Has the Euro changed business cycle synchronization? Evidence from the core and the periphery

Using a Bayesian dynamic factor model, I examine the comovement of output, investment and consumption growth among Euro area countries before and after the introduction of the Euro. For that purpose, I compare a pre-Euro period (1991–1998) to a Euro period (2000–2010) and identify a common Euro factor for each period separately. I find that the comovement of main macroeconomic variables and the common factor increases for core Eurozone countries from the first to the second period, while it decreases for most peripheral economies. This can be interpreted as a rise in business cycle synchronization for the core and a respective decline for the periphery. Different to the implications made by the endogeneity argument of currency areas (Frankel and Rose in Econ J 108(449):1009–1025, 1998), my evidence suggest that the introduction of the Euro has fostered imbalances between core and peripheral Eurozone countries.     

Has the economic crisis of 2007-2009 changed the expectation formation process in the Euro area?

We use the ECB's Survey of Professional Forecaster to show that euro area expectations are consistent with standard macroeconomic building blocks such as the Phillips curve, Okun's law, and the Taylor rule. Moreover, the paper finds that the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 did not change the expectation formation process as professional forecasters still adopt macroeconomic building blocks for their forecast. The skepticism that has recently been raised concerning macroeconomic building blocks has apparently not yet affected professional forecasts. On the contrary, we conclude that professional forecasters still have faith in macroeconomic building blocks.     

Has the Euro increased international price elasticities?

The introduction of the Euro has been accompanied by the hope that international competition between EMU member states would increase due to higher price transparency. This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing price elasticities in international trade flows between Germany and France and between Germany and the United Kingdom before and after the introduction of the Euro. Using disaggregated Eurostat trade statistics, we adopt a heterogeneous dynamic panel framework for the estimation of price elasticities. We suggest a Kalman-filter approach to control for unobservable quality changes which otherwise would bias estimates of price elasticities. We divide the complete sample, which ranges from 1995 to 2008, into two sub-samples and show that price elasticities in trade between EMU members did not change substantially after the introduction of the Euro. Hence, we do not find evidence for an increase in international price competition resulting from EMU.     

Is the Austrian business cycle theory still relevant?

We compile econometric evidence from the latest available time series data on US savings, consumption, interest rates, and gross domestic product (GDP) to test a reduced form model of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT). We build indexes that mimic the gap between the market and natural rates of interest and, using this gap as a proxy for expansionary policy, uncover evidence that changes in reserves lead to changes in real GDP in the manner predicted by ABCT. In addition, we establish that the pattern of endogenous changes in output, from positive to negative, also conforms to the predictions of ABCT. Thus, by incorporating improvements with regard to data and methods over the few other examples of econometric work in this area, we provide more distinctive evidence on ABCT relative to competing theories of the business cycle than has been done previously.

Does the BRRD affect the retail banking business model in the Euro area?

This paper discusses how the introduction of the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in European Union legislation may change the retail banking business model, which is the most prevalent model in Southern European countries. The main point is the treatment of deposits in the BRRD. Uninsured deposits may be written down or converted into equity in case of resolution of a bank. This contrasts with the treatment of other short-term liabilities, in particular repurchase agreements. Short maturity repos are excluded from the bail-in, regardless of their size. Also, liabilities related to securities lending and derivatives are given privileged treatment. It is argued that this will be an advantage for wholesale and investment banks, which use these types of short-term funding largely to finance asset purchases. Moreover, it will severely hit retail banking business models of various types by undermining the trust of depositors in the bank, causing bank runs whenever rumours circulate about financial distress situations, thus increasing its cost of funding and lowering the value of its shares. Therefore, to avoid runs on repos, runs on banks are resurging.     

Dating the ‘world business cycle’

By mid-2008 the world was witnessing the unfolding of a relatively rare macroeconomic phenomenon, namely, the onset of what one might call a synchronized international – or ‘world’ – recession. But what exactly is a ‘synchronized world recession’? This article proposes a practical definition of a ‘synchronized world recession’ and a putative set of historical post-WWII dates for a ‘world business cycle chronology’. Further, using a constructed ‘world coincident index of economic indicators’ and an associated ‘world leading index of economic indicators’, this article demonstrates that evidence was available from early in the second half of 2007 that the world was indeed sliding inexorably towards its fourth synchronized world recession since WWII (although, interestingly, already its second of the twenty-first century!).     

How does population aging affect the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus over the business cycle?

What is the impact of population aging on the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus over the business cycle? We address this question by estimating state-dependent fiscal multipliers in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). A government spending shock is identified as a forecast error of government spending and its output effect is estimated by using the local projection method. We find that there is no effect of population aging on output effects of fiscal spending shocks in expansionary times, whereas in recessions the output effects of fiscal spending shocks are weakened as population ages. This result points to important policy implications in that population aging would call for a larger fiscal stimulus to support aggregate demand during recession. Thus, this requires a larger fiscal space to allow for a wider swing of the fiscal position without creating concerns for fiscal sustainability.     

Government debt dynamics and the global financial crisis: Has anything changed in the EA12?

This paper seeks to shed light on possible changes in the government debt dynamics for the first 12 euro area countries. Structural breaks are present around the global financial crisis for most countries, but not for Germany and France, the two core countries in the euro area. The properties of the government debt dynamics differ markedly across the countries receiving bailouts.     

Does integration and economic policy coordination promote business cycle synchronization in the EU?

Previous studies have discounted important factors and indirect channels that might contribute to business cycle synchronization (BCS) in the EU. We estimate the effects of market integration and economic policy coordination on bilateral business cycle correlations over the period 1995–2012 using a simultaneous equations model that takes into accounts both the endogenous relationships and unveils direct and indirect effects. The results suggest that (1) trade and FDI have a pronounced positive effect on BCS, particularly between incumbent and new EU members. (2) Rising specialization does not decouple business cycles. (3) The decline of income disparities in EU27 contributes to BCS, as converging countries develop stronger trade and FDI linkages. (4) There is strong evidence that poor fiscal discipline of EU members is a major impediment of business cycle synchronization. (5) The same argument holds true for exchange rate fluctuations that hinder BCS, particularly in EU15. Since BCS is a fundamental prerequisite and objective in an effective monetary union, the EU has to promote market integration and strengthen the common setting of economic policies.     

Crime during the business cycle: urban–rural differences

Despite the abundant literature on how crime evolves over the business cycle, no consensus has arisen whether crime increases or decreases during recessions. The literature provides both positive and negative associations between the crime rate and the unemployment rate, a commonly used proxy for the business cycle. This study revisits this issue and uses county-level data from 1990 to 2013. It allows for differences as to how unemployment relates to both property crime and violent crime depending on the size of the counties. We find evidence of a positive association between unemployment and property crime that strengthens with county size. The results show the same pattern for violent crime but are statistically weaker. Our findings suggest that the positive association between property crime and unemployment that others have found is largely driven by more populous areas.     

Are economic growth and the variability of the business cycle related? Evidence from five European countries

We use a long series of annual data that span over 100 years to examine the relationship between output growth and its uncertainty in five European countries. Using the GARCH methodology to proxy uncertainty, we obtain two important results. First, more uncertainty about output leads to a higher rate of growth in three of the five countries. Second, output growth reduces its uncertainty in all countries except one. Our results are robust to alternative specifications and provide strong support to the recent emphasis by macroeconomists on the joint examination of economic growth and the variability of the business cycle.     

Do business cycle peaks predict election calls in Canada?

This paper examines the empirical regularity that in Canada business cycle peaks and federal elections have tended to arise together over the long post-Confederation time period following 1867. We argue that rather than being simultaneous, the two events are related sequentially and that causality can be identified properly if the selection issue associated with observed events is addressed carefully. Our results suggest that business cycle peaks lead federal elections rather than the other way around. Such a finding reinforces the hypothesis of strategic election timing for such countries and is insightful in helping to explain why the presence of a political business cycle is harder to establish for parliamentary governments where the date of the next election is under the control of the incumbent governing party than in democratic systems where governing durations and election dates are fixed.     

Euro Area business cycles in turbulent times: convergence or decoupling?

We study the business cycle properties of the four largest European economies in the wake of the recent recession episodes. The analysis is based on the factors estimated from a multi-country and multi-sector data-rich environment. We measure alikeness of business cycles by studying the synchronization of up and down phases, the convergence properties of country fluctuations towards the Euro Area (EA) cycles and the contribution of the EA factor to national GDP volatilities. While the economic fluctuations of the four EA member states were similar before the global financial turmoil, we gather compelling evidence of an asymmetric behaviour of Spanish fluctuations relative to the EA one.     

Does Leaving the Eurozone Mean Leaving the Euro?

Events in the Eurozone have raised the possibility that a Eurozone member departs the currency union. We devise a simulation to examine whether trading firms in the departed country will continue to invoice their product in the Euro or elect another currency denomination strategy. Because trading firms have flexibility in choosing their invoicing currency, they make an excellent case for studying the currency usage patterns of other economic actors that may emerge after Eurozone departure. Results suggest that greater price discrimination leads to more use of the buyer’s currency while firms that set only one price will tend to denominate that price in the U.S. dollar. Low exchange rate volatility between the exiting country’s new currency and the Euro leads to more Euro usage.     

Introducing...the Euro

Istheeuroreallygoingtohap-pen?Yes.Morethan14billioneuronoteshavebeenprinted;50billioncoinshavebeenminted.Europeangovernmentsandbusinesseshavespentbillionsgettingreadyforthis.Thereisnoturningbackforthe300millionpeoplelivingineuroland.OnJan.1,euroswillbeginspewingfromATMsin12countries(Austria,Belgium,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Ireland,Italy,Luxembourg,theNetherlands,Portu-gal,andSpain).TheplanisthatbyJan.15,mostcurrencytransactionsinthosecountrieswillbeineurosandbythebeginningofMarch,…     

Has the Fed been a failure?

As the 100th anniversary of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act approaches, we assess whether the nation’s experiment with the Federal Reserve has been a success or a failure. Drawing on a wide range of recent empirical research, we find the following: (1) The Fed’s full history (1914 to present) has been characterized by more rather than fewer symptoms of monetary and macroeconomic instability than the decades leading to the Fed’s establishment. (2) While the Fed’s performance has undoubtedly improved since World War II, even its postwar performance has not clearly surpassed that of its undoubtedly flawed predecessor, the National Banking system, before World War I. (3) Some proposed alternative arrangements might plausibly do better than the Fed as presently constituted. We conclude that the need for a systematic exploration of alternatives to the established monetary system is as pressing today as it was a century ago.     

Has the Canadian labour market polarized?

We use Census and Labour Force Survey (LFS) data for the period from 1971 to 2012 to investigate whether the Canadian wage and employment structures have polarized, that is, whether wages and employment have grown more in high‐ and low‐ than in middle‐paying occupations. We find that there has been faster growth in employment in both high‐ and low‐paying occupations than those in the middle since 1981. However, up to 2005, the wage pattern reflects a simple increase in inequality with greater growth in high‐paid than middle‐paid occupations and greater growth in middle than low‐paid occupations. Since 2005, there has been some polarization but this is present only in some parts of the country and seems to be related more to the resource boom than technological change. We present results for the US to provide a benchmark. The Canadian patterns fit with those in the US and other countries apart from the 1990s when the US undergoes wage polarization not seen elsewhere. We argue that the Canadian data do not fit with the standard technological change model of polarization developed for the US.     

Is Fiscal Policy Procyclical in the Euro Area?

We test the relationship between the cyclically adjusted primary balance and alternative indicators of cyclical conditions for the euro area and 18 OECD countries over the period 1970–2009. A countercyclical stance of discretionary fiscal policy is found during bad times after 1999 in the euro area as a whole and in a few member countries only (France, Ireland and The Netherlands). It is also associated with high public deficits or low public debts. There is no significant case of procyclical fiscal policy after 1999, neither in good times nor in bad times.     

Are microfinance institutions resilient to economic slowdown? Evidence from their capital ratio adjustment over the business cycle

Prior studies using pre-crisis data concluded that microfinance institutions are resilient to economic crises. However, some recent studies indicate that the microfinance sector is becoming part of the global financial system and microfinance lending activities are now vulnerable to economic and financial crises. Capital being a key resource to support lending, this paper analyzes the cyclical behaviour of capital ratio using an international sample of microfinance institutions from 2001 to 2014. We uncover a negative relationship between their capital-to-assets ratios and business cycle indicators. This relationship mainly concerns regulated institutions, comprised mostly of profit-oriented MFIs, and is driven by both asset-side and capital level adjustments. We identify the lending channel (loan-to-assets ratio) as the main mechanism to explain these cyclical variations. Our findings are consistent with the “procyclicality” of capital regulation documented extensively in the banking literature. Hence, macro-prudential regulation for MFIs should target regulated and profit-oriented MFIs.     

Does the impact of plant closure on labour market attachment differ between immigrants and native workers across the business cycle?

This article investigates the effect of plant closure on the labour market attachment of immigrants and how these effects vary with business cycles. The research covers two periods: one of economic upturn and one of economic downturn, and uses a rich employer–employee dataset. Results show that experiencing a plant closure in a recession has more severe individual repercussions than experiencing a plant closure in an expanding economy, particularly for immigrants. In good times, the long-term effects of plant closure are very small for both immigrants and natives, while in a recession, effects are more severe for immigrants, possibly leading to lasting scars for this group. These results appear robust using both matching techniques and fixed-effect models.