Management control in public sector Joint Ventures

Cooperation among public sector organizations (PSOs) is increasingly important in the management of resources in welfare systems. A Joint Venture (JV) is an organization form that enables PSOs to cooperate with each other in order to achieve economies of scale. However, JVs contain interrelated horizontal and vertical control relationships (between the owners and between the owners and the JV Company) that complicate their control. The first aim of this paper is to map the dynamics in vertical and horizontal control packages in municipal JVs and to describe the relational factors that affect them. Based on three case studies we conclude that vertical control packages are affected by: goodwill trust and competence trust; parent differences in management style and size in combination with control competence; parent diversification (low relatedness between the JV's activity and the parents’ other activities); and the horizontal control package (e.g., rules for parent interaction and distribution of work). Horizontal control packages are affected by: goodwill trust, system trust and calculative trust; parent differences in size; and efforts to achieve equality. The second aim of the paper is to contribute to the discussion on the relationship between trust and control. We observed that trust is potentially unaffected by the introduction of formal controls. We also found that trust has an inverted “crowding out” effect on control. A high ambition to maintain trust leads to underdeveloped formal controls. In addition, we found that the ambition to preserve trust may inhibit the realisation of economies of scale.     

Management control packages: a literature review and guidelines for public sector research

ABSTRACT

The effectiveness of a management control (MC) element, such as performance measurement, may depend on other MC elements, such as organizational values and training activities. This is why MC elements should be studied ‘as a package’, instead of as isolated elements. Although examining MC elements as a package has the potential to make significant contributions to ongoing debates, this approach is largely absent in the academic public sector management literature. This paper reviews the MC package literature, examines its implications for public sector research and practice, and aids future research by discussing research design choices and research directions.     

Hospital market structure and the behavior of not-for-profit hospitals

I exploit a change in hospital financial incentives to examine whether the behavior of private not-for-profit hospitals is systematically related to the share of nearby hospitals organized as for-profit firms. My findings demonstrate that not-for-profit hospitals in for-profit intensive areas are significantly more responsive to the change than their counterparts in areas served by few for-profit providers. Differences in financial constraints and other observable factors correlated with for-profit hospital penetration do not explain the heterogeneous response. The findings suggest that not-for-profit hospitals mimic the behavior of private for-profit providers when they actively compete with them.     

Management in the public domain

One of the challenging questions which confronts both academics and practitioners is whether there is a generic concept of management. One way of discovering whether management in public sector organisations has unique features is to examine the ways in which those organisations differ from private sector companies.     

Management control in an area of the NCB: Rationales of accounting practices in a public enterprise

This paper explores the rationales offered by participants for the accounting and management control practices in which they are involved. An analysis of these rationales emphasis four characteristics of current practices. Firstly, financial planning and control systems do not appear to be a dominant mode of organisational control for the organisation investigated, physical production planning appearing to be more important. Secondly, the parts of the whole organisation appear to be only loosely coupled, thereby insulating the various parts from each other, and from pressures for change. Thirdly, in such a context, accounting and information generally may be managed either (or both) to enhance ambiguity or to provide legitimacy in (and about) the organisation. The paper concludes, fourthly, by noting the pressures for change which appear to operate through the finance function, thereby enhancing that function's organisational role. The observations and analysis of the paper are based on an in-depth observational study of an Area (i.e. geographical division) of the National Coal Board, in the U.K., and on a detailed study of that organisation's history and environment.     

Hull House: An autopsy of not-for-profit financial accountability

Analyzing financial information for Hull House, an iconic not-for-profit organization, students are asked to explore the clues to its unfortunate demise. Hull House filed for bankruptcy in 2012 after 123 years of service to the Chicago community. Evaluating the reported financial data from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Forms 990, we seek to determine causes for this event and identify issues the board of trustees might have addressed in the years leading up to Hull House’s ruin that may have changed the outcome for this not-for-profit organization and its 60,000 clients. We also investigate the changing responsibilities of an organization’s leadership as it enters the “zone of insolvency.” This case requires real-life application of financial analysis to the not-for-profit accounting data provided by IRS Forms 990, which are publicly available on the website www.GuideStar.org.     

Innovation, public choice and public control in the market for health insurance.

Innovation, public choice and public control in the market for health insurance/benefits in the United States are largely dependent upon the ability of the various stakeholders to successfully argue their positions with legislators, regulators, providers, purchasers and third party beneficiaries. Given the public/private nature of health benefits, these relationships are examined in a Stigler/Posner/Peltzman public choice framework. Conflicts among various stakeholders and their ability to influence innovation in the market for health benefits are discussed.     

Internal control weaknesses and evidence of real activities manipulation

We examine whether US public firms that file internal control weakness (ICW) disclosure reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission, as part of the reporting requirements under Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act, exhibit higher levels of real activities manipulation (RM), compared to firms that do not file such reports. Using firm-level data for the post-SOX period, 2004–2010, we find a positive relationship between firms reporting internal control weaknesses and real activities manipulation. Further, those ICW-firms that use RM to beat earnings benchmarks have lower performance in the subsequent year. Our results also show that firms do not use discretionary accruals as a substitute for RM when they report internal control weaknesses. Overall, our findings suggest that ICW-firms are prone to using real activities manipulation as a form of earnings management. Our findings also have implications for audit quality as auditors need to gain a better understanding of how real activities manipulation influences the operations of the firm.     

Management quality,certification, and initial public offerings

We empirically examine the relationship between the quality and reputation of a firm's management and various aspects of its IPO and post-IPO performance, a relationship that has so far received little attention in the literature. We hypothesize that better and more reputable managers are able to convey the intrinsic value of their firm more credibly to outsiders, thereby reducing the information asymmetry facing their firm in the equity market. Therefore, IPOs of firms with higher management quality will be characterized by lower underpricing, greater institutional interest, more reputable underwriters, and smaller underwriting expenses. Further, if higher management quality is associated with lower heterogeneity in investor valuations, firms with better managers will have greater long-term stock returns. Finally, since better managers are likely to select better projects (having a larger NPV for any given scale) and implement them more ably, higher management quality will also be associated with larger IPO offer sizes and stronger post-IPO operating performance. We present evidence consistent with the above hypotheses.     

Auditing and accounting for program efficiency and management efficiency in not-for-profit entities

A measure of efficiency for not-for-profit entities - developed by the authors in association with Edward Rhodes - is explained and illustrated by data from Program Follow Through, a large scale social experiment in U.S. public school education. A division into Follow Through and Non-Follow Through participants facilitates a distinction between “program efficiency” and “managerial efficiency” which is also illustrated and examined for its use in evaluating such programs. Relations to comprehensive audits and other possible uses are explored.     

The impact of information technology on performance in the not-for-profit sector

The relation between IT usage and performance has been a central question in the AIS literature since the late 1990s. Empirical research has not yet examined whether organizational-level differences in how IT is used are associated with performance, nor whether the lagged performance effects found in for-profit settings carry over to a not-for-profit setting. Spending on information technology (IT) in K-12 schools has grown significantly in the U.S. over the past decade and performance in this sector has significant spillover effects in other sectors. This study examines the effects on performance of a change in how IT is used on a continuum from an automation role to an informating/transforming approach. A sample of over 6300 organizations (schools) having over 700,000 students in grades 3, 8 and 11 is examined. Both short-term (year-over-year) and longer-term (four-year) performance effects are investigated. We find that a change in how IT is used is associated with an increase in performance in two of the three school levels, and that these mean effects are comparable in magnitude to those found for IT spending in for-profit settings. These effects only become positive after four years, and vary across school level. This is the first study to provide large sample evidence of the performance effect of a change in how IT is used at the organizational level. This has significant implications for research investigating the effects of investments in IT on organizational performance and for stakeholders including policy makers, managers, legislators and taxpayers.     

The relationship between supplier control and competition in public sector outsourcing

The aim of this article is to develop theory and contribute to empirical studies about how the effectiveness of bureaucratic controls in public sector outsourcing is contingent upon supplier competition, and why and how this interaction plays out differently for hard and soft types of outsourced services. In previous inter‐organizational management control (IOMC) research there is a contradiction between theory and empirical results concerning how bureaucratic control and supplier competition interacts in aligning suppliers. While IOMC theory suggests competition reduces the need for bureaucratic control, empirical studies clearly indicate the opposite. We extend previous research and theorizing by differing between the outsourcing of hard and soft types of services and by testing the joint effect of bureaucratic control and competition on supplier alignment. The empirical case for testing theory is outsourcing by competitive tendering in the public sector. We use transaction level data from 166 local government suppliers in Sweden. In accordance with our prediction, the effect of bureaucratic control in aligning suppliers decreases with supplier competition when hard types of services are outsourced. For soft types of services, our results indicate that bureaucratic control is not contingent upon supplier competition. Furthermore, we show that when supplier competition is low the effect of bureaucratic control on supplier alignment is stronger for hard than for soft types of services. These results constitute an important contribution to the central notion of the interplay between bureaucratic control and competition in the IOMC literature.     

Accounting control,governance and anti-corruption initiatives in public sector organisations

This special issue focuses on the interactions between accounting, public sector organisations and the socio-economic and political environments in which they operate, with a specific focus on the critical analysis of policy and practice in the fight against corruption. The aim of the special issue is to disseminate knowledge to enable a more sustainable, accountable and less corrupt public sector, regardless of where it is located in the world. It presents the work of a global community of scholars engaged in research projects on policies and strategies related to accountability, transparency, auditing, regulatory disclosure, governance, investor protection and anti-corruption initiatives in public sector organisations. The papers presented here address many different angles of corruption and aspects of the way in which it is reported using a broad range of methodologies, theoretical frameworks and research locations. Collectively, these papers demonstrate that more attention needs be given to investigating the human cost associated with illegal activity that leads to human suffering, inequality, and lifetime costs. They further emphasise that we have much to learn about regulatory disclosure and jurisprudential practice in the fight against fraud and corruption.     

Revenue growth in not-for-profit organisations: The effects of interactive and diagnostic controls and organisational culture

Using survey and archival data for 180 not-for-profit aged care organisations, we find that interactive use of performance measurement systems positively affects the organisations’ revenue growth, while the diagnostic use negatively affects revenue growth. We also find that organisational culture, specifically attention to detail, innovation and respect for people, moderates these effects. Our findings have implications for the literature in terms of understanding the combinatorial effects of formal management control and culture on organisational performance. The findings also have practical implications for designing performance measurement systems and developing organisational cultures, to create an internal environment effective in enabling revenue growth.     

Management control systems and strategy change in buyouts

The impact of management buy-outs (MBO) on strategy and management control systems (MCS) is little understood. Previous research by [Ace. Org. Soc. 17 (1992) 151] focused on efficiency-enhancing buy-outs that were a feature of the early development of the market. However, MBOs are heterogeneous and more recent developments have involved ownership changes that stimulate entrepreneurial practices. The novel contribution of this paper is to use Simons’ [Levers of Control: How Managers Use Innovative Control Systems to Drive Strategic Renewal, Harvard Business School, Cambridge, MA, USA] classification of beliefs systems, boundary systems, diagnostic and interactive control systems to explore management control in these newer forms of MBO. Within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons from two buyout firms are used to capture the interaction between management control systems and competitive strategy formulation, implementation and modification. This evidence supports arguments that buy-out managers undertake efforts in balancing the traditional systems with the newer systems that stimulate opportunity-seeking and learning.     

Management control of complex,mission-critical processes

Because the failure of complex, mission-critical systems—such as certain process control and manufacturing operations—can be exceptionally costly to an organization, appropriate management control of these systems is imperative. This paper presents a theory of management control of complex systems that is the potential basis for an intelligent DSS, which would be capable of supporting human agents monitoring complex systems. The theory is derived from field studies of agent decision making under procedural guidance, and it focuses on the most crucial—and interesting—aspect of agent behavior, i.e. the decision to deviate from a procedure when the procedure is considered detrimental to the achievement of organizational goals. The theory is instantiated in a computer model of the agents' decision processes. The computer model in turn embeds a simulation of the agents' situation and goal assessment processes that produce procedural non-compliance. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.