不披露委托人身份的代理制度的引入——对《合同法》403条的法律探析

在前人关于间接代理研究的基础上,本文阐述了不披露委托人身份的代理同隐名代理的区别,倡导以《合同法>中关于委托的规定作为切入点,实现中西代理法律制度的融合,提出对不披露委托人身份的代理与诚信原则的分歧的处理,从而引出关于第三人撤销权增设的有关问题。     

对于“两面人”行为角色复杂性的分析——一人分饰多重角色的普遍性影响

结合"两面人"行为与身份混同参与者进行分析,并初步在经管类领域引入身份混同参与者这一概念,即一人身兼与分饰多重角色的参与者。借助委托代理理论,将"两面人"刻画为身兼委托人与代理人身份的参与者,将原本的二元结构(委托人与代理人)调整为三元结构(委托人、"两面人"和代理人),据此分析了两面人行为的影响以及其获利的途径,同时也分析了两面人行为在现实以及道德上的复杂性。     

养老保险基金投资运营中的合谋与防范

养老保险基金投资委托代理与一般的委托代理相比具有自身的一些特点,使得政府管理人和投资管理人有可能通过合谋来扩大自身利益,从而损害委托人利益。本文通过建立委托人、监管者、代理人三者的委托代理模型,说明了最优的防合谋合约构成,发现对委托人而言存在减少合谋与提高投资管理人努力程度之间的权衡。因此,提出相应的政策建议:在强调养老保险基金安全性与提高投资管理人努力程度之间达成平衡;明晰养老保险基金产权,加大信息披露力度,完善监督机制;增强对监管者的激励;完善投资管理人报酬制度。     

国有企业委托代理关系特殊性的分析

本文运用委托代理理论的基本框架,分析了委托代理关系基本矛盾在国有企业中四个方面的特殊表现,即委托代理关系产生的特殊性、信息不对称的特殊性、委托人和代理人各自行为的特殊性及行使监督权的委托人行为的特殊性.     

国有企业委托代理关系特殊性的分析

本文运用委托代理理论的基本框架,分析了委托代理关系基本矛盾在国有企业中四个方面的特殊表现,即委托代理关系产生的特殊性、信息不对称的特殊性、委托人和代理人各自行为的特殊性及行使监督权的委托人行为的特殊性。     

论企业代理问题产生的原因

在企业经营实践中,由于委托人与代理人目标函数不一致等原因,代理问题客观存在。本文分别从宏观和微观的角度,对代理问题产生的具体原因进行了深入剖析,这对有效解决代理问题及实现委托人利益最大化,具有深刻的理论指导意义。     

代理问题产生成本粘性的原因及其优化

代理问题是产生成本粘性的主要原因。委托人和代理人利益不一致、委托人和代理人信息不对称、委托人对代理人不能进行完全监督以及代理人对公司信息不能完全掌控等是其具体原因。优化代理问题必须引入管理层股权激励计划、优化公司股权结构、完善报酬激励机制、采用委托代理应用模型、完善有效董事会结构、优化公司资产结构、激励代理人提升自身素质以及采用代理人市场化机制。     

聘请律师六注意

<正> 一、不与律师签订委托代理合同。根据规定,当事人聘请律师,应该与律师所在事务所签订委托代理合同,由律师事务所指派律师代理(在实际中,律师事务所一般会尊重委托人的意见,让委托人指定律师代理)不允许律师私自收案。如果不与律师事务所签订委托     

基于博弈理论的委托代理策略探讨

委托代理理论是在利益相冲突和信息不对称的环境下,研究委托人如何设计最优契约激励代理人,使代理人的努力水平符合委托人的利益。存在委托代理关系就无法避免监督问题。监督与否与其力度直接影响委托、代理双方利益获得。从静态博弈和重复博弈的角度,分别探讨了委托人监督与否、代理人经营利益目标的决策策略。     

国有企业委托代理关系特殊性的分析

本文运用委托代理理论的基本框架，分析了委托代理关系基本矛盾在国有企业中四个方面的特殊表现，即委托代理关系产生的特殊性、信息不对称的特殊性、委托人和代理人各自行为的特殊性及行使监督权的委托人行为的特殊性。     

Risk Taking as Self Discipline in Contractual Relationships

This paper considers an agency model in which the principal is privately informed of her production technology. In our model, the principal can require the agent to adopt the principal’s technology for production, or alternatively, to adopt a technology in the market. Information about the market technology’s efficiency is publicly available, and thus can be acquired. We show that, if the variation in technological efficiency is large, the principal prefers to delay acquisition of information about the market technology. The reason is that, the principal uses uncertainty as a device to provide a truth‐telling incentive to herself, which, in turn, lowers the cost of inducing the agent to accept the contract.     

Crime,Control and Environmental Policy: The Case of Hazardous Wastes

In the context of a model of principal–agency the institutional setting in which the agency operates is investigated. Optimal behaviour for an agency which is restricted to enforcement policies is deduced, and further behavioural interactions between the firm and the restricted agency are explored. Also the firm's behavioural responses to agency dump fee policies are developed, and the welfare implications are derived.     

Exploring advertiser's expectations of advertising agency services

Advertisers have expectations about what they will receive from an advertising agency. These expectations are about the future service they believe the agency will deliver and influence the satisfaction/dissatisfaction the advertiser has of agency performance. Using an expert sample and a native categories approach, the study explores advertiser's expectations of agency services at the selection stage. The paper makes three main contributions to our understanding of agency selection. First, we provide insight into what advertisers seek to gain from an agency in future service delivery. Second, we identify four categories of expectations: craft, affinity, functionality and perspective. Third, we illustrate the nature of these expectations and provide evidence that some expectations are less precise than others. We consider the implications of the findings for the agency selection literature and agency management.     

Brand choice and varying quantity of information

The research reported here examines the impact of varying information on brand choice decisions and the relationship between brand choice and consumers' confidence, satisfaction, and the assumptions they make about undisclosed information.     

Unravelling agency relations inside the MNC: The roles of socialization,goal conflicts and second principals in headquarters-subsidiary relationships

Prior research has advanced classical agency theory to account for various characteristics of headquarters (HQ)-subsidiary relations in the multinational corporation (MNC). In an attempt to contribute to this line of research, in this paper, we propose and test an agency model for HQ-subsidiary relations inside the MNC. Drawing on classical agency assumptions, we develop a baseline hypothesis that links informal controls (i.e., socialization), HQ-subsidiary goal conflicts, and the HQ’s use of formal controls (i.e., behavioral controls). We subsequently introduce an important boundary condition, which reflects subsidiaries’ internal agency relations with subsidiary CEOs as second principals. More specifically, we argue that the baseline relationship only holds under low levels of second principal power. To test our model, we employed a unique study design with three parallel surveys addressing the agents and the two principals involved in 131 agency relations within one MNC.     

Corporate moral agency: A case from literature

I analyze a well-known and moving passage from John Steinbeck's novelThe Grapes of Wrath. This passage provides an excellent illustration of one of the central questions about corporate moral agency: Is corporate moral agency anything over and above the agency of individual human beings? The passage in question is a debate about whether or not the actions of a particular company are anything over and above the actions of individual human beings.     

The creative code

A study investigated the phenomenon, called the creative code, which is a collection of implicit theories about an advertising agency’s creative product that are held by people within a creative department. A foundation was built upon organisation-culture theory. Evidence in literature supported the conceptualisation of the construct. Personal interviews with creative personnel at a midwestern US advertising agency found evidence for a creative code and its components, sources, conditionality and consequences. The study implies that a creative code should be considered as an independent or dependent variable in research about advertising creativity. Client and agency managers and creative employees also may benefit from being more cognisant of the creative code that exists within agency organisations.     

会计政策变更、信号传递与代理成本

在股权分散的上市公司中,存在着全体股东与经营者之间的单层委托代理关系,而在股权集中的上市公司中,存在着大股东与经营者、中小股东与大股东之间的双重委托代理关系。将会计政策变更作为一个可观测变量,针对股权分散和股权集中的两类上市公司,分别建立单委托、双重委托代理模型,分析降低代理成本、提高公司价值的途径。分析结果表明,在两类上市公司中,将会计政策变更作为一种信号传递机制写入激励合同,可以降低代理成本,提高公司价值。     

Managerial Ownership and Agency Cost: Evidence from Bangladesh

This study examines the influence of managerial ownership on firm agency costs among listed firms in Bangladesh. This is an institutional setting that features a mixture of agency costs. This institutional setting has a concentration of ownership by managers, but the firms are not solely owned by managers. The extant literature suggests that the sacrifice of wealth by the principal and potential costs associated with monitoring the agents is known as the agency cost. This study uses three measures of agency cost: the ‘expense ratio’, the ‘Q-free cash flow interaction’, and the ‘asset utilisation ratio’. The finding of the study is that managerial ownership reduces the firm agency cost only under the ‘asset utilisation ratio’ measure of agency cost; this is robust with regard to a number of robustness tests. Furthermore, the non-linearity tests suggest that the convergence of interest is evident with very high and low levels of managerial ownership. The entrenchment effect by the owners is evident at moderate levels of managerial ownership. Although there has been great scepticism among management researchers on the validity of agency theory, overall, the findings of this study do not reject the validity of agency theory. Given that the entrenchment by managers is evident at certain levels of ownership and that the agency problem may still exist between insiders and outsiders, legislative guidelines for controlling share ownership may be required.