高管薪酬公平性、薪酬增长与代理成本--来自我国上市公司的证据

本文在高管薪酬契约基础上,运用2005-2012年我国上市公司数据,从薪酬公平性的角度,分析并检验高管薪酬公平性对其薪酬增长及代理成本的影响。研究结果发现,当高管通过薪酬的社会比较,较低薪酬的高管与下一年度高管薪酬增长、资产周转率显著相关,高管薪酬公平性是造成我国上市公司高管薪酬不断增长的原因之一,并倾向性地增加了公司的代理成本,影响了激励效应。本文丰富和拓展了高管薪酬公平性激励效应的研究成果,为完善我国公司薪酬制度提供理论依据和指导。     

我国不同所有制企业薪酬体系比较研究

本文通过实证研究发现,我国不同所有制企业薪酬体系的特征在整体上不存在显著差异,但在有些维度上存在显著差异,它们是基于资历还是绩效、固定/变动薪酬占总薪酬的比重和对内部/外部公平的重视三个维度。同时本文还发现,各所有制企业的薪酬体系都比较机械,都强调岗位、绩效、短期薪酬、内部公平。此外,外资企业与民营企业员工的总体报酬水平接近,民营企业最为重视绩效薪酬,外资企业员工参与薪酬决策最少。     

Conflicting Objectives within the Board: Evidence from Overlapping Audit and Compensation Committee Members

The board of directors is an elite group that faces multifaceted tasks. The board needs to implement decisions on a wide variety of subject matter. These decisions are often delegated to specialized sub-committees within the board. The different objectives of each sub-committee can result in conflicting interests leading to decisions that are sub-optimal. For example, at times, the objectives of the compensation and the audit committee are not aligned. The objective of compensation committees is to grant CEOs compensation packages reflective of their performance. Yet, these compensation packages might contain incentives that could motivate CEOs to influence the financial reporting process in order to reflect better performance, increasing the risk of poor quality financials. In contrast, the objective of audit committees is to oversee the quality of the financial reports and the process that leads to them. Therefore, they would favor compensation packages that reduce the risk of earnings manipulation. We examine public companies that have overlapping compensation and audit committee members and find a higher proportion of CEO incentive compensation in companies with less overlap among audit and compensation committee members. These results suggest that separating the members within these committees might contribute to the effectiveness of board decisions. Data availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in this paper.     

高管薪酬存在同伴效应吗？

以2007—2017年间沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本，重点探讨了高管薪酬同伴效应的存在性、情景因素以及经济后果。研究发现，高管薪酬同时存在行业和区域同伴效应。而且，上述薪酬同伴效应在环境不确定性程度和非国有控股程度高的公司中更为显著。此外，高管薪酬同伴效应与企业发展的关系因时而异，即短期内可促进企业的发展，但中长期则抑制了企业的发展。进一步发现，模仿是解释薪酬同伴效应的内在逻辑。另外，薪酬同伴效应降低了薪酬业绩敏感性。研究不仅在理论上丰富了高管薪酬的研究内容，同时为高管薪酬方案的制定以及同伴效应外部性的运用提供了指导和借鉴。     

职业经理人薪酬实证研究述评

职业经理人薪酬是近年来国内外理论界关注的热点问题.本文对职业经理人薪酬的实证研究进行了全面回顾,并对今后我国职业经理人的薪酬研究作出了展望.     

我国上市公司经理报酬水平的制度特征研究

本文在回顾我国上市公司经理报酬制度的基础上,对我国上市公司总经理现金报酬水平及趋势作了分析,并比较了不同股权性质的上市公司经理报酬水平的差异和变化趋势。此外,本文对我国上市公司经理现金报酬的类型及特征作了分析,发现业绩型报酬在上市公司中的使用逐步增加,且该类型的报酬水平比非业绩型的报酬水平要高。最后,我们分析了上市公司确定经理现金报酬水平的参照标准,发现它们主要参照同行业或同地区企业的薪酬水平和业绩。     

薪酬外部不公平性与非效率投资--基于社会比较理论的解释和经验证据

在高管薪酬体制扭曲现实背景和社会比较理论视角下,引入心理学和行为学研究成果,关注薪酬外部不公平性对高管心理感知及行为选择影响。研究发现,薪酬外部不公平易引发高管“黑嫉妒”心理,导致其寻求替代性补偿激励而增加非效率投资。这一现象在民营企业更为突出,主要是因国有企业报酬体系异化所致。宏观经济形势和公司所在地区对薪酬外部不公平性与非效率投资之间关系有显著调节作用。研究还发现受自我期望值、归因模式及注意力基础等因素影响,高管对薪酬外部公平性问题的心理感知存在显著性别差异,女性高管治理有助于缓解男性高管主导的“黑嫉妒”心理和抑制非效率投资。     

Corporate Governance Reform and CEO Compensation: Intended and Unintended Consequences

Recent scandals allegedly linked to CEO compensation have brought executive compensation and perquisites to the forefront of debate about constraining executive compensation and reforming the associated corporate governance structure. We briefly describe the structure of executive compensation, and the agency theory framework that has commonly been used to conceptualize executives acting on behalf of shareholders. We detail some criticisms of executive compensation and associated ethical issues, and then discuss what previous research suggests are likely intended and unintended consequences of some widely proposed executive compensation reforms. We explicitly discuss the following recommendations for reform: require greater independence of compensation committees, require executives to hold equity in the corporation, require greater disclosure of executive compensation, increase institutional investor involvement in corporate governance (including executive compensation), and require firms to expense stock options on their income statements. We provide a brief summary discussion of ethical issues related to executive compensation, and describe possible future research.     

法务会计在知识产权侵害赔偿诉讼中的支持

对知识产权侵权损害赔偿与其他财产侵权赔偿进行差异分析,提出法务会计在知识产权侵害损失估计上的特殊作用,认为知识产权侵害诉讼中法官由于专业知识所限,经常难以对知识产权侵权赔偿数额作出合理确定。法务会计的工作鉴定能有助于法官办案,维护权利人利益。     

The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S. Executive Turnover and Compensation

This study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit revelation, this increase is smaller than that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards.     

Do bonus payments help enhance salesforce retention?

Our primary aim in this research is to examine if the existence of a bonus component in the sales compensation structure can enhance salesforce retention. We also study the impact of total sales compensation, relative to industry norms, on salesforce retention. We find that bonus payments do enhance salesforce retention among firms whose total compensation is above industry average but not among firms whose total compensation is below industry average. Further, we also examine the role of sales training, non-financial motivational tools, and length of the selling cycle on salesforce retention.The authors thank Mr. Chris Heide of the Dartnell Corporation for providing the data analyzed in this paper.     

Consumer Product Failure Causing Personal Injury Under the No-Fault Accident Compensation Scheme in New Zealand—a Let-off for Manufacturers?

This article examines how the no-fault accident compensation system in New Zealand operates to relieve manufacturers from liability to consumers for product failures which cause personal injury or death. The state-run accident compensation scheme pays compensation to persons who suffer “personal injury by accident” and bars claims for compensation from the party at fault. The advantage for consumers is that they are entitled to compensation from the accident compensation scheme as of right and do not need to make claims against manufacturers of products which cause injury or death. The article outlines some limited circumstances when consumers may claim compensation from manufacturers and identifies other avenues for holding manufacturers responsible for injury or death caused by faulty products. The paper makes three recommendations to increase manufacturer responsibility: (1) allow the regulatory body which administers the Accident Compensation system to claim compensation, by way of subrogation, from manufacturers in limited circumstances; (2) require manufacturers to pay an additional “product liability” levy to the accident compensation scheme; and (3) amend the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 to cover non-workplace accidents exposing manufacturers of unsafe products to Worksafe investigation and possible criminal liability. The article argues that imposing additional responsibility on manufacturers for product failures which cause personal injury or death is justified on the grounds of fairness. Arguments based on corrective fairness and distributive fairness can both be relevant in cases of personal injury caused to consumers by manufacturers.     

Executive Compensation and Earnings Persistence

Governing boards utilize executive compensation contracts in an attempt to align executive actions with corporate goals. The objective is to ensure that executive performance provides value to the organization in terms of successful outcomes. A key performance criteria typically specified in CEO compensation contracts is earnings targets. However, using earnings as a performance evaluation may be problematic because some firms exhibit robust and sustained earnings over time (high earnings persistence), and other firms, such as high growth oriented firms, exhibit weak or sometimes negative earnings over time (low earnings persistence). Our study reveals that the effect of high earnings persistence results in firms that focus more heavily on cash compensation (salary and bonus) rather than on equity compensation (stock options, etc.) to compensate executive performance. Additionally, for firms characterized by low earnings persistence, our study indicates that cash flows from operations act as a supplementary performance measure to accounting earnings, and become increasingly important as a means to justify executive cash compensation.     

中国上市公司家族企业与非家族企业的经理人薪酬差异分析

经理人薪酬是一种典型的用以降低代理问题的控制机制。以家族企业与非家族企业为对象,从公司绩效、董事会监督及外部大股东控制三个方面对两类企业的经理人薪酬进行了比较研究。实证结果发现:代理理论中以绩效决定经理人薪酬的控制机制在我国非家族企业中是有效的,而在家族企业中效果有限;对经理人经营绩效的评估,会计基础重于市场基础;代理理论在我国主要适用于非家族企业。     

Disentangling CEO compensation: A simultaneous examination of time,industry, and firm‐level effects

Despite decades of research, how CEO compensation is determined remains an enigma. Drawing on agency, managerial hegemony, and institutional theoretical perspectives, we use hierarchical linear modelling—a multilevel analytic technique—to examine how firm‐, industry‐, and time‐level effects drive CEO compensation in US corporations. Results show that while cash salary is mostly driven by firm‐specific factors, equity‐based compensation responds to time‐level effects with firm‐ and industry‐level effects playing a marginal role. We argue that such evidence is consistent with the institutionalization of the CEO compensation determination process through the widespread adoption of benchmark peer‐group comparisons. Such practices underlie economy‐wide changes in CEO compensation that are increasingly disconnected from other fundamental firm‐ or industry‐specific factors. Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vice or Virtue? The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Executive Compensation

We empirically examine the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on CEO compensation using a large sample of the US firms from 1996 to 2010. We develop and test two hypotheses, the overinvestment hypothesis based on agency theory and the conflict–resolution hypothesis based on stakeholder theory. We find that the lag of CSR adversely affects both total compensation and cash compensation, after controlling for various firm and board characteristics. Our estimates show that an interquartile increase in CSR is followed by a 4.35% (2.78%) decrease in total (cash) compensation. We also find an inverse association between lagged employee relations and CEO compensation. Our results are robust to the correction for endogeneity using instrumental variable approach. Taken together, our results support the conflict–resolution hypothesis, but not the CSR overinvestment argument.     

The impact of firm strategy on performance measures used in executive compensation

We investigate the relationship between firm strategy and the use of performance measures in executive compensation. Our analysis shows that there is an increased emphasis on sales in the determination of executive compensation for firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy, which seek to achieve their competitive advantage through low price and high volume. In contrast, there is a decreased emphasis on accounting measures in firms pursuing a differentiation strategy, which require investments in brand recognition and innovative products, investments that are subject to unfavorable accounting treatment. These results indicate that compensation committees link executive rewards to firm strategy.     

Can compensation save free trade?

When the median voter loses from trade reform, liberalization is blocked. Allowing the electorate to vote for compensatory subsidies may reverse this outcome. However, the order of the agenda may matter. The winners who pay the compensation may be sufficiently powerful to block compensation if trade is first liberalized. Seeing the inevitable outcome of sequential votes, the median voter realizes he will not be compensated for his losses and opposes liberalization. In contrast, liberalization can be achieved if compensation is placed first on the agenda. Finally, there is a significant chance that the least efficient compensation scheme will be chosen.     

上市公司高管薪酬指数研究

高管薪酬问题是公司治理理论的核心,如何科学、客观、准确地评价高管薪酬是理论界和实践界共同关注的焦点。通过计算2008年1 581家上市公司的高管薪酬指数,提出基于公司业绩的高管薪酬指数,并分行业、地区和所有制性质分析了上市公司高管薪酬指数的特点,本文认为对高管薪酬的评价不能简单地使用高管薪酬绝对值,而应充分考虑高管薪酬与企业业绩的匹配程度。     

An Ethical Perspective on CEO Compensation

The controversial issue of whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation is excessive or appropriate is examined in terms of two competing claims: that CEOs are overpaid for the value they provide to an enterprise, and that CEO compensation is inherently equitable. Various arguments and perspectives on both sides of the issue are assessed. Little evidence supports the claim that CEO performance justifies very high compensation. Further, the complex interactive alliance between boards of directors and CEOs compromises rational decision-making about CEO compensation, with the Enron affair offered as an illustration of what can go wrong when dishonest CEO actions combine with lax board oversight. Recommendations for restoring trust in the system include continuing current regulatory actions, using different metrics for determining CEO compensation, making board member-CEO relationships transparent to all company stakeholders, and several more radical ideas for change. Stakeholders must resist being distracted by other social, economic, or political issues from pursuing serious, lasting reform.