Dividend premium: Are dividend-paying stocks worth more?

This paper reports that the relation between dividend payout and firm value is positive. Panel data regressions suggest that the dividend premium for firms' equity is 17.4% and the dividend premium for firms' assets is 7.1%. The tests using propensity score matching methodology report a lower – but still positive and statistically significant – dividend premium: 12.5% for equity and 6.1% for assets. Thus, stock prices of dividend payers are greater by 12.5% or 17.4% on average (depending on methodology) compared to those of nonpayers. We find that policy-related economic uncertainty and the proportion of firms paying dividends explain more than half of the variation in dividend premium for assets.     

Asset Pricing Implications of Nonconvex Adjustment Costs and Irreversibility of Investment

This paper derives a real options model that accounts for the value premium. If real investment is largely irreversible, the book value of assets of a distressed firm is high relative to its market value because it has idle physical capital. The firm's excess installed capital capacity enables it to fully benefit from positive aggregate shocks without undertaking costly investment. Thus, returns to equity holders of a high book‐to‐market firm are sensitive to aggregate conditions and its systematic risk is high. Simulations indicate that the model goes a long way toward accounting for the observed value premium.     

One size does not fit all: Selling firms to private equity versus strategic acquirers

This paper investigates the selling process of firms acquired by private equity versus strategic buyers. In a single regression setup we show that selling firms choose between formal auctions, controlled sales and private negotiations to fit their firm and deal characteristics including profitability, R&D, deal initiation and type of the eventual acquirer (private equity or strategic buyer). At the same time, a regression model determining the buyer type shows that private equity buyers pursue targets that have more tangible assets, lower market-to-book ratios and lower research and development expenses relative to targets bought by strategic buyers. To reflect possible interdependencies between these two choices and their impact on takeover premium, as a last step, we estimate a simultaneous model that includes the selling mechanism choice, buyer type and premium equations. Our results show that the primary decision within the whole selling process is the target firm's decision concerning whether to sell the firm in an auction, controlled sale or negotiation which then affects the buyer type. These two decisions seem to be optimal as then they do not impact premium.     

Correlation and the Pension Protection Fund*

In this paper, I use a stochastic approach to model the effect that correlations between pension scheme assets and firm values should have on the premiums chargeable by the Pension Protection Fund. In particular, I look at the effect on the aggregate premium that should be charged considering a representative universe of companies and their pension schemes. I find that ignoring the correlations, even if the volatility of pension scheme assets is allowed for, leads to potentially serious underestimation of the aggregate premium due.     

The impact of conglomeration on the option value of equity

Using contingent claims analysis, I quantify the effect of risk-reducing corporate diversification on the value of equity as a call option on firm assets. The impact of conglomeration on firm risk is heavily conditioned on firm size. In contrast to small firms, the risk of large firms does not decline with increasing conglomeration. Accounting for this effect, the expected equity discount is much lower than commonly assumed and can even turn into a premium if the path dependency of equity is incorporated. My results stand in direct contrast to those of Mansi and Reeb (2002) and caution against using asset substitution as a qualitative argument for explaining economy-wide value phenomena.     

The effect of quarterly earnings guidance on share values in corporate acquisitions

We investigate whether quarterly earnings guidance by corporate takeover targets is associated with acquisition premiums. Regulators have expressed recurring concerns that quarterly guidance is associated with a misallocation of resources because it encourages management to focus on excessively short-term horizons. If so, firms providing quarterly guidance represent an acquisition opportunity for non-guiding firms because acquired resources can be redeployed towards more productive long-term uses. Based on prior research that finds value created by acquisitions accrues primarily to target shareholders, we predict that an expected increase in value from the termination of guidance will be observed in acquisition premiums. We find that, after controlling for the other determinants of acquisition gains, the premium paid for an acquired corporation is associated with the target's practice of issuing quarterly earnings guidance. Consistent with our prediction, we find that no incremental premium is paid to acquire guiding targets when the bidding firm also provides guidance.     

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SOME DETERMINANTS OF THE TARGET SHAREHOLDER PREMIUM IN TAKEOVERS

While a considerable amount of research in Australia, the United States and elsewhere shows that takeovers create value for target shareholders, there is relatively little research investigating the explanations for cross-sectional differences in the size of the premium paid to target shareholders. This paper tests various arguments proposed to explain some of the sources of this premium. One such explanation is the removal of inefficient target management. Takeovers have been recognised as a mechanism that allows management teams to compete for the right to manage corporate assets. We test the associations between bidder and target managerial ownership (proxied by director's holdings), the prior performance of the bidder and target and the size of the premium paid to target shareholders. Other potential influences on the premium include a reduction in the agency costs of free cash flow and the provision of financial slack or reserve borrowing capacity to the target firm by the bidder. Using a sample of seventy-eight Australian takeovers occurring between 1981 and 1989 our tests indicate that the provision of financial slack to the target is associated with a significantly higher premium, while high bidder ownership results in a significantly lower premium. The premium is found to be positively related to the performance of the bidder in the period prior to the bid. The tests disclose an association between the agency costs of free cash flow and the target premium which is inconsistent with the theory, and reveal only weak evidence that the takeover premium is higher when inefficient target management is removed.     

The value implications of restrictions on asset sales

This paper examines the effect of restrictions over asset disposition, measured by the ratio of secured debt to fixed assets, on firm value. We find evidence consistent with two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses. (1) Restrictions on the disposition of assets reduce firm value by limiting a firm's ability to restructure assets or to raise funds to finance higher NPV projects. (2) Restrictions on asset disposition increase firm value by limiting agency costs of managerial discretion over uncommitted assets. The net effect of restrictions over asset disposition on firm value is determined by potential agency problems and the need for operating flexibility.     

Foreign Currency Derivatives versus Foreign Currency Debt and the Hedging Premium

This paper compares the effect on firm value of different foreign currency (FC) financial hedging strategies identified by type of exposure (short‐ or long‐term) and type of instrument (forwards, options, swaps and foreign currency debt). We find that hedging instruments depend on the type of exposure. Short‐term instruments such as FC forwards and/or options are used to hedge short‐term exposure generated from export activity while FC debt and FC swaps into foreign currency (but not into domestic currency) are used to hedge long‐term exposure arising from assets located in foreign locations. Our results relating to the value effects of foreign currency hedging indicate that foreign currency derivatives use increases firm value but there is no hedging premium associated with foreign currency debt hedging, except when combined with foreign currency derivatives. Taken individually, FC swaps generate more value than short‐term derivatives.     

The association of identifiable intangible assets acquired and recognised in business acquisitions with postacquisition firm performance

This paper extends the literature evaluating accounting practices for identifiable intangible assets and considers whether the application of these accounting practices changed on transition to IFRS. It finds no evidence of identifiable intangible assets acquired and recognised in business acquisitions being associated with postacquisition firm performance or changes in postacquisition firm performance, either before or after transition to IFRS. This is inconsistent with the requirements of regulations such as IFRS 3 Business Combinations and IAS 38 Intangible Assets, and there is no empirical evidence supporting the present regulatory distinction between acquired and internally generated and revalued identifiable intangible assets.     

What drives the valuation premium in IPOs versus acquisitions? An empirical analysis

Using a hand-collected data set of private firm acquisitions and IPOs, this paper develops the first empirical analysis in the literature of the “IPO valuation premium puzzle,” which refers to a situation where many private firms choose to be acquired rather than to go public at higher valuations. We also test several new hypotheses regarding a private firm's choice between IPOs and acquisitions. Our analysis of private firm valuations in IPOs and acquisitions indicates that IPO valuation premia disappear for larger VC backed firms after controlling for various observable factors affecting a firm's propensity to choose IPOs over acquisitions. Further, after controlling for the long-run component of the expected payoff to firm insiders from an IPO exit, we find that the IPO valuation premium vanishes even for larger non-VC backed firms and shrinks substantially for smaller firms as well. Our Heckman-style treatment effects regression analysis demonstrates that the above results are robust to controlling for the selection of exit mechanism by firm insiders based on unobservables. Our findings on private firms' choice between IPOs and acquisitions can be summarized as follows. First, firms operating in industries characterized by the absence of a dominant market player (and therefore more viable against product market competition) are more likely to go public rather than to be acquired. Second, more capital intensive firms, those operating in industries characterized by greater private benefits of control, and those which are harder to value by IPO market investors are more likely to go public rather than to be acquired. Third, the likelihood of an IPO over an acquisition is greater for venture backed firms and those characterized by higher pre-exit sales growth.     

Accrual Accounting,Informational Sufficiency,and Equity Valuation

This paper studies accrual accounting and equity valuation in the context of a firm that makes repeated and overlapping investments in productive capacity. The analysis identifies a particular accrual accounting (depreciation) rule that is termed replacement cost accounting because the book value of existing capacity assets is set equal to the value that such assets would have if a competitive market were to exist for used assets. It is shown that replacement cost accounting aggregates past investment decisions of the firm without a loss of value‐relevant information. The intrinsic value of the firm can then be expressed as a function of current accounting data and certain parameters of the firm’s operating environment. Further, it is shown that replacement cost accounting is essentially the only accounting rule with this informational sufficiency property.     

Corporate capital structure and pension-funding strategy

This article provides an integrated analysis of pension funding and corporate financing strategies in the presence of default risk. The article shows that when the marginal personal income tax rate is constant, the financing decision with respect to pension funding is influenced entirely by tax considerations. When the marginal personal income tax is progressive, the optimal financing of pension funding depends on the cyclical nature of the firm (as characterized by the sign of beta), the riskiness of pension assets, and ERISA regulations concerning the pension-benefit guaranty rate, the marginal pension insurance premium and the firm's legal responsibility for its unfunded pension obligations. It is shown that a necessary condition for partial pension funding is that the marginal insurance premium imposed by PBGC must be less than actuarially fair, and a necessary condition for pension funding to be financed by both debt and equity is that beta must be positive.     

Valuation scepticism,liquidity benefits and closed‐end fund premiums/discounts: evidence from fair value disclosures

Closed‐end fund investors may view assets valued using level 2 and 3 inputs more sceptically because of the subjectivity of these inputs (valuation scepticism), or these assets could be viewed favourably because they allow small investors to access illiquid securities (liquidity benefit). We find that funds holding level 3 assets have higher value when funds trade at a premium, but lower value when funds trade at a discount. Both of these effects are magnified for funds with higher levels of unrealized appreciation. Our results suggest that liquidity benefit (valuation scepticism) is more important when funds trade at a premium (discount).     

Investability and Firm Value

We study how investability, or openness to foreign equity investors, affects firm value in a sample of over 1,400 firms from 26 emerging markets. We find that, on average, investability is associated with a 9% valuation premium (as measured by Tobin's q). This significant valuation premium persists in firm‐fixed effects regressions, although the magnitude and robustness of the premium is somewhat lower. Analysis of the components of Tobin's q shows that firms that become investable experience significant increases in both market values and physical investment. These effects are strongest for firms that face country‐level or firm‐level financial constraints prior to becoming investable.     

Flights-to-control: Time variation in the value of a vote

Dual-class shares often violate the ‘one share-one vote’ principle, thereby creating the potential for agency problems. We develop a model of time-variation in the pricing of these agency problems, as reflected by the voting premium. A key implication of this model is that insiders face a trade-off between the private benefits of control and the value of their cash-flow claims on the firm, resulting in a negative relationship between the voting premium and the expected present value of firm cash flows. As predicted by this model, we report empirical evidence consistent with ‘flights-to-control’, where the voting premium increases substantially during financial crises and when negative earnings surprises are announced. These relationships are accentuated for firms where agency problems might be expected to be more pronounced. The average voting premium is also shown to decrease around events that reduce the ability for insiders to extract private benefits of control.     

Mergers and Acquisitions Accounting and the Diversification Discount

q‐based measures of the diversification discount are biased upward by mergers and acquisitions and its accounting implications. Under purchase accounting, acquired assets are reported at their transaction value, which typically exceeds the target's pre‐merger book value. Thus, measured q tends to be lower for the merged firm than for the portfolio of pre‐merger entities. Because conglomerates are more acquisitive than focused firms, their q tends to be lower. To mitigate this bias, I subtract goodwill from the book value of assets and a substantial part of the diversification discount is eliminated. Market‐to‐sales‐based measures do not have this bias.     

Default risk premium and asset prices

We estimate a standard structural model of credit risk to draw insights about the premium demanded by investors for bearing default risk, using data on credit default swaps and market capitalization. We pin down the daily market value of assets for a set of non-financial firms and uncover cross-sectional heterogeneity in terms of the magnitude and time variation of the premium. By exploring the link between asset and default risk premia, we show that this heterogeneity closely depends on the relationship between the firm-specific market value of the assets and the business cycle.     

Human Capital and Stock Returns: Is the Value Premium an Approximation for Return on Human Capital?

This study, using a direct measure of the wage growth rate within firms, examines the value premium in relation to human capital. The results suggest that the dispersion in wage growth in value and growth stocks explains a large portion of the differences in stock returns. It appears that value stocks are less exposed to shocks in rents to human capital. Differences in labor force characteristics among value and growth stocks also proved to be an important factor in determining both the impact of future changes in labor income growth rate and firm value. The present findings are understood to mean that the ability of investors to forecast the dispersion in wage growth in firms is limited.     

UNIT MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, STOCKHOLDER WEALTH, AND SELLING FIRMS' CHARACTERISTICS

Previous research on unit management buyouts, UMBs, has shown that selling firms benefit from the selloff transaction. The current research demonstrates that when the selling firm has either poor liquidity or poor earnings, selling firm shareholders do not benefit as much. We hypothesize that the unit managers have knowledge about the selling firm's difficulties so they do not pay as large a premium for the assets. Since the unit managers technically are employed by the selling firm shareholders, their bargaining to achieve a better price is an agency cost. Finally, selloff frequency does not affect seller abnormal returns.