A NOTE ON THE NONLINEAR EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES

We use a labor search model with worker experience to assess the effects of minimum wage increases. Minimum wages can have nonlinear effects on unemployment as higher minimum wages become binding for larger portions of the underlying productivity distribution. The model is used to assess the increases proposed by the Obama Administration from $7.25 an hour to $9.00 and then to $10.10 per hour. We find that minimum wage increases have large effects on youth unemployment. These large effects cast doubt on using past empirical estimates of the effects of minimum wages that do not account for potential nonlinearities. (JEL E24, J08, J24, J64)     

Worker flows, job flows and firm wage policies

Like many transition economies, Slovenia is undergoing profound changes in the workings of the labour market with potentially greater flexibility in terms of both wage and employment adjustment. To investigate the impact of these changes, we use unique longitudinal matched employer‐employee data that permits measurement of employment transitions and wages for workers and enables links of the workers to the firms in which they are employed. We can thus measure worker flows and job flows in a comprehensive and integrated manner. We find a high pace of job flows in Slovenia especially for young, small, private and foreign‐owned firms and for young, less educated workers. While job flows have approached the rates observed in developed market economies, the excess of worker flows above job flows is lower than that observed in market economies. A key factor in the patterns of the worker and job flows is the determination of wages in Slovenia. A base wage schedule provides strict guidelines for minimum wages for different skill categories. However, firms are permitted to offer higher wages to an individual based upon the success of the worker and/or the firm. Our analysis shows that firms deviate from the base wage schedule significantly and that the idiosyncratic wage policies of firms are closely related to the observed pattern of worker and job flows at the firm. Firms with more flexible wages (measured as less compression of wages within the firm) have less employment instability and are also able to improve the match quality of their workers. JEL Classifications: J23, J31, J41, J61, P23, P31.     

Long‐Term Impact of Minimum Wages on Workers’ Careers: Evidence from Two Decades of Longitudinal Linked Employer–Employee Data

We analyze the impact of high youth minimum wages, relying on two decades of linked employer–employee data and a major law change. Alternative treatment/control groups follow from two strands of the literature, one tracking low‐skilled workers employed before the law change, who are eligible for a large wage increase, and one tracking the employment of full cohorts, whether working or in school when the law changed. High minimum wages led to a short‐term wage gain, which faded over time. They did not jeopardize employment prospects. Changes in the hours worked by part‐time workers point to increased job attachment.     

Age-differentiated minimum wages in developing countries

The fact that minimum wages seem especially binding for young workers has led some countries to adopt age-differentiated minimum wages. We develop a dynamic competitive two-sector labor market model where workers with heterogeneous initial skills gain productivity through experience. We compare two equally binding schemes of single and age-differentiated minimum wages, and find that although differentiated minimum wages result in a more equal distribution of income, such a scheme creates a more unequal distribution of wealth by forcing less skilled workers to remain longer in the uncovered sector. We also show that relaxing minimum wage solely for young workers reduces youth unemployment but harms the less skilled ones.     

Age-differentiated minimum wages in developing countries

The fact that minimum wages seem especially binding for young workers has led some countries to adopt age-differentiated minimum wages. We develop a dynamic competitive two-sector labor market model where workers with heterogeneous initial skills gain productivity through experience. We compare two equally binding schemes of single and age-differentiated minimum wages, and find that although differentiated minimum wages result in a more equal distribution of income, such a scheme creates a more unequal distribution of wealth by forcing less skilled workers to remain longer in the uncovered sector. We also show that relaxing minimum wage solely for young workers reduces youth unemployment but harms the less skilled ones.     

Unobserved Heterogeneity,Exit Rates,and Re‐Employment Wages

Exit rates from unemployment and re‐employment wages decline over a period of unemployment, after controlling for worker observable characteristics. We study the role of unobserved heterogeneity in an economy with asymmetric information and directed search. We show that the unique equilibrium is separating and that skilled workers have more job opportunities and higher wages. The composition of the unemployed varies with the duration of unemployment, so average exit rates and wages fall with time. The separating equilibrium relies on performance‐related pay schemes and the ability of firms to commit to renting an input that is complementary to worker skills.     

Persistence of Employment Fluctuations: A Model of Recurring Job Loss

Standard models of employment fluctuations cannot reconcile the unemployment rate's remarkable persistence with the high job-finding rates found in worker flows data. A matching model emphasizing high hazard rates among newly formed firm–worker matches can resolve this shortcoming. In the model, matches are experience goods; consequently, newly employed workers face higher hazard rates. Following a job loss, workers may experience several short-lived jobs before finding stable employment. At an aggregate level, an initial burst of job loss precipitates a steady flow of recurring job loss. A simulation shows that this recurring job loss can account for the fact that the unemployment rate remains elevated for as much as 4 or 5 years following an initial jump.     

The impact of local unemployment rates on reservation wages and the duration of search for a job.

Evidence about the relationship of local unemployment rates and individuals' reservation wages and duration of search for a job if unemployed is sparse and mixed. This study uses US data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to test whether relatively high local unemployment rates reduce the reservation wages of area residents or increase the duration of search. Labour search theory provides the grounding for the sample selection corrected simultaneous equations econometric model. In neither OLS nor 2SLS results is evidence found that local unemployment rates affect either reservation wages or the duration of search. These results suggest that policies targeted at alleviating unemployment should focus on increasing the demand for labour rather than hope that such policies will be beneficial if pursued in high-unemployment areas because of their effects on labour force characteristics.     

The Impact of Social Segregation on the Labor Market Outcomes of Low-Skilled Workers*

We study the impact of network homophily on labor market outcomes in a search-and-matching model with two job search channels: the formal market and social contacts. There are two worker types: low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The homophily level determines whether the referral networks of the two types are mixed or segregated from each other. We show that there exists an intermediate homophily level that minimizes the unemployment rate and maximizes the wages of low-skilled workers. Complete integration does not maximize the welfare of low-skilled workers, unless it improves their productivity. We argue that our model can explain the empirical findings on the labor market effects of the Moving-to-Opportunity experiment and the integration of immigrants.     

Optimal policy and the role of social contacts in a search model with heterogeneous workers

This paper develops a search model with heterogeneous workers and social networks. High‐ability workers are more productive and have a larger number of professional contacts. Firms can choose between a vacancy in the regular market and a job opening in the referral market. The model predicts that a larger number of social contacts is associated with a larger wage gap between high‐ and low‐ability workers and a larger difference in the unemployment rates. The net welfare gain of referrals is estimated at 1.2%. There are three reasons for the inefficiency of the decentralized equilibrium. First is the traditional search externality described by Hosios. Second, firms share their profits with workers, whereas the social optimum implies that full surplus should be given to firms in the referral market. This inefficiency can be internalized by means of referral subsidies. Third, there is the “pooling inefficiency” in the regular market. If high‐ability workers are sufficiently more productive they impose a positive externality on low‐ability workers and should be rewarded by positive transfers. On the contrary, if productivity differences are small, high‐ability workers achieve unreasonably high wages by referring each other and reduce employment chances of low‐ability workers. In this latter case, high‐ability workers should be penalized. If optimal policy is implemented the net welfare gain of referrals rises up to 1.8%.     

Assessing the Possible Antipoverty Effects of Recent Rises in Age‐Specific Minimum Wages in New Zealand

Real minimum wages increased by nearly 33 percent for adults and 123 percent for teenagers in New Zealand between 1999 and 2008. Where fewer than 2 percent of workers were being paid a minimum wage at the outset of this sample period, more than 8 percent of adult workers and 60 percent of teenage workers were receiving hourly earnings close to the minimum wage by the end of this period. These policy changes provide a unique opportunity to estimate the effects of the minimum wage on poverty. Although minimum wage workers are more likely to live in the poorest households, they are relatively widely dispersed throughout the income distribution. This is particularly true of teenage minimum wage workers. Furthermore, low‐income households often do not contain any working members. We estimate that a 10 percent increase in minimum wages, even without a loss in employment or hours of work, would lower the relative poverty rate by less than one‐tenth of a percentage point.     

A MATCHING MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS SKILL REQUIREMENTS>*

We consider a labor market in which workers differ in their abilities and jobs differ in their skill requirements. The distribution of worker abilities is exogenous, but we model the choice of skill requirements by firms. High‐skill jobs produce more output than low‐skill jobs, but high‐skill jobs require high‐skill workers and thus are more difficult to fill. We use a matching model together with a Nash bargaining approach to wage setting to determine the equilibrium mix of job types, along with the equilibrium relationship between worker and job characteristics, wages, and unemployment.     

UNEMPLOYMENT,LABOR MARKET TRANSITIONS,AND RESIDUAL WAGE DISPERSION

It is commonplace in the debate on Germany's labor market problems to argue that low wage dispersion is a major reason for the high unemployment rate. This paper analyzes the relationship between unemployment and residual wage dispersion for individuals with comparable attributes. In the conventional neoclassical point of view, wages are determined by the marginal product of the workers. Accordingly, increases in union minimum wages result in a decline of residual wage dispersion and higher unemployment. A competing view regards wage dispersion as the outcome of search frictions and the associated monopsony power of the firms. Accordingly, an increase in search frictions causes both higher unemployment and higher wage dispersion. The empirical analysis attempts to discriminate between the two hypotheses for West Germany analyzing the relationship between wage dispersion and both the level of unemployment as well as the transition rates between different labor market states. The findings are not completely consistent with either theory. However, as predicted by search theory, one robust result is that unemployment by cells is not negatively correlated with the within‐cell wage dispersion.     

STRUCTURAL EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF JOB SEARCH MONITORING

To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take account of post‐unemployment wages and job‐to‐job mobility. We structurally estimate a model with search channels, using a controlled trial in which monitoring is randomized. The data include registers and survey data on search behavior. We find that the opportunity to move to better‐paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution toward formal search channels in unemployment. Job mobility compensates for adverse long‐run effects of monitoring on wages. We examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard, like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path.     

Career Paths,Unemployment, and the Efficiency of the Labor Market: Should Youth Employment Be Subsidized?

This paper studies the implications of learning‐by‐doing on youth unemployment and market efficiency when workers benefiting from this kind of training experience search (while on the job) for a higher skill job. Firms with low‐skill jobs suffer from a poaching behavior by firms with high‐skill jobs, causing a shortage of low‐skill jobs and excessive youth unemployment. An optimal policy, consisting of taxing the output of high‐skill jobs and subsidizing the output of low‐skill jobs, restores market efficiency and reduces youth unemployment.     

Participation,Recruitment Selection,and the Minimum Wage

In this paper, we re‐examine the efficiency of participation with heterogeneous workers in a search‐matching model with bargained wages and free entry. Assuming that firms hire their best applicants, we show that participation is always too low. The reason for this is a hold‐up phenomenon: to be active, a worker must pay the entire search cost whereas part of the gain from this investment goes to the firm. As a consequence, introducing a (small) minimum wage raises participation, job creation, and employment. Therefore, net aggregate income of the economy is increased.     

International Trade and Unemployment—the Worker‐selection Effect

This paper investigates the labor market effects of trade liberalization. We incorporate trade unions and heterogeneous workers into the Melitz framework. Workers differ with respect to their abilities. Our main findings are: (i) trade liberalization harms low‐ability workers, they lose their job and switch to long‐term unemployment (worker‐selection effect); (ii) high‐ability workers are better off in terms of both higher wages and higher employment; (iii) if a country is endowed with a large fraction of low‐ability workers, trade liberalization leads to a rise in aggregate unemployment—in this case, trade liberalization may harm a country's welfare; (iv) the overall employment and welfare effect crucially hinges on the characteristics of the wage bargain.     

Do good workers hurt bad workers—or is it the other way around?*

I study the effect of worker heterogeneities on wages and unemployment in a directed search model. A worker's productivity in a given firm depends both on his type and on a worker–firm specific component. Firms advertise unconditional wage offers only. The resulting equilibrium is inefficient, with a too high wage premium for high‐type workers, and too few high‐type jobs. This reduces the welfare of high‐type workers. My findings contrast with the findings in the literature on labor market segmentation, where it is argued that the existence of high‐type workers forces down wages and reduces welfare for low‐type workers.     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.     

Job Security,Financial Security and Worker Well‐being: New Evidence on the Effects of Flexible Employment

This paper uses panel data drawn from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey to provide new evidence of the links between unemployment, wages, job security, financial security and workers' well‐being for workers in flexible employment. Our findings indicate that workers in flexible employment encounter more unemployment and experience increased job insecurity; unemployment is associated with wage penalties. Lower wages, job insecurity and financial insecurity affect well‐being. However, these negative outcomes are mitigated by longer job tenure. Our results have implications for moves towards a flexicurity model of employment