Social security, public education and the growth-inequality relationship

We study how the relationship between economic growth and inequality depends upon the levels of funding of two of the largest government programs, public education and social security. We do this in the context of an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous agents where the government collects a tax on labor income to finance these programs. We show that in our model an increase in government spending on social security reduces income inequality and can have a non-monotonic effect on growth. When the initial level of social security funding is low, as is the case in most poor economies, then its increase will enhance growth. When its funding level is high as is typical for developed countries, we show that its further increase can slow down growth while reducing income inequality. These results obtain regardless of whether the increase in social security funding is financed by a tax increase or by cutting the public education budget. We also find that the effects of increasing the level of public education expenditures or the overall size of the government budget (holding the budget composition fixed) are characterized by similar non-monotonic growth-inequality relationships.     

Optimal tax policy and foreign direct investment under ambiguity

We analyze the optimal timing of an irreversible foreign direct investment by a foreign firm and the optimal tax policy by a host country under ambiguity. We derive the optimal GDP level at which the foreign firm switches from exporting to a foreign direct investment. Furthermore, we derive the optimal tax policy by the host country, and analyze the effect of an increase in ambiguity on the optimal tax policy. We show that the host country should reduce the optimal corporate tax rate from the host government’s perspective in response to an increase in ambiguity. Our result is different from the one obtained by Pennings (2005) that shows that an increase in risk induces an increase in the optimal corporate tax rate.     

Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly

For an oligopolistic industry, the effects of mergers on the domestic country's optimal trade policy are analyzed. If the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy then it will always lose as a result of a foreign merger. The optimal domestic response to a foreign merger is to decrease (increase) the tariff if demand is concave (convex) and to increase the production subsidy. The foreign merger reduces foreign welfare when the domestic country pursues its optimal trade policy. The optimal domestic response to a domestic merger is to leave the tariff unchanged and to increase the production subsidy.     

Brotherhood of competition: Foreign Direct Investment and domestic mergers

We examine the effects of mergers on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and on shaping national policies regarding FDI. In this work we develop a partial equilibrium model of an oligopolistic industry in which a number of domestic and foreign firms compete in the market for a homogeneous good in a host country. It is assumed that the number of foreign firms is endogenous and can be affected by the government policy in the host country. The government sets the policy (subsidies) to maximise social welfare. We allow domestic mergers. Our main results suggest that when the host country government imposes discriminatory lump-sum subsidy in favor of foreign firms, a merger of domestic firms will increase the number of FDI if the subsidy level is exogenous. With an endogenous level of subsidy, a merger of domestic firms will decrease (increase) the welfare if the domestic firms are more (less) efficient.     

Imported inputs and privatization in downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

This paper examines welfare implications of privatization in a mixed oligopoly with vertically related markets, where an upstream foreign monopolist sells an essential input to public and private firms located downstream in the domestic country. The impact on domestic welfare of privatizing the downstream public firm is shown to contain three effects. The first is an output distortion effect, which negatively affects welfare since privatization decreases the production of final good for consumption. The second is an input price lowering effect resulting from a decrease in derived demand for the input. When the level of privatization increases, a decrease in final good production lowers input demand, causing input price to decline and domestic welfare to increase. The third is a rent‐leaking effect associated with foreign ownership in the downstream private firm. The rival domestic firm strategically increases its final good production, causing profits accrued to foreign investors to increase and domestic welfare to decline. Without foreign ownership in the downstream private firm, the optimal policy toward the public firm is complete privatization as the output distortion effect is dominated by the input price lowering effect. With foreign ownership, however, complete privatization can never be socially optimal due to the additional negative impact on domestic welfare of the rent‐leaking effect. We further discuss implications for domestic welfare under different privatization schemes (e.g., selling the privatization shares to the upstream foreign monopolist or to the rival domestic firm).     

Foreign Investment,Technology Transfer and Foreign Capital Impact Function

This paper analyzes the optimal capital accumulation of a small open economy by incorporating the impact of technology transfer that accompanies foriegn ivestment. Assuming that technology transfer depends on the extent of foreign ownership, it is shown that, whenever there is technology transfer through foreìgn participation, the optimal rule suggests that a host country maintain some foreign capital in the steady state. The concept of the foreign capital impact function is introduced to capture possible negative effects in addition to the positive effects of foreign investment. The impact of foreign investment is shown to involve an externality, calling for government intervention for a social optimum. [110]     

Local content requirement on foreign direct investment under exchange rate volatility

This paper analyzes the effects of exchange rate volatility of both the host country and the parent country on host-government policy related to local content requirement (LCR) on export-oriented foreign direct investment (FDI) in the context of an oligopolistic market in a third country. We, inter alia, find that an increase in the volatility foreign exchange rate decreases optimal LCR both under free entry and exit of foreign firms and when the number of foreign firms is fixed. We also find that the government uses a less strict LCR policy when the number of foreign firms is endogenous than when it is exogenous.     

Distributional Effects of Public Education in an Economy with Public Pensions*

We study how the allocation of government expenditures between two major outlays—education and pay‐as‐you‐go social security—affects human capital distribution in an economy with heterogeneous agents. We consider an overlapping generations economy where the government maintains both programs, and allocates tax revenues to finance them. In our model, human capital is one of the factors of production. It is itself produced as a combined result of public inputs and private inputs. Parents' decisions to invest time and material resources in education of their children are motivated by altruism, heterogeneous in its strength across the population, which leads to heterogeneity of incomes. We investigate the effect of an increase in public funding for education on the human capital distribution. We show that in this framework, contrary to some earlier results, increased spending on public education may lead to higher inequality. Our results depend crucially on the interaction of education funding with the social security budget and on the elasticity of substitution in the learning technology.     

我国社会保障基金管理模式构建研究

社会保障基金管理模式不仅关系到我国社会保障基金能否实现保值和增值的基本目标，而且更直接地影响到开征社会保障税后新的社会保障体系运行的效率。针对我国当前社会保障基金管理模式存在的问题．应当借鉴国外社会保障基金管理的成功经验，研究构建符合我国新型社会保障体系运行要求的社保基金管理模式。     

社会保障的供给及其财政责任研究——以北京市为例

本文在系统梳理相关文献基础上,从公共服务分析框架出发,结合社会保障供给的研究,分析了北京市社会保障的财政责任.北京市社会保障制度和管理服务创新持续推进,基金规模增加、待遇标准提高.北京市需要加强社会保障制度的整合衔接,完善社会保障管理和服务体系,并对人口老龄化作出制度安排.北京市社会保障财政支出规模仍维持在较低的水平,财政对基本养老、基本医疗保险缺乏稳定投入,社会保险基金投资渠道狭窄、资金收益率低,社会保障资金的财政管理水平和运行绩效仍缺乏实质性的提高.建议北京市在稳步增加对社会保障的财政投入的同时,实现社会保障的多渠道筹资；重点调整财政投入结构,强化对基金的监督管理以及建立完善社会保障预算.     

The composition of foreign capital stocks in South Africa: The role of institutions,domestic risk and neighbourhood effects

Foreign capital inflows are an important source of funds to finance investment in developing economies. International finance literature is therefore concerned with how institutional factors like property rights and corruption affect foreign capital inflows. We investigate the determinants of the absolute volumes and composition of foreign capital stocks in South Africa, focusing on the role played by institutional quality (property rights), domestic default risk and neighbourhood effects as potential determinants. The empirical results show that secure property rights and low default risk in the host country positively affect the absolute volumes of both long-term foreign capital and short-term foreign capital, but tilt the composition in favour of long-term foreign capital. Empirical results also demonstrate the existence of neighbourhood effects where the institutional environment in Zimbabwe significantly impacts on South Africa's foreign capital inflows. In this regard, weak property rights in Zimbabwe lead to an increase in South Africa's foreign direct investment (FDI), but a reduction in South Africa's portfolio investment. This suggests that Zimbabwe and South Africa compete for foreign direct investment in similar sectors, and present two alternative investment destinations to foreign investors. By contrast, weak property rights in Zimbabwe appear to raise the perceived risk for portfolio investment in South Africa.     

Macroeconomic Impacts of Carbon Capture and Storage in China

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a key technology for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. But a CCS facility consumes vast amounts of energy and capital. With this in mind we analyze macroeconomic consequences of a large scale introduction of CCS in China. We modify and extend the DRC-CGE, a macroeconomic CGE model of the country that is used for long-term planning and policy analyses. We analyze an internal finance scenario of domestic funding, and an external finance scenario of international funding. In the external finance scenario CCS is installed on 70 % of all power plants by 2050. This increases demand for coal in 2050 by one fifth and import of coal by one fourth. The strain on coal resources may be an important political concern for China. In the internal finance scenario coal resources are not strained since this scenario introduces a price on carbon that lifts prices of energy. Moreover, the price on carbon cuts across the board and the internal finance scenario is much more effective at reducing \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) . On the other hand, in this scenario GDP goes down about 4 %, which also raises political concern.     

Is tied aid bad for the recipient countries?

This paper examines the welfare effects of the exclusivity of foreign aid taking consideration of donor countries' strategic and self-interested economic motivations. Based on an oligopolistic model with strategic interactions between firms and governments providing foreign aid, we demonstrate that a higher exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of tied aid, increases the equilibrium amount of aid and the social welfare of the recipient country when the foreign aid policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion between donor countries. However, when donor countries coordinate aid policies to maximize joint-welfare including recipient country's welfare, the lower exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of untied aid, will increase the equilibrium amount of aid and the global social welfare. The results implicate that when a credible enforcement mechanism for the cooperative regime for foreign aid is not available, tied aid is welfare dominant policy for both donor and recipient countries than untied aid.     

Information-eliciting compensation schemes

This paper examines the implications of the ‘residence’ approach to taxing foreign source income such as employed by the United States. It is argued that, because the repatriation of earnings to the home country investor and not the earnings themselves are typically the source of tax liability, the foreign source income tax should affect foreign investment differently depending on the required transfers of funds within the firm.One implication of viewing the tax in this way is that in order to maximize after-tax profits, a firm should finance its foreign investment out of foreign earnings to the greatest extent possible. That is, a firm's required foreign return jumps at the point at which desired foreign investment just exhausts foreign earnings. This allows us to draw a distinction between ‘mature’ foreign operations, which are at any point in time financed at the margin by investing earnings (and perhaps also pay dividends to their parent firm in the home country), and ‘immature’ foreign affiliates, which rely on funding from their parents (and should not be paying dividends). It is noted that survey evidence on multinational firm behavior is consistent with this distinction. Direct investment data indicate that mature foreign operations probably account for nearly 90 percent of U.S. foreign direct investment.The discussion then turns to investment incentives. It is shown that the home country's rate of tax on foreign source income and the presence or absence of a foreign tax credit should be irrelevant to a mature foreign operations's investment and dividend decisions. This conclusion, which conflicts sharply with the conventional wisdom, follows because the home country tax acts as an unavoidable cost. New firms' investment decisions are, on the other hand, influenced by home country taxes.     

Reforming social security: assessing the effects of alternative funding strategies

Population ageing implies that the large pay-as-you-go social security programmes implemented in many OECD economies will run into severe financial problems. By means of a numerical overlapping generations model, this paper investigates the intergenerational welfare effects of a transition to funded security programmes. Such programmes imply permanent increases in the welfare of the young and unborn generations. It is demonstrated that the size of the welfare gains varies significantly between alternative funding strategies. A nonindividualized funding strategy characterized by increased government asset accumulation triggers considerable welfare gains through increased asset returns in the future. Even larger welfare gains may be realized by an individual funding strategy characterized by increased asset accumulation accompanied by an adoption of actuarial supplementary pensions (i.e. actuarial supplementary pensions combined with a fixed minimum pension) which reduces future tax distortions drastically.     

Trade,Transboundary Pollution,and Foreign Lobbying

In this paper, we explore the use of trade policy in addressing transboundary stock pollution problems such as acid rain and water pollution. We show that a tariff determined by the current level of accumulated pollution can induce the time path of emissions optimal for the downstream (polluted) country. But if the upstream (polluting) country can lobby the downstream government to impose lower tariffs, distortions brought by corruption and foreign lobbying lead to a rise in the upstream country’s social welfare, and to a decrease in social welfare in the downstream country. Thus, the usefulness of trade policy as a tool for encouraging cooperation and internalizing transboundary externalities depends critically on the degree of governments’ susceptibility to foreign political influence.     

Public debt and social security: Level of formality matters

This paper presents a contribution to the empirical literature concerning the relationship between social security and public debt in emerging economies. In particular, several economic and social shocks, as income inequality, were considered in the analysis. Based on the Brazilian data from 2004 to 2010, and taking into account the effects of shocks on variables which are essential to the public debt and the social security deficit, two sets of GMM models were considered. Furthermore, with the objective of testing the results, a GMM system model was built. The findings confirmed that the social security deficit significantly contributes to an increase in the public debt. Regarding the effects on social security, it was observed that an increase in the level of formality in the economy reduces the deficit. In contrast, a reduction in income inequality, real increase in the minimum wage, and increase in health benefits imply an increase in the social security deficit. Therefore, these variables play a crucial role in the search for an efficient social security management system and cannot be overlooked in ensuring fiscal sustainability.     

Taxing the Financially Integrated Multinational Firm

This paper develops a theoretical model of corporate taxation in the presence of financially integrated multinational firms. Under the assumption that multinational firms use some measure of internal loans to finance foreign investment, we find that the optimal corporate tax rate is positive from the perspective of a small, open economy. This finding contrasts the standard result that the optimal‐source‐based capital tax is zero. Intuitively, when multinational firms finance investment in one country with loans from affiliates in another country, the burden of the corporate taxes levied in the latter country partly falls on investment and thus workers in the former country. This tax exporting mechanism introduces a scope for corporate taxes, which is not present in standard models of international taxation. Accounting for the internal capital markets of multinational firms thus helps resolve the tension between standard theory predicting zero capital taxes and the casual observation that countries tend to employ corporate taxes at fairly high rates.     

Environmental capital flight and pollution tax

This paper analyzes the impacts of a production pollution tax on environmental capital flight and national product in a two-country static general equilibrium model with two-way foreign investment. It is assumed that the capital input in both countries is a composite good of domestic and imported capital. And pollution is assumed to originate in the production process. The productivity of capital in each country is negatively (or positively) related to the worldwide aggregate emissions.The analysis shows that when a domestic pollution tax is levied, domestic capital outflows increase and foreign capital inflows decrease for sufficiently high elasticities of substitution between labor (immobile input) and capital (mobile input) in both countries. Moreover, with negative transnational externalities, increases of a domestic pollution tax reduce domestic production and increase foreign production. The difficulty of substitution between immobile and mobile inputs hinders the optimal allocation of worldwide capital and national product. In this paper, the optimal pollution tax is based on global welfare maximization, not on global income maximization, taking into consideration the impact of income change on individual welfare. Therefore, an optimal pollution tax in the developing country should be lower for a given rate of pollution.     

Arms production,national defense spending and arms trade: Examining supply and demand

Scholars have estimated demand functions for national defense spending and investigated international arms trade for a long time. The relationship between supply and demand for military goods has, however, only been examined on aggregate level or in formal models yet. I investigate how the supply of military goods by arms-producing companies and the demand for military goods by both the national government and foreign governments are related by using a panel of up to 195 arms-producing companies in 21 countries for the period 2002–2016. The results show that if the demand for national defense spending increases by 1%, the arms sales by a country’s largest arms-producing companies increase by up to 1.2%. If exports of major conventional weapons increase by 1%, sales increase by up to 0.2%. Arms imports do not affect domestic arms sales because imported and domestically produced arms are complements, and countries mainly import those arms they do not produce themselves. Country-specific estimation results suggest that differences among countries in geopolitical conditions and international relations determine whether a country’s arms industry serves economic rather than security purposes.