古诺纳什均衡下商品出口与绕过反倾销的FDI比较研究

该文章运用微观经济学、博弈论等理论和方法探讨了在国内外企业处于完全信息且同时决策（即古诺纳什博弈）的假设条件下,面对进口国政府的反倾销国外企业对商品出口或对外直接投资决策如何抉择问题;建立了绕过反倾销的可能引起对外直接投资的最小反倾销税率模型;得出了该反倾销税率与国外企业在国内外生产产品的单位边际成本及进口国市场所用收入税率有关以及进口国政府不能确定过高的反倾销税率等结论,并以彩电行业进行案例分析。     

Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints

We analyze the nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incomplete information monopolist operating in a market populated by agents with budget constraints. We show that if other goods are available and if the monopolist's goods are nonessential relative to other goods, then there exists an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling mechanism for the monopolist (Theorem 1). Moreover, we show that a solution to all such nonlinear pricing problems exists if and only if the monopolist's goods are nonessential (Theorem 2). In the absence of nonessentiality, we show that if the monopolist's profit function is independent of quantity (e.g., if all costs are fixed), then an optimal selling mechanism exists (Theorem 3). Finally, we show that if there is reporting (of types by agents) and partial recognition of types (by the monopolist), then an optimal selling mechanism exists, even in the absence of nonessentiality, provided agents' utility functions are affine and continuous in goods (Theorem 4).     

从厂商垄断探索外资电力“退潮”中国之原因

文章主要是通过运用厂商垄断优势论来解释上世纪90年代外资电力企业涌入中国和近年来这些企业纷纷选择离去这两种现象。外资企业的离去除了失去垄断地位和垄断利润的原因之外,还和中国的市场经济制度以及全球经济发展变化有着密不可分的关系。     

Learning and stability of the Bayesian–Walrasian equilibrium

Under the Bayesian–Walrasian Equilibrium (BWE) (see Balder and Yannelis, 2009), agents form price estimates based on their own private information, and in terms of those prices they can formulate estimated budget sets. Then, based on his/her own private information, each agent maximizes interim expected utility subject to his/her own estimated budget set. From the imprecision due to the price estimation it follows that the resulting equilibrium allocation may not clear the markets for every state of nature, i.e., exact feasibility of allocations may not occur. This paper shows that if the economy is repeated from period to period and agents refine their private information by observing the past BWE, then in the limit all agents will obtain the same information and market clearing will be reached. The converse is also true. The analysis provides a new way of looking at the asymmetric equilibrium which has a statistical foundation.     

On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in price–quantity games

This paper examines the existence and characteristics of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in oligopoly models in which firms simultaneously set prices and quantities. Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is proved for a class of price–quantity games. If the demand function is continuous, then the equilibrium outcome is similar to that of a price-only model. With discontinuous demand and limited spillover, there are rationing equilibria in which combined production falls short of market demand. Moreover, there might again be an equilibrium reflecting the outcome of a price game. Competition in price and quantity thus yields Bertrand outcomes under a variety of market conditions.     

Irreversible investment and R&D spillovers in a dynamic duopoly

Investments in new production processes usually involve a significant amount of R&D, generating spillovers that lowers the second comer's investment cost. We show that these spillovers substantially affect the equilibrium of the dynamic game. Even for low spillover values, the leader delays her investment until the stochastic fundamental has gone past the level such that the follower's optimal strategy is to invest as soon as he attains the spillover. This bears several interesting implications. First, because the follower invests as he benefits from the spillover, in equilibrium the average time delay between the two investments is short, as it should be expected. Second, in case of a major innovation, an optimal public policy requires an intervention in favor of the investment activity; an increase in uncertainty - delaying the equilibrium - calls for higher subsidization rates. Third, numerical simulations show that the spillover reduces the difference between the leader's and the follower's maximum value functions. Accordingly, our model can help generate realistic market betas.     

THEORIES OF MONOPOLY CAPITALISM

Abstract. This article presents a survey of theories of monopoly capitalism. The defining characteristic of monopoly capitalism is that developed capitalist economies are seen as essentially dominated by firms which operate in oligopolistic industries. It discusses in chronological order the contributions of Hilferding, Lenin, Kalecki, Steindl, Baran and Sweezy, and Cowling to the monopoly capitalism approach. By drawing out some common features of the authors discussed we arrive at an implicit view of the nature of theories of monopoly capitalism. The macroeconomic aspects of monopoly capitalism are discussed with emphasis on the implications for the level of economic activity. A further section discusses the international aspects of the monopoly capital approach. The final section of the paper reviews criticisms of the theories of monopoly capitalism with concentration on those advanced from a Marxist perspective.     

Mixed oligopoly and spatial price discrimination with foreign firms

This paper is the first to examine the welfare consequences of foreign competition in a mixed oligopoly set in a linear model of spatial price discrimination. It demonstrates that the entry of a foreign firm often lowers domestic welfare. This results because the public firm locates largely independently of the presence of the foreign firm and because the profit earned by the foreign firm reduces domestic welfare. Privatization of the public firm typically lowers domestic welfare but can increase global welfare. Thus, domestic governments are unlikely to allow foreign entry and when they do, they are unlikely to privatize the public firm despite the potential rise in global welfare.     

General existence of competitive equilibrium in the growth model with an endogenous labor–leisure choice

We prove the existence of competitive equilibrium in the canonical optimal growth model with elastic labor supply under general conditions. In this model, strong conditions to rule out corner solutions are often not well justified. We show using a separation argument that there exist Lagrange multipliers that can be viewed as a system of competitive prices. Neither Inada conditions, nor strict concavity, nor homogeneity, nor differentiability are required for existence of a competitive equilibrium. Thus, we cover important specifications used in the macroeconomics literature for which existence of a competitive equilibrium is not well understood. We give examples to illustrate the violation of the conditions used in earlier existence results but where a competitive equilibrium can be shown to exist following the approach in this paper.     

Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments

This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. At the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. At the second stage, the two managers compete in an oligopolistic tournament against each other. The findings substantially differ from the results for Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly: There exist asymmetric equilibria where one owner puts a positive weight on sales and the other a negative one, although the structure of the game is completely symmetric. If the influence of noise vanishes, the owner of the more aggressive firm will even induce sales maximization to his manager in order to preempt his competitor. Received: 22 April 2004, Accepted: 25 December 2005 JEL Classification: L1, M2 I would like to thank the editor Semih Koray, two anonymous referees, Ulf Schiller, Dirk Sliwka, Gunter Steiner, and the participants of the Microeconomics Seminar of the Humboldt University at Berlin for very helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), grant KR 2077/2-3 and SFB/TR 15 ("Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems"), is gratefully acknowledged.     

Nash-equilibria in a heterogeneous oligopoly with fuzzy information

We consider a model of an oligopolistic market with heterogeneous firms and products where neither the cost nor the demand functions are common knowledge. Instead, each firm only has some vague ideas about the price strategies adopted by its competitors which is modelled by a fuzzy set. In analogy to the notion of an "equilibrium of actions and beliefs" we define and characterize a generalized Nash-equilibrium and show its existence under general conditions. Furthermore, the impact of the fuzzy information on the equilibrium outcome is analyzed by means of a comparative static analysis within a particular model framework.Received: 28 May 2002, Accepted: 25 December 2002, JEL Classification: D43, D80, L13We wish to thank Bernhard F. Arnold, the editor Murat Sertel , and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Of course, we are responsible for all remaining errors.