创新影响了银行风险承担吗?——基于中国上市银行的实证检验

本文将银行内部创新因素和外部创新环境引入银行风险承担研究框架,从理论和实证两个方面分析创新对银行风险承担的影响。研究结果发现,创新与银行风险承担之间呈现"U型"的关系,适度创新能够弱化银行风险承担,过度创新会加剧银行风险承担。进一步研究发现,内部创新对非五大行具有当期和滞后的双重影响,而对五大行仅具有当期效应。外部创新对五大行具有当期和滞后的双重影响,而对非五大行的当期影响不显著。企业还款能力、银行贷款质量和创新资产规模是创新影响银行风险承担的重要中介机制。此外,五大行对创新的敏感性小于非五大行,五大行可接受的创新区间大于非五大行。     

上市银行社会责任影响因素研究——基于独立董事背景视角的实证分析

本文利用中国15家上市银行2008—2013年的数据实证检验了独立董事背景对上市银行社会责任的影响。研究结果显示:独立董事的教育背景并没有显著地影响上市银行社会绩效,但具有高学历背景尤其是博士学位的独立董事能够显著提升上市银行社会绩效;独立董事的高管背景能够显著提升上市银行社会绩效;无直接证据支持独立董事的金融机构、律师、政府和海外经验背景能够显著提升上市银行社会绩效;具有高校及科研机构、会计背景的独立董事对上市银行社会责任有负面影响;独立董事的多重董事身份(年龄)与上市银行社会责任显著负(正)相关;独立董事的性别和任期对上市银行社会责任的影响不显著。为此,建议各行对独立董事聘请进行调整。     

可转债融资对上市公司市场价值的长期影响及原因分析

本文从可转债融资对公司买进持有超额收益率和对经营指标的影响两方面分析了可转债融资对公司价值的长期影响,并从盈余管理的角度对产生影响的原因进行了实证分析。实证结果表明,发行可转债后公司股价和经营业绩出现显著的下滑,其原因在于上市公司在可转债发行当年普遍利用盈余管理来提高公司利润。尽管存在这样的负面影响,可转债融资仍然具有很大优势,我国监管部门和上市公司应积极采取措施,促进可转债市场的健康发展。     

职业背景对独立董事选择性监督的影响研究——来自银行背景独立董事的经验证据

本文探究了独立董事的职业背景对其选择性监督行为的影响,并以银行背景为例,采用2004~2015年间我国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了独立董事在不同企业中的监督行为。本文发现,银行背景独立董事整体上不发挥监督作用,但将其银行背景与企业的股权性质进一步区分为国有和非国有后,银行背景独立董事在不同企业中的监督作用表现出"同股权性质监督弱、异股权性质监督强"的现象,即在国有企业中,非国有银行背景独董比国有银行背景独董的监督更强,在非国有企业中,国有银行背景独董比非国有银行背景独董的监督更强。进一步的分析显示,银行背景独立董事会比其他类型独董更积极地监督与其银行背景股权相异的企业。     

上市银行公司治理：理论与实证分析

中国上市银行在股权性质上具有资本市场浓厚的转型期特征，在股权结构上又呈现出符合现代股份公司发展态势的寡头竞争型格局；其债务融资比重偏低，融资结构的公司治理效应尚未得以有效发挥，推进银行可转债以及长期次级债的发行工作不仅是大力补充银行资本的需要，也是完善公司治理结构的需要；上市银行董事会的股东信托特征鲜明，针对银行的风险配置属性，需要适当降低股东董事的比重，并引入债权人与职工代表董事；银行业是知识、资金密集型行业，银行管理者应该分享企业剩余，实现高级人力资源的资本化。     

对我国上市公司发行可转换债券融资的考量

可转换债券是兼有债券、股票、期权三方面特征的混合融资工具,对发行公司融资决策的盈亏影响具有不均衡性。基于经济理性假设,不同类别的企业以及企业发展的不同阶段,应根据自身发展战略、市场状况以及融资成本,来选择是否采用可转债融资,即我国企业利用可转债融资应理性地抉择。这一点对于推进我国上市公司利用可转债融资乃至资本市场的发展至关重要。     

产业政策、银行关联与企业债务融资--基于A股上市公司的实证研究北大核心CSSCISSCI

本文从产业政策的视角研究了企业聘请具有商业银行背景的人士担任公司董事(银行关联)的动机及其对债务融资的影响。本文发现,不属于产业政策支持行业的企业更有动机去建立银行关联。本文还发现,企业建立银行关联能够显著增加企业的银行借款总额和长期借款,体现出银行关联的资源效应和信息效应。但对于不属于产业政策支持行业的企业而言,建立银行关联会显著减少其长期借款水平,并降低长期借款的波动性,以应对产业政策对长期债务融资的限制,体现出银行关联的管理效应。进一步的分析表明,对于不属于产业政策支持行业的企业而言,银行关联与政治关联发挥互补作用;对于属于产业政策支持行业的企业而言,银行关联与政治关联发挥替代作用。     

我国上市银行公司治理与内部控制关系的实证研究

商业银行良好的公司治理对于我国金融系统的稳定具有十分重大的作用。本文选取2010-2012年我国16家上市银行的数据对银行公司治理机制与内部控制的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现,内部控制绩效与独立董事比例、董事会专门委员会数量和第二到第五大股东的持股比例之间呈负相关,并且都是显著的。而董事会规模、监事会规模、外部监事比例和第一大股东的持股比例并没有对银行内部控制产生显著影响。此外,大股东的国有性质有利于银行的风险控制。     

上市公司可转债发行动机研究——基于风险评估理论

本文基于风险评估理论对在2006年5月6日至2010年7月31日期间发行过可转债的公司,利用线性回归法和Logistic回归分析法进行实证研究,结果发现公司的规模、盈利能力、经营风险以及盈利能力的稳定性对上市公司是否选择发行可转债的影响较大,资本结构则影响较小,而企业的成长性、收益质量、财务风险以及现金流量状况对融资方式的选择影响不显著,这表明可转债发行的风险评估理论具有一定的合理性。     

独立董事背景特征对企业信贷融资的影响研究——基于我国上市民营企业的经验证据

本文以2007年至2010年我国上市民营企业为样本,检验独立董事的背景特征对民营企业信贷融资的影响。实证结果表明:随着具有融资关系背景特征的独立董事的增加,企业现金流量与现金持有增加额之间的正相关关系明显递减,企业的债务融资成本显著降低,企业的债务违约率明显上升。这说明民营企业虽然能够通过具有融资关系背景特征的独立董事缓解融资约束,以较低的成本获取资金,但存在较高的违约风险。     

The fluctuating maturities of convertible bonds

The maturities of newly issued convertible bonds vary substantially over time. Firm-specific determinants of maturity from the straight debt literature are relevant for convertible bonds. However, the growth of the convertible arbitrage industry and the role of convertible arbitrage hedge funds have changed the importance of firm characteristics in the convertible bond market. Recently issued convertible bonds come with particularly short maturities that serve as substitutes for call provisions. This substitution implies that backdoor-equity and sequential-financing rationales for issuing callable convertible bonds are also applicable for non-callable convertibles with shorter maturities.     

我国资本市场可转债定价及后市走势研究

从1992年发行第一只可转换公司债券(以下简称“可转债”)至今,中国可转债市场已经历了二十多年的发展。自诞生以来,中国监管机构对可转债的发行要求不断明确,配套监管措施不断完善,可转债市场迅速发展,发行规模不断提高。然而,在2017年以前,虽然可转债的发行规模增长迅速,但其融资总额占资本市场股权产品总融资规模的比重仍处于较低水平。究其原因,一方面是因为可转债的发行主体仅限于上市公司,股权融资存在较大的不确定性;同时可转债的定价条款过于复杂,市场接受程度较低。随着2017年证监会对可转债产品的审核标准进一步明确,可转债发行规模高速增长,目前已成为资本市场上不可忽视的品种。为确定可转债定价方式,本文以“广汽转债”历年来的市场价格为数据基础,以B-S模型为分析模型,通过实证分析寻求影响可转债定价的主要因素,对未来可转债定价的研究具有一定的借鉴意义。     

CoCo Bonds,Conversion Prices and Risk Shifting Incentives. How Does the Conversion Ratio Affect Management's Behaviour?

The aim of this paper is to analyze risk shifting incentives for managers and shareholders of the financial institution issuing a CoCo bond. We assess the role of the conversion price settlement in enhancing both shareholders’ and management's discipline. Three recent contingent reverse convertible deals are analyzed, with the intention of showing how shareholder conversion returns are linked to the conversion ratio. The findings demonstrate that, in the case of an ingoing or ongoing crisis, a poor settlement of the conversion ratio could exacerbate both debt overhang and risk shifting issues. This will end in discouraging bank management from issuing new equity and from investing in low risk assets. We argue that a contingent bond triggered on Basel III capital requirement ratios and having a significantly discounted conversion price reduces risk shifting incentives. Moreover, we illustrate how the unexpected wealth transfers between CoCo bondholders and shareholders tends to zero when the bond face value is higher than the current stock market price and there is a concentration of bond subscribers. Accordingly, regulators should consider and oversee not only the conversion trigger but also all the other features of a contingent capital security, especially the conversion ratio.     

Do Investor Demand and Market Timing Affect Convertible Debt Issuance Decisions by REITs?

The unique regulatory environment of REITs casts doubt on the traditional theoretical process by which REIT managers base their convertible debt issuance decisions on issuer condition and prospects. Anecdotal evidence shows that REITs may have catered to demand by investors, including a demand by convertible bond arbitrageurs when issuing convertible debt. This study examines the rationale behind convertible debt issuances by REITs, focusing on the possible impacts of investor demand and market timing. The results suggest that investor demand significantly affects convertible debt issuance decisions by REITs while certain unknown factors appear to have contributed to the sudden increase of convertible debt offerings in 2006 and 2007. REITs also time the market to conditions in the public debt market. The results only partially support the offered risk-shifting, risk-uncertainty, backdoor-equity, and sequential-financing hypotheses.     

Convertible Bond Issues: Evidence from Security Markets

A convertible bond (CB) is a hybrid security containing elements of both common stock and straight debt. Still, empirical investigations on CB issue announcements have failed to discern any pattern in the stock market reaction that is consistent with announcements of either common equity or straight debt issues. This study shows that (a) motives for issuing the CB and (b) its rating (and to a less extent the riskiness of the issuing firm) help explain the stock market reaction to CB issue announcements. Specifically, announcement of a CB issue with an explicitly stated motive for the use of proceeds, when coupled with a high (low) bond rating, generates a stock market response similar to a straight debt (common stock) issue. On the other hand, the preference of CB holders is dictated by the motive for the use of proceeds and the conversion premium. These findings highlight the critical importance of the motive of issue in determining reactions in both the stock and bond markets.     

Earnings Management through Transaction Structuring: Contingent Convertible Debt and Diluted Earnings per Share

In this article we examine whether firms structure their convertible bond transactions to manage diluted earnings per share (EPS). We find that the likelihood of firms issuing contingent convertible bonds (COCOs), which are often excluded from diluted EPS calculations under Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 128, is significantly associated with the reduction that would occur in diluted EPS if the bonds were traditionally structured. We also document that firms' use of EPS‐based compensation contracts significantly affects the likelihood of COCO issuance and find weak evidence that reputation costs, measured using earnings restatement data, play a role in the structuring decision. These results are robust to controlling for alternative motivations for issuing COCOs, including tax and dilution arguments. In addition, an examination of announcement returns reveals that investors view the net benefits and costs of COCOs as offsetting one another. Our results contribute to the literature on earnings management, diluted EPS, financial reporting costs, and financial innovation.     

The agency of CoCos: Why contingent convertible bonds are not for everyone

Some regulators grant contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) the status of “going-concern” capital. Theory, however, suggests that CoCos can induce debt overhang, thereby amplifying the leverage ratchet effect. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence consistent with this theory. Our results suggest that banks with more volatile assets (riskier banks) (i) are less likely to issue CoCos, (ii) conditional on having CoCos outstanding are less likely to issue equity, and (iii) prefer issuing equity over CoCos. Since riskier banks suffer from more debt overhang it is more costly for them to issue CoCos.     

Financing decisions: The case of convertible bonds

Research studying firms' motivations to issue convertible bonds remains far from complete. This paper aims to provide further understanding of firms' motives behind issuing convertible bonds. We propose a theoretical model that explains issuers' choice between convertibles and equity when raising a required amount of capital by comparing the cash flow streams of both alternatives in order to maximize the firm's value for the current shareholders. We derive a closed form solution of our theoretical model both in absence and presence of default risk. Our model suggests that issuing convertible bonds is preferred to a direct stock issuance if the expected return of convertible bonds is lower than the expected return of common stocks. Empirical findings confirm our theoretical predictions.     

Covenants in convertible bonds: Boon or boilerplate?

This paper examines the role of restrictive covenants in convertible bonds. After controlling for standard covenant intensity determinants, an average convertible bond offering has 3.21 fewer covenants than an average straight bond offering. While covenants negatively affect straight bond yields, there is no negative association between covenants and convertible bond yields. Moreover, contrary to straight bond covenants, convertible bond covenants are set largely independently of issuer characteristics. Overall, our findings suggest that the conversion option and certain covenants are substitutes for addressing debt-related financing costs. The few covenants included in convertibles represent irrelevant boilerplate clauses.     

Optimal investment with stock repurchase and financing as signals

When management has private information it has an incentiveto finance investment by issuing a security that is overpricedin the market. The market's valuation of the issued securitymay lead management either to forego profitable investmentsor to invest suboptimally. With investment fixed, there existfully revealing signaling equilibria in which the covenantsof the issued claim serve as signals. A straight bond issuecannot provide the signals but a convertible bond issue can.With investment endogenous, fully revealing equilibria existin which the par value of a straight bond issue and the announcedlevel of investment jointly serve as signals and investmentis optimal. The article also investigates the role of a stockrepurchase in these equilibria.