Pigouvian Taxation in Tourism

The paper studies the characteristics and the effects of a tax imposed by a local government on the land used to create new tourists' accommodations. First, a dynamic policy game between a monopolist in a tourist area and a local government is considered. In each period the former has to decide the size of land undergoing development, whereas the latter has to choose the tax to levy on each newly developed area unit. Linear Perfect Markov strategies are derived for both the non-cooperative and the public monopoly case. In equilibrium, a public monopoly would develop land more rapidly than a private monopoly. Furthermore, the more the monopolist discounts the future, the more the long run use of the natural resource is reduced. Second, the properties of the tax are studied considering an oligopolistic market structure. The tax alone does not lead to the socially optimal level of land use. However, its combined effect with another policy instrument such as a quota, induces the optimal level of resource use.     

Pigouvian Taxes: A Strategic Approach

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can or cannot be formed.     

The cost controversy: Pigouvian economics in disequilibrium

The standard treatment traces the relation between a firm's costs and output to Jacob Viner's seminal article in 1931. This glosses over the importance of the cost controversy a by-product of which is the development of the basic elements of the theory of the firm in the long-run perfectly competitive framework. This article focuses on the contributions to this area of Arthur Cecil Pigou who-while defending specifying and changing the Marashallian treatment of the laws of returns during the 1922–1932 period - separated external and internal economics of the equilibrium firm drew (perhaps for the first time) U-shaped cost curves and spelled out stability conditions for competitive equilibrum. These provided the building blocks of modern theory of the firm as presented in undergraduate economic textbooks.     

Targeting Urban Congestion: Equity and Second-Best Issues

Distributional and second‐best problems of implementing efficiency based demand management of road use in Australian cities are addressed. Both road use pricing and parking policies are considered. Failure to price roads and parking spots efficiently contributes to excessive travel and to excessive urban expansion. A key policy concern is to promote demand management acceptability by offering transportation alternatives and by making explicit the sources of efficiency gain from revenue neutral road charging policies with double‐dividend advantages. Second‐best policies of restricting land releases on city boundaries to encourage more compact city development may be inferior to policies of pricing major roads, cordon pricing and demand based parking policies.     

Gambling Taxation: A Comment

This comment demonstrates that the application of the GST to gambling represents a shift from a commodity tax to an ad valorem tax. Theory and evidence suggest the move is likely to be welfare enhancing.     

Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation

We study the implementation of efficient behavior in settings with externalities. A planner would like to ensure that a group of agents make socially optimal choices, but he only has limited information about the agents’ preferences, and can only distinguish individual agents through the actions they choose. We describe the agents’ behavior using a stochastic evolutionary model, assuming that their choice probabilities are given by the logit choice rule. We prove that there is a simple price scheme with the following property: regardless of the realization of preferences, a group of agents subjected to the price scheme will spend the vast majority of time in the long run behaving efficiently. The price scheme defines a game that may possess multiple equilibria, but we are able to obtain a unique and efficient selection from this set because of the stochastic nature of the agents’ choice rule. We conclude by comparing the performance of our price scheme with that of VCG mechanisms.     

Pigouvian taxation with administrative costs

This paper examines how the optimal Pigouvian tax should be adjusted to reflect adminisrative costs. Several cases are examined, depending on whether the administrative costs are fixed per firm taxed or are a function of the amount of tax collected, and on whether such costs are borne by the government or by the taxed firm. In some cases the presence of administrative costs leads to an optimal tax greater than the external cost, while in other cases it leads to a tax less than the external cost.     

次优理论探析及其应用

在现实经济中一个能达到帕累托最优的完全竞争市场是不可能的。福利经济学的次优理论承认垄断是一种扭曲的市场环境，它认为在扭曲因素影响下的最大值解是低于帕累托最优值解的次优解。当经济环境中存在外部性、垄断、商品税等扭曲因素约束时，承认这些约束因素，然后再寻找最优的资源配置组合。我国经济转轨中选择的转轨方式，实际是一个次优的选择。我国的渐进式改革其实质也是一种典型的次优。     

Uniform and Non-Uniform Second-Best Input Taxes

We investigate second-best, input-based taxes foragricultural nonpoint pollution control when marketprices are endogenous and production isheterogeneous. Theoretically, we derive the optimalforms of taxes which take account of heterogeneity(non-uniform taxes) and a tax which does not (auniform tax). Empirically, we use a multi-factor,market-equilibrium simulation model to determineoptimal tax rates and associated equity effects,particularly differences in landowner gains/lossesacross a heterogeneous region. When market prices areendogenous, second-best tax policies result inpecuniary externalities that affect existingenvironmental externalities. In particular, thepecuniary externalities amplify the effect of producerheterogeneity on determination of sub-regionaldifferences in tax rates and returns to land,particularly for the uniform policy. With endogenousprices, the uniform tax rate is considerably higherthan any of the non-uniform rates and, ironically, thenon-uniform taxes result in less dispersion oflandowner gains across sub-regions than the uniformtax.     

Labor Market Institutions and the Second-Best Tariff

Labor market distortions provide a second-best case for protection. However, the implications are less obvious when the product market is imperfectly competitive too, as suggested by several partial equilibrium studies. This paper adopts a general equilibrium approach, combining unionization in labor markets with monopolistic competition in product markets. Two labor market settings are considered: fully centralized wage bargaining ("Scandinavia", for short) and negotiation at the firm level ("Latin America"). The competitive labor market case is used as a benchmark. It is shown that in Latin America the second-best tariff is higher, and the welfare level lower, than in the benchmark case. Scandinavia reaches the first best under free trade.     

Second-Best Pollution Taxes: an Analytical Framework and Some New Results

This paper compares the second-best optimal tax on polluting consumption goods with the Pigovian tax, which would internalize marginal environmental damage at a second-best optimum. It is shown that the relationship between the optimal tax on polluting consumption and the Pigovian tax is determined by the substitutability between labour and polluting consumption or clean and polluting consumption, depending on whether a wage tax system or a commodity tax system is being considered. The key factor determining the relationship between the two taxes is gross substitutability between the two taxed goods. As long as there is gross substitutability, the optimal dirt tax exceeds the Pigovian tax. The opposite can occur if and only if the two goods are gross complements.     

Prices versus Quantities in a Second-Best Setting

The choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed by two distinct research traditions. The first proceeds from Weitzman's partial equilibrium stochastic model and concludes that a tax should be preferred if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal environmental benefit curve. The second utilises deterministic general equilibrium models with pre-existing distortionary taxes. It concludes that non-revenue-raising instruments (e.g., grandfathered tradable permits) are costlier than revenue-raising ones (e.g., a tax on every unit of pollution or auctioned permits). To build a bridge between these two traditions, we introduce in Weitzman's model a positive cost of public funds due to pre-existing distortionary taxes. The tax admits a greater comparative advantage over the permits, as compared to Weitzman's classical result. Then, we assume that the regulated industry blocks any proposal that poses it too high an expected burden. This may require a transfer to firms, in the form of freely-allocated permits or lump-sum tax rebate. It turns out that if this acceptability constraint is binding, then the comparative advantage of taxes over permits is still reinforced. Quantitatively, even if the marginal benefit function is 50% more steeply sloped than the marginal cost function, the price instrument should be preferred. We also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a contingent instrument which leads to the ex post optimum. The superiority of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is higher than in first-best.     

Second-Best Renewable Subsidies to De-carbonize the Economy: Commitment and the Green Paradox

Climate change must deal with two market failures: global warming and learning by doing in renewable energy production. The first-best policy consists of an aggressive renewables subsidy in the near term and a gradually rising and falling carbon tax. Given that global carbon taxes remain elusive, policy makers might have to rely on a second-best subsidy only. With credible commitment the second-best subsidy is higher than the social benefit of learning to cut the transition time and peak warming close to first-best levels at the cost of higher fossil fuel use in the short run (weak Green Paradox). Without commitment the second-best subsidy is set to the social benefit of learning. It generates smaller weak Green Paradox effects, but the transition to the carbon-free takes longer and cumulative carbon emissions are higher. Under first best and second best with pre-commitment peak warming is 2.1–2.3 \(^{\circ }\)C, under second best without commitment 3.5 \(^{\circ }\)C, and without any policy 5.1 \(^{\circ }\)C above pre-industrial levels. Not being able to commit yields a welfare loss of 95% of initial GDP compared to first best. Being able to commit brings this figure down to 7%.     

Nuclear Power, Externalities and Non-Standard Pigouvian Taxes

The external effects arising from the use of nuclear power are, in a fundamental way, related to uncertainty. In this paper we locate these external effects and derive a dynamic Pigouvian tax in order to make the decentralized economy support the command optimum. Another interesting result is that a small constant energy tax (which we interpret as a second best policy) can take the decentralized economy reasonably close to the command optimum.     

税收文化刍议

本文从文化的内含出发,界定了税收文化的内涵和内容;从税收文化的历史和现实出发,重点提出了重建税收文化的内容--重建纳税人理念、征税人理念、用税人理念.