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1.
    
Several labor markets, including the job market for new Ph.D. economists, have recently developed formal signaling mechanisms. We show that such mechanisms are harmful for some environments. While signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. In particular, we consider a two-sided matching game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Each worker has either the same “typical” known preferences with probability close to one or “atypical” idiosyncratic preferences with the complementary probability close to zero. Firms have known preferences over workers. We show that under some technical condition if at least three firms are responsive to some workerʼs signal, the introduction of signaling strictly decreases the expected number of matches.  相似文献   

2.
    
We compare the amount of information credibly transmitted by cheap talk when information is centralized to one sender and when it is decentralized, with each of several senders holding a distinct but interdependent piece. Under centralization, full information transmission is typically impossible. Under decentralization, however, the number of receivers is decisive: decentralized communication with one receiver is completely uninformative, but decentralized communication with multiple receivers can be fully informative. We analyze the extent of such fully-informative communication, and apply our results to the issue of transparency in advisory committees.  相似文献   

3.
    
Stochastic fictitious play (SFP) assumes that agents do not try to influence the future play of their current opponents, an assumption that is justified by appeal to a setting with a large population of players who are randomly matched to play the game. However, the dynamics of SFP have only been analyzed in models where all agents in a player role have the same beliefs. We analyze the dynamics of SFP in settings where there is a population of agents who observe only outcomes in their own matches and thus have heterogeneous beliefs. We provide conditions that ensure that the system converges to a state with homogeneous beliefs, and that its asymptotic behavior is the same as with a single representative agent in each player role.  相似文献   

4.
    
We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a cheap talk game with one sender and multiple receivers. We study the change in equilibrium behavior from the addition of another audience as well as from varying the degree of conflict between the senderʼs and receiversʼ preferences. We find that, as in cheap talk games with just one receiver, information transmission is higher in games with a separating equilibrium, than in games with only a babbling equilibrium. More interestingly, we find clear evidence that the addition of another audience alters the communication between the sender and the receiver in a way consistent with the theoretical predictions. There is evidence of the presence of agents that are systematically truthful as senders and trusting as receivers: deviations from the theoretical predictions, however, tend to disappear with experience, and learning is faster precisely in the games where deviations are more pronounced.  相似文献   

5.
  总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
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6.
    
We investigate situations in which agents can communicate to each other only through a chain of intermediators, for example, because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication are strategic and might want to influence the action taken by the final receiver. The set of pure strategy equilibrium outcomes is simple to characterize, is monotonic in each intermediator's bias, and does not depend on the order of intermediators; intermediation in these equilibria cannot improve information transmission. However, none of these conclusions holds for mixed equilibria. We provide a partial characterization of mixed equilibria, and offer an economically relevant sufficient condition for every equilibrium to be outcome‐equivalent to a pure equilibrium and hence for the simple characterization and comparative statics results to hold for the set of all equilibria.  相似文献   

7.
We consider a cheap talk game with a sender who has a reputational concern for an ability to predict a state of the world correctly, and where receivers may misunderstand the message sent. When communication between the sender and each receiver is private, we identify an equilibrium in which the sender only discloses the least noisy information. Hence, what determines the amount of information revealed is not the absolute noise level of communication, but the extent to which the noise level may vary. The resulting threshold in transmission noise for which information is revealed may differ across receivers, but is unrelated to the quality of the information channel. When information transmission has to be public, a race to the bottom results: the cut-off level for noise of transmitted information now drops to the lowest cut-off level for any receiver in the audience.  相似文献   

8.
    
This paper develops a model of bargaining over decision rights between an uninformed principal and an informed but self-interested agent. We introduce two different bargaining mechanisms: tacit and explicit bargaining. In tacit bargaining, an uninformed principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer to the agent, who then decides whether to accept or reject the offer. In the equilibrium of the game, the principal inefficiently screens out some agent types so that the agent's private information cannot be fully utilized when the decision is made. In explicit bargaining in which parties can communicate explicitly via cheap talk before tacit bargaining, however, an equilibrium with no such inefficient screening exists even when the conflict of interest is arbitrarily large. We also follow a mechanism design approach, showing that under certain conditions, explicit bargaining is an optimal bargaining mechanism that maximizes the joint surplus of the parties.  相似文献   

9.
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on players' preferences for a verifiable message game to possess a separating equilibrium and/or a pooling equilibrium, as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be pooling. We also characterize all nonseparating equilibria, and use this property to show that less information might be conveyed in any equilibrium of a verifiable message game than in some equilibrium of the cheap talk game with the same parameters.  相似文献   

10.
Behavior in trust games has been linked to general notions of trust and trustworthiness, important components of social capital. In the equilibrium of a trust game, the investor does not invest, foreseeing that the allocator would keep all of the returns. We use a human-subjects experiment to test the effects of changes to the game designed to increase cooperation and efficiency. We add a pre-play stage in which the investor receives a cheap-talk message from the allocator, observes the allocator's previous decision, or both. None of these changes alter the game's theoretical predictions. We find that allowing observation results in substantially higher cooperation and efficiency, but cheap talk has little effect.  相似文献   

11.
    
This study tests whether individuals are reluctant to tell lies, or perhaps only “harmful lies”, in a previously untested environment: an expert sending a message to a decision maker whose interpretation of that message is subject to error, i.e. a noisy sender–receiver game. In the Aligned treatment, the expert can send a “white lie” to the receiver, eliminating the negative effects of noise and improving both parties’ payoffs. In the Conflict treatment, lies are harmful and the inability to commit to truthtelling destroys all meaningful communication in equilibrium unless there is a cost of lying. In the experiment, receivers are overly trusting and experts learn to take advantage of this. As experts gain experience they tell stronger and more frequent lies in both treatments, consistent with models of reinforcement learning. The findings suggest that neither harmful nor universal lie aversion is a factor when communication is noisy, provided individuals have time to discover their personal benefits of lies.  相似文献   

12.
    
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is intended to predict actual behavior in a wide range of cheap talk games. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and size of credible deviations. ACDC organizes the results from several cheap talk experiments in which behavior converges to equilibrium, even in cases where other criteria do not make a prediction.  相似文献   

13.
14.
This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance (CR) game to study how different forms of non-binding communication among responders can help coordinate their collective resistance against a leader who transgresses against them. Contrary to the predictions of analysis based on purely self-regarding preferences, we find that non-binding communication about intended resistance increases the incidence of no transgression even in the one-shot laboratory CR game. In particular, we find that the incidence of no transgression increases from 7 percent with no communication up to 25–37 percent depending on whether communication occurs before or after the leader’s transgression decision. Responders’ messages are different when the leaders can observe them, and the leaders use the observed messages to target specific responders for transgression.

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.   相似文献   

15.
This paper investigates the incentives for informed traders in financial markets to reveal their information truthfully to the public. In the model, a subset of traders receive noisy signals about the value of a risky asset. The signals are composed of a directional component (“high” vs. “low”) as well as a precision component that represents the quality of the directional component. Between trading periods, the informed agents make public announcements to the uninformed traders. With a sufficiently large number of informed traders, an equilibrium exists in which the directional components are credibly revealed, but not the precision components. Even though the informed traders retain some of their rivate information, the post-communication estimate of the asset value converges in probability to the full-information estimate as the number of informed traders increases. The paper is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Western Ontario and was circulated previously under the title “Public Communication Devices in Financial Markets.” I thank my dissertation committee Arthur Robson, Hari Govindan, and Al Slivinski for their guidance and support. I also thank Murali Agastya, Roland Benabou, Philippe Grégoire, Rick Harbaugh, Mike Peters, an anonymous referee and an associate editor, and seminar participants at various universities and conferences at which this paper was presented.  相似文献   

16.
    
This article explores the differentiated effects of health insurer market concentration on net compensation of employees across distinct firm sizes. Consistent with the existing literature evaluating insurer market concentration and the theory of compensating differentials, we find evidence of higher premiums and reduced net compensation for employees in markets with more concentrated insurers. Furthermore, we find evidence that the magnitude of these effects is distinctly smaller for large employers. This implies that mergers of large health insurance companies may have a significant impact on small businesses but that the effect is mitigated for larger employers.  相似文献   

17.
    
In this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors. Agents may sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable – cheap talk messages – hence the quality of the information transmitted depends on the conflicts of interest faced by the senders. We find that, when information has a prevalent horizontal differentiation component, in equilibrium information is acquired when its costs are not too high and in that case it is also sold, though reports are typically noisy. The market for information is in most cases a monopoly, and there is underinvestment in information acquisition. We also show that regulatory interventions, in the form of firewalls, only make the inefficiency worse. Efficiency can be attained with a monopolist selling differentiated information, provided entry is blocked.  相似文献   

18.
入世后中国保险业应采取的宏观对策   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
郭清  彭佳 《经济问题》2002,(11):79-81
伴随着中国加入WTO,外资保险公司蜂拥抢滩中国保险市场,为我国的保险市场注入了新的活力,同时也掀起了一场没有硝烟的战争。因此,如何应对国外保险巨头所发起的强烈攻势,已成为业界探讨的热点。在讨论世贸组织所颁布的服务贸易条款中所涉及保险业有关规定的基础上,分析了中国保险业与世界保险业的差距,并从宏观层面上提出了几项措施来促进我国保险业的发展。  相似文献   

19.
This research examines how three common contextual factors can affect contributions in the linear voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM). Using business student subjects and a low marginal per capita rate of return, the results show that contributions in the last of ten rounds range from 18% for the traditional VCM with no initial cheap talk, no voting, and a status quo of not giving to 94% in a VCM with initial cheap talk, voting, and a status quo of giving. The results demonstrate that context can make the VCM produce sustained efficiencies similar to incentive-compatible public-good mechanisms.  相似文献   

20.
We utilise results from a human-subjects experiment to examine the connection between strategic uncertainty and outcomes in games. Our basic game is a Nash demand game where one player has an outside option available. A “chat” treatment allows bargainers to send cheap-talk messages prior to playing the basic game, and in a “contracts” treatment, they can additionally propose and accept binding contracts. We propose that strategic uncertainty comprises at least two facets: “coordination-type”, which is lower in the chat game than in the basic game, and “rationality-type”, which is lower in the contracts game than in the chat game. We find that both types of strategic uncertainty impact bargaining outcomes: moving from the basic game to the chat game, and thence to contracts, improves several aspects of outcomes, such as higher efficiency, less opting out and less under-demanding. Other results include a treatment effect on the types of agreements that are reached.  相似文献   

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