Peer effects on risk behaviour: the importance of group identity

This paper investigates whether and to what extent group identity plays a role in peer effects on risk behaviour. We run a laboratory experiment in which different levels of group identity are induced through different matching protocols (random or based on individual painting preferences) and the possibility to interact with group members via an online chat in a group task. Risk behaviour is measured by using the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task and peer influence is introduced by giving subjects feedback regarding group members’ previous decisions. We find that subjects are affected by their peers when taking decisions and that group identity influences the magnitude of peer effects: painting preferences matching significantly reduces the heterogeneity in risk behaviour compared with random matching. On the other hand, introducing a group task has no significant effect on behaviour, possibly because interaction does not always contribute to enhancing group identity. Finally, relative riskiness within the group matters and individuals whose peers are riskier than they are take on average riskier decisions, even when controlling for regression to the mean.     

On the effects of group identity in strategic environments

We examine differences in behavior between subjects interacting with a member of either the same or different identity group in both a centipede game and a series of stag hunt games. We find evidence that subjects interacting with outgroup members are more likely to behave as though best-responding to uniform randomization of the partner. We conclude that group identity not only affects player׳s social preferences, as identified in earlier research, but also affects the decision making process, independent of changes in the utility function.     

对霍氏团队激励机制执行中多重均衡问题的探讨

霍姆斯特姆在设计团队激励机制时并没有考虑多重均衡问题,本文着重分析霍氏机制在执行中陷入多重均衡困境的可能性与条件。研究结果表明,团队成员间互补程度的高低是决定多重均衡困境出现与否的根本原因。霍氏机制更适用于广义团队(即管理学意义上的群体),而非狭义团队。因为,正是狭义团队的内在特征———成员之间的强互补性和强依赖性,从根本上导致霍氏机制难以完美执行。     

Religious fragmentation,social identity and cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India

We study the role of village-level religious fragmentation on intra- and inter-group cooperation in India. We report on data on two-player prisoners׳ dilemma and stag hunt experiments played by 516 Hindu and Muslim participants in rural India. Our treatments are the identity of the two players and the degree of village-level religious heterogeneity. In religiously heterogeneous villages, cooperation rates in the prisoners׳ dilemma, and to a lesser extent the stag hunt game, are higher when subjects of either religion play with a fellow in-group member than when they play with an out-group member or with someone whose identity is unknown. Interestingly, cooperation rates among people of the same religion are significantly lower in homogeneous villages than in fragmented villages in both games.     

团队-成员交换差异对团队创新影响机理研究

从社会认知理论出发，将水平和垂直互动关系纳入同一研究框架，以团队认知整合作为中介变量，关系透明度作为调节变量，构建团队-成员交换（TMX）差异对团队创新的作用模型。采用SPSS等统计分析软件，基于74个团队396名成员数据，对研究假设进行检验。结果表明：TMX差异对团队创新具有负向作用；TMX差异对团队认知整合具有负向作用；团队认知整合对团队创新具有正向作用，且团队认知整合能够中介TMX差异与团队创新间关系；关系透明度对TMX差异与团队认知整合间关系发挥显著调节作用；关系透明度调节团队认知整合对TMX差异-团队创新的中介作用。     

探索影响高管团队行为集成的关键认知特征

从认知视角分析高管团队的行为集成,是打开高管团队如何影响组织绩效这个黑盒子的有效方法。本文通过对一个典型案例追踪式研究,以扎根理论的分析方法,发现高管团队中团队领袖和一般成员的认知渴求对行为集成有明显影响。本研究还揭示了团队领袖和一般成员的认知渴求既有共有纬度,也有独有纬度,这些纬度之间存在着交互影响。本研究构建出认知渴求对团队异质性和行为集成间关系的调节作用模型,既有助于理解行为集成本身,又有助于理解高管团队作用机理,具有理论和实践价值。     

基于互惠视角的团队协作激励机制博弈分析

团队激励的关键问题是团队成员的合作问题。修正放松了关于团队成员的理性人假设,引入互惠性假设,用考虑互惠心理效用的效用函数替代物质效用函数,构建包括两个团队成员的团队协作生产的博弈模型。研究了两种博弈模型的团队成员最优自身努力水平和帮助他人的努力水平,并进行对比分析。结果表明,在同时考虑物质效用和互惠心理效用的情况下,非理性团队成员的行为更加复杂,他们会在物质收益和互惠收益之间寻求平衡。     

Learning,forecasting and optimizing: An experimental study

Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: (i) agents on average correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and (ii) given expectations, agents solve optimization problems and these solutions in turn determine actual price realizations. Experimental tests of such models typically focus on only one of these two dimensions. In this paper we consider both forecasting and optimization decisions in an experimental cobweb economy. We report results from four main experimental treatments: (1) subjects form forecasts only, (2) subjects determine quantity only (solve an optimization problem), (3) they do both and (4) they are paired in teams and one member is assigned the forecasting role while the other is assigned the optimization task. All treatments converge to Rational Expectation Equilibrium (REE), but at different speeds. We observe that performance is the best in treatment 1 and the worst in Treatment 3. We further find that most subjects use adaptive rules to forecast prices. Given a price forecast, subjects are less likely to make conditionally optimal production decisions in Treatment 3 where the forecast is made by themselves, than in Treatment 4 where the forecast is made by the other member of their team, which suggests that “two heads are better than one” in term of the speed of finding the REE.     

团队制度正式化对团队创造力的影响：团队整合的中介作用与横向监督的调节作用

基于理性行为理论,构建团队制度正式化通过团队认知整合以及团队情感整合作用于团队创造力的理论模型,并分析横向监督对上述中介机制的调节效应。综合运用多元回归分析以及被调节的中介效应分析方法,利用79份项目团队样本展开实证分析。结果表明：团队制度正式化通过团队认知整合正向作用于团队情感整合;团队情感整合正向促进团队创造力;横向监督调节团队情感整合与团队创造力间关系;低横向监督情境下,团队情感整合正向促进团队创造力,而高横向监督情境下,团队情感整合与团队创造力关系不显著;低横向监督情境下,制度正式化通过团队认知整合、团队情感整合正向促进团队创造力,而高横向监督情境对该中介效应的调节作用不显著。     

Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries

We present a dynamic game of search and learning about the productivity of competing fishing locations. Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium search patterns for non-cooperating fishermen and members of an information sharing cooperative are compared with first-best outcomes. Independent fishermen do not internalize the full value of information, and do not replicate first-best search. A fishing cooperative faces a free-riding problem, as each coop member prefers that other members undertake costly search for information. Pooling contracts among coop members may mitigate, but are not likely to eliminate free-riding. Our results explain the paucity of information sharing in fisheries and suggest regulators use caution in advocating cooperatives as a solution to common pool inefficiencies in fisheries.     

Social connectedness improves co-ordination on individually costly,efficient outcomes

We study the impact of social ties on behavior in two types of asymmetric coordination games. Social ties are varied by making players interact with partners from different in-groups (fellow members of their own sports team, members of their sports club, students of their university). Subjective social ties are further measured by direct questionnaires. We find that smaller and more salient in-groups lead to significantly more group beneficial choices. The same effect is observed for players that report high values of their subjective social ties. We discuss the implication of these results for theories assuming that socially tied individuals follow some group beneficial reasoning.     

Choosing the agent's group identity in a trust game with delegated decision making

Members of a given social group often favor members of their own group identity over people with different group identities. We construct a trust game in which the principal delegates the decision about an investment into a receiver to an agent who either favors the principal's or the receiver's group identity. When choosing the agent's group identity the principal faces a trade‐off between a loyal agent and an agent who might increase the receiver's willingness to cooperate. We solve for the principal's decision in a subgame‐perfect nash equilibrium for the two scenarios of a risk‐neutral and risk‐averse agent, respectively.     

政治关联与城市公用事业民营企业成长 ——基于首家公交民营企业案例研究

在转型期的中国，政治关联是影响民营企业进入城市公用事业的关键因素。本文采用案例研究的方法，选取我国首家进入城市公交行业的民营企业作为研究对象，探索研究了该企业成长过程中的政治关联的变化及其对企业成长的影响。研究发现，首先，对于一个企业而言，政治关联来源可以分为三个层面：关键政府官员的扶持、企业家政治身份、企业家以外的高管团队成员政治身份。其中，对于政府主导型政治关联民营企业，关键政府官员的扶持对企业成长起决定性作用，而企业家和高管团队成员的政治身份对企业成长并没有显著影响。其次，政治关联对民营企业成长具有“双刃剑”的作用--驱动作用和约束作用。驱动作用主要表现在企业政治关联有利于其突破政府管制型壁垒和获得政府补助，从而分别促进企业进入公用事业和成长，约束作用主要表现在企业政治关联会导致民营企业非相关多元化、增加政治风险，从而抑制企业成长。     

Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?

This article reports two experiments that compared the standard ultimatum game played by individuals with the same game played by three-person groups. In the group treatment, the members of the allocating group conducted a brief, face-to-face discussion in order to decide, as a group, on a proposed division, whereas the members of recipient group held a discussion on whether to accept or reject the proposal. If the proposal was accepted, each group member received an equal share of his group's payoff (the pie in the group condition was three times that in the individual condition). In both experiments, groups offered less than individuals. But as indicated by the low rejection rate in both treatments, groups were also willing to accept less.     

Splitting leagues: promotion and demotion in contribution-based regrouping experiments

The paper reports an experimental study on a promotion-demotion mechanism to mitigate the free-rider problem in a voluntary contribution setting. The mechanism hierarchically splits a group in two; we refer to one subgroup as the Major league and to the other as the minor league. The most cooperative subject of the minor league is switched with the least cooperative subject in the Major league. The results reveal a significant increase of cooperation levels in both leagues relative to the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We argue that a lack of sequentially-rational beliefs about continuation payoffs in Major and minor leagues leads to higher equilibrium contributions. The data suggest beyond that, the promotion-demotion mechanism regroups subjects deliberately according to their cooperativeness.     

群体情感基调——团队认知的互补性概念

不同于以往团队研究侧重于团队认知维度,随着情感维度在团队及组织中重要性的日益凸显,学者对团队情感展开相应研究发现,在大部分现实团队中存在着对团队产出有重要影响的群体情感基调,即成员情感状态存在相对甚至高度一致的现象。从群体情感基调定义及其相关概念出发,构建了其形成及发展的理论框架,针对群体情感基调影响因素、形成过程、状态、产出以及相应的情境因素进行了相应论述。最后提出,未来研究可对团队中权威人物与其他成员情感关系、具体情感基调、情感二重调整、现代交互媒体下的群体情感基调以及子团队情感基调等方面进行探索。     

高科技创业团队的合作驱动因素研究

基于囚徒困境理论,提出影响创业团队成员合作决策的概念模型。以L公司为案例,考察其初创、转型发展、出现团队冲突、最后解体的发展过程,分析创业团队的合作与背叛行为,研究高科技创业企业的创业团队合作驱动因素。研究发现:合适的团队组成是创业团队顺利合作的关键前提;背叛成本、预期回报、有效沟通以及创业伙伴间的价值认同和信任是影响创业团队成员合作的主要因素;设计合理的核心团队成员进入和退出机制有助于创业团队的成长和转型。在此基础上,构建了高科技创业团队合作驱动因素模型。     

基于双重委托-代理的科研团队成员知识创新激励机制研究

采用双重委托-代理关系模型研究科研团队成员知识创新激励机制,强化主体创新参与意识和知识贡献精神。在团队知识创新个体成员角色划分的基础上,论述团队知识创新中的双重委托-代理关系,进而分析双重关系中的知识创新激励机制,并提出基于人力资本价值差异的激励措施。团队层面的委托-代理关系表明,个体成员的拟线性效用令有效努力水平与其收益独立分配,符合科斯定理的“行动有效,与利益分配无关”的思想;个体层面的委托-代理关系分析表明,实施基于人力资本价值的差异化激励合约,其数值模拟和参数分析结果验证了知识贡献者的产出份额、努力程度以及确定性等价收入明显得到优化。     

沟通技术平台支持的高校科研团队创新行为影响因素研究〖HJ*2〗〖HJ〗

群体环境下沟通技术平台正向着低成本、高有效性和多对多的轻OA工具的方向发展，有效促进了团队成员创新。引入高校科研团队“领导支持”这一团队层构念，以46个全国高校科研团队、261名成员为样本，基于技术接受模型及创新行为理论，运用结构方程模型（SEM）与多层线性模型（HLM），验证高校科研团队领导支持在团队采纳沟通技术平台采纳意愿和成员创新行为之间的作用。结果发现，感知易用性、感知有用性与使用意愿显著正相关；使用意愿与成员创新行为显著正相关；团队领导支持与高校科研团队成员创新行为显著正相关，而且在使用意愿与成员创新行为之间起调节作用。最后，提出相应的实践指导建议。     

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution

We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing to redistribute. A solution to the repeated game allows for redistribution and high effort, sustained by the threat to revert to the worst of these equilibria. Our results show that redistribution with high effort is not sustainable. The main reason for the absence of redistribution is that rich agents do not act differently depending on whether the poor have worked hard or not. The equilibrium in which redistribution may be sustained by the threat of punishing the poor if they do not exert effort is not observed in the experiment. Thus, the explanation of the behavior of the subjects lies in Hobbes, not in Rousseau.