员工股权激励对中小企业创新会产生补充的促进效应吗？

高管与核心技术员工作用于创新的不同过程,同时也是股权激励计划的主要激励对象,两者股权激励的互动效应对创新的影响值得探讨。选取2009—2015年成功实施股权激励的深A上市中小板与创业板公司为研究对象,考察员工股权激励对高管股权激励在中小企业创新中的影响及其作用机制。研究结果表明：实施股权激励计划能够显著增加企业研发投入与创新产出;相较于高管,核心技术员工股权激励强度越大,企业创新数量越多、质量越高;高管股权激励降低了创新转化效率。进一步地,融资支持效应和人才激励效应是员工股权激励补充促进创新的重要机制;代理成本在高管股权激励与研发投入关系中起遮掩作用。     

多视角下的上市公司股权激励影响因素分析

我国上市公司股权激励的相关数据统计显示,上市公司在是否实施股权激励,激励方式的选择、激励的范围、深度的确定等方面存在较为显著的差异。上市公司所处行业、规模、成长性、绩效水平、股权结构、负债程度等因素均从不同层面对其股权激励行为的产生影响。结论认为创新企业评价体系,建立完善、有效的激励指标是股权激励有效的重要保障。     

Analysis of the equity preference influence in customer participation incentives

In this paper, equity preference is introduced into the customer participation (CP) incentive problem and new principal–agent models are built. The proposed models are different from the Holmstrom and Milgrom's models (1987) because of the consideration of equity preference, which emphasize the material utility and equitable distribution of customers. By assuming that the incentives that firms pay to customers have the same effect on monetary incentives, the optimal incentives are discussed, in which the equilibrium solutions are explored and the respective impact of horizontal equity preference and vertical equity preference on CP incentives are compared. The proposed models are validated by numerical experiments in the product enhancement project of a large software enterprise in Guangzhou. It can be demonstrated that 1) asymmetric information induces lazy behaviors of customers concerning vertical equity preference; 2) horizontal equity preference promotes the work enthusiasm of customers in CP more than self-interest does; and 3) it is more conducive to obtain a much bigger expected income when firms employ customers with horizontal equity preference to participate in innovation process.     

高管过度激励、所有权性质与企业国际化战略

文章采用中国制造业上市公司的数据讨论高管薪酬激励和股权激励对企业国际化程度的影响。研究证实,由于边际递减效应在一定程度上形成所谓的过度激励,中国上市公司高管股权激励与企业国际化程度之间表现为倒U形关系;进一步研究发现,国有和民营上市公司薪酬激励和股权激励在促使企业高管开展国际化经营方面的作用迥然相异。     

混合所有制、股权激励与融资决策中的防御行为--基于动态权衡理论的证据

文章基于动态权衡理论,以1999-2014年上市公司为样本,运用混合所有制改革这一“自然实验”条件,研究了高管股权激励对其融资决策中防御行为的影响,分离出激励和治理双重效应。研究发现：(1)股权激励有助于抑制高管融资决策中的防御行为,但这种效应只存在于民营企业中;(2)对于国有企业,只在股权分置改革后才观察到类似效果,而股改前高管在减少债务融资的同时,提高了股权激励水平,自我激励问题明显;(3)公司股权混合度越高,其在赋予高管股权激励上越谨慎,但在国有股比例较高的公司中,混合所有制改革显著提高了股权激励水平;(4)股权混合安排显著改进了股权激励契约在抑制高管防御行为方面的效率,这种效应在非国有股比例较高的公司中更强。     

Incentive effects of funding contracts: an experiment

We examine the incentive effects of funding contracts on entrepreneurial effort and on allocative efficiency. We experiment with funding contracts that differ in the structure of investor repayment and, thus, in their incentives for the provision of entrepreneurial effort. Theoretically the replacement of a standard debt contract by a repayment-equivalent non-monotonic contract reduces effort distortions and increases efficiency. Likewise, distortions can be mitigated by replacing outside equity by a repayment-equivalent standard-debt contract. We test both hypotheses in the laboratory. Our results reveal that the incentive effects of funding contracts must be experienced before they are reflected in observed behavior. With sufficient experience, observed behavior is either consistent with or close to theoretical predictions and supports both hypotheses. If we allow for entrepreneur-sided manipulations of project outcomes, we find that non-monotonic contracts lose much of their appeal.     

上市公司股权激励存在的问题与对策

2014年伊始,A股上市公司就掀起股权激励的热潮,截至3月份,已有益生股份、东华能源、鸿利光电等27家上市公司推出股权激励预案。在我国,股权激励在A股市场已经历了四个阶段,从最开始的萌芽期到股改时的冲动期,再到股权激励的相关办法相继出台后的规范期;随着中小企业板及创业板的长足发展及民营企业的大量上市,目前已经进入了快速发展期。随着股权激励计划在我国上市公司的普遍推行,大量问题涌现出来,严重影响实施股权激励的效用。     

Manipulation-proof equilibrium in atomless economies with commodity differentiation

Summary. In this paper, we introduce a perfect competition test which checks the incentives of arbitrarily small coalitions to behave strategically in endowments and preferences. We apply this coalitional incentive compatibility test to atomless economies with a continuum of differentiated commodities. We show that, under thickness conditions, economies with a finite number of types and economies whose set of agents' preferences is compact, pass this perfect competition test. Limiting results for replica economies are also presented. Received: July 25, 1997; revised version: December 5, 1998     

我国上市公司高管层股权激励中存在的问题及对策研究

高管层股权激励是上市公司管理中的重要机制,是极为重要的薪酬激励模式之一。高管层股权激励加强了公司股东与高管之间的利益关系,促进公司高管为股东创造更多的利益。就此,以上市公司的高管股权激励为研究对象,初步探讨高管股权激励的基本类型和特点,对我国上市公司高管层股权激励中存在的问题进行分析研究,并提出一些行之有效的对策。     

Is executive compensation a substitute governance mechanism to debt financing and leasing?

This study examines whether and how CEO equity incentives relate to financing choices (i.e., debt and leases). Using manually collected CEO compensation and lease data for a sample of large UK firms, we found evidence of a negative relationship between CEO equity incentives and firm leverage. We also found that CEO equity incentives and leases are negatively related. The results are consistent with the theory introduced in this study on the substitutability of executive compensation and firm’s debt/lease financing. Our findings represent fresh empirical evidence and renewed interpretation regarding the relationship between executive equity-based incentives and firm’s financing choices. The substitutability theory we introduced here suggests that firms with greater use of debt and/or leases will implement less equity-based compensation in mitigating the agency cost of equity.     

Incentives for firms to provide safety: Regulatory authority and capital market reactions

We investigate the relationship between the various incentives that firms have to act safely, focusing on the relationship between the equity losses experienced by a firm following a fatal, accident and the incentive effects created by government regulation. The major findings are that first, the capital market reactions vary dramatically by which agency has regulatory jurisdiction for the accident. And second, the capital market effects tend to be weak (equity values do not decline sizably) where federal agencies rely heavily on an ex ante inspection policy. On the other hand, where ex ante inspection policy is lax or nonexistent, capital market effects tend to be strong - up to an order of magnitude higher per fatality than willingness-to-pay estimates based on labor market data.     

技术董事、股权激励对企业创新效率的影响

随着知识经济时代的到来，创新在企业经营中的地位越来越高，董事、监事及高管团队对企业创新战略的方向、组织和实施具有重要影响，研究他们对企业创新的影响变得必要和迫切。以2012-2017年沪深两市上市公司为研究对象，运用DEA-Tobit两阶段模型，分析企业技术董事比例和股权激励（分为高管股权激励和核心员工股权激励两个维度）对中国上市公司技术创新效率的影响。结果显示，公司技术董事的比例越大，上市公司技术创新效率越高；对核心员工的股权激励授予比例越高，上市公司技术创新效率越高；然而，高管股权激励授予比例与上市公司技术创新效率并无显著联系。     

Government incentive strategies and private capital participation in China’s Shale gas development

Shale gas development investments are uncertain and irreversible in the initial stage in China. Flexible incentive strategy is needed for governments to guide private capital participation at different development stages. This study aims to provide analysis governments can use to encourage private investment in shale gas projects according to its plans in an extended real options framework. A social benefits variable is introduced to determine the threshold of social benefits that determine whether the government will choose a deferred or instant incentives strategy. By considering the efficiency factor, we show the optimal arrangements of two kinds of incentives: tax cuts and production subsidies, to implement incentive targets. The results indicate that current market demand and social benefits are the key factors that affect the government’s choice of incentive strategy. We also find that the optimal level of incentives, either tax cuts or production subsidies, are independent of current market demand and future market uncertainty under the delayed incentive strategy, but which affect the optimal level of incentives under the instant motivation strategy, and ignoring the negative influence of unpredictable random events on future market demand might lead to insufficient government incentives in this case.     

技术董事、股权激励对企业创新效率的影响

随着知识经济时代的到来，创新在企业经营中的地位越来越高，董事、监事及高管团队对企业创新战略的方向、组织和实施具有重要影响，研究他们对企业创新的影响变得必要和迫切。以2012-2017年沪深两市上市公司为研究对象，运用DEA-Tobit两阶段模型，分析企业技术董事比例和股权激励（分为高管股权激励和核心员工股权激励两个维度）对中国上市公司技术创新效率的影响。结果显示，公司技术董事的比例越大，上市公司技术创新效率越高；对核心员工的股权激励授予比例越高，上市公司技术创新效率越高；然而，高管股权激励授予比例与上市公司技术创新效率并无显著联系。     

银行规模与经理人激励——基于中国信息和不确定性环境的理论研究

本文基于委托代理激励理论,探讨不同规模银行中信息类别、不确定性信息与合同期限、政府行为等因素对经理人激励的影响.发现在中国这样的转型经济国家中,不确定性、非契约关系与政府行为使得银行规模与其竞争力和生存性的关系变得更加微妙.(1)相对大银行而言,小银行的发展面临更多的机会和风险;(2)长期合同下股权激励对于小银行经理人有着更为重要的意义;(3)客户经理的素质高低与一致性对于小银行激励效率的发挥至关重要;(4)我国小银行与地方政府天然密切的关系对其"软"信息获取作用很大,但同时也可能对其激励机制的长期有效性造成负面影响.     

Self-selection and the power of incentive schemes: an experimental study

We examine how self-selection of workers depends on the power of incentive schemes and how it affects team performance if the power of the incentive schemes is increased. In a laboratory experiment, we let subjects choose between (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting high trust or reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual incentives, subjects who chose team incentives perform worse if both the unobservable interdependency between their efforts and their incentive to cooperate under team incentives are high.     

高管激励与研发支出:内生性考察

高管激励与研发支出显著正相关,但二者是否存在内生性问题?基于2009—2011年中国制造业上市公司数据的实证研究发现,高管激励和研发支出之间存在内生性问题,OLS回归法会导致系数估计不具有一致性。利用联立方程模型则发现,高管股权激励和研发支出之间存在双向因果关系,高管报酬激励与研发支出之间并不存在因果关系。这表明高管激励和企业研发支出决策之间存在相互影响。     

董事会激励对公司效率影响的随机前沿分析

本文将激励形式分为两种内部激励——显性激励、隐性激励和两种外部激励——产品市场压力、资本市场压力,并以2005—2008年度中国纺织服装行业上市公司为样本,利用随机前沿模型实证分析了董事会激励对公司效率的影响。结果表明:显性激励方面,董事会薪酬激励优于权益激励;隐性激励方面,董事长更替对公司效率有积极显著的影响,而董事长和总经理的两职合一对公司效率有负面的影响。外部激励方面,产品市场的竞争压力比资本市场的收购风险对公司董事会更有约束力。     

Executive compensation in government-linked companies: evidence from Malaysia

The aim of this study was to explore the characteristics of executive pay, equity ownership incentives and pay–performance relationship in government-controlled firms. Data were hand-collected from the annual reports of 179 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. The results show that executive pay is lower in government-linked companies. Positive pay–performance relationship is also not evident for this category of firms, which indicates that their executives were largely guaranteed with certain level of pay irrespective of performance. The level of equity ownership incentives provides the executives in government-controlled firms with very little incentive to produce effort that can improve firm performance. Overall, our findings are consistent with the inefficient pay hypothesis developed in this study.     

Peer Pressure and Incentives

We study the effects of peer pressure on incentives. To this end, we extend a multiagent model with moral hazard and limited liability by introducing a peer pressure function. We show that the optimal incentive for the less productive agent is more high powered than that for the more productive agent in the case with peer pressure. Moreover, in comparison with the case without peer pressure, the optimal incentive for the less productive agent becomes more high powered, while the optimal incentive for the more productive agent becomes less high powered.