reveal that firms with fluctuating D&O coverage limits engage in more aggressive tax reporting than other firms, suggesting that managers may consider the level of D&O insurance that they purchase when they make aggressive tax‐reporting decisions. 相似文献
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Hong Zou Sonia Wong Clement Shum Jun Xiong Jun Yan 《Journal of Banking & Finance》2008,32(12):2636-2645
This paper examines the demand for directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) by Chinese listed companies where controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts are acute due to the concentrated and split ownership structure. We hypothesize and find evidence that the incidence of seeking D&O insurance is positively related to the extent of controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts – a finding not previously documented in the literature. Using an event study, we find that the announcements of D&O insurance decisions in firms that engage in earnings management, and/or are controlled by a local government (such firms tend to have stronger incentives to tunnel), seem to have a negative wealth effect. In addition, the incidence of the D&O insurance decision is positively related to the proportion of independent directors and several litigation risk proxies. Therefore, the breakthrough in corporate governance and judicial reforms has created non-negligible perceived securities litigation risks in China. 相似文献
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Directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance is a commonly used risk management tool for corporations both in the United States and abroad. While prior research has focused on the demand for D&O insurance and its role in corporate governance, there is an absence of literature on the supply side of the D&O market. Using the newly available D&O Insurance Coverage Supplement to insurers’ statutory filings, we develop a more comprehensive understanding of the D&O insurance market and of those firms that write D&O coverage. We develop and estimate a model of the decision to write D&O insurance and the extent of market participation. Our results suggest that there are significant operational and financial differences between firms that supply D&O insurance and those that do not. Several of these differences (specifically, size, diversification, and organizational form) are consistent with the predictions of the managerial discretion hypothesis. 相似文献
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We investigate the impact of directors' and officers' insurance (D&O insurance) on stock price crash risk. We find that D&O insurance in China is negatively associated with stock price crash risk. This association is robust to a series of robustness checks including the use of alternative sample, Heckman two-step sample selection model, propensity score matching procedure, fixed effects model, the inclusion of some possibly omitted variables, and bootstrap method. Further analyses show that the impact of D&O insurance on crash risk is more pronounced in firms with lower board independence, non-Big 4 auditors, lower institutional shareholdings, and weaker investor protection; and the negative relationship between D&O insurance and crash risk is not driven by the eyeball effect. Moreover, we find that D&O insurance purchase is associated with less financial restatements and more disclosure of corporate social responsibility reports. Our findings provide support to the notion that D&O insurance appears to improve corporate governance. 相似文献
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D&O保险的立法问题是我国司法实践中一个亟需澄清的问题,同时亦是保险法学界关注较多的基础理论问题。本文通过考察D&O保险合同在公司治理中的价值,细致分析在2019年日本第二次《公司法》修改之际学界对D&O保险规则立法与否的争论及立法演进历程,并对增设D&O保险合同规定的初衷以及在决定该保险合同内容时的决策程序进行系统阐释。研究发现,增设D&O保险合同规定、明确公司有权全额负担保险费用,有助于提高管理层的风险承担水平和管理效率,进而促进企业创新。在探讨我国《公司法》是否应当构建D&O保险规则这一问题时,应注意到公司法上的补偿制度是D&O保险存在的前提。就D&O保险合同内容的信息披露问题,一方面,为防止公司费用无限地用于提升填补限额,可采披露D&O合同信息的手段;另一方面,就具体的信息披露事项,不可盲目“照搬”美国做法。 相似文献
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Stephen G. Fier Kathleen A. McCullough Joan T. A. Gabel Nancy R. Mansfield 《Risk Management & Insurance Review》2015,18(1):55-75
Over the past decade, much attention has been given to the topics of corporate governance and corporate risk management. One increasingly important insurance product associated with each of these issues is directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance. Given the interconnectedness that exists between D&O insurance, corporate risk management, and corporate governance, we exploit industry‐specific D&O data to explain how industries most associated with the corporate scandals of the early 2000s adjusted demand patterns during periods of certainty and uncertainty. The rich data set coupled with dramatic changes in the marketplace allows for the testing of insurance demand patterns and enables us to offer insight into the market's response to a unique type of loss shock. The results of this study suggest evidence in favor of demand‐side probability updating, whereby those industries most associated with the corporate scandals of the early 2000s adjusted the demand for D&O insurance during periods of greater uncertainty. 相似文献
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We study whether and how financial reporting concerns are priced by insurers that sell Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) insurance to public firms. As D&O insurers typically assume the liabilities arising from shareholder litigation, the premiums they charge for D&O coverage reflect their assessment of a company’s litigation risk. Using a sample of public firms in the 2001–2004 Tillinghast D&O insurance surveys, we document that firms with lower earnings quality or prior accounting restatements pay higher premiums after controlling for other factors impacting litigation risk. In addition, insurers’ concerns about financial reporting are most evident for firms with restatements that are not revenue or expense related, are greater in the period following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, and are greater for firms with financial reporting problems that linger. Our results are consistent with past restatements being viewed as evidence of chronic problems with a firm’s financial statements. By analyzing archival data, we can also quantify the effects of other determinants of D&O premiums (such as business risk, corporate governance, etc.) identified by Baker and Griffith (Univ Chic Law Rev 74(2):487–544, 2007a) through interviews regarding the D&O underwriting process. 相似文献
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We analyze a sample of 72 IPO firms that went public between 1992 and 1996 for which we have detailed proprietary information about the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. If managers of IPO firms are exploiting superior inside information, we hypothesize that the amount of insurance coverage chosen will be related to the post-offering performance of the issuing firm's shares. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant negative relation between the three-year post-IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in conjunction with the IPO. One plausible interpretation is that, like insider securities transactions, D&O insurance decisions reveal opportunistic behavior by managers. This provides some motivation to argue that disclosure of the details of D&O insurance decisions, as is required in some other countries, is valuable. 相似文献
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《Risk Management & Insurance Review》2018,21(2):243-288
Whether directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance improves firm value is a controversial issue. We perform a literature review about the effect of D&O insurance and find mixed results. The proponents of D&O insurance believe it enhances corporate monitoring and improves firm value, while the opponents of D&O insurance argue that it creates a moral hazard problem and diminishes firm value. Against this backdrop, we argue that the trade‐off between the monitoring and moral hazard effects depends on the information acquired by the outside directors. Using a sample of listed Canadian firms, we find that (1) a change in D&O insurance coverage has no net effect on a firm's subsequent value when we ignore the information acquired by outside directors, (2) an increase in D&O insurance coverage improves a firm's subsequent value when the outside directors are well informed, and (3) an increase in D&O insurance coverage reduces a firm's subsequent value when the outside directors are poorly informed. Our findings are robust to endogeneity checks and have important implications for the regulation of D&O insurance. 相似文献
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We analyze the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the spreads charged on bank loans. We find that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with higher loan spreads and that this relation depends on loan characteristics in economically sensible ways and is attenuated by monitoring mechanisms. This association between loan spreads and D&O insurance coverage is robust to controlling for endogeneity (because both could be related to firm risk). Our evidence suggests that lenders view D&O insurance coverage as increasing credit risk (potentially via moral hazard or information asymmetry). Further analyses show that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with greater risk taking and higher probabilities of financial restatement due to aggressive financial reporting. While greater use of D&O insurance increases the cost of debt, we find some evidence that D&O insurance coverage appears to improve the value of large increases in capital expenditure for firms with better internal and external governance. 相似文献