WTO as Moral Support

International cooperation in trade policies under the auspices of the WTO makes countries "feel" more obliged to uphold agreements. The paper emphasizes the role of the WTO to give moral support: countries incur "psychological costs" when they renege on the agreements that are formally signed under the WTO. Using the concept of Kandori's (2003 ) "morale equilibrium," we formalize this idea and show that countries can agree on a cooperative level of the binding tariffs but they occasionally deviate from the agreement, which lowers the morale and invites further deviations in the future.     

Developing-Country Benefits from MFN Relative to Regional/Bilateral Trade Arrangements

Using a general‐equilibrium model of world trade, this paper evaluates the benefits of most‐favored‐nation (MFN) treatment to developing countries in multilateral relative to bilateral or regional trade agreements, from three sources. First, developing countries may be able to free‐ride on bilateral tariff concessions exchanged between larger countries in MFN‐based GATT/WTO rounds. Second, MFN benefits developing countries by restricting discriminatory retaliatory actions by other countries, evaluated here by a non‐ cooperative Nash tariff game. Finally, MFN changes threat points in bargaining and hence affects the bargaining solution of multilateral MFN‐based trade negotiation compared to a bilateral/regional arrangement. The authors find that the benefits to developing countries are small in the first case as the tariff rates are already low, and the benefits are small in the second case as the optimal tariffs under unconstrained retaliation are not very asymmetric. Benefits from the third case are large as large countries can extract large side‐payments if they bargain bilaterally.     

The role of the most favored nation principle of the GATT/WTO in the New Trade model

I study the impact of the most favored nation (MFN) principle of the GATT/WTO on bilateral trade agreements in the New Trade model. The paper offers four main predictions. First, a bilateral trade agreement without external tariff adjustments hurts the outside country, while a bilateral trade agreement under MFN benefits the outside country. Second, the MFN principle may cause a free‐rider problem. Third, a Pareto‐improving bilateral trade agreement under MFN does not exist if initial tariffs and the elasticity of substitution are sufficiently low. This suggests that the MFN principle may prevent bilateral trade agreements in the future when tariffs are already low and that the definition of “like products” in the MFN rule is welfare improving only if it covers only goods that are closely substituted. Fourth, in the future when tariffs are low, multilateral negotiations and preferential trade areas will become more desirable. Using a calibrated 10‐region 33‐industry model, I show that around 30% of bilateral trade agreements that would be agreed upon in the absence of the MFN rule could not be agreed upon if the MFN rule is imposed.     

Trade policy under the GATT/WTO: empirical evidence of the equal treatment rule

Abstract. A fundamental difference between multilateral trade agreements like the GATT and WTO and a preferential agreement is the multilateral agreements’ inclusion of a most‐favoured‐nation principle. Though MFN requires that members implement policies that provide equal treatment to all GATT/WTO countries, how far do members actually follow the MFN principle when so required? We empirically investigate a sample of GATT/WTO trade disputes and the effect of successful dispute settlement negotiations on the disputed product trade of third country exporters to the defendant country. We document evidence of trade liberalization consistent with defendant countries successfully applying the equal treatment rule. JEL classification F13     

应正确理解与运用WTO金融审慎措施

WTO框架内以GATS及其金融附件等多边协定组成的有关金融服务贸易的规则体系,是推行金融服务贸易自由化的最重要的国际协定.而金融监管与金融自由化看似矛盾的两者在WTO框架之中是通过金融审慎措施进行协调的.金融审慎措施的正确理解和运用既是履行WTO义务的要求,也是维护一国利益的需要.     

International Trade, Regional Free Trade Agreements, and Economic Development

In 1991, Krugman illustrated that natural (regional) free trade agreements (FTAs) are likely to be welfare-enhancing if intercontinental costs are prohibitively high, but are likely to be welfare-reducing if such costs are zero. In 1995, Frankel, Stein and Wei extended the analysis to consider positive but nonprohibitive transport costs. This paper extends these models to allow for countries of different economic size. Large countries will tend to have higher relative wages, influencing the relative gains and losses from natural FTAs. For even modest differences in size, intracontinental FTAs are welfare-enhancing for larger countries, regardless of strong preferences for diversity or low intercontinental transport costs.     

Free Trade Agreements and the Prospects for Regional Integration in East Asia

Trade policy in East Asia has switched from non-discriminatory unilateral liberalization, reinforced by General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) commitments, to discriminatory free trade agreements (FTA). The paper surveys the FTA activity of the major regional players: China, the ASEAN countries, Japan, and South Korea. It concludes that emerging FTAs are weak and partial. A hub-and-spoke pattern of dirty FTAs will not drive regional economic integration or further integration with the global economy. Rather, it could be a force of regional economic disintegration – especially if the multilateral trading system weakens further. At the same time, FTA activity is distracting attention from the WTO, and, more fundamentally, from unilateral liberalization and domestic structural reforms. Hence, East Asian trade policies need to be rebalanced, with better-quality FTAs and more focus on the WTO. However, more important than the WTO and FTAs is a fresh spurt of unilateral liberalization and structural reform outside trade negotiations.     

International supply chains and trade agreements

There is a growing literature that examines the role of trade agreements on the formation of international supply chains. The evidence indicates that in general countries that share trade agreements are more likely to develope cross-border supply chains. In this analysis, we argue that in order to examine the effects of trade agreements on the formation of supply chains between two countries, it is not enough to analyse the impact of the trade agreements that the two countries share but it is also important to assess the impact of the trade agreements that they share with third countries. Using data on trade in value added for 129 countries, we show empirically that about 40% of the potential increase in trade in value added induced by a trade agreement between an importing country and a sourcing partner is wiped out by each additional trade agreement signed by the importing country with third nations in which the sourcing partner is not a member. The result has important implications for regions seeking to develop international supply chains but in which the process of integration is highly fragmented.     

Do external interventions work? The case of trade reform conditions in IMF supported programs

Trade reform conditions are common in IMF supported programs. Of the 99 countries that had IMF programs during 1993-2003, 77 had trade reform conditions in their programs. Since the WTO has not been found especially effective in promoting trade openness for most developing countries, it is of great interest to see if the IMF has been more effective as it combines carrots and sticks not available to the WTO. Yet, the effectiveness of these trade conditions has not been systematically studied. Using a unique dataset, this paper provides such an assessment. It finds that trade conditions are indeed associated with an increase in trade openness on average, but the effect comes mostly from countries that can be characterized by a high degree of “willingness to reform.”     

Beyond trade creation: Preferential trade agreements and trade disputes

This study investigates the effects of preferential trade agreements (PTA) on bilateral trade disputes. We construct a unique and comprehensive dataset on inter-country trade disputes from 1995 to 2007. The dataset covers 110 countries and 1,162 bilateral country-pair trade disputes. Using this dataset in a gravity-type model of trade dispute analysis, we find that countries belonging to the same PTA tend to experience fewer trade conflicts among themselves than with non-member countries. By studying various types of PTA with different dispute settlement mechanisms, we further find that the dispute-reducing effect only comes from PTA with specific provisions on dispute settlement mechanisms. Moreover, the effect is stronger if those PTA explicitly stipulate that members can also resolve their disputes via the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. However, having PTA that do not address how members should resolve their disputes may lead to more dispute initiations than in cases without PTA.     

On the emergence of an MFN club: equal treatment in an unequal world

Abstract .  Motivated by GATT, we endogenize the formation of a club whose members have to abide by the MFN principle of non-discrimination. The underlying model is that of oligopolistic intraindustry trade. While an MFN club does not alter average tariff levels across countries, it increases aggregate world welfare; makes non-members worse off; and can immiserize its high cost members. These results imply that (i) core WTO rules such as MFN are valuable even if multilateral negotiations deliver limited trade liberalization and (ii) the distributional effects of MFN maybe one reason why developing countries have been granted Special and Differential treatment at the WTO.     

Do SPS measures matter for margins of trade? Evidence from firm-level data

According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) standards, countries are allowed to adapt regulations under the Sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) agreements in order to protect human, animal and plant health, as well as environment and human safety. Yet, these measures can become an impediment in international trade, especially for developing countries. Therefore, using an Egyptian firm-level data set and a new database on specific trade concerns raised in the TBT and SPS committees at the WTO, we analyse the effects of product standards on two related aspects: first, the probability to export (firm-product extensive margin), and second, the value exported (firm-product intensive margin). We merge this data set with a new database on specific trade concerns raised in the TBT and SPS committees at the WTO. Our main findings show that SPS measures imposed on Egyptian exporters have a negative impact on the probability of exporting a new product to a new destination. By contrast, the intensive margin of exports is not significantly affected by such measures.     

FREE TRADE NETWORKS WITH TRANSFERS*

We investigate the network of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a network formation game with transfers. In a previous paper we showed that without international transfers countries with different industrialization levels cannot sign an FTA, so that the global free trade network, in which every pair of countries signs an FTA, is not in general pairwise‐stable. In this paper we show that, even if the world consists of fairly asymmetric countries, the global free trade network is pairwise‐stable when transfers between FTA signatories are allowed. Moreover, it is a unique pairwise‐stable network unless industrial commodities are highly substitutable.     

The MFN clause,welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size

This paper analyzes MFN in a “competing exporters” model of trade between three countries with unequal endowments and shows that MFN yields higher aggregate welfare than tariff discrimination even as it makes low income countries worse off. Furthermore, in a repeated game of tariff cooperation, multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under MFN punishments relative to discriminatory ones. This conclusion holds even when tariff discrimination takes the form of bilateral trade agreements. Overall, the analysis shows that from the viewpoint of low income countries, MFN and multilateral tariff cooperation are complementary in nature.     

International Integration,Trade, and the Great Recession

In the wake of the Great Recession, almost all countries suffered a severe and synchronized trade collapse unlike any seen since the Great Depression. To the extent that economic integration fosters trade among countries, this paper examines the role that international integration played in moderating the negative shock caused by the Great Recession on trade. The methodology adopted is a modified gravity model in which we control for the Great Recession, different forms of integration, as well as the interaction between integration and the recession. Measuring integration in three different ways, the findings show that countries that were more integrated fared better in trade – the extent of trade collapse was milder – than less integrated countries. Specifically, Regional Trade Agreement, as a form of trade integration, had a positive and robust effect on trade during the Great Recession. This positive effect is also robust across regions and countries around the world. In a nutshell, countries that are into some form of trade agreements are better-positioned to absorb negative demand-side shocks caused by economic recessions than similar countries without such agreements.     

Heterogeneous trade agreements,WTO membership and international trade: an analysis using matching econometrics

This article explores the heterogeneous effects of trade agreements (TAs) and World Trade Organization (WTO) membership on the volume of international trade. We extend Baier and Bergstrand’s (2009a) application of matching econometrics by distinguishing between different types of TAs and WTO participation and account for the endogenous nature of trade policy. For a panel data set covering 1960–2005 and 187 countries, we find that the treatment effect on international trade systematically varies with the type of TA and WTO membership.     

Optimal remedies in international trade agreements

This paper takes a mechanism-design approach to characterize a politically optimal trade agreement under the assumption that governments have private information about the fluctuating political pressure they face from domestic interest groups to restrict trade. The optimal mechanism under these changing circumstances involves a remedy system for breach of trade agreements that specifies less-than-proportional retaliations against deviating parties. This result is in contrast to the conventional wisdom in the literature regarding the efficiency of the Reciprocity Principle as a rule of renegotiation in trade agreements. I also consider an institutional structure in which only commensurate retaliations are practical but governments can employ a public randomizing device to authorize retaliations. I show that it is optimal to authorize retaliations only randomly. This suggests a role for the WTO dispute settlement process as a public randomizing device.     

Depression of the deprived or eroding enthusiasm of the elites: What has shifted the support for international trade?

We use the 2003 and 2013 waves of the International Survey Program (ISSP) in order to explore the change in people’s attitudes that may be behind the recent backlash against globalization. We show that the average support for international trade has decreased in many – albeit not all – countries, and we demonstrate that these changes are related to the depth and length of the global financial crisis of 2008/09 as well as the evolution of income inequality. Moreover, our results document a declining support of those individuals who are likely to benefit from international trade: the young, high-skilled and well-off. We show that this “eroding enthusiasm of the elites” is empirically relevant even if we control for individuals’ increasing exposure to international labor-market competition.     

The Welfare Synergy of Bundling International Environmental Agreements with International Trade Treaties

This paper examines whether linking environmental cooperation with international trade agreements improves the welfare of the participating countries and allows countries to move closer to free trade compared with trade‐only agreements. The model is an infinitely repeated game with the threat of reversion to Nash equilibrium if an economy deviates from the cooperative agreement. It is found that such a synergy exists in a symmetric two‐country model with two goods, both emitting pollutants even when the externalities have local impact. A combination of analytic and numerical simulation analysis is used to derive the conclusions.     

The heterogeneous effect of finance on international trade

Is the impact of financial development on international trade heterogeneous – being positive, negative or null – across manufacturing sectors? And is it dependent on the level of sectoral requirement on external finance for capital need? To examine these questions this article uses a panel trade database on 21 manufacturing sectors in 80 countries between 2000 and 2009. The analysis demonstrates that the effect of financial development on trade is indeed heterogeneous by estimating a coefficient for each sector and showing that the signs and significance levels vary across them. The article also demonstrates that sectors with strong reliance on external finance export higher volume from countries with developed financial system and that financial development reduces trade in industries with low financial dependence level.