Combining performance-based and action-based payments to provide environmental goods under uncertainty

Payments for environmental services (PES) are widely adopted to support the conservation of biodiversity and other environmental goods. Challenges that PES schemes have to tackle are (i) environmental uncertainty and (ii) information asymmetry between the provider of the service (typically a farmer) and the regulator. Environmental uncertainty calls for action-based payment schemes, because of the more favorable risk allocation if the farmer is risk-averse. Information asymmetry, on the other hand, calls for a performance-based payment, because of the more direct incentives for the farmer. Based on a principal-agent model, we study the optimal combination of both, performance-based and action-based payments under conditions of environmental uncertainty and asymmetric information. We find that for a risk-neutral regulator a combination is optimal in the majority of cases and that the welfare gain of the combined scheme over a pure action-based (performance-based) payment increases with information asymmetry (environmental uncertainty). We further show that for a regulator who is risk-averse against fluctuations in environmental goods provision the optimal performance-based payment is lower than for a risk-neutral regulator. We quantitatively illustrate our findings in a case study on the enhancement of the butterfly Scarce Large Blue (Maculinea teleius) in Landau/Germany.     

Data Envelopment Analysis of different climate policy scenarios

Recent developments in the political, scientific and economic debate on climate change suggest that it is of critical importance to develop new approaches able to compare policy scenarios for their environmental effectiveness, their distributive effects, their enforceability, their costs and many other dimensions. This paper discusses a quantitative methodology to assess the relative performance of different climate policy scenarios when accounting for their long-term economic, social and environmental impacts. The proposed procedure is based on Data Envelopment Analysis, here employed in evaluating the relative efficiency of eleven global climate policy scenarios. The methodology provides a promising comparison framework; it can be seen as a way of setting some basic guidelines to frame further debates and negotiations and can be flexibly adopted and modified by decision makers to obtain relevant information for policy design. Three major findings emerge from this analysis: (i) stringent climate policies can outperform less ambitious proposals if all sustainability dimensions are taken into account; (ii) a carefully chosen burden-sharing rule is able to bring together climate stabilisation and equity considerations; and (iii) the most inefficient strategy results from the failure to negotiate a post-2012 global climate agreement.     

认证中介的效率基础:信托市场监管规则选择的例子

在资产管理领域中 ,投资者面对的信息劣势来源于实体项目收益的不确定性和理财机构专业水平的不确定性两个方面。我们的研究着力于分析 ,对项目风险和理财机构评估项目专业水平的信息缺乏导致的柠檬效应 ,以及引入认证中介机构后市场效率的改善。本文以信托市场为例 ,比较了认证中介面临不同市场结构时 ,效率后果的差异 ,说明完全竞争市场中的认证中介对信息不对称问题的解决更加有效。     

Offset carbon emissions or pay a price premium for avoiding them? A cross-country analysis of motives for climate protection activities

This article contributes to the economic literature on pure and impure public goods by considering two alternatives for contributing to the public good climate protection: offsetting carbon emissions from conventional consumption or paying higher prices for climate-friendly products. We empirically examine a wide range of motives and their impact on individuals’ choice in favour of these two alternatives relying on data from representative international surveys. Our results indicate that environmental awareness, warm glow motives and the desire to set a good example have the most robust effects on both climate protection activities in Germany and the United States. However, some motives differ considerably between both alternatives and the two countries. A green identity enhances the willingness to pay a price premium for climate-friendly goods or services in Germany, while social norms seem to be of much higher relevance in the United States. Our results further suggest that the choice of climate protection activities, especially of carbon offsetting, entails a high degree of uncertainty.     

农业面源污染控制的一体化环境经济政策体系研究

农业面源污染由于排放主体的分散性和隐蔽性、污染发生的随机性、污染负荷的时空差异性,使得农业面源污染具有很强的外部性、不确定性和非对称信息,这是农业面源污染控制的理论依据。文章在对农业面源污染控制面临的污染控制成本不确定性、污染者排污水平不确定性进行理论分析后,构建了农业面源污染控制的一体化环境经济政策体系,指出农业面源污染控制须针对各责任主体设计独特化、具体化、精确化、针对性的环境经济政策。     

气候政策的时间不一致性问题研究

经验证据表明,很多国家都很难严格执行既定的气候政策。从理论上证明追求社会福利最大化的政府在经济剩余、政府税收收入和碳排放的负外部性等多重目标约束条件下,实施碳税政策时会产生时间不一致现象。结果表明,即使考虑到公共资金的边际成本,由于企业投资的不可逆转性和沉淀性,相对社会最优而言政府也会在事后降低碳税率,导致更多的能源消费和更多的碳排放。为克服时间不一致问题带来的效率损失,建议政府应建立独立的碳排放管制机构,对碳税政策做出可置信的承诺,改变电源结构,鼓励减排技术的投资,完善碳交易市场。     

Choosing the right instrument

This paper analyses the optimal choice of second-best optimal environmental policies. Using a partial equilibrium model, the paper first reconfirms the well-known result that the existence of a double dividend (in its weak definition) favours environmental policy instruments which maximise tax revenues for a given improvement in environmental quality. Additional revenues can be used to reduce the distortion of existing taxes such as taxes on labour and capital income. Without uncertainty, environmental taxes and auctioned permits are equally appropriate. In the presence of uncertainty, however, the optimal choice of taxes or tradable permits depends on the relative magnitudes of the marginal environmental damage and the marginal benefit from consuming a polluting good. In the second part, the paper, therefore, analyses how the revenue capacity affects the optimal choice of environmental policy instruments in the presence of uncertainty. The paper shows that the first-best choice rule between price and quantity regulation (Weitzman, 1974) remains valid in a second-best world with distortionary taxation.     

Economic policy uncertainty and real output: evidence from the G7 countries

We use economic policy uncertainty index, and impulse response based test to assess the impact of economic policy-related uncertainty on real economic activity. We use monthly data, over the period from 1985:1 to 2015:3, and impulse response functions to investigate how the economies of the G7 countries respond to positive and negative economic policy uncertainty shocks of different magnitudes. We find that economic policy uncertainty is countercyclical, that the effects of uncertainty shocks increase with size and that the responses of real output to positive and negative economic policy uncertainty shocks are country specific. Our research is important for policymaking and in favour of policies that remove economic uncertainty and its negative effects on the economy. We argue that some control over yellow journalism, a transparent tax system and a set of predictable fiscal and monetary policies can minimize the social costs of economic policy uncertainty.     

Information Exchange and Transnational Environmental Problems

This paper analyzes information exchange in a model of transnational pollution control in which countries use private information in independently determining their domestic environmental policies. We show that countries may not always have an incentive to exchange their private information. However, for a sufficiently high degree of predictability of domestic environmental policy processes, the expected welfare from sharing information is greater than the expected welfare from keeping it private. The minimum degree of policy predictability for which information sharing occurs increases with the level of environmental risk. Intuitively, information exchange can help mitigate the perception of global uncertainty (both political and scientific) that surrounds transnational environmental problems and potentially improve welfare if policymaking processes are sufficiently aligned with evidence-based approaches (predictable).     

Asymmetric Regulation of Identical Polluters in Oligopoly Models

Studies of optimal second-best environmental regulation of identical polluting agents have invariably ignored potentially welfare-improving asymmetric regulation by imposing equal regulatory treatment of identical firms at the outset. Yet, cost asymmetry between oligopoly firms may well give rise to private as well as social gains. A trade-off is demonstrated for the regulator, between private costs savings and additional social costs when asymmetric treatment is allowed. Asymmetry is indeed optimal for a range of plausible parameter values. Further, it is demonstrated that for a broad class of abatement cost functions, there is scope for increasing welfare while keeping both total output and total emission constant. Some motivating policy issues are discussed in light of the results, including international harmonization and global carbon dioxide reduction.     

On the efficiency of environmental instruments in a spatial economy

This paper develops an efficiency criterion to evaluate environmental policy instruments in a spatial economy. We call an environmental policy regime at the regional level efficient if it guarantees not only an efficient distribution of emission permits within a region, but also an efficient locational pattern of mobile firms across the regions of a federation. Using marketable pollution rights or emission taxes, efficiency in this broad sense can only be achieved if revenues of regional environmental agencies are not transferred to regional firms. Direct controls neither support an efficient allocation of emission rights within a region nor locational efficiency of firms.     

Climate Policy Under Fat-Tailed Risk: An Application of Dice

Uncertainty plays a significant role in evaluating climate policy, and fat-tailed uncertainty may dominate policy advice. Should we make our utmost effort to prevent the arbitrarily large impacts of climate change under deep uncertainty? In order to answer to this question, we propose a new way of investigating the impact of (fat-tailed) uncertainty on optimal climate policy: the curvature of the optimal carbon tax against the uncertainty. We find that the optimal carbon tax increases as the uncertainty about climate sensitivity increases, but it does not accelerate as implied by Weitzman’s Dismal Theorem. We find the same result in a wide variety of sensitivity analyses. These results emphasize the importance of balancing the costs of climate change against its benefits, also under deep uncertainty.     

Overlapping Generations or Infinitely-Lived Agents: Intergenerational Altruism and the Economics of Global Warming

Do we need an overlapping generations model for the economics of global warming? To answer this question, an infinitely-lived agent (ILA) approach and an overlapping generations (OLG) model are contrasted. ILA and OLG can be viewed as polar representations of intergenerational altruism. With ILA an immortal agent acts through his investment/savings decisions as trustee on the behalf of the future generations. With OLG, agents need not behave altruistic. They simply save during working years and dissave completely during retirement. Nevertheless, ILA and OLG must not differ in their implication for greenhouse policy. Greenhouse gas abatement is a straightforward alternative to physical capital formation and, even without altruism, each age cohort has an incentive to provide current abatement in order to reduce future damages attributable to climate change. Indeed, under reasonable assumptions and parameter values, our simulations reveal such an invariance result. Provided carbon taxes are the only policy tool and tax revenues are recycled through socially mandated rules, projections of economic growth, climate change and energy consumption are only insignificantly affected by the choice of approach.     

Pushing the boundaries of climate economics: critical issues to consider in climate policy analysis

Climate policy choices are influenced by the economics literature which analyses the costs and benefits of alternative strategies for climate action. This literature, in turn, rests on a series of choices about: the values and assumptions underlying the economic analysis; the methodologies for treating dynamics, technological change, risk and uncertainty; and the assumed interactions between economic systems, society and the environment, including institutional constraints on climate policy. We identify and discuss such critical issues, pushing at the boundaries of current climate economics research. New thinking in this area is gathering pace in response to the limitations of traditional economic approaches, and their assumptions on economic behaviour, ecological properties, and socio-technical responses. We place a particular emphasis on the role of induced technological change and institutional setups in shaping cost-effective climate action that also promotes economic development and the alleviation of poverty.     

Regulating a Polluting Firm Under Asymmetric Information

This paper reinterprets the Laffont-Tirole model of regulation under asymmetric information to cover the case of pollution control. The asymmetry of information concerns the firm's cost of lowering its pollution. The regulator has three objectives: Ensuring an efficient abatement level, generating 'green taxes' and securing the survival of the firm. We show that when optimal abatement is important relative to tax generation, the regulator cannot use the policy of offering the firm a set of linear tax schemes from which to choose. By contrast, this policy is optimal in the Laffont-Tirole model under certain not very restrictive assumptions. We proceed to establish a simple rule for when to shut-down inefficient types. In an example with specific functional forms, we derive the optimal tax function both analytically and graphically. We show the effect on the optimal tax system of a change in a technological parameter.     

Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy

We study the optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy when (i) the regulator does not know the firms’ abatement costs, (ii) penalties for tax evasion are limited, and (iii) monitoring of pollution is costly. We show that the threat of being audited alter the usual firms’ incentives to over-estimate their abatement costs. In particular, depending on the firms’ abatement costs, the optimal policy may involve over or under-deterrence compared to the full information outcome. We then investigate the properties of a pollution standard. We show that this policy comes close to an environmental tax once the economic incentives of the accompanying enforcement policy are considered.     

Achieving the triple dividend in Portugal: a dynamic general-equilibrium evaluation of a carbon tax indexed to emissions trading

Using a dynamic general equilibrium model, we simulate the environmental, economic, and budgetary effects in Portugal of a new carbon tax indexed to the carbon price in the European Union’s Emissions Trading System market. Through careful recycling of the carbon tax revenues to finance lower personal income taxes, lower Social Security contributions, and higher investment tax credits – in particular when changes are directed at promoting energy efficiency – we show that it is possible to design a carbon tax reform that boosts economic growth and strengthens fiscal consolidation. These results served as the basis for a new carbon tax eventually approved by the Portuguese Parliament.     

What's the damage? Environmental regulation with policy‐motivated bureaucrats

In choosing environmental policy, governments rely on information provided by bureaucrats, who may have a political motivation of their own. We analyze the ensuing principal–agent relationship and derive the government's optimal contract. We find that a regulatory agent who is more environmentalist than the government is rewarded for truthfully stating that the environmental impact of the regulated economic activity is low (and vice versa). The bureaucrat has a stronger influence on policy if there is greater uncertainty about the environmental impact, or if the policy choice has a strong weight in his utility function. For some impact values, the bureaucrat is permitted to set his own preferred policy, which is a form of optimal delegation.     

Dynamics of environmental quality and economic development: the regional experience from Yangtze River Delta of China

This article investigates the dynamic relationship between economic progress and environmental quality at a regional level. An important economic intuition in this context is that environmental degradation will be limited by human behaviour if costs and benefits of such degradation are local since economic agents will then be incentivized to choose appropriate corrective action. Therefore, we note the likelihood that regional economic development can help regions ‘grow out of’ environmental problems. Using a new data set from Yangtze River Delta of China, we find a strong confirmation of the intuition that human can and will resolve the environmental problem by altering the damaging behaviour of economic agents. A very interesting finding of this study is that the relationship between environmental quality and economic progress measured by per capita income can display a wave-like function in the case of water pollution, as opposed to the much dramatized environmental Kuznets curve, with significant policy implications.     

Economic Impacts of Multiple Agro-Environmental Policies on New Zealand Land Use

This paper investigates the implications of policy on farm income, land use, and the environment when New Zealand landowners face multiple environmental constraints. It also looks at the interaction between climate and nutrient reduction policy and the extent to which one policy can be used to meet the other’s objectives. We use a non-linear, partial equilibrium mathematical programming model of New Zealand land use to assess the economic impacts of climate and water policies at the New Zealand territorial authority level. The spatially explicit agro-environmental economic model estimates changes in land use, agricultural output, land management, and environmental impacts. The policies investigated include a range of carbon prices on land-based emissions ($0–30/tCO\(_{2\mathrm{e}}\)) as well a range of prices on nitrogen leaching from diffuse sources ($0–30/kgN). We estimate that implementing stand-alone greenhouse gas and nutrient emissions reduction policies for the agricultural and forestry sectors will create environmental benefits outside the scope of the policy. However, not all environmental outputs improve, and net farm revenue declines by between 0 and 11%. Simultaneously implementing the two policies results in the desired goals of reductions in nitrogen and greenhouse gas emissions with a marginal economic burden on landowners (i.e. 1–2% additional loss in farm profit relative to a stand-alone policy).