The economics of ethics: A new perspective on agency theory

Agency theory provides a series of instructive parables concerning the systems consequences of unreservedly opportunistic behavior. Due to a mutual lack of trust, some otherwise mutually beneficial exchanges do not take place. And, even when exchanges do take place, there are dead-weight losses due to monitoring costs and inefficient risk sharing. Therefore, in ex ante terms, everyone may be better off if they mutually agree to restrain their opportunistic behavior. Unfortunately, by its very nature, opportunistic behavior is not readily observed. Thus, an agreement (i.e. ethical code) to abstain from opportunistic behavior cannot be effectively enforced by external rewards or sanctions; instead, the sanctions for unethical behavior must be internalized. Hopefully, this article will stimulate ideas for incorporating ethics in discussions of accounting, using agency theory as a convenient vehicle.     

How (un) ethical are you?

Answer true or false: "I am an ethical manager." If you answered "true," here's an Uncomfortable fact: You're probably wrong. Most of us believe we can objectively size up a job candidate or a venture deal and reach a fair and rational conclusion that's in our, and our organization's, best interests. But more than two decades of psychological research indicates that most of us harbor unconscious biases that are often at odds with our consciously held beliefs. The flawed judgments arising from these biases are ethically problematic and undermine managers' fundamental work--to recruit and retain superior talent, boost individual and team performance, and collaborate effectively with partners. This article explores four related sources of unintentional unethical decision making. If you're surprised that a female colleague has poor people skills, you are displaying implicit bias--judging according to unconscious stereotypes rather than merit. Companies that give bonuses to employees who recommend their friends for open positions are encouraging ingroup bias--favoring people in their own circles. If you think you're better than the average worker in your company (and who doesn't?), you may be displaying the common tendency to overclaim credit. And although many conflicts of interest are overt, many more are subtle. Who knows, for instance, whether the promise of quick and certain payment figures into an attorney's recommendation to settle a winnable case rather than go to trial? How can you counter these biases if they're unconscious? Traditional ethics training is not enough. But by gathering better data, ridding the work environment of stereotypical cues, and broadening your mind-set when you make decisions, you can go a long way toward bringing your unconscious biases to light and submitting them to your conscious will.     

Toward resolving the debate surrounding slippery slope versus licensing behavior: The importance of individual differences in accounting ethical decision making

A great deal of attention, research and print space has been devoted to the role of the “slippery slope” in corporate malfeasance. Slippery slope refers to a pattern of behavior in which small unethical infractions lead to more egregious behaviors over time. In accounting, this escalation can relate to increasing dollar amounts or engaging in different behaviors reflecting increasing degrees of ethical grayness. Much of corporate malfeasance indeed relates accounting practices: theft fraud (Wells 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) or fraudulent financial reporting (e.g., AIG, 2005; Bernie Madoff, 2008; Enron, 2001; Diamond Foods, 2012; HealthSouth, 2003; Lehman Brothers, 2008; Saytam, 2009; WorldCom, 2002). More recent research on compensatory ethics in psychology and business, however, has shown conflicting findings: that performing an initial unethical act can create an internal incentive to end or curtail subsequent unethical behavior; this behavior has also been referred to as a “licensing effect”, in which bad behavior is limited in how much individuals can license and still preserve their reputation or moral identity (Beaman et al., 1983; Brown, Rennekamp, Seybert, & Zhu, 2014; Freedman and Fraser, 1966; Gino and Bazerman, 2009; Joosetn et al., 2014; Murphy & Dacin, 2011; Zhong et al., 2010). It is our belief that both theories may be found to co-exist in accounting practice depending on individual characteristics. We conduct two studies to examine the role of individual differences in instances of malfeasance specifically related to accounting practices, heretofore largely ignored in the accounting literature. In Study One, we investigate the role of locus of control (Rotter, 1966) and negative affect (Crawford and Henry, 2004; Lowe and Reckers, 2012; Watson and Tellegen, 1985). In Study Two, we examine narcissism (Johnson et al., 2013; Little et al., 1992; Young et al., 2015) and moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999; Detert et al., 2008). Findings confirm hypotheses that both slippery slope and licensing patterns of behavior will manifest depending on individual differences among the participants.     

Accountancy as Computational Casuistics

If a company's share price rises when it sacks workers, or when it makes money from polluting the environment, it would seem that the accounting is not being done correctly, since real costs are not being paid. This article argues for a synthesis of ethics with accountancy's tradition of quantification, which would allow ethical rights to become legally enforceable.     

Ethical norms of CFO insider trading

Insider trading encompasses the buying or selling of stocks based on non-public information about the securities in question. Engaging in insider trading is particularly unethical for a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) who holds a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders and also typically is ethically obligated by his or her professional responsibilities. Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (1934) has expressly forbidden insider trading, the business press suggests insider trading continues. An application of Cooter’s [Cooter, R., 1997. Normative failure theory of law. Cornell Law Review 82 (5), 947–979; Cooter, R., 2000. Three effects of social norms on law: Expression, deterrence and internalization. Oregon Law Review 79 (1), 1–22] theory of the law and norms suggests that one explanation for the continuation of insider trading is that although illegal, norms may fail to consider insider trader to be unethical. Nevertheless, our knowledge of the norms regarding insider trading is limited. To address this gap, we examine the ethical norms regarding CFOs’ insider trading, and consider the extent to which contextual variables are associated with ethical perceptions of CFO insider trading. We find that insider trading by CFOs is generally perceived to be unethical but not by all participants, nor all ethical measures. Moral equity is particularly informative for understanding the ethicality of CFO insider trading. When relying on the multidimensional ethics scale (MES) measure of moral equity, our results reveal that contextual factors, including trading method used (stock options or share equity) and the direction of earnings surprise (favorable or unfavorable) are significant. We also found that participants that possessed more work experience or financial expertise had a greater tendency to consider CFO insider trading to be unethical than those with less work experience or financial expertise, which suggests the importance of training and education of the general public. In addition, our findings suggest that tougher sanctions will encourage compliance with existing insider trading laws. Implications of our findings for public policy are discussed.     

货币与伦理的关系探究

货币和伦理的关系实际上是经济因素和非经济因素的关系,货币是伦理道德历史变化的动因之一,同时二者又是互动的。货币和伦理可以融合而成为货币伦理,利益是两者联系的中介。     

Rules,discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy

In a discretionary regime the monetary authority can print more money and create more inflation than people expect. But, although these inflation surprises can have some benefits, they cannot arise systematically in equilibrium when people understand the policymaker's incentives and form their expectations accordingly. Because the policymaker has the power to create inflation shocks ex post, the equilibrium growth rates of money and prices turn out to be higher than otherwise. Therefore, enforced commitments (rules) for monetary behavior can improve matters. Given the repeated interaction between the policymaker and the private agents, it is possible that reputational forces can substitute for formal rules. Here, we develop an example of a reputational equilibrium where the outcomes turn out to be weighted averages of those from discretion and those from the ideal rule. In particular, the rates of inflation and monetary growth look more like those under discretion when the discount rate is high.     

The founder's dilemma

Why do people start businesses? For the money and the chance to control their own companies, certainly. But new research from Harvard Business School professor Wasserman shows that those goals are largely incompatible. The author's studies indicate that a founder who gives up more equity to attract cofounders, new hires, and investors builds a more valuable company than one who parts with less equity. More often than not, however, those superior returns come from replacing the founder with a professional CEO more experienced with the needs of a growing company. This fundamental tension requires founders to make "rich" versus "king" trade-offs to maximize either their wealth or their control over the company. Founders seeking to remain in control (as John Gabbert of the furniture retailer Room & Board has done) would do well to restrict themselves to businesses where large amounts of capital aren't required and where they already have the skills and contacts they need. They may also want to wait until late in their careers, after they have developed broader management skills, before setting up shop. Entrepreneurs who focus on wealth, such as Jim Triandiflou, who founded Ockham Technologies, can make the leap sooner because they won't mind taking money from investors or depending on executives to manage their ventures. Such founders will often bring in new CEOs themselves and be more likely to work with their boards to develop new, post-succession roles for themselves. Choosing between money and power allows entrepreneurs to come to grips with what success means to them. Founders who want to manage empires will not believe they are successes if they lose control, even if they end up rich. Conversely, founders who understand that their goal is to amass wealth will not view themselves as failures when they step down from the top job.     

What's the matter with business ethics?

The more business ethics secures its status in campuses across the country, the more bewildering it appears to actual managers. It's not that managers dislike the idea of doing the right thing. As University of Toronto Assistant Professor Andrew Stark argues, far too many business ethicists just haven't offered them the practical advice they need. Before business ethics became a formal discipline, advocates of corporate social responsibility claimed that the market would ultimately reward ethical behavior. But ethics and interests did not always intersect so fruitfully in the real world. And when they did not, managers were left in the dark to grope for the right ethical course. In the 1970s, the brand-new field of business ethics came onto the scene to address this issue. Critical of the "ethics pays" approach, academics held that ethics and interests can and do conflict. Still, scholars took an equally unrealistic line. To them, a manager's motivation could be either altruistic or self-interested, but never both. In short, ethicists still weren't addressing the difficult moral dilemmas that managers face on a day-to-day basis, and only recently have they begun to do so. After some initial stumbles, ethicists are getting their hands dirty and seriously considering the costs of doing the right thing. Finally, a new business ethics is emerging that acknowledges and accepts the messy world of mixed motives. As a result, novel concepts are springing up: moderation, pragmatism, minimalism, among others.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

Short-selling constraints as cause for price distortions: An experimental study

In this paper we explore the influence of the possibility to short stocks and/or borrow money in laboratory markets. A key innovation of our study is that subjects can simultaneously trade two risky assets on two double-auction markets, allowing us to differentiate between assets with relatively high versus low capitalization. Divergence of opinions is created by providing each trader with noisy information on the intrinsic values of both assets. We find that when borrowing money or shorting stocks is restricted prices are systematically distorted. Specifically, stocks with high (low) capitalization are traded at lower (higher) prices than their fundamental value. Lifting the restrictions leads to more efficient prices and more liquidity, thereby also lowering volatility and bid-ask spreads.     

Ethics,capital and talent competition in banking

We model optimal ethical standards, capital requirements and talent allocation in banking. Banks with varying safety-net protections, including depositories and shadow banks, innovate products and compete for talent. Managers dislike unethical behavior, but banks heed it only because detection imposes costs. We find: (i) higher capital induces higher ethical standards, but socially optimal capital requirements may tolerate some unethical behavior; (ii) managerial ethics fails to raise banks’ ethical standards; (iii) banks with lower ethical standards attract better talent and innovate more; and (iv) it is socially optimal to allocate better talent to shadow banks instead of depositories, and this allocation results in higher capital requirements and ethical standards for depositories. Consequently, with capital capacity constraints, the shadow banking sector is larger than the depository sector; talent competition induces a race to the bottom in ethical standards, and the regulator responds by setting capital requirements to magnify this size difference.     

Is ethical money financially smart? Nonfinancial attributes and money flows of socially responsible investment funds

We study the money flows into and out of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds around the world. In their investment decisions, investors in SRI funds may be more concerned with ethical or social issues than with fund performance. Therefore, SRI money flows are less related to past fund returns. Ethical money is less sensitive to past negative returns than are conventional fund flows, especially when SRI funds primarily use negative or Sin/Ethical screens. Social attributes of SRI funds weaken the relation between money inflows and past positive returns. However, money flows into funds with environmental screens are more sensitive to past positive returns than are conventional fund flows. Stock picking based on in-house SRI research increases the money flows. These results give evidence on the role of nonfinancial attributes, which induce heterogeneity of investor clienteles within SRI funds. We find no evidence of a smart money effect, as the funds that receive more inflows neither outperform nor underperform their benchmarks or conventional funds.     

Ethical climate in Chinese CPA firms

Much concern has been expressed in recent years regarding the state of business ethics in the People’s Republic of China, and it has been suggested that unethical behavior is common both in the business community and in accounting firms. Despite such concerns, very little empirical research has been done on ethics in the Chinese public accounting profession, and no previous study has examined the ethical culture or climate in Chinese CPA firms. The current paper reports the results of a preliminary study of the ethical climate in local and international CPA firms operating in China, and the influence of ethical climate and personal ethical orientations on decision-making. Contrary to expectations, the perceived ethical climate in local firms was not more negative; however, auditors employed by local firms judged questionable actions as more ethical and indicated a higher likelihood of committing similar actions. Consistent with our hypotheses, perceptions of the ethical climate in one’s organization had a significant effect on intentions to commit ethically questionable acts. In addition, high relativists (who tend to reject broad moral principles in favor of situational analysis) were significantly influenced by the perceived organizational ethical climate, but low relativists were not similarly influenced.     

Does good luck make people overconfident? Evidence from a natural experiment in the stock market

This paper examines the changes in investors' trading behavior after winning an IPO allotment in China—a purely luck-driven event. We find that these investors subsequently become overconfident: They trade more frequently and lose more money relative to other investors. This effect is stronger when investors are inexperienced and when investors' pre-existing level of overconfidence is low. We also show that investors exhibit a stronger gambling propensity and hold more lottery-like stock after winning an IPO allotment. Our findings are not explained by wealth effects or house money effects. Overall, our evidence indicates that the experience of good luck makes people overconfident about their prospects.     

Ethical evaluations and behavioural intentions of early career accountants: the impact of mentors,peers and individual attributes

This study examined how mentoring support, peer influence and individual attributes of early career accountants (ECA) influence their ethical evaluations and behavioural intentions. Respondents indicate that their evaluation of the seriousness of the ethical conflict is affected by the perceived standard of ethical conduct of their peers, their personal ethical orientation, the extent of ethics education at university, and gender. ECAs’ evaluation of a senior colleague's unethical behaviour is affected by mentoring support and the perceived standard of ethical conduct of peers. In terms of ECAs’ willingness to contact accounting professional bodies for ethical advice, the size of the accounting firm and the extent of their ethics education at university are significant factors. Furthermore, the likelihood of respondents choosing a more ethical decision is correlated with his or her individual ethical orientation and the extent of ethics education at university.     

Post-Keynesian money endogeneity evidence in G-7 economies

Post-Keynesian theory of money endogeneity emphasizes the importance of bank loans causing money supply changes. Thus, the proponents of endogenous money supply assert banks create money by meeting money demands of economic agents. Money is said to originate as bank-created loans from deposits, which in turn create more loans under the endogenous money supply. The traditional money supply theory asserts that deposits create money, so money is exogenously created. This paper provides new evidence on endogenous money supply across G-7 economies over 26 years using quarterly data with controls for monetary regime change effects. Bank loans cause money supply, hence money is endogenous and the monetary regime effect appears to hold as crucial factors in money supply theory. Money supply behavior is exogenous during two short periods in the UK and the US when monetary targeting policies were in place.     

Solutions to the Asset Allocation Problem by Informed Respondents: The Significance of the Size-of-Bet and the 1/N Heuristic

Asset allocation is a classic topic in the theory of finance and a crucial issue for investment policy. Noted for its significance in driving pension fund performance, it is also an issue that individual investors consider when designing their investment portfolios. In theory, Markowitz and those following in his wake have an optimal solution. In practice, however, we show that when asked to allocate their own money to a set of asset classes (from relatively low risk to high risk) in an experimental situation, most of our informed respondents would vary their investment strategies according to the size-of-bet (the money value of assets to be invested). We also show that most participants in the study adopted one of three solutions to the posed problem only one of which could be thought consistent with Benartzi and Thaler's 1/ n  heuristic. Since respondent solutions do not seem to be explained by formal education, professional qualifications, or training, it is suggested that solutions to the asset allocation problem are a product of strategies that mix intuitive responses to the initial tranche of money with theoretical cum practical shared conventions. Solutions to the asset allocation puzzle suggest that the size-of-bet could be a significant consideration for many informed investors. In conclusion, suggestions are made about taking forward closer scrutiny of these experimental results.     

How prior realized outcomes affect portfolio decisions

Investors have been shown to have particular preferences when it comes to the characteristics of stock they hold in their portfolios, while prior gains and losses have been shown to impact on individuals’ economic decisions, both in an investment context and more widely. This paper is the first to investigate how prior gains and losses affect investors’ preferences for particular stock characteristics and so shape their portfolio compositions. Using a rich dataset combination from China, we conclude that prior realized outcomes play an important role in shaping portfolio composition through their impact on the characteristics of stocks that investors choose to hold. We find that positive prior realized outcomes encourage investors to select stocks with a variety of characteristics broadly consistent with higher risk taking (for example, higher betas and higher levels of idiosyncratic risk), though there are some differences across investor classes. While our empirical results are in line with what one would expect from the existing literature on the disposition and house money effects, we also consider other possible interpretations of the results.     

When time is (not) money: preliminary guidance on the interchangeability of time and money in laboratory-based risk research

The familiar adage that ‘time is money’ may not be entirely accurate according to research involving hypothetical choice: People’s decisions are less sensitive to temporal expenditures and outcomes than monetary ones. We provide a novel examination of whether similar patterns of risky choice are found for time and money when choices are consequential (i.e. monetary outcomes are obtained and temporal outcomes are experienced) – both for one-shot and repeated choices, over gains and losses. On the aggregate, across decision contexts (described and experienced), choices are similar for time and money. However, on the level of the individual, little relationship between risk preferences for time and money are observed. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.     

What future generations might say to us

If future generations could speak to us, what might they say to us about our efforts to learn and teach about them? Probably they would ask us to understand their perspective, to feel connected to them, and to care deeply. When we teach about future generations we should affect the head, heart, soul and hands. This learning and teaching should include inspiration, transpersonal bonding, empowerment, a personal affirmation or pledge, a sense of meaning and purpose, and a commitment to action. Certain books and journals can be especially useful for gaining the perspective of future generations.