Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment

In a public goods experiment with the opportunity to vote to expel members of a group, we found that contributions rose to nearly 100% of endowments with significantly higher efficiency compared with a no-expulsion baseline. Our findings support the intuition that the threat of expulsion or ostracism is a device that helps some groups to provide public goods.     

Free Riding and Consistent Conjectures in the Provision of Public Goods: An Experimental Study

The aim of this paper is to examine free riding and consistent conjectures in the provision of public goods. In this research, a Lindahl optimum is never reached. The prediction that public goods will inevitably be under-supplied is proven. With repetition, the subjects' contributions move toward the free riding level instead of the Lindahl optimum. However, a surprising observation is that the public goods provided sometimes increase with time. Economists and males behave more selfishly than other people. Most people expect matching behaviour, and most of them do behave accordingly. The extent to which people will match is overestimated, therefore expectations about the amount of public goods and the amount of actually provided public goods will be revised accordingly and tend to decline over time.     

An Experimental Investigation of Excludable Public Goods

This paper extends the research on incentive compatible institutions for the provision of public goods by imposing a minimum contribution that must be met in order for an individual to enjoy the benefits of the public good. Excluding individuals who do not contribute at least the minimum transforms the linear n-player pure public goods game to an n-player coordination game with multiple, Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. The experimental results show that exclusion increases contributions to the public good in most cases. However, an increase in contributions may not be sufficient to increase social welfare because there is a welfare cost to excluding individuals when the good is non-rival. Furthermore, exclusion can decrease both contributions and welfare in environments in which individuals fail to coordinate their contributions. The results are sensitive to the minimum contribution requirement and to the relative returns from the public and private alternatives.     

省直管县改革对县域公共物品供给的影响——基于河北省136县(市)面板数据的实证分析

基于河北省136个县(市)2003～2007年的相关社会经济数据,文章建立面板数据实证分析了省直管县改革对县域公共物品供给的影响。研究发现,省直管县改革在显著提高县域生产性公共物品供给水平的同时,显著降低了县域服务性公共物品的供给水平;而且除人口规模外,省直管县改革对县域公共物品供给的影响关系并不会受到县域环境因素的影响。     

中国农村社区公共物品投资的决定因素分析

本文使用具有全国代表性的抽样调查数据,对农村社区公共物品投资的决定因素进行了初步的分析。本文通过理论分析提出了两个理论假说,进而提出在我国公共投资中要注意的问题:既要考虑各地对公共投资有不同的需求,还要考虑区域协调发展。研究结果表明,除了一些政策因素以外,当地经济发展水平是影响农村公共投资的重要因素,一般来说,在工商业较发达的村公共投资活动也相对较多。对于外出务工人员较多的村,由于本地公共投资对外出务工人员的收入等作用较小,因此这部分村民就不那么愿意对村里进行公共投资。从政策实施角度看,本研究发现,上级政府的公共投资更多地投向贫困地区、偏远山区、农业生产条件差的地区或少数民族地区。这种投资战略有助于统筹区域发展,降低区域差异。     

Matching behavior and collective action: Some experimental evidence

A new approach to explaining voluntary collective action, emphasizing strategic interactions of actors in their contributions to the provision of a public good, is tested experimentally. The results support this approach, and tend to reject the conventional, Cournot theory of the provision of public goods. Among the findings are a positive interaction between individual contributions to the provision of a public good, and a U-shaped time trend in combined contributions.     

The role of risk aversion in public goods dilemmas with environmental uncertainty: an experimental analysis

The purpose of this study is to extend earlier research on environmental uncertainty in public goods dilemmas. The present paper reports the results of an experiment designed to examine the effect of risk aversion on public goods provision. A von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function with constant coefficient of relative risk aversion is used to investigate the impact of risk attitudes within a threshold public goods environment. The outcome of the threshold public goods experiment shows that subjects are indifferent to the changes in environmental conditions. Additionally, the analysis indicates that risk aversion is a significant determinant of voluntary public goods contribution level.     

Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis

One important determinant of voluntary contributions to public goods is the value of the public good relative to that of the forgone private good. Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) formalized this relation in the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) and demonstrated its influence on the provision of linear public goods. This paper develops a parallel concept, in the context of a threshold public good, the Step Return (SR). After providing a meta-analysis of the effect of SR in previous experiments, we compare contributions in threshold public goods games with low, medium and high SRs. Results show that subjects respond to the SR in this setting just as they respond to the MPCR in the linear public goods setting: higher SRs lead to more contributions.     

Should governments stop subsidies to private goods? Evidence from rural Latin America

This paper empirically documents the effects of subsidizing private goods to the detriment of the government's supply of public goods. We use a new data set from the rural sector in fifteen Latin American countries over the period 1985–2001 collected using a methodology that allows us to separate government subsidies to private goods from expenditures in the provision of public goods. The econometric evidence shows that the government's decision to subsidize either private or public goods has dramatic consequences for economic development. Reducing the share of subsidies to private goods (or, equivalently, increasing the share of public goods) in the government's budget has, ceteris paribus, a large and significant positive impact on rural per capita income, reduces certain undesirable environmental effects associated with output expansion, and contributes to poverty reduction.     

The Welfare Effects of Environmental Taxation

Recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second-best setting than in a first-best setting. This question has mainly been addressed indirectly, by asking whether the second-best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first-best Pigouvian rate. Even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly, comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first-best value, marginal social damage (MSD). On closer examination, however, MSD becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second-best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the Pigouvian rate. Given these observations, the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first-best value, the second-best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements. Even in cases where the second-best environmental tax is lower than its first-best value, the welfare gains may be greater than in a first-best setting. These results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit (revenue recycling effect) exceeds the marginal fiscal cost (tax base effect) over a range of environmental tax rates that, for benchmark models, extends above the first-best Pigouvian rate. These findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods.     

Commitment and matching contributions to public goods

We study multi-stage processes of non-cooperative voluntary provision of public goods. In the first stage, one or more players announce contributions that may be conditional on the subsequent contributions of others. In later stages, players choose their own contributions and fulfill any commitments made in the first stage. Equilibrium contributions are characterized under different assumptions about the commitment ability of players, the number of public goods and whether players commit to matching rates or to discrete quantities. We focus on contribution mechanisms that can emerge and be sustainable without a central authority, and that may be particularly relevant for international public goods. Efficient levels of public goods can be achieved under some circumstances, while in others commitment is ineffective.     

Individual Differences In Contributions And Crowding‐Out Of A Public Good

This paper reports experimental results that link other‐regarding preferences, personality, and demographic characteristics to contributions to a public good and the responsiveness of contributions to tax‐financed contributions. Contribution levels are higher among those with cooperative preferences, those with Myers–Briggs personality types of introversion and intuition, females, and upperclassmen. However, the response to a tax‐financed contribution is uniform. All player types reduce their contribution by an amount equal to the tax, a result known as complete crowd‐out.     

Effect of an audience in public goods provision

This paper investigates a novel public goods game where contributions to the public goods require effort that is observable. When the players are observed, they exert more effort to contribute to the public goods, and free-riding diminishes significantly compared to the no observer case. These effects are absent when no effort is required in order to contribute to the public goods. Furthermore, in the presence of an audience, the contributions to the public goods do not diminish when the game is repeated in the effort-required environment. Being observed does not affect the performance of the players if there is no strategic aspect of the game, in other words, when they play a private goods game. These results indicate that an individual wants to avoid appearing lazy when her effort helps the society.     

Dynamics of environmental quality and economic development: the regional experience from Yangtze River Delta of China

This article investigates the dynamic relationship between economic progress and environmental quality at a regional level. An important economic intuition in this context is that environmental degradation will be limited by human behaviour if costs and benefits of such degradation are local since economic agents will then be incentivized to choose appropriate corrective action. Therefore, we note the likelihood that regional economic development can help regions ‘grow out of’ environmental problems. Using a new data set from Yangtze River Delta of China, we find a strong confirmation of the intuition that human can and will resolve the environmental problem by altering the damaging behaviour of economic agents. A very interesting finding of this study is that the relationship between environmental quality and economic progress measured by per capita income can display a wave-like function in the case of water pollution, as opposed to the much dramatized environmental Kuznets curve, with significant policy implications.     

Is There a Bias Toward Contributing to Local Public Goods? Cultural Effects

A series of experiments was designed and implemented to investigate cross-cultural differences in preferences for contributing to local public goods. The research investigates differences between contributions made by participants from the United States, Russia and Kazakhstan. In these experiments each participant has three options: keep money for herself, contribute to a public good that benefits a small group (the local good), or contribute to a public good that benefits the entire group (the global good). The researchers find significant differences in contribution patterns across the three cultures, and find that all participants contribute significantly more to the small group public good than to the large group public good.     

基层分权改革与农村社会公共品供给——基于DID方法的经验证据

分权能否提高下级政府对辖区居民公共品需求的响应度,本文以基层分权改革较为典型的浙江扩权改革为对象,利用其56个县市面板数据和DID方法对这一问题进行分析。研究发现,扩权改革对农村社会不同类型公共品供给的影响存在明显差异,扩权改革显著提高了硬公共品供给水平,对软公共品供给产生负面影响。扩权改革后,县市政府对农村社会软硬公共品供给偏好差异不仅与扩权改革所处的体制环境有关,与扩权本身改革策略也有一定关系。     

Altruism and the Economic Values of Environmental and Social Policies

Altruism is a type of non-use value which can have different definitions depending on the type of goods entering the utility function of the altruists and their expectations about the contributions of others. The purpose of this paper is to measure the trade-offs between different types of altruist values originating from social and environmental policies. Environmental policies are concerned with reducing health effects from a power plant while social policies involve both the attainment of public facilities for education and leisure and an increase in the income of the affected population. The empirical application utilizes a choice experiment technique which allows for valuation of multiple goods. Health effects are decomposed into the values of the risk of becoming ill, the duration of the episodes and the limitations imposed by illness. Altruist values are elicited from a population that is not affected by pollution. Results show that altruism is significant for policies directed to reducing health effects and improving the income level of the affected population, whereas there is egoism for a policy aimed at improving public facilities in the polluted suburb. The value of altruism is significantly influenced by the expectations of net benefits to be received by the affected population.     

Is There a Bias Toward Contributing to Local Public Goods? Cultural Effects

A series of experiments was designed and implemented to investigate cross-cultural differences in preferences for contributing to local public goods. The research investigates differences between contributions made by participants from the United States, Russia and Kazakhstan. In these experiments each participant has three options: keep money for herself, contribute to a public good that benefits a small group (the local good), or contribute to a public good that benefits the entire group (the global good). The researchers find significant differences in contribution patterns across the three cultures, and find that all participants contribute significantly more to the small group public good than to the large group public good.     

Fairness in the contingent valuation of environmental public goods: attitude toward paying for environmental improvements at two levels of scope

Respondents to contingent valuation (CV) surveys give a variety of reasons for not wanting to pay money. This variability is likely to reflect people's attitudes toward paying for the public good change, their attitudes toward paying for public goods in general, and a component that is independent of these attitudes but unique to particular beliefs about paying (e.g. ‘I can't afford to pay’). Negative attitudes toward paying can contribute to an apparent insensitivity to different levels of the same public good. In a telephone survey, northern Wisconsin property owners were asked about their WTP for four environmental public goods (biodiversity, Indian spearfishing, water quality, and wolves) at two levels of scope (part and whole). For water quality and spearfishing, the part was a chain of lakes that was geographically nested within a larger region of lakes. Similarly, the biodiversity whole represented a region comprising the smaller level of the public good. The scope conditions for wolves were quantitatively nested levels of returning 300 and 800 wolves to northern Wisconsin. Respondents’ beliefs about paying for each public good and level of scope were measured in order to test their generality across the different public goods and levels of scope. Negative attitudes toward paying that are general across public goods place restrictions on the use of CV for environmental public goods. However, negative attitudes that are tied to specific environmental public goods suggest that the valuation method might be difficult to implement in these cases only. Moreover, negative attitudes toward paying that are either general or specific may contribute to perfect embedding when they are expressed across different levels of scope for the same public good. Respondents' beliefs about paying for each public good were associated with an attitude toward paying for the respective good and an attitude toward paying for public goods in general at both levels of scope. The general attitude was more explanatory of beliefs about paying for wolf reintroduction and spearfishing than were the specific attitudes. The distribution of beliefs was sensitive to the type of good being valued, but less so to the scope of the public good change. Contingent valuation practitioners should seek improvements in respondents' perceptions of the fairness of the valuation process in order to facilitate citizens' involvement in decisions about environmental public goods. Avenues for future research are proposed and discussed.     

On the Private Provision of Intertemporal Public Goods with Stock Effects

The provision of public goods is often hindered by a lack of powerful institutions that can sanction free riders or otherwise enforce private contributions to the public good. The simple deposit based solution introduced by Gerber and Wichardt (J Public Econ 93:429–439, 2009) solves this problem, but may require prohibitively large deposits, in particular in the context of intertemporal public goods. In this paper, we propose a modification of the deposit solution that relies only on comparably small deposits. The proposed modification improves the applicability of the procedure, most notably as it also allows to reduce deposits in static public goods problem by transforming them into dynamic ones with small per period contributions.